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ABSTRACT 
Credit  ratings  have  become  a  widely  accepted  measure  of  firms’  creditworthiness  in 
financial  markets.  Despite  the  significant  growth  of  rating  agencies,  with  a  continuous 
reliance  on  credit  ratings  by  regulators,  investors  and  firms,  prior  academic  literature 
generally tends to underestimate the relevance of credit ratings in firms’ financial decision-
making. This thesis, therefore, provides a comprehensive analysis, which aims to examine 
the impact of external credit ratings on the financial structure decision-making of UK firms. 
The thesis has three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter examines whether there 
are any systematic differences in firms’ levels of leverage across the rating levels which 
would suggest that the cost and benefits of credit ratings are material for such firms. The 
study finds that credit ratings are an important determinant of the capital structures of firms 
and that there is a strong non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between credit ratings 
and capital structures. It is noted that rated firms have higher leverage than non-rated firms, 
but within the rated firms, leverage varies across the rating levels. High and low rated firms 
are found to have low leverage in their capital structures, and mid rated firms generally have 
higher leverage. Low gearing ratios may suggest that such firms have higher incentive to 
maintain their current ratings or to achieve upgrades, given the cost and benefits offered by 
credit ratings, than firms with high gearing ratios.  
The second empirical chapter investigates whether costs and benefits of credit ratings are 
material enough for potential and actual credit ratings changes to matter in the financial 
decision making of the firms. It does not appear from the empirical evidence that marginal 
changes in credit ratings possibly impose any serious costs on the rated UK firms. Whether 
credit ratings changes are potential or actual, they do not lead firms to follow any specific 
pattern with regards to their capital structure, which would suggest that firms are concerned 
about the marginal rating changes. Within the rating scale, however, some differences are 
noted among high and low rated firms. High (low) rated firms tend to issue (reduce) debt 
when they have a higher likelihood of upgrades. Similarly, high rated firms issue debt when 
they are actually upgraded or downgraded, while low rated firms are found only to reduce 
debt  when  they  are  upgraded  indicating  their  efforts  towards  maintaining  or  achieving 
higher credit ratings.  
The third empirical chapter examines the influence of credit ratings on the debt maturity 
structure of UK firms by testing Diamond’s (1991) liquidity hypothesis. Consistent with the      
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predictions,  the  results  indicate  that  firms’  debt  maturity  structures  are  significantly 
influenced by their levels of refinancing risk, and that this refinancing risk induces a strong 
non-linear relationship between credit ratings and debt maturity structures. It appears that 
high rated firms possibly have low levels of refinancing risk, which allows them to select 
debt with short maturity. Low rated and non-rated firms are also found to have shorter debt 
maturities, despite being exposed to high levels of refinancing risk. It appears that these 
firms may have constrained access to long-term debt markets and, therefore, they have to 
rely mostly on short-term debt. Mid rated firms, however, have more long-term debt, which 
appears to be due to their better access to debt markets as well as their exposure to some 
degree of refinancing risk.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
The  importance  of  credit  rating  agencies  has  increased  significantly  over  time  with 
increased  dependency  of  regulatory  bodies,  investors  and  firms  on  their  output,  credit 
ratings. Despite the increased reliance on credit ratings by market participants, credit ratings 
are mostly  understood as  an outcome of  financial  decisions.  However,  recent  academic 
research has emphasized that the output of credit rating agencies can also influence the 
financial decision-making of firms. In this regard, this thesis is an attempt to explore the 
impact of credit ratings on the financial decisions of firms, by specifically investigating 
non-financial listed UK firms over the period 1988-2009.  
To examine the influence of credit ratings on financial structures, the thesis is divided into 
three empirical chapters, each of which analyses a distinct but interrelated dimension of the 
relationship  between  the  two.  The  first  empirical  chapter  (Chapter  6)  investigates  the 
influence of levels of credit ratings on the capital structures of firms. It examines whether 
the costs and benefits of different rating levels as suggested by the credit rating – capital 
structure hypothesis (CR-CS), are sufficiently material for the firms to induce a non-linear 
relationship between their levels of ratings and leverage. It tests whether high and low rated 
firms, which arguably would be more careful about their credit ratings than mid rated firms, 
have lower levels of leverage compared to their counterpart mid rated firms. The CR-CS 
hypothesis proposes that the costs and benefits of different credit ratings are material for 
firms and can significantly affect managerial financial decision-making (further discussion 
follows in Section 1.2 and Chapter 3) . The implications of the CR-CS hypothesis are also 
tested in the second empirical chapter (Chapter 7) to analyse the costs and benefits of credit 
ratings affect financing decisions in subsequent years. It is expected that if firms are careful 
about their credit ratings, they will pursue leverage reducing behaviour following potential 
and actual rating changes. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 8) provides more detail on 
capital structures by specifically analysing the debt maturity structures of firms. It examines 
whether  firms’  debt  maturity  structures  vary  with  their  levels  of  rating,  by  specifically 
testing the influence of refinancing risk. Refinancing risk is expected to induce a non-linear 
relationship between credit ratings and debt maturity structures (further discussion follows 
in Section 1.2 and Chapter 4).         
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The aim of the present chapter is to introduce the thesis and provides the context of this 
research. Section 1.1 presents the background and the rationale for conducting this study. 
Section 1.2 discusses the main reasons for choosing UK firms as a sample, and Section 1.3 
sets out the overall research questions and briefly reports the key findings of the thesis. 
Section  1.4  discusses  the  contributions  of  the  study.  Finally,  Section  1.5  provides  the 
organisation of the thesis and briefly presents the content within each of the chapters.  
1.1. Background and Rationale   
Capital structure remains one of the most well researched topics in finance literature, where 
several  key  aspects  of  the  subject  have  already  been  explored.  Since  Modigliani  and 
Miller’s (1958) seminal study proposing capital structure irrelevancy, a rich theoretical and 
empirical  literature  have  emerged  challenging  the  underlying  assumptions  underpinning 
their  proposition.  It  was  argued  that  the  set  of  assumptions  including  presumed 
homogeneity  of  firms,  a  perfect  substitution  of  internal  and  external  financing  and 
unrestricted access to any type of financing, were extremely restrictive, and that the capital 
structure  irrelevance  seemed  to  be  highly  dependent  on  these  assumptions.  Subsequent 
studies, therefore, sought to determine the sensitivities of firms’ valuation with different 
financing mixes when these assumptions were relaxed. To date, thus, several theories have 
been advanced to explain the relevance of capital structure, including tax related theories 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Miller, 1977; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), static trade-off 
theories  (Kraus  and  Litzenberger,  1973;  Scott, 1976;  Kim,  1978),  pecking  order  theory 
(Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) and agency cost theories (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976;  Jensen,  1986),  all  of  which  directly  conflict  with  the  underlying  assumptions  of 
Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance proposition. 
Based on the theoretical predictions, empirical studies examining the capital structure of 
firms  have  also  been  able  to  successfully  unearth  some  stylized  facts  about  the  capital 
structure.  The  most  prominent  factor  emerging  from  the  studies  could  generally  be 
synthesised either into the trade-off theory or into the pecking order theory (i.e., the size of 
a firm, its growth opportunities and profitability, etc). However, in recent years there has 
been a growing recognition that such theories do not fully explain the behaviour of firms 
regarding their financial structure decisions. For example, Graham (2000) finds that most 
low risk firms paradoxically prefer low levels of gearing, despite the fact that such firms can 
easily access debt markets, without aggravating the potential bankruptcy risk. Also, in a      
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survey study of 392 US CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) show that none of the factors 
proposed by the traditional theories of capital structure, including profitability, taxes and 
costs of financial distress, are among the most important factors when financial decisions 
are made. Similarly, Brounen et al.’s (2004) and Bancel and Mittoo’s (2004) survey studies 
on the European firms show that the relevance of the factors proposed by these traditional 
theories has been superseded by other determining factors which could potentially have 
different implications for the capital structure of the firms. Among this set of factors, the 
credit ratings of respective firms were found to be one of the most important concerns when 
firms make their capital structure decisions.      
Credit  ratings  have  become  a  widely  accepted  measure  of  creditworthiness  for  firms, 
investors  and  regulators,  due  to  the  increased  complexities  of  financial  markets  and 
diversity of the borrowers and lenders (Cantor and Packer, 1994). Rating agencies play a 
vital role in the capital markets and are influential in altering and shaping the perceptions of 
market  participants.  They,  by  rating  a  wide  range  of  borrowers  and  several  types  of 
instruments over the period, have established credit standards in the market, which have 
received regulatory attention in several countries as well (Pinto, 2006). The clients of these 
rating agencies, i.e., large and creditworthy firms, incur considerable costs in acquiring and 
maintaining their rating status and often even acquire ratings from more than one rating 
agency  (Claes  et  al.,  2002).  Credit  ratings  are  clearly  providing  such  firms  with  some 
additional benefits, which are deemed by the firms to be worth the large cost of acquiring 
and  maintaining  credit  ratings.  Moreover,  credit  ratings  are  also  an  important  part  of 
investment decisions of institutional investors. For example, Cantor et al. (2007) state that 
86% of fund managers explicitly use ratings in their investment guidelines. 
Despite continuous reliance on rating agencies by regulators, investors and firms along with 
the  significant  growth  of  rating  agencies  globally,  academic  studies  generally  tend  to 
underestimate the relevance of credit ratings for firms’ financial structure decision-making. 
Specifically, after the recent financial crisis of 2008, it becomes imperative to investigate 
the role and significance of their output for the firms’ financing decisions to  assess the 
importance  of  credit  rating  agencies  in  the  financial  markets.  With  the  underlying 
assumption that credit ratings are not just an output of the financial decisions, this study 
specifically  explores  the  relevance  of  credit  ratings  for  the  financial  structure  decision-
making by the UK firms.       
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With the implicit assumption that capital structure is always a function of the demand-side 
factors only, prior studies have largely concentrated on firm-level characteristics such as 
profitability, size, and growth opportunities, towards determination of the capital structure 
(Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). Prior studies generally assume that the supply of funds is 
infinitely elastic at the correct price and time, whenever the firms require. For example, the 
trade-off theory suggests that the leverage of a firm is dependent on the trade-off between 
the benefits of debt (e.g., tax shields gained from issuing additional debt) and the cost of 
debt (e.g., potential bankruptcy costs). However, the supply of funds can be equally or very 
important in the determination of leverage and its components. Their significance was also 
highlighted during the recent financial crisis, where banks and financial institutions were 
cutting back on their lending and refinancing, causing severe financial difficulties for firms 
(Sakoui, 2010).  
Due to the nature of credit ratings, it is also argued to represent the supply-side factors for 
determining  the  firms’  financial  structure  (Judge  and  Mateus,  2009;  Faulkender  and 
Petersen, 2006; Mittoo and Zhang, 2010). Credit ratings can offer several benefits to firms, 
including correct pricing of securities, flexibility, and widening their investor base, which 
reduces  reliance  on  typical  sources  of  funding  such  as  bank  debt  (Judge  and 
Korzhenitskaya, 2011). Chave and Puranandam (2011) also argue that rated firms suffer 
less in terms of raising capital in adverse conditions such as the recent financial crisis. A 
recent survey study by Bacon et al. (2009) of 43 senior treasury professionals from non-
financial UK firms, indicates that ratings have become more important during the recent 
crisis,  while  the  firms  without  ratings  sought  to  obtain  them  during  this  period.  This 
suggests  that  the  credit  ratings  could  possibly  be  an  important  supply-side  factor  and 
necessitates  further  exploration of  how this  factor can be influential  in  determining the 
financial structure of firms. 
Previous  studies  exploring  the  relationship  between  credit  ratings  and  capital  structure 
present a very restrictive view of the relationship. For example, studies on capital structure 
have established that credit ratings play a significant role for the firms in facilitating the 
access to debt markets (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Judge and Mateus, 2009; Mittoo 
and Zhang, 2010; Judge and Korzhenitskaya, 2011). These studies have found that rated 
firms have higher leverage than non-rated firms because holding a credit rating minimises 
information asymmetry and the need for evaluation and monitoring by outsiders resulting in 
a lower overall cost of debt for such firms (for simplicity purposes, the hypothesis in this      
5 
 
study  is  termed  as  the  credit  rating  –  market  access  hypothesis  (CR-MA)).  With  the 
exception of Mittoo and Zhang (2010), an implicit assumption of these studies is that all 
rated firms have higher leverage, irrespective of their level of ratings.  
However, if the costs and benefits associated with different rating levels are material for 
firms, they are likely to have a different behaviour towards their capital structure at each 
level of rating. To understand whether firms vary in their capital structure at different levels 
of  rating,  the  present  study  incorporates  the  implication  of  the  credit  ratings  –  capital 
structure hypothesis (CR-CR) as developed and tested by Kisgen (2006). The hypothesis 
that ‘credit ratings are a material consideration in managers’ capital structure decisions 
due to the discrete costs (benefits) associated with different rating levels’ (Kisgen, 2006, 
p.1037) was originally tested to examine capital structure activities of US firms following 
potential credit rating changes (Kisgen, 2006) and actual rating changes (Kisgen, 2009). 
However, and as will be explained further, it can be argued that the hypothesis can also 
have implications for the relationship between firms’ levels of credit rating and their levels 
of debt. This study, therefore, tests the implications of the CR-CS hypothesis for the levels 
of debt, thereby, extending Kisgen’s (2006, 2009) studies. 
If the hypothesis holds, firms at different levels of ratings should have different concerns 
over the costs and benefits offered by their credit ratings. Specifically, high rated firms 
would have a higher incentive to maintain their credit ratings. High rated firms arguably 
enjoy certain financial and non-financial benefits of high credit ratings. Financial benefits 
may include lower cost of debt, financial flexibility, easier access to the commercial paper 
market and favourable terms and conditions in debt contracts while non-financial benefits 
can include employees’ loyalty, a good management reputation in the labour market and 
favourable terms and conditions in suppliers’ contracts. If these benefits are material for the 
high rated firms, they are likely to have low levels of gearing in their capital structure in 
order to maintain their current ratings.  
The low rated firms, on the other hand, are likely to have constrained access to debt market 
due to the high costs of capital (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994; Diamond, 1991) and restrictive 
covenants in their debt securities (Billet et al., 2007). Firms with lower ratings could also 
face  early  liquidation  in  the  event  of  credit  rating  deterioration  due  to  a  vicious  cycle 
created by their credit ratings. Although these firms are in a better position to raise debt, due 
to being rated, the costs associated with low ratings are likely to be higher than the benefits      
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of  raising  additional  leverage.  This  expectation  is  more  relevant  for  the  UK  market 
specifically due to the differences in the credit quality of the rated firms in addition to the 
creditor friendly bankruptcy code compared with other active users of credit ratings such as 
the US (Section 1.3 provides more discussion on these differences). Mid rated firms can be 
expected to have high levels of gearing due to their better access to debt markets and being 
cushioned from any serious consequences of any initial deterioration of their credit ratings. 
This study therefore adopts a different approach from the previous studies (Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2006; Judge and Mateus, 2009; Judge and Korzhenitskaya, 2011) to understand 
the  differences  between  non-rated  and  rated  firms,  by  examining  the  differences  in  the 
leverage between the rated firms as well. It also extends Mittoo and Zhang’s (2010) study, 
by suggesting that credit ratings are likely to have a non-linear relationship with the capital 
structure of the firms.      
The study also examines the impact of potential and actual credit rating changes on the 
capital  structure  activities  of  the  UK  firms.  Kisgen  (2006)  explicitly  states  that  capital 
structure research would benefit from the inclusion of credit ratings in their framework for 
correct inferences and depiction of firms’ behaviour towards their capital structures. Kisgen 
notes that potential rating changes lead to debt reducing behaviour, which he attributes to 
the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS). He argues that if the benefits and 
costs offered by credit ratings are material, the firms facing a potential rating change would 
choose  to  reduce  their  leverage  to  get  an  upgrade  or  prevent  a  likely  downgrade.  In  a 
following  study,  Kisgen  (2009)  finds  that  downgraded  firms  continue  to  reduce  their 
leverage in the likelihood of regaining their target ratings or to prevent them from further 
downgrade. Upgraded firms are, however, not likely to make any significant change in their 
capital structure since being upgraded itself is beneficial for a firm in terms of its cost of 
capital and standing among other rated firms.  
Kisgen (2006, 2009) tests these above predictions for the US market, which is characterised 
as a developed bond market where credit rating agencies have been in place for over a 
century, with several regulations tied up with the credit ratings of firms or securities (see 
Langohr and Langohr, 2008). The history of rating agencies together with the growing need 
for credit ratings arguably influences the type of firms which acquire credit ratings, the level 
of regulatory dependence and perceptions of investors and management. However, as will 
be  discussed  in  more  detail  below,  the  UK  market  is  characterised  by  a  relatively  less 
developed bond market, a shorter history of rating agencies, and almost no explicit reliance      
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on credit ratings by the regulatory authorities. Such dissimilarities are substantial enough to 
warrant  a  separate  empirical  investigation  as  this  poses  an  interesting  question,  as  to 
whether the sensitivities of firms would be similar across the UK market. It is expected that 
such differences would make UK firms relatively less sensitive to rating changes than firms 
in the US market (further discussion follows in Section 1.2).  
The study also extends the capital structure analysis by examining the relationship between 
credit ratings and debt maturity structures. Survey studies by Graham and Harvey (2001) 
and  Bancel  and  Mittoo  (2004),  on  US  and  European  firms  respectively,  indicate  that 
refinancing risk is the second most important concern when firms make their debt maturity 
structure decisions.
1 Specifically for UK firms, Brounen  et al. (2006) find that maturity 
matching of assets remains the foremost factor while refinancing risk stands as the second 
most  important  driver  when  firms  choose  between  long  and  short-term  debt.  Previous 
empirical studies on the UK market by Ozkan (2000, 2002), Fan et al. (2011) and Antoniou 
et  al.  (2006)  have  ignored  the  possibility  that  refinancing  risk  could  be  an  important 
determinant of debt maturity structures. Therefore, the present study aims to explore the 
influence of refinancing risk by empirically testing Diamond’s (1991) liquidity hypothesis 
for the UK firms.  
Diamond’s liquidity hypothesis is based on credit quality or credit  ratings, which could 
serve as a proxy for refinancing risk. Diamond argues that refinancing risk is less likely to 
be a concern for high rated firms as their superior credit quality warrants easy refinancing of 
debt at the time of maturity. High rated firms may be confident that they are able to rollover 
the debt into the next period, possibly at a lower borrowing cost, and they can therefore be 
expected to have short maturity in their debt structure. Contrary to high rated firms, low 
rated firms are exposed to higher refinancing risk. However, they are argued to have less 
access to long-term debt markets due to their potential inability to meet their obligations in 
the long run, when they come due. Therefore, they are expected to rely on directly placed 
short-term debt. Diamond argues that mid rated firms are more likely to issue long-term 
debt due to relatively easier access to long-term debt markets compared with low rated 
firms, but they also simultaneously face higher refinancing risk than high rated firms.  
                                                 
1 Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) find that maturity matching of assets is the most 
important concern.      
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The previous studies directly testing Diamond’s liquidity hypothesis have mainly examined 
US firms (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996) and to date no UK study has 
tested the implications of refinancing risk for the UK firms’ debt maturity structures. This 
study,  therefore,  empirically  examines  the  relationship  between  credit  ratings  and  debt 
maturity structures of UK firms that will shed light on the relevance of refinancing risk for 
firms’ debt maturity structures. 
1.2.  Reasons for Selecting the UK as a Sample Country 
Besides the fact that there is a lack of academic literature on the subject from the UK 
market, the institutional setup of the UK also provides a rich and unique setting. The UK 
firms are among the largest users of credit ratings in the world, with Hanafin (2007) finding 
82% of FTSE 100 firms. They are also the third largest users of Standard and Poor’s credit 
ratings after the US and Canada (Standard and Poor's, 2010c). It can also be noted that the 
FSA  and  the  European  Commission  are  actively  pursuing  measures  to  improve  the 
functionality  of  credit  rating  agencies  within  Europe  (see,  for  example,  European 
Commission, 2011) which could possibly further increase the use of rating services.  
Moreover, since deregulation in mid 1980s, there has been a shift in the level and diversity 
of the sources of borrowing of UK firms, where traditional reliance on bank loans and 
equity financing as their main sources of financing was gradually replaced by the use of 
bonded debt (Rudin, 1991). Specifically after the recent financial crisis of 2008, there has 
been a structural shift in the way in which UK firms finance themselves. Sakoui (2010) 
reports that UK financial institutions have reduced their lending to firms by £59.1bn since 
2008, while over the same period corporate bond issuance by UK firms has increased by 
£22.2bn.  The  increase  in  the  use  of  public  bonds  could  arguably  also  increase  the 
dependency on external rating agencies in the future. The current and potential widespread 
use of rating services in addition to the shifts in the sources of financing naturally makes the 
UK an important sample country for the study. The inferences drawn from the study would 
be useful for future studies, specifically following the financial crisis, conducted on the 
subject.  
Another important reason to study the UK market is the state of development of the rating 
agencies and its effect on the distribution of the rated firms. Despite the increased use of 
rating services in the UK market, credit rating agencies do not have a very long history in      
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the UK market. Compared to the US market, where the rating agencies originated and have 
a history of over a century, the operations of the rating agencies in the UK market can be 
traced back to the mid 1980s when rating agencies started their operations in the UK.
2 The 
short  history  of  these  institutions  in  the  UK  market  has  plausibly  resulted  in  large 
differences in the quality of rated firms compared with the US. For example, European 
Commission data shows that speculative grade issuers make up less than 10% of the total 
rated firms in  the  European market, where the UK is the largest user of credit ratings  
(Standard and Poor's, 2010a), compared to more than 40% in the US market (Batten  et al., 
2004). The sample of the present study also shows that investment grade firms, being 87% 
of the total rated firms, dominate the sample.  
It can be argued that a self-selection bias most likely leads large and creditworthy firms to 
acquire credit ratings in the UK market, while in the US market it is common for the mid-
sized firms which presumably have lower ratings also to possess a rating (Batten et al., 
2004). This skewed distribution of credit ratings can have meaningful implications for the 
relationship between credit ratings and capital structures, where it can be expected that low 
rated firms would be relatively more careful about their credit ratings compared with high 
rated firms. Low rated firms are arguably more at a risk of downgrade compared to high 
rated firms and while they are fewer in the market, can easily be identified as firms with 
inferior quality, which may impose certain financial and non-financial costs. Shivdasani and 
Zenner (2005), arguing along the same lines, state that low rated firms would be more 
careful about their credit ratings as debt issuance behaviour could be expected to have more 
serious implications for their future cost of borrowing and their credit ratings than high 
rated firms. Thus, it can be expected that low rated UK firms will have less leverage in their 
capital structure and will be less inclined to leverage issuance behavior.   
While there is no clear evidence of the type of rating firms acquire due to the stage of 
development of the bond market and credit rating agencies, it can be expected that the US 
market would have a relatively higher proportion of unsolicited ratings compared to the UK 
market.
3  Studies find that unsolicited  ratings are generally lower than solicited ratings 
                                                 
2 Standard and Poor’s opened its London office in 1984 to start its operations in the European Market and the 
first available UK rated firm-year by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s in the data collected is 1989.  
3 An anecdotal enquiry via a telephone conversation with S&P customer services suggested that most of the 
UK firms rated by S&P have solicited ratings. Moreover, unsolicited ratings are labelled ‘pi’ by S&P (Poon, 
2003). The sample of the present study does not indicate any presence of firms with unsolicited ratings.      
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(Poon, 2003) and that the ratings actually improve when firms acquire solicited ratings.
4 
Firms with solicited ratings are also found to be more liquid, more profitable and to have 
lower leverage than their counterpart firms with unsolicited ratings (Poon and Chan, 2010). 
Moreover, solicited rated firms have also a chance to discuss their ratings and present their 
case to the rating agencies in case they do not agree with the decisions of the agencies. If 
the above is true, one can expect that the firms with unsolicited ratings (i.e., US firms), will 
be more concerned for the possible changes in their ratings and the sensitivities of reactions 
to rating changes would be higher for firms with unsolicited ratings compared to firms with 
solicited ratings (such as UK firms).  
Another  important  distinction  between  the  UK  market  and  most  developed  markets 
including the US and France is the limited regulatory dependence on credit rating agencies. 
Despite being a high user of rating services, with the exception of the Capital Requirement 
Directive (CRD) 2006 (see Langhor and Langhor, 2008), the UK market does not have any 
explicit regulatory reliance on credit ratings. By using credit ratings as a regulatory tool, the 
regulators alter the behaviour and perception of market participants including issuers, 
investors and the rating agencies themselves (Baklanova, 2009). Firms operating within a 
market, which actively makes use of ratings in its regulatory structure, would be likely to be 
more careful about rating changes to meet the thresholds of certain regulations than the 
markets  where  the  regulations  are  not  dependent  on  such  standards.  Moreover,  the 
dependence on the regulations can affect the cost of borrowing as minor changes in ratings 
can induce forced selling by institutional investors. If this is the case, the cost of borrowing 
of firms can change with changes in credit ratings irrespective of whether there are any 
changes in the underlying quality of firms. Thi s  might  suggest that firms operating in 
countries with less regulatory dependence on credit ratings,  e.g., UK firms, may be less 
sensitive to credit ratings changes than firms operating in markets with high regulatory 
dependence, e.g., the US market.  
The US and UK market also differ with respect to their bankruptcy codes (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Beattie  et al., 2006), which are likely to influence the behaviour of low 
rated firms towards their capital structure. The UK bankruptcy laws are strict in terms of 
enforcing creditor’s rights. A creditor friendly bankruptcy code and a strict enforcement of 
creditors rights may theoretically encourage lending by creditors due to better creditors’ 
                                                 
4 Credit ratings that are initiated and paid for by the issuer are called solicited ratings while unsolicited ratings 
are issued at the request of parties other than the issuing firm (Poon, 2003).       
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protection.  However,  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  subject  is  quiet  contradictory.  For 
example, Acharya et al. (2011) note that creditors’ rights have adverse effect on financing 
behaviour of firms; firms operating in countries with strong creditors’ right protection have 
lower leverage and vice verse. Therefore, from the firms’ point of view, a stricter creditors’ 
code may limit the use of external debt by firms. If this is the case, it can have more serious 
implications for the low rated UK firms as credit ratings can reinforce a vicious cycle for 
such firms. This means that low ratings and any subsequent change in their ratings will 
affect the borrowing capacity, covenants of debt securities and financial flexibility of firms 
resulting in a possible further downgrade of credit ratings. Since market participants believe 
in the validity of credit ratings, one can expect that the low rated UK firms will be more 
cautious about their ratings and as a result will follow a more conservative debt policy. 
Most of the studies on the determinants of firms’ debt maturity structures, specifically those 
incorporating the effects of refinancing risk, are concentrated on the US market. Analyzing 
the  UK  firms’  debt  maturity  structures  also  requires  paying  particular  attention  to  the 
prominent differences in firms’ debt maturity structures in both countries. Firms in the UK 
rely more on debt which is to mature in less than one year compared to their US counterpart 
firms (Marchica, 2008). Marchica (2008) reports that the median percentage of debt due 
within one year for small firms is 72% compared to 3% for small US firms. Similarly, for 
the large firms, the median short-term debt ratio is 34% while it is only 3% for large US 
firms. Given these differences, the study is expected to provide in-depth evidence as to 
whether refinancing risk would have similar implications for firms in the UK market, where 
firms rely mostly on short-term debt, compared to other markets. 
1.3.  Research Questions and Key Empirical Findings 
As stated earlier, until recently, studies examining the financial structure of firms, have 
generally ignored credit ratings as one of the determinants of debt structure despite the 
rapid  growth of rating agencies as  a strong financial intermediary, both  within the US, 
European  and  the  UK  markets.  The  present  study  is  thus  one  of  the  first  studies  that 
systematically  and  thoroughly  investigates  the  relationship  between  credit  ratings  and 
financial structures of firms. Apart from the fact that there is a serious lack of academic 
literature on the topic for the UK market, the discussion in the previous section highlights 
that the UK market presents an interesting and unique setting in which to analyse the issue 
in more detail. In this regard the main research question of the thesis is:      
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  Do credit ratings affect the financial structures of UK listed firms?  
To  operationalise  the  main  research  question,  four  specific  research  questions  will  be 
investigated:  
1.  Is there any relationship between the level of ratings and capital structure of the UK 
firms?  
The study aims to explore that if rated firms have higher leverage than non-rated firms as 
suggested by the credit rating – market access hypothesis (CR-MA), do concerns about the 
costs and benefits of ratings as predicted by the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis 
(CR-CS) alter the behaviour of firms at different rating levels? Specifically, the CR-CS 
hypothesis implies a conservative debt policy for high rated and low rated UK firms. This 
non-linear relationship is tested for a sample of non-listed UK firms over a period of 22 
years. This part of the thesis uses two main datasets to test the relationship: the first dataset 
contains only the 874 firm-years of rated firms, and the second dataset contains the whole 
sample of 38,800 firm-years of rated and non-rated firms. The study uses different coding 
schemes  for  credit  ratings,  different  measures  of  the  dependent  variable,  and  various 
estimation techniques to test the relationship. 
By estimating models specifically developed to examine the non-linear relationship between 
credit  ratings  and  capital  structure,  the  results  indicate  a  presence  of  a  strong  non-
monotonous inverted U-shaped relationship between the levels of ratings and the levels of 
debt. It is found that firms with high and low ratings have low amounts of debt in their 
capital structure while mid rated firms have high levels of debt. The low levels of leverage 
may indicate higher incentives of firms at both ends of the rating spectrum to maintain their 
current credit ratings and to prevent themselves from downgrades. Further, it is also noted 
that  non-rated  firms,  which  are  assumed  to  be  firms  with  low  creditworthiness  and 
constrained  access  to  debt  markets,  have  lower  leverage  than  rated  firms.  The  results 
indicate that they specifically have lower leverage than the lowest rated firms available in 
the sample, which may confirm the assumption made about their inferior access to debt 
markets.  
2.  If the cost and benefits imposed by downgrades and upgrades are material for UK 
firms, do they show any specific behaviour when they are faced with potential rating 
changes?       
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This sub-research question examines the implications of the credit rating- capital structure 
hypothesis (CR-CS) by specifically testing models developed by Kisgen (2006) to ascertain 
whether the results of the previous US study holds for the UK. By using a sample of 874 
rated  firm-years,  the  study  examines  whether  UK  firms  follow  a  pattern  of  leverage 
reducing behaviour when there is a proximity to a rating change. Due to the noticeable 
differences in the institutional settings of the UK and US markets, the present study, as a 
measure of robustness, specifically explores the behaviour of rated firms across the rating 
levels, towards their capital structures when they are faced with potential rating changes. 
The study also provides a decomposition analysis for components of capital structure, i.e., 
debt and equity issuance, and reduction activities, to examine the effects of potential rating 
changes on these components. Potential rating changes are measured by firms having either 
a ‘+’ or a ‘–’ sign with their credit ratings.  
The results do not demonstrate any specific pattern in leverage related decisions when firms 
are near rating changes thus suggesting that potential rating changes do not matter for firms 
when they make their financial structure decisions. The results suggest that modifiers (i.e., + 
or -) with credit ratings do not have any particular relevance for future adjustments in capital 
structures. However, when the impact of potential rating changes are examined across rating 
levels, high and low rated firms tend to behave differently. The results indicate that high 
rated UK firms increase leverage when they have a PLUS sign with their credit ratings, 
suggesting that these firms probably take advantage of their superior credit quality within 
the broad rating category. Conversely, low rated firms tend to reduce leverage when they 
have  a  PLUS  sign  indicating  that  for  low  rated  firms  upgrades  could  provide  material 
benefits and thus they strive to achieve upgrades when there is any likelihood of being 
upgraded.  
3.  Do  actual  credit  rating  changes  have  any  explanatory  power  for  the  UK  firms’ 
financial decisions?  
The analysis of potential rating changes is extended to incorporate the effects of actual 
rating changes on the capital structure activities. The implications of the credit rating – 
capital  structure  hypothesis  are  tested  by  examining  whether  firms  follow  a  pattern  of 
leverage reduction behaviour after they have been downgraded. They are expected to have 
no  significant  change  in  their  capital  structure  when  they  are  upgraded.  Similar  to  the 
analyses  of  potential  rating  changes,  extensive  analyses  are  carried  out  using  several      
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different model specifications and measurements of dependent variables to scrutinise the 
results of the main model.   
The  results  show  that  actual  rating  changes,  in  general,  influence  the  firms’  financial 
decisions in subsequent years, where upgraded firms tend to reduce debt while downgraded 
firms tend to issue more debt. It appears that upgraded firms possibly continue to reduce 
debt  once  they  have  been  upgraded,  while  downgraded  firms  continue  to  issue  debt. 
However, when the impact of rating changes is tested for different levels of ratings, the 
results demonstrate that only the low rated firms reduce debt when upgraded, while the high 
rated firms still issue more debt. The debt issuance behaviour of high rated firms, when they 
are upgraded or downgraded suggests that high rated firms possibly consider themselves 
sufficiently financially sound to issue more debt even after experiencing rating changes. 
From the debt issuance behaviour of high rated firms, it appears that rating changes do not 
impose any serious financial or non-financial costs on these firms. The leverage reduction 
pattern observed for low rated firms when upgraded suggests that for such firms low ratings 
are costly and achieving higher ratings could provide benefits worth the cost of reducing 
leverage.  
4.  Do credit ratings have any relevance for the firm’s debt maturity structure?  
Diamond’s (1991) theoretical framework, which underscores the importance of refinancing 
risk in the firms’ debt maturity structures, is tested for the UK firms. As argued in Section 
1.1 and as will be discussed further in Chapter 4, Diamond theorises that refinancing risk 
induces a non-linear relationship between credit ratings and debt maturity structures, where 
high and low rated firms are expected to have shorter maturity while mid rated firms are 
expected to have longer maturity. The study uses two datasets to test Diamond’s predictions: 
the whole sample of 23,974 rated and non-rated firm-years, and a separate sample of 571 
rated firm-years.  
The results of the model provide strong support for Diamond’s liquidity hypothesis. High 
rated UK firms are found to have short debt maturity, possibly due to the low refinancing 
risk they are exposed to. Low rated firms tend to have shorter debt maturity. It appears that 
low  rated  firms  have  restricted  access  to  debt  markets  due  to  their  perceived  potential 
inability to meet their long-term obligations. Consistent with Diamond’s prediction, mid 
rated firms have longer maturity in their capital structures, indicating their better access to      
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the long-term debt market relative to low rated firms, but also some exposure to refinancing 
risk. The results indicate that non-rated firms, similar to low rated firms, have also high 
levels of short-term debt. The findings indicate the possibility of non-rated firms having 
constrained access to long-term debt markets. The results are robust to different measures of 
credit ratings, model specifications and estimation techniques. 
1.4.  Contributions of the study 
 This thesis offers, for the first time, a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the relevance 
of  credit  ratings  for  the  financial  structure  of  UK  firms,  and  thus  makes  a  number  of 
contributions to finance literature in general, and to UK based studies in particular.  
This study is original in providing an in-depth examination of the leverage structures of the 
firms  and  in  recognising  the  significance  of  rating  levels  for  the  leverage  structures. 
Specifically, it has, for the first time, provided direct evidence that leverage varies across 
the levels of ratings due to the unique costs and benefits offered by credit ratings, even after 
controlling  for  the  factors  which  traditional  theories  propose.  The  examination  of  the 
relationship  between  levels  of  credit  ratings  and  leverage  not  only  acknowledges  the 
previous literature (Judge and Mateus, 2009; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Mittoo and 
Zhang, 2010) by suggesting that rated firms have higher leverage, but also extends these 
studies. While the past studies recognise that credit ratings are useful in accessing the debt 
market,  this  present  study tests  the implications  of the credit rating  – capital  structure 
hypothesis (CR-CS) for different levels within the rating scale. The joint implication of the 
above suggests a non-linear relationship between credit ratings and capital structures, which 
is novel and has never been examined before in any of the previous studies.  
Another  finding  of  this  study  is  also  interesting  and  important.  The  study  provides  a 
comprehensive analysis of the credit ratings – capital structure relationship, suggesting that 
credit ratings are important in general for UK firms in terms of their access to the debt 
markets. For the rated firms specifically, credit ratings are one of the important factors in 
determining  the  level  of  leverage  in  firms’  capital  structures.  This  indicates  that  the 
variables  proposed  by  traditional  theories  of  capital  structure  have  limited  explanatory 
power with regard to capital structures’ relation to credit ratings for this particular group. 
Also, the relationship of the factors proposed by traditional theories does not hold for this 
group of firms.       
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Moreover, this study provides direct evidence for the first time on potential and actual credit 
rating changes and their impact on financial decisions from a country which is unique in 
terms of its institutional settings. Compared to the US market, where the bond market and 
credit rating industry are developed and ratings are more widely accepted, a study of the UK 
market is an attempt to test whether the findings of the previous US studies hold elsewhere. 
Recognising the differences in the leverage behaviour across the rating levels, the models of 
Kisgen (2006 and 2009) are adjusted to incorporate such effects.  
While most of the previous studies note that capital structure determinants are similar across 
both the US and the UK (see for example Rajan and Zingales, 1995), the impact of credit 
ratings is likely to be different. In this regard, the findings of the study are also unique and 
important.  For  example,  unlike  US  firms,  the  rated  UK  firms  do  not  seem  to  be  very 
cautious about rating changes, whether these are potential or actual. Specifically, high rated 
firms present an interesting scenario. Unlike US firms, such firms issue more debt when 
they face potential or actual credit rating change. Such findings suggest that perceptions 
about the costs and benefits gained from credit ratings are different compared to those of 
their counterpart firms in the US. It seems that the acquisition of credit ratings is still mostly 
limited to highly creditworthy firms in the UK market and rating changes are not likely to 
impose any serious costs for these firms.    
In  addition,  unlike  prior  studies  on  UK  firms’  debt  maturity  structures,  which  have 
completely ignored the  relevance of refinancing risk in determinations of debt  maturity 
structure, the study also seeks to contribute to and complement the growing debt maturity 
structure literature by providing a comprehensive analysis in investigating this relationship. 
The study, for the first time, tests Diamond’s (1991) framework to explain variations among 
the debt maturity structures of UK firms. The empirical evidence on the determinants of 
debt maturity structures provides a comprehensive analysis with which to systematically 
examine the relevance of refinancing risk, as measured by credit ratings, for the maturity 
structures  of the firms.  The results  indicate that credit ratings  are among the  important 
determinants of rated firms’ debt maturity structures, and the level of refinancing risk faced 
by  different  rating  classes  alters  the  behaviour  of  firms  towards  their  debt  maturity 
structures.  
Kisgen (2006) stated that ‘future capital structure research would benefit from including 
credit ratings as part of the capital structure framework, both to ensure correct inferences      
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in capital structure empirical tests, and more generally, to obtain a more comprehensive 
depiction of capital structure behaviour’ (p.1069). The findings of this thesis, however, 
imply that the sensitivities of firms towards their credit ratings depend on many external 
factors, and such a conclusion has restricted implications for firms in other markets. For 
example, regulatory dependence on credit rating agencies and the history of rating agencies 
along with the type of firms acquiring credit ratings may influence the behaviour of firms 
towards their credit ratings in a particular market. Nevertheless, trends in the UK market 
suggest that credit ratings are important for accessing debt markets, but also that rating 
changes generally do not have any implications, as suggested by the CR-CS hypothesis, for 
capital structure decisions made in the subsequent periods.  
1.5.  Structure of the thesis 
The thesis has nine chapters.  
Chapter 1 has introduced the thesis by presenting the general background of the study, the 
motivation and justification for conducting the research and the broad research questions. 
Chapter 2 provides details of the general background of the rating agencies, their operations 
and their significance. It discusses how rating agencies have significantly developed over 
time and have become important global financial intermediaries. The chapter also presents 
an overview of the UK corporate debt market, its development and shifts in the financing 
pattern of UK firms  in  the past  few  years, and then discusses the role of credit rating 
agencies in the UK market.  
Chapter 3 reviews the general literature on capital structure.  It gives an account of the 
important theories of capital structure and presents the relevant empirical evidence. This is 
followed by a section devoted to discussing the limitations of the traditional theories of 
capital structure in fully explaining the behaviour of firms towards their capital structures 
and highlighting the implications of credit ratings and associated concerns for the capital 
structure decisions of the UK firms. The chapter also presents the workable hypotheses 
based on the theoretical and empirical framework.   
Chapter 4 reviews the theories of debt maturity structure and the empirical evidence related 
to those theories. It presents a review of Diamond’s 1991 theoretical framework and the      
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hypotheses based on it, to examine the relationship between credit ratings and debt maturity 
structures of UK firms.  
Chapter 5 discusses the methodology adopted in the present study. Specifically, it presents 
the data collection procedures, models and the variables for the three empirical chapters of 
the thesis, with discussion of the proxies and their justification.  
Chapter 6 investigates the relationship between the level of credit ratings and the leverage 
structure of the UK firms. Specifically, it presents the descriptive statistics of the sample 
used in the analysis, the empirical results of the models presented in Chapter 5 and the 
robustness checks performed to analyse the sensitivity of the results to alternative measures 
and estimation techniques.  
Chapter 7 empirically examines  the influence of credit rating  changes  on the financing 
decisions of the firms. The chapter has two parts, addressing the impact of potential changes 
in  the credit ratings  and the actual changes  in  the credit ratings  on the firms’ leverage 
related decision making.  
Chapter 8 investigates the impact of the credit ratings on the maturity structure of the UK 
firms. This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the sample, the regression results of 
the models proposed in Chapter 5, and outlines the robustness checks for verifying the 
results of the main model.  
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by summarising the key findings, discussing the 
limitations of the study and offers recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND THE UK’S FINANCING AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
2. Introduction 
Financial markets have changed substantially over time, with the development of innovative 
and complex financial instruments along with the expanding global activities of borrowers 
and lenders. This has increased the role of third parties such as credit rating agencies in 
potentially reducing any uncertainties arising thereof, and in facilitating issuers, investors 
and regulators in their local and global activities. To contextualise the present study, it is 
imperative  to  understand  precisely  what  credit  rating  agencies  are  and  why  they  are 
perceived to be an important component of any financial system. This chapter therefore 
discusses the background of the credit rating agencies and the specific role they play in the 
capital markets, both globally and in the UK. The focus is thus to establish how well the 
rating  agencies  have  established  themselves  as  key  players  in  the  financial  markets. 
Furthermore, the chapter also discusses changing trends in the UK corporate debt market 
and the simultaneous development of credit rating agencies, in order to set out the broader 
framework of the study.   
The chapter has three sections. Section 2.1 presents the general background of the rating 
agencies, presenting their history and development in the US and international markets. The 
section also offers some working definitions of credit ratings, their types, and then briefly 
discusses possible reasons for acquiring credit ratings by issuers. Section 2.2 focuses on the 
background  of  the  UK  corporate  debt  market  and  highlights  the  importance  of  rating 
agencies in the UK, their trends and development and finally Section 2.3 concludes the 
chapter.  
2.1.  General Background: Credit Rating Agencies and Credit Ratings  
This section briefly presents the historical development of rating agencies and evaluates 
their role in the financial markets. The section is divided into three subsections: Subsection 
2.1.1 presents how the rating agencies developed and expanded over time, Subsection 2.1.2 
explains  what  credit  ratings  are  and  discusses  different  types  of  credit  ratings,  and 
Subsection 2.1.3 assesses the use and importance of credit ratings in the financial markets.  
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2.1.1. Historical Development of Rating Agencies 
Credit rating agencies originated in the US market. While bond markets and capital markets 
had existed in the UK, the US and other parts of the world for over three centuries, and 
some markets were global for more than two centuries (Sylla, 2002), the emergence of 
formal credit rating agencies dates back over a century. The key feature of these credit 
rating agencies, i.e., the appraisal of creditworthiness is, however, not a modern concept. 
This is, and was, routine in all lending and borrowing activities for a long time, specifically 
in  banks  for their loan  business  (Sinclair, 2005). Other small institutions  also  provided 
financial  information  regarding  firms.  However,  in  the  early  20
th  century,  due  to  the 
expansion of financial activities  in  the US  and  globally,  apart from  investors,  financial 
regulators were also demanding wider disclosure in terms of firms’ financial standings. 
Moody’s, recognising the need, formed the first formal rating agency in 1909 (Sinclair, 
2005). Following Moody’s, Standard Statistics Company and Fitch Publishing Company 
also emerged in this period.  
Since their inception, credit rating agencies gradually became an important intermediary 
specialising in the provision of reliable appraisals of the creditworthiness of the firms and 
countries. Due to the desired attributes and general acceptability of credit rating agencies 
within  the  financial  markets,  they  soon  gained  recognition  from  regulatory  bodies.  For 
example, in the 1930s,  for the first time, the US Treasury Department  and US Federal 
Reserve prohibited banks to hold securities below a certain quality threshold (Langohr and 
Langohr, 2008). Banks were forced solely to use the judgment of the ‘recognised rating 
manuals’ (White, 2010, p.213) which essentially represented the formal rating agencies. 
Regulatory  dependence  continued  in  the  US  market  and  important  criterions  were 
established based on the credit ratings supplied by the external agencies. Such dependencies 
continued to enhance the overall impression of the importance of the rating agencies among 
the market participants.   
Until the 1940s, rating agencies experienced a rapid growth in the US. The period from the 
1940s to the 1960s however, was characterized by slow growth
5 but they re-emerged in the 
mid 1970s and experienced  exploding growth up until the present day.  In 1975, for 
example, Partnoy (2002) states that only 600 new bond issues were rated. The Standard and 
                                                 
5 This may be attributable to stable economic conditions in the US market. In this phase, the US market was 
considered too safe for the rating agencies to matter (Langohr and Langohr, 2008).      
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Poor’s  agency  had  fewer  than  50  professional  employees.  However,  by  the  year  2000, 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s rated 20,000 public and private issuers in the US market 
with  $5 trillion  worth  of rated debt  outstanding. By 2011, statistics  from Standard and 
Poor’s show that there are approximately 4,300 people employed worldwide by Standard 
and Poor’s, dealing with US$32 trillion of rated debt and approximately 870,000 ratings 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2011) in more than 100 countries.
6 The compound annual growth rate 
of Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s revenues during 2002 to 2007 was also high at 17% 
and 14.5% respectively, indicating tremendous growth over the years. 
Though the early period from 1900 to 1930 saw the development of rating agencies in the 
US market, the period from 1970 to 2009 showed significant expansion of the credit rating 
agencies around the world. According to Caouette et al. (2008), in 1920, the proportion of 
international firms among the total rated firms by Moody’s was 6% which has risen to 
approximately 50% by 2006, with revenues earned from international operations increased 
to 49% of the total revenues of Moody’s. Studies generally cite four main reasons for the 
successful  expansion  of  rating  agencies,  within  the  US  and  globally.  Apart  from  the 
successful  track  record  of  the  credit  rating  agencies  (Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision, 2000), financial globalization (Langohr and Langohr, 2008) and the switching 
to an issuer-paying model by rating agencies (Packer and Cantor, 1994), the most argued 
reason is the widespread use of credit ratings in legislation and the endorsement of the US 
regulatory bodies (Partnoy, 1999, 2002).  The rating agencies capitalising on the reputation 
earned in the US market also successfully penetrated other markets.  Following the US, 
regulatory authorities around the world also outsourced several regulatory functions to the 
credit  rating  agencies,  thus  enhancing  their  scope,  the  dependence  upon  them,  and  the 
overall impression of credit rating agencies as a vital component of the financial system 
without any legal responsibility on the part of such intermediaries (Langohr and Langohr, 
2008).  
Although credit rating agencies have largely been successful in the past, they have always 
been  criticised  for  the  value  addition  of  the  information  they  provide  (Partnoy,  2001; 
Cantor, 2004; Amato and Furfine, 2004; Altman and Rijken, 2004), for errors of judgment 
(Covitz  and  Harrison,  2003;  Haan  and  Amtenbrink,  2011)  and  for  a  perceived  lack  of 
                                                 
6 As comparable statistics are not available from any reliable source, it is believed that Moody’s will have 
similar statistics due to their equal market share. White (2010) confirms that Moody’s and S&P have a 40% 
market share each while Fitch has a 15% share of the market.      
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objectivity and independence (Mathis et al., 2009; Partony, 2006; Frost, 2007). Specifically 
following the default of Enron in 2001 followed by the Worldcom collapse and the recent 
financial crisis of 2008, rating agencies have again been in the spotlight. They are blamed as 
major  culprits  of  the  current  crisis,  which  has  resulted  in  a  new  argument  from  the 
regulatory  bodies,  investors  and  academic  community  concerning  the  credibility  of  the 
rating agencies themselves in terms of their independence, transparency and accuracy.  
Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  criticisms  of  credit  rating  agencies  may  seem  valid,  the 
intermediary role they have played in the financial markets over the years should not be 
disregarded. This is evident from recent developments regarding the role of rating agencies 
and measures taken by regulatory authorities to improve their functioning. Following the 
recent crises, the regulatory bodies in the US, the EU and the rest of the world are still 
attempting to improve the functionality of rating agencies rather than condemning them 
altogether. For example, the Basel III accord up until now allows the use of credit ratings 
from external rating agencies (see for example Bank of International Settlements, 2010; 
Standard  and  Poor’s,  2010b,  for  more  details).  The  European  Commission  also 
acknowledges the role of rating agencies in the financial markets and has recently focused 
on measures to improve the functioning of rating agencies in terms of their competition, 
transparency and vigilance. Brooks (2011) also argues that rating agencies, following the 
financial crisis, are still dominant in financial markets and are as important as they were 
three years ago. 
The widespread recognition which these rating agencies have gained over time signifies the 
importance of these institutions in shaping the knowledge structure of the participants and 
community as a whole, whether they are investors, policy makers or issuing firms. It is not 
because credit ratings are necessarily accurate but for the reason that they are believed to 
come from an authoritative source of judgement (Sinclair, 2005). The opinion of credit 
rating agencies are respected by market participants and their actions correspond to such 
beliefs. Thus, it can be argued that market and debt-issuing firms have a strong incentive to 
consider credit ratings in their decision-making processes.   
2.1.2. Understanding Credit Ratings  
The term ‘credit rating’ does not have any single, definite definition or standard to describe 
it. Regulatory bodies and rating agencies define themselves in their own ways. For example,      
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Standard and Poor’s (2010b) defines a credit rating as ‘a forward-looking opinion about the 
creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a specific financial obligation, a specific 
class  of  financial  obligations,  or  a  specific  financial  program’  and  from  Moody’s 
perspective, ‘credit ratings are opinions of the credit quality of individual obligations or of 
an issuer’s general creditworthiness’ (Moody’s, 2009). While the definitions may seem 
similar, the underlying philosophy of the rating firms may differ. For example, Moody’s 
rate on the expected loss due to possible default while Standard and Poor’s issue ratings 
based on the probability of default (Bongaerts et al., 2012). However, the above definitions 
and the ones used commonly by regulatory bodies (see for example, Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act, 2006; European Union, 2006; US SEC, 2003), all have one thing in common; 
opinion. Credit rating agencies provide an opinion or more specifically a forward-looking 
predictive view on the firm’s ability to meet its obligations when they are due. The rating 
agencies explicitly express that their ratings reflect a relative risk of default and not an 
absolute one. Besides, these opinions are not with reference to any specific time horizon 
(Hovakimian et al., 2009). Despite the fact that the word opinion is explicitly stated by 
credit  rating  agencies,  they  are  actively  used  in  investors’  and  firms’  decision-making 
processes and form the basis of many regulations in different countries.  
Credit ratings are a set of alphabetic codes assigned in descending order according to the 
rising likelihood of default. They may also include numerical codes or symbols, depending 
on the rating agencies, to show the relative standing within each set of broad category of 
alphabetic codes. For example, Standard and Poor’s assigns alphabetic codes such as AAA, 
AA, A, BBB, BB and so on, with ‘+’ or ‘-’ modifiers (AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, 
BBB+, BBB, BBB- and so on) to show the respective creditworthiness within the broad 
rating category (See appendix 2A for the Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit ratings 
and their interpretation). Moody’s assign numerical modifiers (Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, 
A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 and so on) to the alphabetic codes (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa and so on). 
These ratings can be broadly assigned to the issuers or specific security issues of the issuers 
with (i.e., solicited ratings) or without (i.e., unsolicited ratings) a request from the issuer. 
Issuers’  and  issues’  ratings,  however,  are  argued  not  to  be  independent  of  each  other 
(Langohr and Langohr, 2008) and can change with or without the credit watch or the rating 
outlook (Wansley et al., 1992). Credit watch, also known as rating alerts and watch lists, 
gives a strong indication that the ratings will change in the near future. Rating agencies 
conclude decisions about the ratings within 90 days, if they have placed the firm or issue on      
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credit  watch  (Langohr  and  Langohr,  2008).  Ratings  outlooks  are  issued  to  add  more 
precision to the ratings. They also indicate the potential direction of rating over the next six 
months to two years. 
2.1.3. Evaluating the Need for Credit Ratings  
Credit rating agencies serve several important economic functions. It is argued by Millon 
and Thakor (1985), Beavera et al. (2006) and Tang (2009) that financial intermediaries such 
as credit rating agencies provide a more transparent view of the securities and firms which 
facilitate a minimisation of information asymmetry in the market place, leading to increased 
capital market efficiency (Beavera et al., 2006). The unique selling point of the credit rating 
agencies is their ability to gather all the public and private information, as argued by the 
rating agencies, and convey them to the market through letters  and symbols easily and 
quickly recognisable by market participants (Hovakimian et al. 2009). Specifically, when 
issuers have solicited credit ratings, rating agencies might have access to information not 
strategically disclosed by the firms to the market, and the agencies therefore serve as a 
channel to quantify the complete information picture into meaningful codes to transfer to 
users.
7 It is expected that this function of credit ratings results in the  correct pricing of 
securities, reduced transaction costs and quicker access to the debt markets for borrowe rs. 
Thus, rated firms are expected to attract a large pool of investors and to have better access 
to capital markets (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Mittoo
 and Zhang, 2010), and achieving 
financial  flexibility,  improved  bargaining  power  with  banks,  suppliers  and  other  non-
financial parties (Langohr and Langohr, 2008). Reducing information asymmetry is thus 
argued to be the principal function of rating agencies. One of the basic premises of the 
thesis revolves around this function of the credit ratings.  
Moreover, regulatory dependence on credit ratings can further motivate firms to acquire and 
maintain  good  ratings.  The  outsourcing  to  rating  agencies  by  regulatory  bodies  has 
increased the use of credit ratings, as several regulations allow certain grades of issuer or 
issue to qualify for institutional investment purposes. For example, every registered security 
in the US market requires a rating from NRSRO
8 if it is to be sold to institutional investors. 
                                                 
7 Empirical evidence concerning the function of credit rating agencies, as reducing information asymmetry, 
can mostly be seen in the studies which found significant market price reaction following rating change (see 
for example, Katz, 1974; Liu and Thakor, 1984; Ederington et al., 1987; Hand et al.,1992; Ederington and 
Goh, 1999; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Tang, 2009).  
8 NRSRO or Nationally Recognised Statistical Ratings Organizations are those rating agencies whose ratings 
qualify for the use of regulatory purposes in the US.        
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Initially, the information conveyed to the market through rating agencies was conceivably 
valuable  for  small  investors  with  limited  resources  and  unsophisticated  investors  for 
assessing the creditworthiness of the borrower (Beavera et al., 2006; Cantor and Parker, 
1994). However, they are now found to be widely used by banks, plans sponsors, fund 
managers,  and  trustees  in  the  US  and  Europe  who  require  a  standardized  form  of 
information  as  investment  guidelines  for  their  portfolio  management  (see,  Cantor  and 
Parker, 1994; Baker and Mansi, 2002). For example, Cantor (2004), through a survey study 
of 200 plan sponsors and investment managers in the US and Europe, finds that around 
three quarter of them actively use credit ratings to setup the minimum criterion for bond 
purchases. 
Finally, the most important reason for firms acquiring ratings could be the intention of the 
firms to be screened as good quality firms. The rating mechanism may be similar to the 
screening mechanism model presented by Stiglitz (1975). Firms pay fees to rating agencies 
to differentiate them from firms with inferior quality, thereby avoiding the ‘average quality 
pricing’  as  described  by  Akerlof  (1970)  and  Liu  and  Thakor  (1984).  These  firms,  by 
acquiring credit ratings, may become more visible and achieve more recognition, which 
results in better access to capital markets, specifically the international debt markets. For 
example, Perraudina and Taylor (2004) argue that, unlike domestic markets where firms can 
access financing through reputation, international markets may require a measure, which is 
more comprehensible and easily standardisable by the investor base. 
2.2.  The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in UK Capital Markets 
As  discussed  earlier,  due  to  the  changing  financial  environment,  rising  complexity  in 
financial products and services, and concern for more risk management, rating agencies 
have been successful in creating a niche in the global financial markets. Similar to other 
markets, the UK has also experienced a growth in the operations of credit rating agencies. 
This section provides background on the corporate debt markets of the UK and highlights 
the  role  of  rating  agencies  for  this  market.  This  section  is  further  divided  into  two 
subsections.  Section 2.2.1 offers  some details  on the corporate debt  market  in  the UK, 
suggesting some shifts in the trends of corporate financing patterns, while Section 2.2.2 
focuses  on  the  progression  and  advancements  of  credit  rating  agencies  in  UK  capital 
markets.      
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2.2.1. An overview of the UK Corporate Debt Market 
The  UK,  as  with  the  US,  has  a  market-oriented  financial  system  (Demirguc-Kunt  and 
Levine, 1999) where the liquidity and depth of the financial market provide the financial 
instruments required by the participants. After the deregulation of the financial sector in the 
1980s,  the  banking  sector  in  the  UK  experienced  tremendous  expansion.  For  example, 
Dimsdale and Prevezer (1994) state that bank lending rose from £55bn in 1979 to £414bn in 
1989, with the bank lending to GDP ratio rising from 32% to 89% in these ten years. This 
expansion was, however, limited to the personal sector, and the proportion of lending by the 
banks to the corporate sector started declining.
9 Deregulation of the global and UK financial 
sectors, along with the availability of innovative financial products, facilitated UK firms in 
accessing the securities markets, both locally and internationally. Such access offered lower 
borrowing costs compared to those available from the banks.  
As a result of the recession, interest rate spreads in that period were also high due to the bad 
debt provision of the banks. This further discouraged firms, specifically the large firms 
which could choose alternate sources of financing, from bank borrowing. Within a period of 
three years (1987-1990), bank borrowing as a proportion of the total liabilities of large firms 
declined by approximately 9%, while total liabilities increased from 26.6% to 46.8%  for 
such firms (Dimsdale and Prevezer, 1994). This period thus can be regarded as the one 
which triggered the flow of funds through the public debt market for the UK firms.  
The UK is considered a market -orientated economy similar to the US; the pattern of 
financing for the firms in the UK, however, differs from that of firms in the US market. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wald (1999) find that UK firms are typicall y less levered 
than the US firms but at the same time are more dependent on external financing. Yet the 
major source of external financing for UK firms is equity issuance and bank lending, unlike 
their US counterpart firms which rely more on the public debt market. However, in the past 
two decades there has been a shift in the sources of financings for UK firms, particularly the 
larger borrowers. They have now been actively issuing debt securities in the domestic and, 
particularly, in the international debt   markets. A report of the Bank for  International 
Settlements (2010) also shows an increasing trend of activity for the UK firms in the 
international debt securities market while the outstanding domestic debt securities have 
                                                 
9 This shift in the lending of banks was not just limited to the UK but was also seen around the world. It is 
estimated that commercial bank lending decreased from 37% of the total capital movement in 1970s to 14% in 
1980s (Sinclair, 2005).       
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remained constant over the past 15 years. The report indicates that the domestic debt market 
for non-financial firms is US $22bn. Conversely, UK corporate debt issuers in international 
markets  have  grown  considerably,  from  $35.34bn  in  1993  to  $300.115bn  in  2009,  an 
increase of approximately 750% in 16 years. The UK corporate sector is noted to be the 
third  largest  international  debt  securities  issuer  after  the  US  and  France  (Bank  for 
International  Settlements,  2010).  The  UK  firms  are  particularly  active  in  the  Eurobond 
market  where, despite being  second following  the  US in terms  of the  number of bond 
issues, the mean face value  of  debt  issued by  UK firms is  the largest among different 
countries, including the US, France and Germany (Claes et al., 2002). The UK domestic 
bond market, however, is dominated by UK government securities commonly known as 
Gilt-Edged  Securities  or  Gilts  (Roberts,  2008).  With  the  growth  of  public  debt  and 
international debt, the UK market also experienced a simultaneous growth in the credit 
rating  industry.  The  next  section,  therefore,  provides  details  on  the  role  and  growing 
importance of credit rating agencies in the UK market. 
2.2.2. Credit rating Agencies and the UK market 
As discussed in the previous section, UK firms were historically mostly financed by bank 
loans or through equity. However, there has been a growing trend in the use of public debt 
markets  by  UK  firms.  These  markets  may  be  more  efficient  than  traditional  bank 
borrowing, as the borrowers and lenders are able to meet without incurring the cost of bank 
intermediation. This efficiency may, however, be dependent on how quickly and efficiently 
the relevant information is disseminated between the interested parties.  
In this context, the UK market has also witnessed  a growing demand for credit ratings 
similar to other markets globally. Standard and Poor’s, for example, started its operations in 
the UK in 1984 and up until 2010 more than 335 firms have been rated (Standard and 
Poor’s, 2010c).
10 Among the FTSE 100 companies, Hanafin (2007) reports that 82% of 
these firms are publicly rated. Statistics reported by Standard and Poor’s (2010a) indicates 
that UK non-financial firms are the third biggest users of Standard and Poor’s credit ratings 
after firms in the US and Canada.
11 All three major rating agencies operate  in the UK 
                                                 
10 Comparable statistics for Moody’s and Fitch are not available. 
11 One reason for this heavy use may be that  the UK does not have any credit rating agency of its own while 
other countries such as Canada and Japan have their own rating agencies. However, as stated earlier, Standard 
and Poor’s and Moody’s have a 40% market share each and Fitch has a 15% share of the world’s credit rating 
industry. The small and local rating agencies have about 5% of the market share. This may imply that the      
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market. In addition, small rating agencies focused on providing specialised rating services 
to the insurance industry only, such as A.M. Best, also operate in the UK.  
Despite the increased growth of the credit rating agencies in the UK market,  it can be 
argued that rated firms in the UK market are substantially different from those in other 
markets, specifically the US (being the largest user of credit ratings). Compared to the US 
market, for example, European firms’ rated bonds are generally skewed towards higher 
ratings  (Adjaoute,  2000).  Moreover,  as  already  stated  in  Chapter  1,  the  proportion  of 
speculative  grade  issuers  in  the  European  market  is  also  low  at  10%  of  total  issuers 
compared to 40% in the US market (Batten et al., 2004). Claes et al. (2002) note that UK 
rated firms are the second largest active users of Eurobonds after the US, where 95-97% of 
the Eurobonds are investment grade issues. This may also indirectly support the view that 
UK firms would generally have better quality than firms from other markets. As will be 
further  discussed  in  Chapter  7,  the  sample  of  the  present  study  also  indicates  such 
differences. These differences can be expected because of the developed and mature rating 
industry in the US compared to European markets, where the credit rating agencies do not 
have a very long history. Due to this, small and mid-sized firms also acquire credit ratings 
in the US market while in the European market credit ratings are accessed predominantly by 
large and creditworthy firms (Batten et al., 2004). Given that the UK credit rating industry 
does not have a very long history as compared with the US market, one could expect that 
rated firms in the UK market are more creditworthy firms. As will be discussed further, UK 
firms are also likely to self-select themselves for ratings and will therefore have higher 
ratings.  
If the above is true, such differences could be important for the present study as it can 
influence the sensitivities of the rated firms towards their credit ratings. For example, it can 
be argued that due to the skewed distribution of UK rated firms towards the higher end, 
poor rated firms would be particularly more concerned about costs of low credit ratings. 
This is because when a large number of rated firms have higher ratings, poor quality firms 
can easily be identified and the market can screen out such firms from debt markets and 
specifically from long-term debt markets. This would imply that, unlike the US market, 
concerns over the costs and benefits of ratings would not be shared equally among all the 
                                                                                                                                                     
ranking of rating users presented above will not be seriously affected once the rest of the rating agencies are 
taken into account.      
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rating levels, and that the low rated firms will be particularly more concerned about the 
costs imposed by their ratings.  
As bond markets and rating agencies in the UK market are not as developed as they are in 
the  US  market,  the  UK  rated  firms  are  also  expected  mostly  to  have  solicited  ratings. 
Elkhoury (2008) also states that Moody’s claim that they have not issued unsolicited ratings 
in Europe, while Standard and Poor’s claim that they have not done any unsolicited rating 
outside the US. It is documented that solicited rating are more favourable than unsolicited 
ratings. Prior studies argue that apart from solicited rated firms being more profitable, liquid 
and having higher levels of debt than unsolicited rated firms (Poon and Chan, 2010), there 
is a self-selection bias, which drives the differences between rating levels of the two groups 
(Gan, 2004). This implies that highly creditworthy firms are more likely to have solicited 
ratings.  These  differences  in  firm-level  characteristics  and  credit  ratings  might  lead  to 
different sensitivities of solicited rated firms and unsolicited rated firms towards their rating 
changes. For example, Shivdasani and Zenner (2005) argue that large and high credit rated 
firms will be less likely to be downgraded following debt issuance compared to low rated 
firms. Moreover, unsolicited rated firms do not generally provide any input into the ratings 
assigned to them and therefore these ratings lack soft information content (Bannier et al., 
2010). Given this, it can be expected that unsolicited rated firms will be careful about the 
signals they convey to the market compared to firms with solicited ratings who can discuss 
and  present  evidence  of  their  credibility  to  the  rating  agencies  before  their  ratings  are 
disclosed to the public.  
A distinguishing feature of the UK market that is particularly relevant for the present study 
is the limited regulatory dependence on credit ratings. Unlike the US market, where over a 
hundred federal laws and over 50 regulations (Cantor et al., 2007) covering banking, real 
estates,  mutual  funds,  insurance  and  pensions  etc  are  based  on  credit  ratings  (Partnoy, 
1999), the regulatory dependence on the credit ratings in the European market is not as 
widespread.
12 Particularly in the UK market, this reliance is almost non -existent, with the 
exception of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) (Langhor and Langhor, 2008) 
allowing banks to use external credit assessments in determining the risk weights for capital 
adequacy requirements (Mäntysaari, 2009). The dependence of regulations on credit ratings 
can be expected to have implications for the perceptions of the issuer and investors in any 
                                                 
12 In Europe, France has the highest number of regulatory uses of credit ratings. See Langhor and Langhor 
(2008) for more details.      
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market. Partnoy (1999, 2006), for example, argues that the market power of rating agencies 
in the US market can be directly attributable to the regulatory license granting ability of the 
rating  agencies.  Kisgen  and  Strahan  (2010)  find  that  once  the  Dominion  Bond  Rating 
Service  was  assigned  an  NRSRO  status  in  2003,  the  firms  that  were  rated  better  by 
Dominion  compared  with  other  NRSROs,  experienced  a  sharp  decline  in  their  cost  of 
capital, irrespective of any change in the underlying quality of the firms or their securities. 
Therefore, it seems that the level of regulatory dependence on credit ratings in a particular 
market may affect factors such as its cost of financing, investor base, dependence on credit 
ratings and the general perception about the credit ratings among the market participants.      
It should be noted, however, that credit rating agencies in the European Union are under 
close scrutiny now. In the past, the European Union did not have targeted exit and entry 
requirement  for  the  credit  rating  agencies  (Langhor  and  Langhor,  2008).  However, 
following the financial crisis, the European Commission now requires that any credit rating 
agencies interested in operating inside the European Union have to be registered with the 
European Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA) which will directly supervise the rating 
agencies. Moreover, they will be governed under stricter rules based on the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct for credit rating agencies to ensure transparency, monitoring and the addressing of 
potential conflicts of interests (Dewar, 2010). This does not suggest that regulatory reliance 
in European countries will increase but it may suggest that the perception of the market 
participants  about  rating  agencies  might  be  more  favourable  in  the  future.  Increasing 
reliance is expected because the market would perceive rating agencies to be more formal, 
regulated and authenticated sources of information.   
Another interesting feature that can have implications for the relationship between credit 
ratings and capital structures is the creditor friendly bankruptcy code which prevails in the 
UK market. In the UK, emphasis is placed more on the creditor rights compared to other 
markets such as the US, as indicated by La Porta et al. (1997). In some circumstances when 
firms are distressed, secured creditors may have the rights to sell firms’ assets and realize 
their claim and such actions sometimes may not be challenged in the court (Kausar et al., 
2006; Acharya et al., 2011). The creditors, therefore, have an incentive for early liquidation. 
This can arguably have implications for the firms and their sensitivities over their credit 
ratings given that credit ratings create a vicious cycle and may lead to liquidation much 
before firms are actually distressed. Due to the mediating role of the bankruptcy code, a 
firm  far  from  distress  is  expected  to  have  less  concern  for  downgrades  leading  to      
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liquidation, compared to a firm near distress. Specifically, it would suggest that low rated 
firms are likely to be more concerned about the costs of low credit ratings as low ratings 
will  result  in  higher  capital  costs,  constraining  their  access  to  debt  markets  and  may 
possibly even lead to inefficient early liquidation.  
A survey study on UK corporate treasurers by Bacon et al. (2009) suggests that the use of 
credit ratings is likely to increase in the foreseeable future, as unrated firms in the UK 
market also seek to obtain credit ratings to minimise uncertainties in their flow of financing. 
Moreover,  recent  steps  taken  by  the  FSA  and  the  European  Union  to  improve  the 
functionality of domestic debt markets and credit rating agencies respectively, is also likely 
to influence the role played by rating agencies in the UK market.  
2.3.  Conclusion  
This chapter highlighted the role of credit rating agencies in financial markets and presented 
an overview of the UK market and the role of credit rating agencies in the UK. The aim of 
the  chapter  was  to  establish  that  credit  rating  agencies  are  powerful  intermediaries  in 
financial markets and because of this, they are likely to have a strong influence on the 
perceptions of investors, regulators and even the managements of firms. Therefore, it can be 
argued that firms take into consideration the impact of their decisions on their credit ratings. 
The chapter also discussed that the UK market, similar to other markets, has witnessed a 
high growth in the use of credit ratings. However, despite the increased use of credit ratings, 
the UK market has some unique features, including non-reliance of regulations on credit 
ratings, a tendency towards issuing international debt, a higher likelihood of high rated and 
solicited rated firms than in the US market, and a creditor-friendly bankruptcy code, all of 
which make the UK an interesting sample country to study. The influence of these features 
is also likely to play a mediating role in the relationship between credit ratings and the 
financial structure decisions made by the UK firms.  
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review: Credit Ratings and Capital Structure  
3. Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the role of credit ratings in determining the 
financial structure of UK firms. The aim of the current chapter is to present a systematic 
review of the previous studies on the subject, to provide the background and develop a link 
to the present study. The first half of the chapter discusses the major theories of capital 
structure along with a review of the previous empirical studies relating to those theories. 
The later part of the chapter attempts to underline the importance of the credit ratings for 
capital structure decision-making and also presents the specific testable hypotheses based 
on  the  literature  review.  The  chapter  is  divided  into  four  main  sections.  Section  3.1 
discusses the major theories related to the determinants of capital structure, and Section 3.2 
contains a review of the empirical literature on the determinants of capital structure based 
on the traditional theories. Section 3.3 presents a detailed discussion on the relevance of 
credit ratings towards firms’ leverage structures and the hypotheses based on the literature 
presented. This section is further divided into three subsections; each looking at different 
aspects of the credit rating-capital structure relationship. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.  
3.1.  Capital Structure: Review of the Traditional Theories  
Even after five decades of extensive academic research, the question of what constitutes the 
determinants of capital  structure still remains one of the most contentious issues in the 
finance literature. The origin of the debate can be traced back to Modigliani and Miller’s 
1958 irrelevance proposition, which serves as the focal point of the major theories and the 
studies conducted afterwards. During the 1960s and 1970s, the studies presented criticism 
of Modigliani and Miller’s proposition by proposing imperfections that might make the 
capital structure of a firm relevant. They proposed factors such as tax benefits (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1963), personal taxes (Miller, 1977) and the role of bankruptcy (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1976; Kim, 1978) for the relevance of capital structure. By the 
end of the 1970s, the studies focused more on the signalling and information asymmetry 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984; Krasker, 1986) aspect of capital structure. A rich 
strand of literature has also recently emerged which emphasises the understanding of more 
detailed aspects of capital structure such as the type of debt, e.g., private vs. public (Denis 
and Mihov, 2003), its components, e.g., convertible debt and debentures (Mayers, 1998),      
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and the maturity structure, e.g., long-term vs. short-term (Stoh and Mauer, 1996; Barclay 
and Smith, 1995a, 1996; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Ozkan, 2000, 2002). Despite the large 
number of theoretical and empirical studies, it still remains an empirical question as to how 
firms choose their capital structure. The present section aims to provide a comprehensive 
review of literature relating to the existing theories of capital structure. The next section will 
discuss  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  determinants  of  capital  structure  based  on  these 
theories. 
3.1.1. The Irrelevance of Capital Structure  
The seminal study by Modigliani and Miller (1958) can be regarded as a starting point of 
the theoretical and empirical debate on capital structure. They proposed the  irrelevance 
proposition suggesting that the debt has no inherent advantage for the firm and thus how 
assets  are  financed  is  irrelevant  for  a  firm’s  total  value  and  its  cost  of  capital.  This 
proposition rests on the arbitrage argument, which suggests that the investors of a firm can 
create homemade leverage, which can replicate the firm’s capital structure without incurring 
any additional costs. Therefore, any change in the firm’s capital structure is irrelevant to the 
shareholders.  
The irrelevance proposition raises several questions pertaining to the validity of the theory 
in  the  real  world.  For  example,  if  the  capital  structure  does  not  matter,  then  why  are 
financial  managers  concerned  about  it?  It  should  be  noted  that  the  proposition  was 
originally  proved  under  a  certain  restrictive  set  of  assumptions  including  perfect  and 
frictionless  markets  with  perfect  substitution  of  financing  types,  where  there  was  no 
transaction cost, constraining regulation, default risk, taxation or information asymmetry 
and the firms were homogenous in nature within an equivalent risk class. The theory might 
be valid with these underlying assumptions, but may not hold if the assumptions critical to 
the theory are relaxed. Therefore, the study received criticism generally pointing out that the 
capital  structure  does  matter  for  the  firm’s  value.  Regardless  of  the  criticism  (detailed 
discussion of which follows in the next sections), this apparently simplistic theory provides 
a conceptual basis for other major theories on capital structure.  
The following discussion points out several different factors, which theoretically influence 
capital  structure  in  the  real  world.  These  theories  generally  add  imperfections  to  the 
irrelevance  model  proposed  by  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958),  by  addressing  some      
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dimensions of the capital structure. Nevertheless, it is argued that no single theory can fully 
explain the dynamics of firms’ capital structure. As Myers (2001) rightly points out, ‘there 
is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one’ (p.81).  
3.1.2. Theories of Taxes and Capital Structure 
In an imperfect world, where the influences of corporate and personal taxes, agency costs, 
information asymmetry and bankruptcy costs exist, the irrelevance of the capital structure 
for a firm’s value is an inappropriate generalization. In 1963, therefore, Modigliani and 
Miller proposed a correction, as they called it, of an error in their earlier paper of 1958. 
They recognised the value of the tax deductibility of the interest payments for the capital 
structure. Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that given the value of the tax shield, an 
optimal decision for firms would be to use as much debt as the firm can get, as this would 
lead to increased value of the firm. This would imply a near exclusion of equity financing. 
The value of the levered firm would therefore be equal to that of the unlevered firm plus the 
value of the debt tax shield. This would mean that firms, which have higher tax benefits, 
ceteris paribus, should have higher leverage. However, the study overestimates the benefits 
of using debt, as this would imply that an optimum capital structure would consist almost 
entirely of debt financing, with no limits to the maximum amount of debt a firm can safely 
employ. Moreover, the theory rests on similar assumptions as the irrelevance proposition 
including no personal taxes, potential bankruptcy costs, information asymmetry and agency 
costs in this choice of debt. 
It is argued that the tax advantages proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1963) could be 
completely  offset  if  the  personal  taxes  are  also  considered.  The  modelling  of  the 
implications of personal taxes for the capital structure determination by Miller (1977) was 
the first major development in the tax related argument following Modigliani and Miller 
(1963). Miller argues that as the debt increases, the firms also have to pay higher interest 
rates to entice higher tax bracket bondholders to hold corporate debt. This will increase the 
net after-tax cost of debt to the firms to the point that there is no net advantage of further 
debt.  Consistent  with  Modigliani  and  Miller,  he  argues  that  the  irrelevance  proposition 
would still hold. While both Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miller (1977) offer extreme 
predictions about the leverage of firms, there are theories which are relatively less inclined 
towards  any  particular  behaviour  around  the  choice  of  capital  structure.  For  example, 
DeAngelo  and  Masulis  (1980)  highlight  the  benefits  of  non-debt  tax  shield  such  as      
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depreciation and investment tax credit, which firms can substitute for the debt tax shields. 
The presence of a substantial amount of non-tax debt shields would imply lower levels of 
debt, as the incentive to borrow more for the tax reasons would diminish, when such an 
alternative is available for the firms. Under such circumstances, the firms will have a unique 
interior optimum capital structure (p.27) which affects value of the firms.  
3.1.3. The Role of Bankruptcy and the Trade-off Theory 
Studies proposing the advantages of tax shields suggest that firms can employ infinite levels 
of debt. However, subsequent studies argue that such conclusions are unrealistic and can 
have little intuitive appeal because for firms, there might be risks associated with acquiring 
and servicing debt. As a result, studies by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976) and 
Kim (1978) formally introduce bankruptcy cost into their models to explain a firm’s choice 
of capital structure.  These studies suggest that firms can achieve a finite and an optimal 
capital structure by offsetting the present value of the tax shields and the expected cost of 
bankruptcy. Kim (1978) specifically argues that if the firms are subject to direct and indirect 
bankruptcy costs, then they reach their maximum debt capacity, defined as the maximum 
borrowing allowed by the capital markets, well before 100% debt financing is employed. 
Scott (1976) proposes that firms can issue more debt as long as it is backed up by collateral 
since these collaterals can serve as security for lenders as well as the fact that in the case of 
default, debt can be recovered through liquidating or selling off the assets. The existence of 
bankruptcy  costs  would  therefore  restrict  the  firms  to  a  finite  optimal  capital  structure 
(Baxter, 1967), which would reconcile Modigliani and Miller’s 1963 tax argument with the 
observed behaviour of the firms.  
This  theory,  more  generally  known  as  the  static  trade-off  theory  (Myers,  1984),  thus 
suggests that, other things being constant, firms that have higher bankruptcy costs should 
have  lower  leverage  and  correspondingly  firms  with  lower  bankruptcy  costs  will  have 
higher  leverage  (DeAnglo  and  Masulis,  1980;  Fischer  el  al.,  1989).  Such  costs  can  be 
broadly classified into indirect (such as, loss of sales, profits and employees and an inability 
to  raise  capital)  and  direct  costs  (such  as,  lawyer  and  accountant  fee,  managerial 
administration time spent during a bankruptcy process and other professional fee) (Warner, 
1977; Altman, 1984). Barclay and Smith (1999) argue that these costs can have different 
implications for large and small firms. Larger firms have significant economies of scales 
and therefore are likely to have higher leverage than their counterpart smaller sized firms.       
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A further implication of the static trade-off model is that firms have a target or an optimal 
debt ratio and they gradually move towards that ratio (Myers, 1984). This optimal debt ratio 
is achieved by the continuous rebalancing of the benefits of debt (tax shield advantages) 
against the expected cost of debt (indirect and direct costs of bankruptcy). Thus, substituting 
debt for equity or equity for debt would allow the firm to maximise the value of the firm. 
These adjustments might be costly for firms. Studies (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006) 
argue that if there were zero adjustment costs, firms would never deviate from their optimal 
debt  ratio.  However,  given  that  adjustments  are  costly,  this  may  hinder  firms  from 
immediately reverting to their optimal leverage level.  
There has been some disagreement on the relevance of tax shields and costs of bankruptcy 
in capital structure determination. Studies propose that the tax subsidy should not be offset 
against bankruptcy costs to reach an optimal capital structure, as the latter can be avoided 
by informal reorganisation (Haugen and Senbet, 1978). In addition, the cost of bankruptcy 
is difficult to calculate (Baxter, 1967) especially the indirect costs (Warner, 1977) and the 
magnitude  of  the  bankruptcy  costs  cannot  be  accurately  determined  unless  the  firm  is 
actually declared insolvent (Haugen and Senbet, 1978). Studies also propose to offset the 
transaction cost of the debt against the tax advantage since bankruptcy can be avoided by 
selling  new  shares  and  purchasing  the  outstanding  debt  given  that  such  informal 
reorganization is beneficial for both parties (Haugen and Senbet, 1978).  
3.1.4. Information Asymmetry, Signalling and Pecking Order Hypothesis 
Studies  arguing  the  relevance  of  corporate  or  personal  taxes  and  the  relevance  of 
bankruptcy costs for the capital structure, implicitly assume that managers and investors 
share similar knowledge of a firm’s prospects  for returns and investment  opportunities. 
However, in the real world the insiders (i.e., the firm or management), and the outsiders 
(i.e.,  the  investors),  do  not  have  symmetrical  knowledge  about  the  firms.  Given  such 
information  asymmetries,  investors  will  continuously  update  their  beliefs  from  the 
observable information  communicated through the actions of managers, while managers 
also  take into consideration  investors’ reaction when they make firms’ capital  structure 
decisions.  
There  are  a  number  of  ways  in  which  information  asymmetry  affects  capital  structure 
decisions. First, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that managers are likely not to issue equity      
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for financing a project, knowing that it may be mispriced by the market. Investors believe 
that firms issue debt when managers think that the firm is undervalued, while issuing equity 
occurs when it is overvalued (Myers, 1984). The larger the size of new investment project, 
the larger will be the mispricing (Krasker, 1986). Due to such underpricing, the existing 
shareholders will incur a net loss, as the new shareholders will capture more than the net 
present value of the new project. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that such under-pricing 
can be avoided by using the safest and least costly source of financing first. For example, 
the firms may prefer to utilise internally generated funds, followed by less risky debt and 
finally by equity. They argue that even the risky debt will be preferable to equity, as it will 
be less severely undervalued than equity. Narayanan (1988) further argues that firms can 
restrict dividends so that they can finance themselves through internally generated funds. 
Overall, this suggests a hierarchy in financing which Myer (1984) called a pecking order. 
Unlike the static trade-off theory, however, the pecking order theory does not suggest an 
optimal leverage ratio  
Second, in the presence of information asymmetry, managers can use capital structure as a 
mean with which to communicate information to outsiders about their superior quality of 
the firms. Ross’s (1977) model assumes that managers have better information about the 
true quality of their firms and by issuing high levels of debt, they signal their firms’ superior 
quality to the outsiders. If managers have unfavourable information regarding the prospects 
of the firm, they are likely not to take on more debt, which would otherwise expose them to 
bankruptcy risks. This can result in a separating equilibrium because the low quality firms 
cannot imitate the high quality firms by issuing more debt as the low quality firms have 
higher marginal expected bankruptcy costs. Narayanan (1988) also supports the argument 
that debt has an advantage over equity as it serves as a barrier for the inferior firms to enter 
the market.  
A  third  way  in  which  the  information  asymmetry  can  affect  capital  structure  is  by 
examining the proportion of the firms, which is held by the insiders. Since insiders have 
better  information,  Leland  and  Pyle  (1977)  argue  that  this  will  induce  managers  or 
entrepreneurs to choose a fraction of the equity to convey information about the quality of 
the  project  or  the  firm.  Good  quality  firms  will  choose  such  costly  signals  to  convey 
information to the outsiders in order to prevent the poor quality firms from mimicking them. 
Moreover, their model suggests that firms, which have a higher proportion of equity held by 
insiders, will issue more risk free debt to finance the projects. This implies an indirect      
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relationship that higher quality firms have higher levels of equity owned by insiders and 
will also have higher debt.  
3.1.5. Agency Cost and Capital Structure 
Another factor, which may affect the way firms finance themselves, is the agency costs 
arising from conflicts between various stakeholders such as the managers, bondholders and 
shareholders of the firms. The idea of an optimal capital structure proposed by some of the 
previous studies may also become ambiguous due to such costs, as the  optimal capital 
structure can vary from one group to another. Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first to 
present a formal framework, which incorporates the significance of agency costs for capital 
structure. They argue that an optimal capital structure can be achieved by offsetting the 
agency costs of debt against the benefits of debt.  
Two  main  types  of  conflicts  can  arise:  conflicts  between  the  management  and  the 
shareholders  and  conflicts  between  the  bondholders  and  the  shareholders  (Jensen  and 
Meckling, 1976). The former agency problem can arise because management has a smaller 
stake in the residual claims compared to equity holders. This may lead to behaviour, which 
is less than optimal for maximising the firm’s value. For example, the managers may invest 
the firm’s resources for their own benefit such as extensive rewards and perquisites, plush 
offices and building empires, and may not invest their best efforts into the firm unless the 
firm’s interests are consistent with their own self-interests. Moreover, they may invest in 
projects with low net present value (called overinvestment problems) (Jensen, 1986). Such 
inefficiencies can be reduced by increasing managers’ share in the equity, by increasing the 
debt  in  the  capital  structure  or  by  repurchasing  equity  through  debt.  As  Jensen  (1986) 
argues, debt disciplines the managers, as the contractual nature of debt forces them to pay 
regular interest and principal payments. This will reduce the problem of free cash flows. 
Moreover, debt financing provides a mechanism of continuous monitoring by externals, 
which is likely to reduce the agency conflicts between both the parties.  
The latter agency problem arises because in the presence of debt, the equity holders have an 
incentive  to  invest  sub-optimally.  Equity  holders  will  follow  courses  of  action,  which 
benefit  themselves  at  the  expense  of  debt  holders,  thus  transferring  the  wealth  from 
bondholders to shareholders. Jensen and Meckling argue that shareholders of geared firms 
capture investment yield above the debt holders’ fixed claim, but they will not suffer any      
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loss above their basic investment in the firms, due to their limited liability in the firm. 
Therefore,  shareholders  will  be  more  inclined  towards  investing  in  risky  projects  with 
higher returns. Myer (1977) adds that the likelihood of shareholder-bondholders conflict 
will further increase when the value of assets is largely based on growth opportunities. In 
the presence of risky debt, firms are likely to forgo investment opportunities, as the returns 
from those investments would go to the debt holders, leaving nothing for the shareholders. 
Myers (1977) describes this as the underinvestment problem. In such cases, firms are less 
likely to issue new debt (see more detailed discussion in Subsection 3.2.4). 
3.1.6. Market Timing Theory 
A more recently developed theory, which suggests that firms time their equity issuances 
with their stock market performance, has challenged the traditional trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory. However, similar to the pecking order theory and unlike the trade-off 
theory, the market timing theory does not assume that firms have a target debt ratio. The 
theory, developed and tested by Baker and Wurgler (2002), suggests that firms issue equity 
when they are overvalued while they reduce equity when they are undervalued. Therefore, 
the observed capital structure of firms is the cumulative outcome of their past efforts to time 
the  market  where  they  opportunistically  issue  overvalued  equity.  Though  Baker  and 
Wurgler (2002) find strong negative relationship between weighted measure of past stock 
performance  and  capital  structure,  following  studies  find  mixed  support  for  the  theory. 
Leary  and  Robert  (2005)  and  Alti  (2006),  for  example,  argue  that  market  timing  is  an 
important short run determinant of changes in capital structure but this effect has limited 
explanatory power in the long-run. They note that the actual behaviour of firms is more 
supportive of the dynamic trade-off theory. In line with Leary and Robert (2005) and Alti 
(2006), Hovikimian (2006) argues that market timing effects are not persistent and that the 
negative  relationship  that  does  exist  between  the  weighted  average  of  past  stock 
performance  and  the  capital  structure  is  because  the  measure  also  reflects  the  growth 
opportunities of firms. Conversely, a survey study by Graham and Harvey (2001) finds that 
76% of respondents consider overvaluation and undervaluation important determinants of 
equity issuance. Welch (2004) and Huang and Ritter (2009) also finds strong support in 
favour of the theory.
13  
                                                 
13 It should be noted that the market timing theory is not tested in the present study due to the nature of 
research questions under investigation. The implications of credit ratings are tested by incorporating them into      
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The  review  of  the  capital  structure  theories  shows  the  extent  to  which  the  theoretical 
framework  has  developed  in  explaining  the  various  viewpoints  on the  determination  of 
firms’  capital  structures.  It  highlights  several  factors  which  can  influence  the  debt  and 
equity choice of the firms. As can be noted, there are two competing theories in the capital 
structure theoretical literature: the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. The basic 
static trade-off theory refers to the offsetting of tax benefits against the costs of bankruptcy 
to reach an optimal debt ratio. It can be argued that the extended version of the trade-off 
theory  can incorporate other benefits and costs of debt and equity, such as information 
asymmetry and the agency costs of debt. Proponents of the trade-off theory suggest that 
firms weigh such costs against the benefits to reach a target debt ratio. On the other hand, 
the pecking order theory suggests a hierarchy in financing choices but does not suggest any 
optimal level of financing. The empirical literature is generally dominated by these theories.  
3.2.  Empirical Evidence on the Firm-Level Determinants of Capital Structure 
This section reviews the empirical literature on the determinants of the capital structure of 
the firms based on the main theories of capital structure as discussed above. It discusses the 
most prominent factors, which affect capital structure decisions.  
3.2.1.  Size 
The size of the firm, which mainly represents the trade-off theory, is argued to be important 
for capital structure decisions due to a number of reasons. Large firms on average raise 
larger amounts of capital compared with smaller firms, due to economies of scale, e.g., the 
lower percentage fixed flotation cost (Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2007). They also have a 
lower ratio of bankruptcy costs to firm value compared with small firms (Warner, 1977; 
Ang et al., 1982). Compared with large firms, small firms are more likely to be liquidated in 
case of financial distress and thus they are likely to have less leverage (Ozkan, 1996). In 
addition, large firms tend to be more diversified (Titman and Wessels, 1988), have superior 
debt capacity and to be more likely to get loans at favourable terms (Ferri and Jones, 1979; 
Kim and Sorensen, 1986). Such firms are likely to have lower agency costs associated with 
assets  substitution  and  underinvestment  problems  (Chung,  1993;  Ozkan,  2001)  and  are 
therefore likely to have higher leverage. The size of a firm is sometimes also regarded as a 
proxy for information asymmetry, which suggests a negative relationship between size and 
                                                                                                                                                     
the  models  which  tests  implications  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  different  financing  options  and  thereby 
examining the relative significance of costs and benefits of credit ratings for capital structure decisions.         
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leverage.  For  example,  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1995)  argue  that  large  firms  have  lower 
information asymmetry (e.g., due to more public information being available, more analysts 
following) which can in turn help them with regards to equity issuances. 
The above reasoning generally suggests that size may have a positive relationship with the 
gearing ratios of the firms. The empirical evidence related to size and gearing, however, is 
rather mixed. By and large, a positive relationship is found for the size of firms and leverage 
by Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999) and Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) for UK firms, Fama and French (2002) for US firms, and Deesomsak et al. 
(2004) for Asian Pacific firms. However, Jong et al. (2008), similar to Booth et al. (2001) 
studying several international firms, find mixed results of a relationship between size and 
gearing for firms in different countries.  Barclay and Smith (1995), examining 6700 US 
firms from 1963 to 1993, also find mixed results; a significant negative result using OLS 
alongside a significant positive result using fixed effects regression. However, they note that 
the economic significance of the variable is relatively small compared with other factors 
affecting capital structure regardless of the estimation technique used. A study of 390 non-
financial UK firms for the period 1984-1996 by Ozkan (2001) finds limited support for the 
positive  relationship  between  size  and  gearing,  while  Toy  et  al.  (1974)  and  Kim  and 
Sorensen (1986) do not find size to be significant in explaining the debt structure of US 
firms. 
Theoretically, size of the firm is believed to have a positive relationship with gearing, which 
to a large extent is supported by previous studies (with a few exceptions as mentioned 
above). In this study, size is used as one of the control variables to isolate the effect of size 
from the credit ratings  of the firms in explaining their capital structure, as most of the 
previous studies have used size as a proxy for bankruptcy or access to the capital market. 
Based on theoretical reasoning and following most of the previous empirical findings, size 
is expected to have a positive relationship with the leverage of the firms.  
3.2.2.  Profitability 
The motivation for using profitability as one of the explanatory variables in past studies has 
been  stimulated  by  the  seminal  paper  of  Myers  and  Majluf  (1984).  The  pecking  order 
theory,  as  discussed  above,  suggests  a  negative  relationship  between  profitability  and 
gearing.  Myers  and  Majluf’s  (1984)  pecking  order  theory  relies  on  the  signalling  and      
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information  asymmetry  problems  associated with  the issue of specific types  of external 
financing,  and  the  transaction  costs  of  issuing  equity.  Consequently,  firms  follow  a 
hierarchy  in  their  financing  policies,  where  internal  sources  are  given  preference  over 
external sources. The model proposes that firms will choose internally generated sources 
such as retained earnings followed by less informational disadvantaged sources, e.g., debt 
and hybrid securities. When firms have exhausted all other financing sources, they will 
issue equity as a last resort. It follows that firms with higher levels of internally generated 
funds, typically measured by profitability in earlier studies, will have lower debt ratios. 
Most of the prior studies confirm the pecking order hypothesis and that profitability has a 
strong negative association with gearing ratios given that such firms do not need outside 
capital  (Titman and Wessels,  1988;  Rajan and Zingales, 1995;  Frank and Goyal,  2000; 
Ozkan, 2001; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002, 2004; Barclay et al., 2003; Fan et al., 2011).  
In contrast, the trade-off theory carries different implications about the relationship of a 
firm’s profitability and its gearing. Debt ratios are expected to have a positive association 
with profitability, according to Modigliani and Miller (1963). Profitable firms have higher 
income to shelter, higher marginal tax rates, and have less probability of bankruptcy. It 
follows that profitable firms’ capital structures will comprise of more debt to gain the added 
advantages  of  tax  shields,  apart  from  the  other  benefits  of  higher  debt.  However,  the 
empirical  studies  have  strongly  substantiated  Myers  and  Majluf’s  pecking  order  theory 
suggesting a negative association between profitability and the gearing of firms. Following 
prior literature, profitability is expected to have a negative relationship with the leverage of 
firms. 
3.2.3.  Tangibility of Assets 
Another factor in the literature of capital structure is the amount of tangible assets in the 
firms’ assets structure. Tangibility has been integrated in the models in previous studies to 
signify the influence of collateralisable assets in leverage related decisions. Scott (1977) 
argues that issuance of debt backed up by assets will increase firms’ value and thus the 
optimal strategy for the firms is to issue, as far as possible, secured debt. The underlying 
rationale is that for the borrowing firm in the case of bankruptcy, the amount of cash paid to 
the secured creditors will be less since the market value of collateralised assets will serve 
the purpose of compensating lenders. Scott also argues that if firms do not have collateral, 
they  either  have  to  bear  high  borrowing  costs  or  have  to  issue  equity  instead  of  debt.      
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Alternatively, Smith and Warner (1979) argue that the secured debt may also reduce the 
total cost of lending to the creditors by precluding the assets substitution problem. The 
collateralised assets cannot be disposed to any other use without the consent of the lender. 
Moreover, the borrower may not issue additional debt secured on the same asset, as this will 
jeopardise the claim of the existing secured lenders. The tangibility of firms’ assets may 
also help in reducing information asymmetries as the payoffs of tangible assets are more 
easily  observed  (Almeida  and  Campello,  2007).  This  may  offer  further  benefit,  in  the 
correct pricing of securities.    
In  contrast,  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988)  argue  that  debt  may  also  have  a  negative 
relationship  with  collateral  assets.  The  capital  outlay  of  firms  with  less  collateralisable 
assets may be more difficult to monitor and thus they are more inclined to use debt as a 
monitoring mechanism. A large proportion of debt, as argued earlier, reduces the tendency 
of consuming excessive perquisites by management, and principals may thus encourage 
firms to have higher leverage. An indirect explanation for a negative relationship could be 
that firms with a higher amount of tangible assets are more likely to have a stable and 
constant source of earnings. Such internally generated funds are more likely to be reinvested 
according  to  the  pecking  order  theory;  therefore,  the  reliance  on  external  sources  is 
minimised.  
Several  empirical  studies  have  documented  the  importance  of  collateralisable  assets  in 
leverage decisions  (Titman and Wessels,  1988;  Rajan and  Zingales, 1995;  Wald,  1999; 
Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Jong et al., 2008). These studies generally find the tangibility of 
firms to have a positive relationship with their capital structures. However, a few studies, 
specifically from the developing market, also report negative (e.g., Booth et al., 2001) and 
insignificant (see for example, Deesomsak et al., 2004) relationships of fixed assets ratios 
with gearing. Following theoretical and empirical studies and specifically studies focused 
on the UK firms, tangibility is expected to have a positive relationship with the leverage of 
the firms. 
3.2.4.  Growth Opportunities 
As  discussed  in  Section  3.1.5,  a  firm’s  investment  opportunity  set  may  also  have 
implications for its capital structure. Myers (1977) deconstructs a firm’s total value into two 
categories; the value of assets in place, and the present value of the investment opportunities      
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firms have. In essence, Myers terms the present value of the future investment opportunities 
as ‘real options’ or more specifically ‘call options’, where their value is determined by the 
likelihood of exercising and materialising the payoffs of these options. Myers argue that 
such options may eventually lead to conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt 
holders. For example, in the case of risky debt outstanding, firms may not undertake any 
positive NPV projects as, due to the riskiness of the firm the returns from the investment 
would go to the debt holders. The existing debt may alter the management’s behaviour in 
the best interest of the equity holder, which leads to underinvestment or debt overhanging 
problem. Firms in such cases will not issue new debt, as the returns generated from the 
projects will be used to compensate the risk borne by debt holders and they will extract 
most of the net present value of the project. Myers assumes that since managers will work 
in the best interest of equity holders, they will not issue equity to finance new projects or the 
shareholders  would  be  forced  to  bear  the  associated  risks  of  the  project,  which  would 
otherwise  be  borne  by  the  junior  debt  holders.  To  reduce  the  debt  and  equity  holders’ 
agency problems, firms with risky debt outstanding are likely not to issue debt when they 
have growth opportunities.  
Another  possible  explanation  of  the  negative  relationship  of  growth  opportunities  with 
leverage is that the revenues from these growth opportunities have not yet materialised and 
firms are reluctant to take on large amounts of debt at this stage or engage in a contractual 
obligation against it (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). Moreover, these assets do not generate 
taxable income, which otherwise might have motivated firms to issue more debt, according 
to  the  trade-off  theory.  In  addition,  investment  opportunities  are  seen  as  capital  assets 
adding value to the firms but they cannot be collateralised for obtaining debt (Scott, 1977; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Ozkan, 2001; Booth et al., 2001; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). 
Thus,  it  is  likely  that  firms  whose  value  primarily  reflects  their  set  of  investment 
opportunities will have lower amounts of leverage.  
Some  previous  studies  have  documented  a  negative  relationship  between  growth 
opportunities and firms’ leverage, specifically for the UK market (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Ozkan, 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Jong et al., 2008). 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002), for example, examining 822 UK firm, find that the investment 
opportunities are negatively related with most of the measures of leverage, with results 
being more pronounced for the market measures of debt. The book debt ratio, however, 
shows an insignificant positive relationship with the level of growth opportunities. Fama      
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and French (2002) also confirm that leverage is negatively related to growth opportunities 
when measured by market to book ratio and R&D by total assets, respectively, whereas the 
book ratios show a positive relationship with investment opportunities. Booth et al. (2001), 
studying international firms, find mixed results, where market measures of total debt and 
long-term debt still mostly show a significant negative relationship. Conversely, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), investigating capital structures of G-7 countries, find both market and book 
debt  ratios  to  have  a  significant  negative  relationship  with  the  market  to  book  ratio. 
Following  most  of  the  previous  UK  studies,  it  is  predicted  that  there  is  a  negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and the leverage of the UK firms. 
3.2.5.  Liquidity 
Though not widely used in the capital structure literature, the levels of liquidity of firms’ 
assets  may  also  have  implications  in  their  capital  structure  decisions.  Assets’  liquidity 
means  the  ease  with  which  the  assets  can  be  traded  at  a  price  close  to  their  value. 
Theoretical literature suggests a mixed relationship of liquidity with the financing decision 
of the firms. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the liquidity of firms’ 
assets  enhances  their  debt  capacity,  as  liquid  assets  serve  as  better  collateral  and  thus 
increase the liquidation value of the firm. Moreover, firms with higher liquidity ratios may 
have  better  ability  to  pay  their  obligations  as  they  come  due,  suggesting  a  positive 
relationship between the liquidity and leverage choice of the firms. This view contradicts 
the collateral argument put forward in favour of the fixed assets role for debt capacity, 
where it is suggested that fixed assets can be utilised as collateral for acquiring external 
finance. 
Morellec (2001) to some extent supports the positive relation and argues that asset liquidity 
may  increase  leverage  capacity  only  when  covenants  in  debt  securities  restrict  the 
transformation of those assets. On the contrary, in the case of unsecured debt, higher asset 
liquidity increases the credit spreads of the debt and thus reduces optimal leverage. Assets’ 
liquidity may also have a negative impact on leverage. Managers may take advantage of 
excessive  liquidity  in  shareholders’  favour  and  can  manipulate  the  liquid  assets  against 
debt-holders’ interests. They may replace safe and stable assets with risky assets. For this 
reason, the creditors may require a higher yield, decreasing the optimal leverage (Myers and 
Rajan,  1998).  From  the  pecking-order  perspective  as  well,  liquidity  may  be  negatively      
46 
 
correlated with leverage, as liquid assets can serve as an internal source of financing, thus 
reducing dependence on external finance.  
Empirical  studies  are  limited  on  this  subject.  One  of  the  studies  on  UK  firms’  capital 
structures by Ozkan (2001) finds a highly significant negative relation of liquidity with the 
capital structure, suggesting a potential conflict between the shareholders and debt holders 
of the firms as discussed above. Deesomsak et al. (2004), investigating the capital structure 
of firms in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, find the liquidity of the firms to 
have a strong negative relationship in most of the countries. In an international comparison 
of the capital structure of 42 countries by Jong et al (2008), liquidity is found to have a 
significant negative correlation with leverage for most of the countries, although it should 
be noted that for UK firms, liquidity has an insignificant positive relation. Since previous 
theoretical and empirical studies yield mixed results regarding the liquidity and leverage 
relationship,  it  is  hypothesised  that  liquidity  may  have  either  a  positive  or  a  negative 
relationship with the leverage of the firms. 
3.2.6.  Industry level factors 
The industry class can potentially be another important determinant of the capital structure. 
Firm characteristics may vary in terms of assets structure, type of assets and requirement for 
external financing between different firms across industries and so too may the leverage 
which  is  dependent  on  such  characteristics.  Different  industries  are  subject  to  different 
regulations (e.g., utilities) and economic and global changes can influence the industries 
differently.  Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) argue  that firms  using similar technology and 
producing  similar  goods  are  likely  to  face  similar  levels  of  uncertainty  with  respect  to 
demand shocks and funding availability. Schwartz and Aronson (1967) state that  ‘…the 
various classes of firms have developed typical financial structures that are optimal for 
their  operational  risks  and  asset  structure’,  and  ‘…presumably,  if  optimal  financial 
structures did not exist for the different industry classifications, then theoretically there 
should be no recognizable patterns…’ (p.10). It follows that firms may have similar debt 
ratios  within  the  industry  because  of  their  tendency  to  cluster  due  to  similar  business 
policies (Scott, 1972).  
Empirical evidence substantiates the industry effect on leverage. For example, Scott and 
Martin (1975) find significant differences in the capital structure choices across a wide      
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array  of  industries.  Bradley  et  al.  (1984)  find  that  industry  dummies  explain  54%  of 
variation whereas when regulated firms are excluded from the sample, industry dummies 
explain 25% of the variation in the leverage ratios. On the other hand, studies investigating 
UK firms’ capital structures such as Marsh (1982), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Ozkan 
(2001) generally do not control for effects of industry-level heterogeneity on the capital 
structures. This omitted variable could possibly introduce misspecification into the model. 
Therefore, in order to reduce any misspecification bias and to proxy out any of the effects of 
industry in the determination of capital structure, industry dummies are included in the 
model. 
The  above  discussion  points  out  the  most  prominent  variables  for  capital  structure 
determination by specifically focusing on UK and US studies, a summary of which is also 
presented in Table 3.1. As will be discussed further in the following section, until recently 
studies tended not to consider credit ratings as an important determinant of capital structure 
decisions, which may restrict a thorough understanding of capital structure determinants and 
correct  inferences  from  the  empirical  tests  in  the  previous  studies.  The  next  section, 
therefore, will discuss the implications of credit ratings for the capital structure decisions 
with a specific focus on the UK firms.  
3.3.  Credit Ratings and Capital Structure 
Credit rating, as discussed in Chapter 2, is a well-established term in the financial markets. 
The appropriateness of these ratings and the incremental information they communicate has 
been a focal point of the academic debate for a long period. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
investors,  specifically  institutional  investors  and  regulatory  bodies,  have  been  actively 
dependent  on  these  ratings  as  a  source  of  independent  judgement  on  the  firms’ 
creditworthiness. Investors, for example, not only rely on credit ratings for fund allocations 
but  also  for  pricing,  monitoring  and  future  risk  evaluation  (Norden  and  Weber,  2004). 
Several  studies  have  documented  credit  ratings’  influence  on  security  prices.48 
 
Table 3.1 
Theoretical Argument and Empirical Evidence of Capital Structure Theories  
Theory  Argument  Empirical Evidence 
Modigliani and Miller 
irrelevance proposition  
Leverage of firm is irrelevant for firm’s value  Not support: Weston, 1963 
Support: Sametz, 1964 
Corporate taxes,  
Personal taxes and 
Non-debt tax shields 
Firms with higher tax rates have higher leverage  Support: Grahan et al. 1998 
Firms with higher non-debt tax shields have low levels of 
leverage 
Support: Bowen et al., 1982 
Not Support: Bradley et al., 1984; Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993 
   
Cost and probability of 
bankruptcy 
There is an optimal debt ratio by offsetting tax benefits 
and bankruptcy 
Support: Flath and Knoeber, 1980; Flath and Knoeber, 1980 
Leverage is negatively related to cost of bankruptcy  Support: Fama and French, 2002; Castanias, 1983 
Firms have a target debt ratio and they tend to revert to it  Support: Ozkan, 2001 
Large firms have economies of scale and lower chances 
of bankruptcy, therefore they have higher leverage 
Support: Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald 1999;   
Bevan and Danbolt 2002; Fama and French 2002; Deesomsak et al., 
2004 
Information Asymmetry, 
Signalling and pecking 
order theory 
Profitability has a negative relationship with leverage  Support: Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 
2000;  Ozkan,  2001,  Bevan  and  Danbolt,  2002,  2004;  Barclay  et  al., 
2003; Fan and Titman, 2008 
Firms issue equity after abnormal price appreciation   Support: Marsh, 1982; Korajcyzk et al., 1990 
Debt gives positive signals to market  Support: Kim and Stulz, 1988 
 
 
Agency cost of debt and 
equity 
Managerial ownership is positively related to leverage 
 
Support: Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Amihud et al., 1990;  Agrawal and Mandlker, 
1987 
Debt with covenants reduce assets substitution problems  Support: Smith and Warner, 1979 
Debt increases with the increase in the free cash flows   Support: Bowen et al., 1982; Bradley et al., 1984 
Firms  which  have  higher  growth  opportunities  have 
lower leverage 
Support: Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ozkan, 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Frank  
and Goyal, 2009; Jong et al., 2008; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Fama and 
French, 2002; Booth et al., 2001; Alderson and Betker, 1995  
Notes: This table presents major theories of capital structure and the argument supporting each theory. Column 3 reports some of the empirical evidence either consistent (support) or inconsistent (not support) with 
the theoretical argument.  49 
 
For example, security prices react to actual ratings changes (Katz, 1974; Liu and Thakor, 
1984; Ederington et al., 1987; Hand et al., 1992; Ederington and Goh, 1999; Dichev and 
Piotroski, 2001; Barron et al., 1997), and also to the assignment of modifiers to the original 
ratings (Tang, 2009), the initial assignment of commercial paper rating and commercial 
paper rating changes (Nayyar and Rozeff, 1994) and to the assignment of a credit watch 
(Hand et al., 1992; Matolcsy and Lianto, 1995). Credit ratings are also argued to have an 
association with the credit spread, with a higher credit rating implying a lower spread 
(Cantor and Packer, 1995; Altman, 1989).  
The credit rating agencies have become important intermediaries with a powerful quasi-
regulatory role in the financial markets (Partnoy, 2001). However, it is worth noting that 
previous  literature  tends  to  focus  only  on  evaluating  the  incremental  information 
communicated by the credit ratings. Prior studies have largely ignored the significance of 
credit ratings in capital structure decision-making. In the past few years, however, there 
has  been  a  growing  recognition  that  credit  ratings  are  important  in  determining  the 
financial structure of firms; for example, as Denis and Mihov (2003) note, many rated 
borrowers are high issuers of public borrowing. They find that 73% of public borrowers 
have a rating assigned by Standard and Poor's while for bank borrowers and non-bank debt 
placements, 24% and 26%, respectively, have a rating assigned by Standard and Poor's. 
Similarly, by using credit ratings as a proxy for accessing public debt markets, Faulkender 
and  Petersen  (2006)  for  a  US  sample,  Judge  and  Mateus  (2009)  and  Judge  and 
Korzhenitskaya (2011) for a UK sample, and Mittoo and Zhang (2010) for a Canadian 
sample,  find  that  firms  possessing  a  credit  rating  have  significantly  higher  leverage 
compared to those who do not possess a rating. These studies provide empirical evidence 
which substantiates the relevance of credit ratings in accessing debt markets by suggesting 
that credit ratings reduce information asymmetry. This leads to a lower cost of capital and 
a reduction in the duration and distance between the borrowers and investors, thus resulting 
in higher levels of leverage for rated firms.  
In 2001, a survey study by Graham and Harvey was the first to highlight that credit ratings 
is  an  important  consideration  when  firms  make  their  capital  structure  decisions.  Their 
survey of 392 US firms’ CFOs shows that they consider credit ratings as the second most 
important  concern  when  they  make  their  capital  structure  decisions  (57%  of  the 
respondents  consider  credit  ratings,  while  59%  of  the  respondents  consider  financial      
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flexibility  as  their  foremost  concern).  They  note  that  management  places  a  far  higher 
concern on their credit rating, compared to the other factors proposed by the traditional 
trade-off and pecking order theories. Following Graham and Harvey (2001), Brounen et al. 
(2004) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) also report that European firms’ managers, similar to 
US firms’ CFOs, rate credit ratings as one of the most important concerns when they make 
financial structure decisions.  
The first formal theoretical and empirical study to model the implications of the concerns 
for credit ratings for the capital structure of the firms was by Kisgen (2006). He developed 
the  credit  rating  —  capital  structure  hypothesis  (CR–CS)  that  ‘credit  ratings  are  a 
material consideration in managers’ capital structure decisions due to the discrete costs 
(benefits) associated with different rating levels’ (p.1037). The hypothesis imply that if the 
costs and benefits of certain credit ratings are material for firms, they are likely to have 
lower leverage or would tend to reduce the amount of leverage. The empirical findings by 
Kisgen (2006) for US firms support his fundamental hypothesis. He finds that following 
proximity to rating changes, firms behave in a way that suggests that credit ratings are an 
important  consideration.  They  reduce  the  amount  of  leverage  in  their  capital  structure 
when  they  are  near  upgrades  or  downgrades.  A  subsequent  study  by  Kisgen  (2009), 
exploring the influence of actual credit rating changes on firms’ leverage related decisions, 
also  supports  the  CR-CS  hypothesis  suggesting  that  credit  ratings  are  material 
considerations for the firms and that firms follow leverage reduction behaviour when they 
have actually been downgraded. The CR-CS hypothesis following empirical evidence by 
Kisgen (2006, 2009) points out that the credit ratings may not just be a proxy for default or 
a measure for the cost of capital, but instead they also provide certain discrete benefits and 
costs, which can be material for the concerned firms.  
The above studies provide an overview of the previous literature which points out the 
relevance of credit ratings for the capital structure of firms, a summary of which is also 
provided  in  Table  3.2.  The  following  two  subsections  discusses  in  further  detail  the 
implications of credit ratings for the levels of debt (Subsection 3.3.1) and the potential 
influence  of  rating  changes  on  the  capital  structure  decisions  of  the  firms  (Subsection 
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Table 3.2 
Previous Studies on the Relationship between Credit Rating and Capital Structure 
Study  Aim of Study  Sample  Findings 
Graham and Harvey 
(2001)  
To examine the practices of cost of capital, capital 
budgeting, and capital structure through a survey study 
392 CFOs from Fortune 500 US firms  Credit ratings are the second most important concern when firms 
make their financial structure decisions 
Brounen et al. (2004)  To understand the capital budgeting, cost of capital, 
capital structure. and corporate governance practices 
through a survey study 
313 CFOs from listed and unlisted 
firms in the UK, Netherlands, France, 
and Germany  
Credit ratings are important for European firms but specifically 
for the UK firms, credit ratings rank as the fifth most important 
concern  
Bancel and Mittoo 
(2004) 
To examine cross-country determinants of capital 
structure choices through a survey study 
87 respondents of publically listed 
firms in 16 European countries 
including the UK 
Credit ratings are the second most important concern for capital 
structure decisions of the European firms’ managers 
Faulkender and 
Petersen (2006) 
To assess whether firms with credit ratings (as a tool 
for reducing information asymmetry) have better 
access to public debt markets resulting in higher 
leverage 
63,272 firm-years observations of US 
firms for the years 1986-2000 
Rated firms have significantly more (5 to 8 percentage points) 
leverage than non-rated firms  
Kisgen (2006)  To examine whether concern for credit ratings affect 
the capital structure decisions 
10,842 firm-years observations of US 
firms for the years 1986 to 2001  
Firms with potential rating change measured by a ‘+’ or ‘-’ sign 
with their credit ratings have debt reducing behaviour 
Kisgen (2009)    To examine whether concerns for credit ratings are 
material for capital structure decisions 
11,372 firm-years observations of US 
firms for the years 1987- 2003 
Downgraded firms follow leverage reduction behaviour. 
Upgrades do not have any significant effect on the leverage 
behaviour of firms 
Tang (2009)  To examine the effect of Moody’s credit rating 
refinements in 1982 on firms’ credit market access, 
financing decisions, and investment policies 
266 US firms between 1980-1983  Firms which are upgraded as a result of rating refinements 
experience ex post decrease in the cost of borrowing and they 
issue more debt than downgraded firms 
Hovakimian et al. 
(2009) 
To examine whether firms have target credit ratings  84,051 firm-year observations of US 
firms between 1985 and 2006  
Firms above credit rating targets show leverage issuance 
behaviour while firms below target show leverage reduction 
behaviour  
Judge and Mateus 
(2009) 
To examine whether rated firms have better access to 
debt markets  
Top 500 UK according to market 
capitalization from 1999 to 2006 
Rated UK firms have significantly higher leverage (5 to 12 
percentage points) than non-rated UK firms 
Mittoo and Zhang 
(2010) 
To examine whether bond market access, measured 
through credit ratings, is linked to higher leverage 
4,741firm- year observations of 
Canadian firms from 1990-2003 
Rated firms have higher leverage than non-rated firms. 
Investment grade firms have less leverage than speculative firms 
Judge and 
Korzhenitskaya (2011) 
To examine the role of credit ratings in accessing debt 
markets during financial crisis of 2001 and 2008 
7,258 firm-year observations of top 
500 UK firms according to market 
capitalization from 1989-2008  
The role of credit ratings in accessing public debt markets is 
more pronounced in periods of tight credit market conditions 
Notes: This table presents a summary of the previous literature to date on the relationship between credit ratings and capital structures.  
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3.3.1.  Credit rating as a Determinant of Capital Structure 
As discussed in Section 3.1.3, under the traditional trade-off theory, firms are likely to 
determine their capital structure by weighing the benefits of debt (e.g., tax shields) against 
the costs of debt (e.g., potential costs of bankruptcy). Further theoretical and empirical 
evidence indicates that mispricing due to information asymmetry and agency costs of debt 
and equity also affects the leverage choice of firms. Therefore, the generic version of the 
trade-off theory suggests that firms should weigh such cost and benefits to determine the 
firms’ capital structure. However, these studies implicitly assume that the supply of funds 
is infinite with a correct price and how much debt to employ is a decision solely at the 
discretion of firms (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). In frictionless markets, there can be 
infinite funding opportunities available and thus firms are able to secure funding for all 
positive  NPV  projects.  However,  in  the  presence  of  information  asymmetry,  firms  are 
opaque to outsiders and the investors cannot directly assess their quality. If this is the case, 
credit rationing by the market does not allow firms to obtain sufficient funds to finance all 
such  projects  (Stiglitz  and  Weiss,  1981;  Faulkender  and  Petersen,  2006).  If  outsiders 
cannot directly assess the firms’ projects, they will demand high coupon rates due to moral 
hazards (Boots et al., 2006). Thus, an optimal strategy for the firms would be to engage in 
high-risk projects to generate higher returns. This creates multiple equilibrium, in which 
firms with higher costs of debt have the incentive to engage in high-risk projects with 
higher returns.  
However,  financial  intermediaries,  such  as  credit  rating  agencies,  can  resolve  such 
problems by minimising concerns about information asymmetry (Boots et al., 2006; Tang, 
2009).  As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  these  institutions  are  theoretically  able  to  generate 
superior information due to economies of scale, specialisation and close connections with 
the firms. Moreover, the continuous monitoring role of rating agencies may further lessen 
such  information  asymmetry  and  serve  as  a  coordination  mechanism  in  the  financial 
markets (Boot et al., 2006). Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argue that if two identical 
firms have similar projects, one firm has no established track record, requiring evaluation 
and monitoring by the lenders, then this firm will have higher costs of debt capital and 
constrained access to sources of funding compared with the other firm with an established 
track record. This implies that firms with credit ratings have better access to the capital  
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markets with lower costs compared with their counterpart firms without credit ratings. The 
hypothesis,  initially  developed  by  Faulkender  and  Petersen  (2006),  for  the  purpose  of 
simplification, is here called the credit rating – market access hypothesis (CR-MA). 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) also empirically test the CR-MA hypothesis by examining 
differences in the capital structure of rated and non-rated US firms. After controlling for 
the  determinants  suggested  by  the  traditional  theories  of  capital  structure  (e.g.,  size, 
profitability and volatility) and further controlling for potential endogeneity, their findings 
show that rated firms have significantly higher leverage compared to non-rated firms. In 
addition,  consistent  with  Boots  et  al.  (2006),  rated  firms  have  lower  interest  coverage 
ratios, showing that firms with low information asymmetry face lower costs of capital. A 
similar study by Mittoo and Zhang (2010), investigating Canadian firms between 1993 to 
2003, also note that Canadian rated firms have higher leverage in comparison to non-rated 
firms.   
A recent study by Judge and Mateus (2009) provides similar evidence for the CR-MA 
hypothesis  from  the  UK  market.  However,  unlike  the  US  and  Canadian  samples,  the 
effects of credit ratings on leverage structure are more pronounced for UK firms. Judge 
and Mateus note that UK rated firms have around 5-12 percentage points higher leverage 
than non-rated UK firms, while Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Mittoo and Zhang 
(2010) report 5-8 and 6 percentage points for US and Canadian rated firms respectively. 
This testifies the significance of credit ratings for the UK firms, as already discussed in 
Chapter 2 Subsection 2.2.2, and shows its relevance to the capital structure of these firms. 
Another recent study, by Judge and Korzhenitskaya (2011), further supports the CR-MA 
hypothesis but also suggests that the effect of possession of credit ratings becomes more 
evident during the period of financial crisis which is characterised by constrained access to 
funding sources, specifically bank financing.  
It should be noted that these studies generally ignore any differences in the rating levels 
and any implications that this can have in determining the capital structure of the firms. 
This would mean that all firms which have credit ratings, ceteris paribus, would have 
higher leverage, irrespective of the particular credit rating they possess. Such a conclusion 
would imply that firms at every rating level have equal access to public debt markets.   
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However,  it  can  be  argued  that  levels  of  leverage  can  differ  across  the  rating  levels. 
Specifically, low rated firms are likely to have constrained access to the debt market since 
a low credit rating would imply higher costs of debt and more covenants in their debt 
contract.  For  example,  Mizruchi  and  Stearns  (1994),  using  credit  rating  as  an  indirect 
proxy for cost of capital, argue that firms with low ratings will have higher cost of capital 
and therefore for such firms it might be expensive to engage in high levels of leverage. 
Similarly,  Diamond  (1991)  argues  that  borrowers  with  lower  credit  ratings  may  have 
higher  capital  costs  compared  with  higher  rated  firms.  Billet  et  al.’s  (2007)  empirical 
findings are that low rated bonds have a higher number of restrictive covenants. This can 
include all types of covenants including restrictions on issuing further debt, which will 
dilute the claims of the existing bondholders. In addition, from the financial distress point 
of view, low rated firms may have a higher probability of default, which will restrict them 
from issuing more debt. Lemmon and Zender (2010) argue that the high risk firms have 
debt capacity constraints which prevent them from issuing more debt despite the fact that 
such firms may have a preference of debt over equity financing.    
Apart from the above factors, a more important reason for low rated firms to have low 
levels  of  gearing  could  be  their  concerns  for  costs  imposed  by  their  credit  ratings. 
Following Kisgen (2006), who highlighted that credit ratings are important considerations 
for the managerial capital structure decisions due to their discrete costs and benefits, it can 
be argued that  low rated firms  would be more inclined towards low gearing levels  as 
concerns for credit ratings can be expected to be higher for such firms in comparison to 
other rated firms. The implication of the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-
CS) would suggest that for low rated firms, the benefits of improving credit ratings or the 
cost of low ratings outweighs the benefits of issuing additional leverage as suggested by 
the CR-MA hypothesis. This is because, compared to other rating categories, downgrades 
for low rated firms can have more serious implications. For example, as already discussed 
in Chapter 2, credit ratings, which are a widespread phenomenon and which are considered 
a key input in the financial decision-making of market participants, can create a vicious 
cycle for such firms. Low rated firms will face higher cost of capital, which as a result will 
affect  their  probability  of  default  and  further  increase  the  likelihood  of  a  downgrade. 
Shivdasani and Zenner (2005) also argue that downgrades for low rated firms can seriously 
affect their ability to access debt markets. Moreover,  a low rating and any subsequent 
downgrades  may  also  have  reputational  concerns  for  these  firms  which  affect  their  
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business operations and disclosure requirements. To achieve better ratings and to avoid any 
downgrade, low rated firms can be expected to have low levels of gearing.  
The positive relationship between the low ratings and levels of gearing is expected to hold 
specifically within the UK context since UK rated firms are likely to be of superior credit 
quality compared to rated firms in other markets. Not specifically from the UK market but 
it  is  noted  that  speculative  grade  issuers  comprised  less  than  10%  of  issuers  in  the 
European market compared to more than 40% in the US market (Batten et al., 2004). As 
will be discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, the sample of the present study also shows such 
differences  where  87%  of  total  sample  firms  are  investment  grade,  while  13%  are 
speculative  grade  firms.  Moreover,  since  the  operations  of  credit  rating  agencies  are 
relatively newer in the UK market, one can expect that initially highly creditworthy firms 
would have been more inclined towards acquiring credit ratings (see Chapter 2, for more 
details). If the above is true, this skewed distribution will make low rated firms particularly 
concerned  about  their  credit  ratings,  as  such  firms  can  easily  be  identified  as  less 
creditworthy firms in the market, thus restricting their access to debt markets and imposing 
certain financial and non-financial costs. Moreover, it can be expected that low rated firms 
operating  in  a  market  with  a  creditor  friendly  bankruptcy  law  would  also  be  more 
concerned about the high costs of low credit ratings as rating downgrades can presumably 
lead debt holders to sub-optimally liquidate low rated firms even in cases where there 
could be any possibility of reorganization.      
The arguments above are, however, inconsistent with Mittoo and Zhang (2010), who argue 
that  speculative  grade  firms  have  high  levels  of  gearing,  as  acquiring  credit  ratings 
facilitates low rated firms in accessing alternative sources of financing. Moreover, they 
argue that speculative grade issuers can issue public debt with fewer covenants, longer 
maturity  and  less  secured  assets  compared  to  what  is  required  to  obtain  bank  debt. 
Therefore, such firms can issue speculative grade debt  and pay back the bank debt to 
protect themselves from covenants and increase their financial flexibility. However, such 
assumptions might not be valid since speculative grade firms, particularly the lowest rated 
firms within the speculative grade, can be expected to have constrained access to debt 
markets due to higher costs of debt, restrictive covenants and high concerns over the costs 
imposed by their credit ratings.   
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It should be noted that the implications of the trade-off theory and the CR-CS hypothesis 
for the capital structure of low rated firms are similar. However, given that credit ratings 
are a relative measure of risk and that the credit ratings are acquired by high creditworthy 
firms who have confidence about the outcomes (see Chapter 2 for details), low rated firms 
can be argued to be financially sound firms according to the trade-off theory. Nevertheless, 
models testing the relationship between credit ratings and capital structure in the study 
include variables that control for the financial condition and therefore the effects of credit 
ratings can be identified separately from financial distress effects.   
From the discussion above, the joint implications of the credit rating – capital structure 
hypothesis (CR-CS) and the credit rating – market access hypothesis (CR-MA) suggest 
that  although  rated  firms  have  better  access  to  debt  markets,  for  low  rated  firms  in 
particular, the cost of having high levels of leverage or having low ratings are expected to 
be high. If the cost of low ratings and benefits of achieving high ratings are material for the 
firms, low rated firms can be expected to have low levels of gearing. Therefore: 
H1a = Other things being equal, low rated firms are likely to have low levels 
of leverage in their capital structure.  
High rated firms can also be expected to choose low levels of leverage for a number of 
different reasons. High ratings may arguably offer firms a competitive edge, with many 
financial and non-financial benefits. Financial benefits can include lower cost of financing, 
easy  access  to  the  commercial  paper  market,  favourable  terms  and  conditions  in  debt 
contracts, availability of alternate sources of financing and increased financial flexibility 
(Diamond, 1991; Shivdasani and Zenner, 2005; Mittoo and Zhang, 2010; Kisgen, 2006). 
Non-financial benefits may include a reputation of being the safest and highest rated firms 
in the market, managements’ successful image in the labour market, employees’ loyalty 
and favourable suppliers’ terms  and  conditions  (Shivdasani  and  Zenner, 2005;  Kisgen, 
2006).   
Due to the benefits of high credit ratings, the CR-CS hypothesis would imply that such 
firms may have low gearing ratios. The conservative behaviour of high rated firms towards 
their  leverage  is,  however,  different  to  that  predicted  by  traditional  theories  of  capital 
structure (Kisgen, 2006). For example, the traditional trade-off theory proposes that firms 
weigh the  costs of debt against the benefits  of debt  to  reach an optimal debt  ratio.  It  
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predicts  that  firms  which  have  a  lower  probability  of  bankruptcy  will  choose  higher 
leverage and vice versa. However, if the costs and benefits of credit ratings are material 
and taken into consideration when weighing other costs and benefits of debt, the optimal 
capital structure ratio thus achieved would be lower than the traditional trade-off theory 
prediction.  This  implies  that  for  high  rated  firms  the  benefits  of  high  ratings  can  be 
expected to outweigh the benefits of having higher leverage irrespective of the fact that 
they can safely employ high levels of debt. It can therefore be expected that high rated 
firms will have low levels of gearing. 
Some  previous  empirical  evidence  also  finds  that  high  rated  firms  have  low  levels  of 
leverage. For instance, Graham (2000) finds that large firms, which are more liquid and 
profitable with a very low probability of distress, surprisingly have lower leverage. Mittoo 
and Zhang (2010) also document that financial flexibility and concerns for credit ratings 
lead high rated Canadian firms to choose low gearing ratios. Following the above argument 
it is expected that high rated firms are likely to prefer low levels of debt. Therefore: 
H1b = Other things being equal, high rated firms are likely to have low 
levels of leverage in their capital structures.   
Contrary to higher rated and lower rated firms, intermediate rated firms can be expected to 
have higher leverage. Although the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis suggests 
considerations for credit ratings should be observable at each rating level, mid rated firms 
should in relative terms be less concerned about their credit ratings in comparison with 
high and low rated firms. It could be argued that mid rated firms take more advantage of 
being able to tap debt markets through the possession of credit ratings. Mid rated firms 
would likely require a large change to get into category where they would benefit from 
being top rated firms. On the other hand, they can be expected to have limited risk of being 
downgraded to a level where market imposes certain financial and non-financial costs. 
Thus, it can be expected that high leverage due to credit ratings, as suggested by the credit 
rating  –  market  access  hypothesis,  is  mostly  driven  by  this  category  of  rated  firms. 
Therefore:  
H1c = Other things being equal, mid rated firms are likely to have high 
levels of leverage in their capital structures.    
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Overall, the above discussion suggests that access to debt markets may not automatically 
mean higher leverage and that the credit ratings held by firms is likely to have a non-linear, 
inverted U-shaped relationship with the leverage structure of the firms. In particular, high 
and low rated firms are expected to have lower levels of leverage than mid rated firms.  
3.3.2. Impact of Credit Rating Change on Capital Structure Decisions 
The previous section highlighted that credit ratings can potentially influence the capital 
structure of firms  due to the benefits  and costs associated  with  different  rating levels. 
Therefore, some firms, which have access to debt markets, can be expected deliberately to 
select lower levels of leverage if the costs and benefits of credit ratings are material for 
those firms. While firms are expected to have a certain amount of leverage in their capital 
structure, the actual level of leverage might change with a change in their credit ratings. 
The effects, which credit ratings have on capital structure, can be examined from two 
distinct  but  interconnected  perspectives.  The  financial  behaviour  of  the  firms  can  be 
expected  to  be  influenced  by  potential  credit  rating  changes,  as  well  as  when  firms 
experience actual rating changes. Therefore, this section reviews the previous theoretical 
and empirical literature on the effects of credit rating changes on the capital structure of 
firms. This section is divided into two subsections: Subsection 2.3.2.1 reviews previous 
studies  related  to  potential  credit  ratings  changes  and  presents  the  hypotheses  for  the 
present study and Subsection 2.3.2.2 discusses the literature focusing on the impact of 
actual credit ratings on financing decisions by firms, and presents hypotheses based on the 
literature review.   
3.3.2.1.  Influence of Potential Credit Rating Changes 
The credit rating- capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) was originally developed to test 
the potential and actual rating changes on the capital structure of US  firms. Since the 
discrete costs and benefits of credit ratings are likely to be material for the firms, they are 
argued to be sensitive even to minor changes in their credit ratings. Therefore, Kisgen 
(2006) argues that firms follow a financing behaviour which will ensure that they can 
achieve higher credit ratings or protect existing ratings from downgrades.  
Credit rating changes may impose financial and non-financial costs on the firms. Given 
that the market perceives credit ratings as conveying some meaningful information about 
firms or their securities, the cost of debt will be sensitive to rating changes. If a firm is  
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downgraded  to  the  next  broad  rating  category,  this  can  theoretically  create  a  pooling 
equlibria for that firm. The market may perceive a similar default probability for all the 
firms  in  a  particular  rating  class,  irrespective  of  whether  the  quality  of  the  individual 
downgraded firm is above or below other firms in the same category. It is therefore likely 
that firms with similar ratings may have a more or less similar credit spread (Kisgen, 
2006).  For  example,  Shivdasani  and  Zenner  (2005)  empirically  find  that  credit  ratings 
explain 58% of variations  in  the credit spreads of bonds  with  different  maturities and 
features. Therefore, rating upgrades (downgrades) may be associated with decreases (and 
increases) in the cost of debt. 
Moreover, due to a strong correlation between the long-term credit rating and short-term 
credit rating of firms (Standard and Poor's, 2008), credit rating downgrades may restrict 
firms in accessing short-term debt markets too. The rating-based triggers in debt contracts 
can also force firms to make repayments earlier or may lead to termination of their credit 
facility (Gonzalez et al., 2004). For example, in a survey study of 1000 US and European 
investment  grade  debt  issuers,  Standard  and  Poor's  reports  that  few  firms  were  highly 
vulnerable to rating triggers or some sort of rating linked contingent liability, such that a 
moderate rating change can lead to serious liquidity problems for those firms (Kisgen, 
2006). Rating triggers in the case of Enron also gave rights to lenders to demand cash 
collateral,  which  further  increased  the  financial  difficulties  of  the  firm  (Langohr  and 
Langohr, 2008). In addition, boards of directors of firms may also use credit ratings as a 
quantifiable  measure  for  evaluating  the  performance  of  management  (Langohr  and 
Langohr, 2008). Ratings changes and triggers also become an important part of the media 
and press news.  
Kisgen (2006) also argues that regulatory dependence on credit ratings is likely to increase 
the sensitivities of firms towards any rating changes. Credit rating embedded into laws and 
regulations can make the behaviour of market participants more predictable (Cantor et al., 
2007). For example, in the US market, institutional investors may not  be able to hold 
securities below a certain threshold, e.g., below investment grade (see Partnoy, 1999), and 
if ratings fall below investment grade, this eventuality leads to forced selling. Since many 
investors are constrained by regulations  dependent  on credit ratings,  the price reaction 
could  be significant  on  rating changes,  causing  yields  on the bonds  to increase. Thus, 
firms’ underlying risk levels may not have increased but they may face higher cost of 
borrowing because of their credit ratings.   
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If the above mentioned costs and benefits of different rating levels are material for firms, 
the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) predicts that firms will follow 
leverage behaviour which will protect them from downgrades and also ensure (or at least 
increase the likelihood of) upgrades, even if such behaviour contradicts what traditional 
theories of capital structure propose. For example, the traditional trade-off theory predicts 
that the firms will offset the benefits of debt against the costs of debt to reach an optimal 
capital structure, which maximises the firms’ value. Such an optimal capital structure, once 
achieved, would require that firms continuously balance these costs and benefits and they 
will revert towards the optimal debt ratio to the degree to which it has departed from this 
optimal debt ratio. However, if the costs or benefits from credit rating changes are material 
for firms, the CR-CS hypothesis predicts that the proximity to rating change will induce 
firms  to  reduce  the  amount  of  leverage,  irrespective  that  the  trade-off  theory  suggests 
higher leverage ratios (Kisgen, 2006). This suggests that firms will balance the costs and 
benefits of credit ratings with the other costs and benefits of debt proposed by the trade-off 
theory in order to reach an optimal capital structure. 
Similarly, the CR-CS hypothesis also has implications for the pecking order theory, which 
suggests a hierarchy in financing where firms typically choose the safest source of funding 
first, i.e., the internal financing. When such sources are fully exhausted they will then turn 
to  external  financing  where  they  have  a  preference  for  debt  over  equity  since  equity 
communicates negative signals to the market. The CR-CS hypothesis, however, implies 
that if the discrete cost and benefits of credit rating changes to firms are material, then 
firms near to rating changes may not follow this hierarchy and may instead issue equity 
first (Kisgen, 2006). Hovakimian et al. (2009), for example, argue that high rated firms, 
which are arguably fewer in the market, may be more reluctant to issue debt and can 
choose  more  costly  measures  such  as  issuing  equity,  if  by  issuing  debt  they  have  to 
compromise on their high ratings.  
Empirically, US studies support the CR-CS hypothesis, showing that firms tend to show 
leverage reducing behaviour if they are close to rating changes. Kisgen (2006) finds that 
US firms near upgrades (as measured by a PLUS sign with the credit ratings) issue 0.6% 
less net debt than equity, while the firms which are near downgrades (as measured by a 
MINUS sign with the credit ratings) issue 0.5% less net debt than equity. The findings 
across all broad rating categories suggest similar results, although the effects of proximity 
to rating changes are more pronounced for firms with higher likelihood of being upgraded  
61 
 
from speculative grade to investment grade or with higher likelihood of being downgraded 
from investment grade to speculative grade. 
If the costs and benefits of rating changes were material for firms, the implication of the 
CR-CS  hypothesis  would  lead  to  somewhat  similar  leverage  behaviour  by  firms 
irrespective of the market. However, there remains the empirical question of whether firms 
in other markets, such as the UK (characterised by a less developed credit rating industry 
and bond market with little or no regulatory dependence on credit ratings), would behave 
in  a  similar  way  to  countries  with  a  long  history  of  credit  rating  agencies  and  well 
developed bond markets, such as the US market. As argued in Chapter 2, UK rated firms 
are possibly larger firms with higher creditworthiness compared to their US counterparts. 
The distribution of UK rated firms suggest that 87% of the firms are investment grade 
while only 13% are speculative grade firms. Hence, it can be argued that the sensitivities to 
ratings  changes  might  be  different  too.  As  Shivdasani  and  Zenner  (2005)  argue,  debt 
issuance by high rated firms with limited debt on their balance sheets may not have as 
significant and economic impact on their ratings and cost of debt as it would for low rated 
firms. Moreover, if the firms have mostly solicited their ratings, which is arguably often 
the case with UK firms, then they are likely to have close relationships with the credit 
rating agencies where they can discuss issues related to their financial leverage, financial 
risks  and  exposures  and  other  business  strategies  in  advance  (Shivdasani  and  Zenner, 
2005). This may lessen the sensitivities to rating changes. As discussed by Kisgen (2006 
and  2009),  one  of  the  major  factors,  why  firms  are  sensitive  to  rating  changes  is  the 
regulatory dependence on credit ratings. Such dependencies on credit ratings  can have 
affect on the use and perception of credit ratings by investors and can significantly affect 
the cost of borrowing of firms. Rating changes can lead to forced selling by institutional 
investors,  which  may  be  argued  to  affect  the  cost  of  borrowing  irrespective  of  any 
significant change in the underlying quality of rated firm (Kisgen, 2006). Thus, it can be 
expected that firms operating in countries with little or no regulatory dependence on credit 
ratings such as the UK market, will be less sensitive to rating changes, whether potential or 
actual.  
Nevertheless, following the prior literature which suggests that firms will follow leverage 
reducing behaviour when they are near credit rating changes, it is hypothesised that:  
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H2a  =  Other  things  being  equal,  firms  with  a  higher  likelihood  of  rating 
changes are more likely to reduce the amount of leverage. 
H2b = Other things being equal, firms with a higher likelihood of downgrade 
are more likely to reduce the amount of leverage. 
H2c= Other things being equal, firms with a higher likelihood of upgrade are 
more likely to reduce the amount of leverage.  
3.3.2.2.  Influence of Actual Credit Rating Changes 
As discussed already, previous studies note security price reactions along with changes in 
firms’ credit ratings. However, most of the previous literature supports the view that rating 
downgrades are followed by negative price reactions whereas rating upgrades do not lead 
to any significant price changes (Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982; Holthausen and Leftwich, 
1986; Wansley and Clauretie, 1985; Cornell et al., 1989; Hand et al., 1992; Steiner and 
Heinke, 2001). In line with US studies, Barron et al. (1997) find similar results for the UK 
market.  These  studies  argue  that  downgrades  by  credit  rating  agencies  have  far  more 
information  content  than  upgrades  because  firms  are  far  more  reluctant  to  directly 
communicate bad news to outsiders than good news. Rating upgrades generally are not 
followed by positive price reactions as firms might be quicker to disclose good news to the 
market before rating agencies incorporate them into their ratings.  
In the context of capital structure, the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) 
also proposes that downgrades are important for the firms and will lead to reduction of 
debt by firms. Rating downgrades, as discussed in the previous section, affect costs of debt, 
access to the short-term debt market, third party relationships and can increase agency 
problems between shareholders and management. Therefore, firms have an incentive to 
revert to their previous ratings or prevent themselves from further downgrades. Kisgen 
(2009) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) argue that firms have target credit ratings, and if costs 
associated with downgrades are higher than adjustment costs of reverting to the debt ratio 
corresponding  to  the  previous  rating,  downgraded  firms  have  a  higher  likelihood  of 
reducing leverage compared with firms which are not downgraded. If the costs associated 
with downgrades are material, firms may choose lower debt ratios than the optimal debt 
ratios suggested by the trade-off theory. The CR-CS hypothesis further proposed that firms  
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may have a preference of equity over debt, if they anticipate that such  behaviour will 
ensure them an upgrade.  
On the other hand, upgraded firms may not experience significant changes in their capital 
structure (Kisgen, 2009). Upgraded firms would arguably enjoy the benefits that rating 
upgrades offer them, i.e., better access to long-term and short-term debt markets, improved 
financial flexibility, and a better management reputation in the labour market, leading also 
to minimisation of agency problems with debt holders and shareholders. It can be argued, 
following the CR-CS hypothesis, that if these benefits are material for upgraded firms, they 
are not likely to bring any significant changes in their capital structure. If the effects of the 
CR-CS hypothesis are incorporated in the dynamic trade-off theory, which suggests the 
firms revert to their target debt ratios once there is a deviation from target, it is likely that 
firms will not do so if the benefits of higher credit ratings (through upgrades) are greater 
than reverting to their targets. For example, if the debt ratio before the upgrade was higher 
and the firm received an upgrade after reducing the total amount of debt or by any positive 
shocks to the cash flow, it is less likely that it will revert to their original debt ratio after 
upgrades if upgrades provide material benefits. Similarly, the hypothesis implies that debt 
issuance after an upgrade also is an unlikely event, as upgraded firms would not like to 
jeopardise their high credit ratings. (Kisgen, 2009).  
Kisgen (2009) also finds empirical results consistent with the CR-CS hypothesis, where 
firms following a downgrade have leverage reducing behaviour. He notes that US firms 
issue 1.5% to 4% (depending on the model used) less debt than equity when they face a 
downgrade.  He  also  finds  that  the  speed  of  adjustment  will  double  when  firms  are 
downgraded compared to when they are upgraded or have no change in their ratings. This 
is also consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2009), who note that firms tend to issue equity 
instead of debt, if their target ratings are below their actual credit ratings. However, they 
note that if actual credit ratings are above their target ratings, they make issuance and 
purchase decisions that increase their amount of leverage.  
For  the  upgraded  firms,  Kisgen’s  results  are  generally  inconsistent  with  the  CR-CS 
hypothesis  for  most  of  the  specifications.  With  the  exception  of  models  with  industry 
effects,  upgraded  firms  issue  more  debt  than  equity.  This  behaviour  is  rather  more 
supportive of the distress argument where the further a firm is from bankruptcy, the higher 
the probability of that firm issuing more debt than equity. The coefficient of the upgrade  
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dummy, however, is notably lower than for the downgrade dummy. Other studies also note 
that the upgraded firms take advantage of their superior position in the market and issue 
more debt. Tang (2009), for the US market, finds that after rating refinements by Moody’s 
in 1982, the firms, which receive higher ratings within the broad rating category, issue 3% 
more debt than the firms which were downgraded. The issuance behaviour of upgraded 
firms can also be explained from a signalling perspective. For example, a survey report by 
the Association of Financial Professionals (2004) shows that 57% of the firms viewed that 
their upgrades were delayed by more than six months after the firms’ financials improved, 
while 73% of respondents believe that they were downgraded within six months of their 
financial deterioration. It is possible that if credit rating agencies delay upgrades, upgraded 
firms are likely to signal their good quality by issuing more debt. 
As  stated  in  Section  3.3.2.1,  the  sensitivities  of  firms  towards  rating  changes  may  be 
influenced by the institutional setup. As the UK market is less developed in terms of credit 
ratings and bond market with little or no dependence on credit ratings, it may affect the 
way firms perceive the relevance of credit ratings and any changes therein for their capital 
structure. However, following the previous theoretical and empirical literature, if firms 
have concerns for their credit ratings as proposed by the CR-CS hypothesis, they would be 
more likely to reduce their amount of leverage after a downgrade in a hope of achieving 
their previous ratings or at least maintaining their current ratings. Conversely, following 
the implications of the CR-CS hypothesis, upgraded firms are more likely not to have any 
change in their capital structure, since the upgraded firms enjoy the discrete benefits of 
achieving higher ratings. Therefore: 
H3a = Other things being equal, downgraded firms will decrease the amount 
of leverage in their capital structure. 
H3b = Other things being equal, upgraded firms are likely to have significant 
change in their capital structure.  
3.4.  Conclusion  
This chapter presented a review of the previous literature related to the capital structure of 
firms. It discussed the main theories of capital structure along with the empirical findings 
of the proxies representing different theories. It highlighted that the previous theoretical 
and  empirical  studies  tend  to  underestimate  the  relevance  of  credit  ratings  in  capital  
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structure decisions until some recent survey studies pointed out the importance of credit 
ratings for managerial capital structure determination. The chapter also highlights the lack 
of empirical studies that have employed UK data, given that one can expect differences in 
the  significance  of  credit  ratings  for  UK  firms’  capital  structure,  due  to  its  unique 
institutional settings.  
This chapter also presented the hypotheses of the present study based on the review of 
previous literature. The rationale behind the hypotheses follows from the credit rating-
capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS), developed by Kisgen (2006), which states that credit 
ratings impose specific costs and benefits on firms, and thus firms are cautious about their 
capital  structure  decisions.  Specifically,  it  presented  three  main  set  of  hypotheses  to 
examine the relevance of credit ratings for the capital structure of the firms. The first set of 
hypotheses relates to the level of credit ratings and the capital structure of the UK firms. It 
is hypothesised that credit ratings have a non-linear, inverted U-shaped relationship with 
the capital structure of the firms. By proposing the implications of the CR-CS hypothesis, 
this is likely to extend prior studies that have assumed similar levels of leverage for all 
rated  firms.  The  second  set  of  hypotheses  related  to  the  implications  of  the  CR-CS 
hypothesis, which suggests that firms are expected to be concerned about any potential 
credit ratings changes. If the costs and benefits associated with these changes are material, 
firms with proximity to downgrades or upgrades are likely to follow leverage reducing 
behaviour. The third set of hypotheses focuses on the relevance of actual credit rating 
changes and their impact on the subsequent capital structure decisions. Firms are expected 
to reduce their amount of debt if rating downgrades impose any material costs on firms, but 
they are not likely to make any change in their capital structure if they are upgraded. These 
hypotheses are tested in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 4 
Literature Review: Credit Rating and Debt Maturity Structure  
4.  Introduction 
This  chapter  reviews  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  the  determinants  of 
corporate debt maturity structures. Although studies have established the prominent factors 
that determine the capital structures of firms, theoretical and empirical research on debt 
maturity structure decision making is still far from being complete. Recent studies (e.g., 
Rauf and Sufi, 2010) emphasise the heterogeneity in capital structure, which conventional 
studies on capital structure mostly ignore in assuming that all debt is the same. In practice, 
debt  has  several  different  dimensions  such  as  maturity,  convertibility,  call  provisions, 
covenants and security, and each one of them is potentially important (Barclay and Smith, 
1996). For example, the recent failure of some financial institutions (e.g., Lehman Brothers 
and  Bear  Stearns)  and  non-financial  firms  (e.g.,  WorldCom,  Enron  and  Penn  Central) 
during the financial turmoil are some prominent cases where the inability to roll over short-
term  debt  exacerbated  the  financial  deterioration  of  these  firms.  This  study,  therefore, 
provides an in-depth on one of the important dimensions of capital structure: the maturity 
of debt in capital structure.  An optimal balance between long-term debt and short-term 
debt can, therefore, ensure reductions in the costs of financing (Ozkan, 2000), tax liabilities 
(Brick and Ravid, 1985), information asymmetry (Goswami et al., 1995; Diamond, 1991; 
Flannery, 1986; Kale and Noe, 1990) and agency costs (Barnea et al., 1980; Myers, 1997).  
The  present  chapter  is  divided  into  four  sections.  Section  4.1  reviews  the  theoretical 
literature on the choice of debt maturity structure. Section 4.2 presents empirical literature 
on the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure. Section 4.3 presents Diamond’s 
(1991) theoretical framework to explain the relationship between firms’ credit ratings and 
their debt maturity structures. It also reviews the previous empirical studies which have 
tested the theory in different settings and presents hypotheses for the present study based 
on the prior literature. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter.   
4.1.  Debt Maturity Structure: Theoretical Review 
Similar to Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance proposition for capital structure, 
Stiglitz (1974) argues that in perfect capital markets, the debt maturity structure of a firm is 
irrelevant for its value. Following this, numerous theoretical and empirical studies have  
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challenged this maturity structure irrelevance proposition due to the market imperfections 
that  play  a  role  in  determining  the  maturity  structure  of  a  firm.  These  theoretical 
extensions, originating as a result of the irrelevance proposition proposed for debt maturity 
structure,  can  be  broadly  grouped  into  four  categories:  (1)  Agency/contracting  Cost 
Hypothesis  (2)  Assets  Maturity  Hypothesis,  (3)  Implication  of  Taxation  for  the  Debt 
Maturity  Structure  and  (4)  Information  Asymmetry  and  Signalling  Theories  of  debt 
maturity structure. Each of these will be discussed in the following sections.  
4.1.1. Agency/Contracting Cost Perspective 
Many theoretical studies view debt maturity structure as a means to reducing potential 
conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. As discussed in Section 3.1.5, risky debt 
financing  may  increase  potential  conflicts  of  interests  between  bond  and  shareholders. 
These conflicts may arise when firms have included risky debt in their capital structure and 
plan to undertake some positive NPV projects, the benefits of which have to be shared 
between the bondholders and shareholders. However, when the firm already has risky debt 
outstanding,  the  bondholders  may  capture  more  benefits  from  the  project,  such  that 
existing shareholders do not earn the required return from that investment project. This 
may in turn give rise to potential agency conflicts over materialising those opportunities, 
leading to debt overhang or underinvestment problems.  
Among other ways to resolve these conflicts, such as the inclusion of restrictive covenants 
in  debt  contracts  and  reducing  the  amount  of  leverage  in  the  capital  structure,  Myers 
(1977) and Bodie and Taggart (1978) argue that reducing the maturity of the debt in the 
capital structure is also likely to lessen any underinvestment problems. The reduction in the 
maturity of debt ensures that the short-term debt matures before the growth opportunities 
are exercised as the firm gets an opportunity to re-contract and re-price its debt such that 
all the gains from the new investment opportunity do not accrue to bondholders.  
It is also argued that short-term debt holds a higher effective priority, as it is paid first. Ho 
and Singer (1982) argue that short-term debt is similar to secured debt, even if the priority 
in bankruptcy is equal for both short and long-term debt. Short-term debt also helps lenders 
to monitor borrowing firms, which may also effectively reduce the disincentive to invest. 
For example, Barclay and Smith (1995) argue that most bank loans are short-term as the 
reduced term of the debt gives banks superior bargaining positions, and maximises the  
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effectiveness  of  the  monitoring  activities.  Easterbrook  (1984)  further  argues  that  the 
agency cost of monitoring is also lower when firms issue short-term debt on regular basis, 
as the market evaluates the prospects and reviews the firm on a regular basis. Hart and 
Moore (1990) and Stulz (1990), arguing along the same lines, suggest that long-term debt 
discourages any managerial discretion in making poor investments. They would mean that 
firms  should  use  more  long-term  debt  when  they  have  fewer  growth  options.  The 
contraction  cost  hypothesis  therefore  suggests  that  firms  with  a  higher  growth 
opportunities set tend to prefer to have shorter debt maturity in their capital structure.  
Given  that  smaller  firms  normally  have  higher  growth  opportunities  than  large  firms 
(Denis,  1994),  smaller  firms  are  likely  to  have  more  short-term  debt  in  their  capital 
structure. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that small firms are also more likely to face 
potential  conflicts  of  interest  between  bondholders  and  shareholders.  This  is  because 
lenders  know  that  small  firms’  owner/managers  will  gain  greater  advantage  from  any 
wealth transfer in favour of their shareholders due to them having a higher stake in the 
firm. Therefore, they are more likely to substitute one asset for another, thus altering the 
overall risk of the firm (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001; Pettit and Singer, 1985). Barnea et al. 
(1980) argue that such conflicts can be curtailed by lowering the maturity in the capital 
structure.  Moreover,  long-term  debt,  specifically  the  long-term  public  debt,  has  fixed 
flotation costs which small firms are less capable of paying (Barclay and Smith, 1995). 
These costs include legal fees, investment banker fees, filing and other transaction costs 
and they can play a significant role in explaining the choice between public and private 
debt (Krishnaswami et al., 1999). Although such costs offer economies of scale, small 
firms are unable to take advantage of these opportunities due to their limited resources. 
Consequently,  they  are  forced  to  take  private  debt,  which  has  an  overall  low  cost, 
particularly  a  low  fixed  component  of  the  cost,  with  shorter  maturity.  Hence,  the 
contracting cost argument implies a shorter maturity of debt for small firms compared to 
larger firms.  
4.1.2. Assets Maturity Hypothesis 
One of the risks associated with debt financing is an inability to service the fixed cash 
outflows with the cash inflows generated by the operations of the business (Morris, 1976; 
Myers, 1977). This risk can be minimised by matching the stream of the incoming and 
outgoing cash flows with each other. This may serve as a hedging policy for the firms  
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whereby the maturities of assets are matched with the maturity of debt. In this case, firms 
may have enough funds generated from the assets so that they can service debt or retire 
debt at the maturity of the debt. When debt matures before the end of the asset’s life, this 
event may elevate the risk of a firm, as there is a possibility that not enough funds are 
generated to pay back the debt by the time of the retirement. Similarly, if debt is due to 
mature after the end of the assets’ life, the funding source and volume is uncertain at the 
maturity of debt and it is likely that the firm has already used up the cash flows generated 
from the assets. Both situations push firms into unfavourable conditions and may elevate 
their risk of liquidation. It is also argued that underinvestment problems can be minimised 
when the schedule of repayments corresponds with the declining value of assets (Myers, 
1977). It follows that firms will finance long-term assets with debt of longer maturity and 
short-lived assets with short-term debt.  
4.1.3. The Role of Taxation for the Debt Maturity Structure 
Another possible explanation for the choice of debt maturity structure can be found in the 
tax related theories by Kane et al. (1985) and Brick and Ravid (1985, 1991). Kane et al. 
(1985) argue that optimal maturity structure can be reached by trading off the benefits of 
tax against bankruptcy costs and the cost of raising the debt. They show that a firm’s 
optimal  debt  maturity  structure  is  likely  to  have  a  negative  relationship  with  its  tax 
advantages and a positive relationship with the flotation costs of the debt. The reason for 
this is that the flotation costs decrease the advantages associated with the debt. When there 
is a decrease in the tax advantages of debt, firms are likely to choose higher maturity in the 
debt structure to ensure that the flotation costs are amortised over a longer period of time, 
such that the tax advantages of debt are never less than the amortised flotation costs.  
Conversely, Brick and Ravid (1985) postulate a positive relationship between taxation and 
debt maturity structure. If the term structure of the interest rate has an increasing slope, 
then the optimal strategy for the firms would be to increase their proportion of long-term 
debt. This is because if the yield curve is upward sloping, it will increase the present value 
of the tax shields in the initial years, thus reducing the tax burden of a firm. This will have 
a direct effect on a firm’s value. In addition to the accelerated tax advantages proposed by 
Brick and Ravid (1985), Brick and Ravid (1991) argue that the long-term debt is also 
optimal, when the term structure of interest rates is either flat or even downward sloping. It 
is argued that in the case of uncertain interest rates, firms with long-term debt are less  
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concerned about adverse shifts in interest rates, unlike firms who have more short-term 
debt. This increased debt capacity particularly increases the value of tax benefits of debt. 
Therefore, the higher the effective tax rate, the higher will be the proportion of long-term 
debt. On the other hand, Lewis (1990) argues that taxation does not have any effect on the 
debt  maturity  structure  once  capital  structure  and  debt  maturity  structure  are 
simultaneously determined. Therefore, firms can achieve an optimal capital structure by 
various  combinations  of  short-term  and  long-term  debt.  These  tax  related  theories 
collectively suggest a mixed relationship between taxation and the debt maturity structure.  
4.1.4. Information Asymmetry and Signalling Theories   
The  choice  of  debt  maturity  structure  may  also  depend  on  private  information  which 
management holds about  the quality of their firm.  Flannery (1986)  and Kale and Noe 
(1990) are among the initial studies which model the role of signalling for the maturity 
structure of  a firm’s debt.  In the presence of information  asymmetry,  Flannery  (1986) 
argues that insiders choose a particular maturity structure of their debt to signal to outsiders 
the true quality of the firms. Flannery argues that high quality firms will elect to have 
shorter debt maturity in their capital structure compared to low quality firms, given that 
there is a positive transaction cost. If the markets cannot distinguish between good quality 
and poor quality firms, good quality firms are more likely to issue short-term debt when 
insiders know that their firm is undervalued.  
Flannery’s  model  assumes  that  issuing  short-term  debt  frequently  over  a  given  period 
incurs more fixed transaction costs than issuing long-term debt and this cost has to be 
sufficiently high so that good firms will choose a maturity structure to identify themselves 
as better firms. If there had been no costs associated with the issuance of short-term debt, 
all firms, whether of good or poor quality, would have the incentive to issue short-term 
debt. This would create a pooling equilibrium such that the market could learn nothing 
about the firm’s quality and their beliefs would remain the same after the issuance of the 
debt.  However,  if  the  flotation  costs  are  sufficiently  high  for  the  short-term  debt,  low 
quality borrowers cannot mimic high quality borrowers and they have no choice but to 
issue  long-term  debt.  This  results  in  a  separating  equilibrium  such  that  high  quality 
borrowers issue short-term debt and low quality borrowers issue long-term debt.   
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Flannery’s  model  assumes  that  all  firms,  whether  of  high  or  low  quality,  will  have  a 
preference for short-term debt but the transaction costs associated with short-term debt will 
not permit low quality borrowers to issue more short-term debt. However, Kale and Noe 
(1986) argue that such separating equilibrium can exist without the transaction costs. Due 
to information asymmetry, uninformed investors might misprice the securities. Although 
both types of long and short-term securities are subject to mispricing, long-term debt is 
more specifically sensitive to such mispricing. Good quality firms would therefore like to 
reduce the losses due to mispricing of long-term debt and issue more undervalued short-
term debt. On the other hand, the low quality borrowers will issue more overvalued long-
term debt. The theoretical models from both studies thus predict a negative relationship 
between a firm’s quality and its maturity structure. 
To summarise, this section has provided a review of the different theoretical frameworks 
that emerged as a direct or indirect critique of debt maturity irrelevance. It has highlighted 
several different factors that affect the maturity structure of the firms, such as agency costs 
faced by firms, their maturity of assets, information asymmetry and firms’ willingness to 
signal quality, and minimisation of their tax burdens. The next section provides a review of 
the empirical evidence on the debt maturity structure of the firms based on the theories 
above. It highlights the prominent factors, which are argued to be of prime importance for 
the determination of the debt maturity structure of firms.  
4.2.  Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure 
Studies have empirically found several important determinants based on the theoretical 
models  discussed  in  the  previous  section  which  impact  on  decision  making  on  debt 
maturity structure. These are discussed below: 
4.2.1. Size 
The  size  of  a  firm  is  one  of  the  most  well  documented  determinants  in  the  empirical 
literature  of  debt  maturity  structure.  The  empirical  literature  mostly  supports  the 
contracting cost-hypothesis, which suggests that large firms have higher maturity in their 
debt maturity structures than their smaller firm counterparts. For example, Barclay and 
Smith (1995, 1996), Stoh and Mauer (1996), Fan et al. (2011) and Cai et al. (2008) report a 
positive  association  between  the  size  of  a  firm  and  its  debt  maturity  structure.  Ozkan 
(2000)  and  Ozkan  (2002),  using  a  dataset  of  429  and  321  non-financial  UK  firms,  
72 
 
respectively, report a direct relationship which supports the theory that larger firms have 
lower agency problems (Smith and Warner, 1979), easier access to long-term debt markets 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988) and higher levels of collateralisable assets than smaller firms 
(Whited, 1992). Deesomsak et al. (2009), investigating the debt maturity structure of Asian 
economies  pre  and  post  the  1997  crisis,  find  that  size  maintains  its  consistency  in 
positively affecting the debt maturity in both periods. Other studies, such as Pettit and 
Singer  (1985)  and  Scherr  and  Hulburt  (2001),  argue  that  small  firms  provide  less 
information about their prospects and operations and find it expensive to produce audited 
statements/reports  to  outsiders.  Consequently,  these  difficulties  affect  their  access  to 
financial markets and such firms are therefore more likely to rely on private debt such as 
bank loans with shorter maturity. Thus, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests a 
positive relationship overall between the size of firms and their debt maturity structures.  
4.2.2. Growth Opportunities 
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, theoretical models developed by Myers (1977), Hart and 
Moore  (1990)  and  Stulz  (1990)  predict  a  negative  relationship  between  growth 
opportunities and the debt maturity structure of the firms. However, empirical evidence on 
the  relationship  of  growth  opportunities  and  debt  maturity  is  somewhat  mixed.  For 
instance, Barclay and Smith (1995, 1996) and Guedes and Opler (1996), using US data, 
find  a  significantly  negative  relationship  of  investment  opportunities  with  leverage. 
However, Scherr and Hulburt (2001), investigating the debt maturity structures of small 
US  firms,  find  mixed  results  for  different  measures  of  debt  maturity  structure.  Many 
studies,  contrary  to  the  above,  have  failed  to  document  any  relationship  between  the 
growth opportunities and debt maturity structure of firms (Esho et al., 2002; Cai et al., 
2008).  Fan  et  al.  (2011),  studying  a  large  international  dataset  of  39  developed  and 
developing economies, find that growth opportunities affect the debt maturity structures of 
the full sample of developed and developing economies directly but for the sub-samples of 
developed and developing economies separately, the growth opportunities do not show any 
impact.  Individual  regression  results  of  the  countries  show  mixed  evidence  where  the 
coefficient is insignificant for UK firms.  
Consistent with Fan et al. (2011), Antoniou et al.’s (2006) results also show that growth 
opportunities do not have any significant impact on debt maturity structures for the sample 
from the UK, France and Germany implying that UK firms are not concerned about sub- 
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optimal investment. However, Ozkan (2000, 2002), employing a dataset of relatively larger 
firms than that used by Antoniou et al.(2006), reports a significant negative relation of 
investment  opportunities  with  debt  maturity  structure  for  the  UK  firms  which  might 
support the theory that firms use their maturity structures to curtail any underinvestment 
problems,  as  proposed  by  Myers  (1977).  As  the  evidence  is  mixed  overall  for  the 
relationship  of  the  two  variables  and  specifically  for  the  UK  sample,  the  expected 
relationship  is  hypothesised  based  on  the  theoretical  argument  that  predicts  a  negative 
relationship between the investment opportunities set and debt maturity structure. 
4.2.3. Assets Maturity Matching 
The  asset  maturity  argument  put  forward  by  Myers  (1977)  has  received  considerable 
empirical support. It appears to be one of the most important factors in a large number of 
the studies examining the determinants of debt maturity structure of firms. In a survey 
study  of  392  US  firms’  CFOs,  Graham  and  Harvey  (2001)  report  that  CFOs  consider 
maturity matching of their debt with assets as the most important consideration when they 
come to make decisions regarding short and long-term debt and Bancel and Mittoo (2004), 
through a survey study of European firms, also find similar results. Kim et al. (1995), 
Stohs and Mauer (1996), Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for the US firms and Cai et al. (2008) 
for the Chinese listed  firms, amongst  others, empirically  find support  for the  maturity 
matching theory. In addition, for the incremental data of straight debt as well as total debt 
issues, assets maturity shows a direct relationship with debt maturity (Guedes and Opler, 
1996). It should also be noted though that a few studies, on the other hand, also report 
mixed  or  insignificant  evidence  (see  for  example,  Deesomsak  et  al.,  2009;  Fan  et  al., 
2011). 
For UK samples, Ozkan (2000, 2002) finds that assets maturity has a significant positive 
relationship with the debt maturity of firms. However, contrary to this, Antoniou et al. 
(2006) find no relationship between assets maturity and debt in the case of UK firms. 
Antoniou et al. (2006) argue that the firms might not match the maturity of their assets 
with the maturity of their debt because the firms are at a stage in their life cycle where 
concerns  for  maturity  matching  and  associated  risk  are  minimal.  As  noted  above,  the 
majority  of  the  empirical  studies  find  a  direct  relationship,  which  suggests  that  firms 
composed  of  long-lived  assets  may  have  longer  maturity  in  their  capital  structure  to 
minimise risk. However, the empirical evidence for the UK firms is mixed. Following the  
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theoretical  argument by Myers (1977), it is  hypothesised that assets maturity and debt 
maturity may have a direct relationship. 
4.2.4. Taxes  
Several empirical studies have tested the impact of taxes on the debt maturity structure as 
proposed by Brick and Ravid (1985) and Kane et al. (1985). Their findings are generally 
inconsistent with the models. For example, Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler 
(1996) and Stohs and Mauer (1996), examining US firms, do not support the positive 
relationship predicted by Brick and Ravid (1985). They find that the term structure of 
interest rates is negatively associated with the debt maturity structures of US firms. In most 
cases,  however,  the  economic  significance  of  the  variable  is  trivial.  The  negative 
relationship may be attributable to the assets substitution hypothesis. It can be argued that 
that when interest rates are high, firms may find it difficult to borrow long-term debt as the 
higher required rate of return may create an incentive to substitute low-risk projects with 
high-risk projects (Guedes and Opler, 1996).   
Empirical evidence also suggests either insignificant or inconsistent results for the theory 
proposed by Kane et al. (1985). Stohs and Mauer (1996) find a negative but economically 
insignificant relationship between effective tax rates and maturity structures for the US 
firms. Cai et al. (2008) find effective tax rates to be insignificant and negatively associated 
with  the debt  maturity structures  of the Chinese firms.  For Germany,  characterised by 
relatively higher tax rates than other sample countries, Antoniou et al. (2006) find that 
effective  tax  rates  are  significant  and  positively  associated  with  maturity  structures. 
Antoniou  et  al.  (2006)  note  that  effective  tax  rates  are  positive  but  insignificantly 
associated with debt maturity structures for UK and French firms. Similarly, Ozkan (2000 
and 2002), for UK firms, finds either positive and/or insignificant relationships between 
effective tax rates and debt maturity structures, depending on the estimation technique. 
Given that in the UK, a dividend imputation system (Fan et al., 2011) is in place and tax 
rules exist that allow separate preparation of accounts for taxation purposes and for public 
financial  reporting  with  allowance  of  other  provisions,  such  as  carry  forward  losses 
(Antoniou et al., 2006), it can be expected that the role of taxation may not be as prominent 
as in those countries that adopt a more ‘classical’ tax system. However, following the 
theoretical predictions and empirical studies, the effective tax rate is included as one of the 
explanatory variables for the determination of the debt maturity structure of a firm.     
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4.2.5. The Quality of the Firm 
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the models proposed by Flannery (1986) and Kale and Noe 
(1990) predict the existence of a negative relationship between the quality of firms and 
their debt maturity structures. This prediction for the quality of firms has been studied 
empirically in  a number of studies.  However, the findings  of these studies are largely 
contradictory to the theory. For example, Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer 
(1996), investigating US firms’ debt maturity structures, note that the quality of firm, as 
measured by abnormal earnings (i.e., the difference between earnings in the subsequent 
year and in the current year, scaled by the earnings of the current year or the share price), 
has  a  negative  relationship  with  the  maturity  structure  of  the  debt,  but  the  economic 
significance of the variable is very low. A subsequent study by Barclay and Smith (1996) 
shows that the effect of abnormal earnings is positive and significant for long-term debt, 
yet the economic significance remains immaterial. Other studies also find contradictory 
evidence  for  the  theory.  For  instance,  Cai  et  al.  (2008)  find  that  quality  is  either  not 
significant  or  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  debt  maturity  structure,  irrespective  of  the 
estimation  techniques  used.  Similarly,  Antoniou  et  al.  (2006)  also  find  mixed  or 
contradictory results for the sample set of UK, French and German firms.  
There could be a number of reasons for these contradictory results. For example, for firms 
in countries dominated by a bank-based system, it might be more prestigious to borrow 
long-term bank loans, and short-term bank loans may actually indicate poor quality of the 
firms (Cai et al., 2008). In addition, levels of information asymmetry may vary in different 
countries.  For  instance,  counties  with  civil  law  are  expected  to  have  less  severe 
information  asymmetry  problems  than  common  law  countries  (Antoniou  et  al.,  2006). 
Therefore,  the  practical  implications  cannot  be  directly  observed  in  these  countries.  It 
might also be possible that the measurement used for the quality of firms, the abnormal 
earnings of firms, does not truly represents that which it is intended to measure (this point 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 5). 
Although the empirical evidence is inconclusive about the significance and direction of the 
variable, the theoretical proposition predicts a negative relationship between the quality of 
firms and the level of maturity of their debt structures. Therefore, following the theoretical 
literature  and  in  alignment  with  the  previous  studies  that  include  firms’  quality  as  a 
determinant  of  debt  maturity  structure,  it  is  expected  that  debt  maturity  structure  is  
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negatively affected by firms’ quality. Good quality firms are expected to have more of a 
preference for shorter maturity in their capital structure than the counterpart poorer quality 
firms.  
To sum up, this section has presented a review of prior studies that have highlighted factors 
which, theoretically and empirically, have been found to affect the choice of debt maturity 
structure of firms. More specifically, the models and empirical analyses point that debt 
maturity structure can be used as a contracting device to minimise agency costs between 
different  stakeholders,  as  a  measure  to  reduce  the  tax  burden,  to  ensure  the  smooth 
servicing of debt and to signal firms’ quality or private information about firms’ prospects 
to outsiders. A summary of these findings are presented in Table 4.1. Apart from these 
factors,  the  cost  of  inefficient  liquidation  may  also  affect  the  choice  of  debt  maturity 
structure, as will be discussed further in the next section.  
4.3.  Credit Ratings and Debt Maturity Structure: Diamond’s (1991) 
Framework 
As argued in the last section, firms have to balance the costs and benefits of different 
maturities of debt to reach an optimal debt maturity structure (Stohs and Mauers, 1996; Jun 
and Jen, 2003). The previous section discussed the prominent factors that firms take into 
consideration  when  making  their  debt  maturity  structure  decisions.  Another  stream  of 
literature on corporate debt maturity structure points out the significance of liquidity risk in 
the determination of debt maturity structure. If the firms are unable to rollover debt to the 
next period, they may have to resort to more expensive sources of financing or they may 
even be subject to liquidation in some cases. In such cases, the liquidity risk has to be 
weighed  against  other  costs  and  benefits  of  choosing  certain  levels  of  maturity  in  the 
capital structure. 
Survey studies also show that liquidity risk is an important determinant of debt maturity 
structure. For example, Graham and Harvey (2001), investigating 392 US firms’ CFOs, 
find that liquidity risk is the second most important factor in the determination of the 
maturity structure of the debt. Bancel and Mittoo (2004), surveying firms’ managers from 
16 European countries including the UK, report that 77% of respondents rate asset maturity 
matching as the most important concern, while 70% of the respondents rate liquidity risk 
as  the  second  most  important  concern  in  debt  maturity  decisions.  However,  the 
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Table 4.1 
A Summary of Prior Theoretical and Empirical Literature on the Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure 
Theory  Argument  Support  Not Support 
Contracting Cost/ Agency 
Cost Perspective 
Firms with large investment opportunity sets will 
prefer more short-term debt 
Barclay and Smith, 1995; Barclay and 
Smith, 1996;  Ozkan, 2000;  Ozkan, 
2002;  Guedes and Opler, 1996;  
Esho et al., 2002; Cai et al., 2008;  
Antoniou et al., 2006; 
Large firms have longer debt maturity than small 
firms 
Barclay and Smith, 1995; Barclay and 
Smith, 1996;   Ozkan, 2000; Ozkan, 
2002;  Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Fan et 
al., 2011; Cai et al., 2008; Datta et al., 
2005 
Antoniou et al., 2006 
Maturity Matching Theory 
Firms match the maturity of their assets with the 
maturity of their debt 
Ozkan, 2000; Ozkan, 2002;  Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; 
Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Scherr and 
Hulburt, 2001; Cai et al., 2008; 
Guedes and Opler, 1996 
 
Antoniou et al., 2006; Datta et 
al.,2005 
Signalling Theory of Debt 
Maturity Structure 
Firm signal their quality through the choice of 
debt maturity structure. High quality firms have 
shorter maturity while low quality firms have 
longer maturity in their debt structure 
Barclay and Smith, 1995; Barclay and 
Smith, 1996 
Ozkan, 2000;  Ozkan, 2002;  
Antoniou et al., 2006; Datta et 
al.,2005 
Tax Related Theories 
Firms employ more long-term debt when the term 
structure of debt is upward sloping 
Datta et al., 2005  Barclay and Smith, 1995; Barclay 
and Smith, 1996; Guedes and Opler, 
1996, Stohs and Mauer, 1996 
Debt maturity structure has a negative 
relationship with the tax advantages of debt 
Stohs and Mauer, 1996  Ozkan, 2000;  Ozkan, 2002;  
Antoniou et al., 2006;  Cai et al., 
2008 
Note: This table displays a summary of the main theories of debt maturity structure and reports some of the empirical evidence, which supports or not supports the 
theoretical argument.  
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empirical literature addressing concerns over liquidity risk in the debt maturity structure is 
still limited, while the way in which it affects the debt maturity structure is also unclear.  
The  liquidity  risk  of  the  firms  may  increase  with  the  level  of  information  asymmetry 
present between borrowers and lenders. In the literature on debt maturity structures, two 
frameworks that theorize the relationship between information asymmetry and the debt 
maturity  structure  are  most  prominent.  The  first  series  of  studies,  which  have  been 
reviewed in Section 4.1.4, is by Flannery (1986) and Kale and Noe (1990) where firms 
choose a certain maturity structure to signal to outsiders about the true quality of the firms. 
The second framework, which extends the conventional models of Flannery (1986) and 
Kale and Noe (1990), is provided by Diamond (1991). Diamond’s framework, as will also 
be discussed further, theorises a non-monotonous link between credit ratings and the debt 
maturity by incorporating the effects of liquidity risk.  
Although both models rely on information asymmetry, there are some notable differences 
between  Flannery’s  (1986)  and  Diamond’s  (1991)  models.  Such  differences  make 
Diamond’s theoretical framework more relevant to explain the credit ratings – maturity 
structure relationship among firms. Flannery and Diamond’s models are both two period 
models where the firms can finance their projects either through long-term debt extended 
over two periods or by short-term debt, which has to be rolled over at the end of first 
period to the next period. In Flannery’s model, the quality of the firms is not observable 
directly  and  the  NPV  of  the  projects  are  not  known  to  outsiders.  In  the  presence  of 
information asymmetry, Flannery (1986) argues, that the firms, through their choice of 
maturity structure, may signal to the market about their quality. In his model, all the firms 
are  expected  to  have  a  preference  for  short-term  debt,  but  due  to  transaction  costs 
associated with short-term debt, high-risk firms may be screened out of the short-term debt 
market. The low-risk firms with favourable private information are likely to choose short-
term debt, as they believe that the market is charging them higher risk premium given that 
the market does not have full set of information about their quality. Moreover, they believe 
that the market would probably alter its beliefs once the firms’ quality becomes apparent, 
and will then charge lower risk premium. This, as stated in Section 4.1.4, would imply a 
negative relationship between the quality of the firms and their debt maturity structures.  
Contrary  to  Flannery’s  model, which implies  that all firms  will prefer short-term  debt 
unless the transaction costs do not permit them, Diamond’s model implies that not all firms  
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have a preference for short-term debt. In Diamond’s theoretical framework, the market can 
observe the initial differences in the firms’ quality, but cannot assess the differences in the 
present value of their projects. The firms, however, have private information about whether 
their projects have positive or negative NPVs. The only observable factor to outsiders is 
the initial quality of the firms, which, unlike in Flannery’s model, varies for different firms 
(Berger et al., 2005). This may be similar to the actual credit ratings, which shows the 
initial quality of the firms while the information is periodically updated for the investors to 
reduce  the  information  asymmetry  that  exists  between  insiders  and  investors.  Unlike 
Flannery’s model, therefore, the choice of maturity structure reveals no private information 
to outsiders. While Flannery’s model is based on the transaction costs, Diamond argues 
that concerns over liquidity risk or rollover risk will result in firms choosing different 
maturity structures.  Liquidity risk is defined by Diamond (1991) as ‘... the risk that a 
solvent  but  illiquid  borrower  is  unable  to  obtain  refinancing’  (p.710).  The  firms  will 
therefore trade off the costs of liquidity risk against the benefits of choosing short-term 
debt.  
Diamond argues that low risk or high rated firms may have private information about the 
superior quality of the projects and thus likely choose short-term debt, specifically directly 
placed debt such as commercial paper, with an expectation that they can rollover the short-
term  debt  into  the  next  period  with  low  interest  rates.  Due  to  favourable  private 
information, such firms are likely to subject themselves to a new set of information that 
will arise at the time of refinancing. For such firms, the benefits of revealing good news in 
future may outweigh the costs associated with the risk of refinancing and liquidation. For 
high  rated  firms,  the  concerns  of  refinancing  may  be  lower  in  the  event  of  bad  news 
revealed to the market at the time of refinancing than that of other firms with low ratings. 
Unlike the average rated borrower, downgrades for high rated firms may not necessarily 
mean that they will be forced into liquidation. As these firms know about the true value of 
their projects, new favourable information at the time of refinancing the existing debt may 
lead to lower expected costs of borrowing. This suggests that if the liquidity risk is absent, 
firms will borrow short-term debt.  
If  there  is  liquidity  risk  present,  firms  are  likely  to  issue  more  long-term  debt.  In 
Diamond’s two period model, long-term debt may not lead to liquidation at the end of the 
first period because the lenders do not have the right to liquidate the firm. The firms, which 
have intermediate ratings with favourable private information, may choose more long-term  
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debt. In comparison with other firms, mid rated firms might choose longer debt maturity at 
higher interest rates to minimise the liquidity risk of being unable to refinance the short-
term debt in the next period. Being intermediate or mid rated firms, they can be expected to 
have better access to long-term debt markets compared to the low rated borrowers. In 
Diamond’s model, the availability of long-term debt for any firm would also automatically 
mean that they could access short-term debt. This would mean that only the high and mid 
rated firms have access to the long-term debt market but, significantly, only the mid rated 
borrowers would prefer to use more long-term debt. 
For some firms the option of long-term debt is not available because of the high probability 
of a negative NPV project. Low rated firms with unfavourable private information may 
like to mimic highly rated firms so that they may not be identified as having negative 
information associated with them. However, such firms are likely to have unstable cash 
flows and higher required rates of return by investors. Higher required rates of return may 
encourage asset substitution problems and, therefore, such firms are likely to have lower 
levels of leverage in their capital structure (Diamond, 1991; Barnea et al., 1980). As their 
initial quality is observable to outsiders, long-term debt financing might not be available 
for such firms. Consequently, these firms will rely more on short-term debt.  
4.3.1. Empirical Evidence on Diamond’s Theoretical Framework  
Diamond’s (1991) theory as a whole suggests a non-monotonic relationship between the 
liquidity risk, as measured by credit ratings, and the debt maturity structure. High risk (or 
low rated) and low risk (or high rated) firms are expected to choose to issue more short-
term debt and intermediately rated firms are likely to issue more long-term debt. The non-
monotonicity has been tested by several empirical studies, which have mostly concentrated 
on the US market. These studies generally use either the available balance sheet data or the 
incremental debt issuance data to test the relationship. Nevertheless, the relationship is 
found to be generally mixed. For example, Barclay and Smith (1995), using balance sheet 
data for the US firms over a period of 19 years (1974-1992), support Diamond’s theory. 
However, the findings suggest that the non-monotonic relationship is solely driven by the 
inclusion of non-rated firms in the sample. If non-rated firms are considered to be of poor 
quality  with  higher  information  asymmetry  and  low  rated  firms  are  considered 
intermediate rated firms, then the findings support the theory. Stohs and Mauer (1996),  
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using the weight average debt maturity ratio, find strong support for Diamond’s theory 
even after controlling for the inclusion of non-rated firms in the sample.  
Most  of  the  studies  testing  Diamond’s  theory  use  balance  sheet  data.  Those  using 
incremental debt issuance data either do not test the theory directly or do not find results 
consistent with the theory. For example, Guedes and Opler (1996) examine the maturity 
structure of 7,368 public debt issuances made by US firms from 1982 to 1993. They note 
that investment grade firms are more likely to issue short-term debt than non-investment 
grade firms.
14 Mitchell (1993) finds that high rated firms have longer maturity compared to 
low rated firms. Berger  et al. (2005), using data on 6,000 newly issued bank loans, find 
that low risk firms tend to issue more short-term debt and the maturity increases as their 
information  asymmetry  is  reduced.  However,  for  high-risk  firms,  their  results  are 
inconsistent with this theory. They note that such firms have maturity structures similar to 
intermediate risk firms. It should be noted that Berger et al.’s (2005) results cannot be 
compared  directly  with  prior  studies  by  Barclay  and  Smith  (1995),  Guedes  and  Opler 
(1996) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) as they have used bank loan data, which arguably has 
different  features  compared  with  public  debt.  Banks  have  close  relationships  with 
borrowers so that they can effectively monitor, renegotiate, and enforce their loan terms 
and conditions. Such characteristics of bank loans may limit the power of the models to 
test Diamond’s theory correctly.  
A few studies have also used accounting measures of credit quality for testing Diamond’s 
theory. Scherr and Hulburt (2001), for example, test the theory for small US firms by using 
Altman’s (1968) z-score. Although their results are consistent with the theory, accounting 
measures  might  not  be  appropriate  for  testing  the  theory,  as  the  maturity  of  the  debt 
structure is dependent on the disclosure of information to outsiders at the end of the first 
period, when the firms have to rollover the debt to the next period. Accounting measures 
are  based  upon  information  which  is  already  publicly  available.  A  few  studies,  where 
although they do not test any signaling theory directly, support Diamond’s liquidity risk 
argument for high rated firms. Jun and Jen (2003), for example, report that the short-term 
debt is mostly accessed by financially strong firms who enjoy greater financial flexibility.  
                                                 
14 Specifically for capturing liquidity risk, Guedes and Opler (1996) use the size of firms, for which they note 
that large firms have lower maturity in their debt issuance.   
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Unlike US studies, which tend to include liquidity risk in modelling the determinants of 
debt maturity structure, evidence from non-US markets and specifically for the UK market 
is non-existent. For example, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1997), Ozkan (2000, 2002), 
Antoniou et al. (2006) and Fan et al. (2011), ignore the relevance of liquidity risk in their 
models. Moreover, it should also be noted that most of the empirical studies from the US 
market also find mixed relationships between liquidity risk, as measured by credit ratings, 
and debt maturity structures. Therefore, it is expected that a non-US study will provide 
empirical evidence to the extent that liquidity risk is relevant for debt maturity structure 
decisions. Following Diamond’s (1991) theoretical argument, it is hypothesised that: 
H4a:  If  other  things  remain  constant,  there  is  a  non-linear,  inverted  U-
shaped  relationship  between  credit  ratings  and  the  debt  maturity 
structures of the firms. 
4.4.  Conclusion 
This  chapter  reviewed  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  the  determinants  of 
corporate debt maturity structure. The literature suggests several possible determinants of 
debt  maturity  choice, including  firms’ size,  growth opportunities,  the  maturity of their 
assets  structure,  the  firms’  quality,  and  taxation.  The  chapter  focuses  on  Diamond’s 
theoretical  framework  to  test  the  relationship  between  firms’  credit  ratings  and  debt 
maturity structures. It highlights that prior US studies have found mixed empirical support 
in relation to Diamond’s theory. Given that there is no prior UK study, which tests the 
liquidity hypothesis, a study using data on UK firms is likely to provide an interesting 
insight regarding the applicability of the theory within a different market. Following the 
theoretical argument put forward by Diamond (1991), which is based on the varying levels 
of liquidity risks across rating levels, a non-linear relationship is hypothesised between the 
credit ratings and the debt maturity structures. High rated firms are likely to have low 
liquidity risk and therefore they are expected to prefer short-term debt, mid rated firms 
have  relatively  higher  liquidity  risks  but  better  access  to  long-term  debt  markets,  and 
finally low rated firms may have higher liquidity risk but also suffer from constrained 
access to the long-term debt market. Thus, high rated and low rated firms are expected to 
have higher levels of short-term debt, compared to mid-rated firms, which may use more 
long-term debt. These theoretical predictions are put to the test in Chapter 8.   
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Chapter 5 
Sample and Methodology 
5. Introduction 
This  chapter  discusses  the  sample  selection  criteria  and  presents  the  empirical  models 
under consideration. The objective of the chapter is to provide a clear rationale behind the 
research design of the study. The chapter has four sections: Section 5.1 focuses on the 
sample  selection  criteria  and  the  design  of  the  study,  while  Section  5.2  presents  the 
empirical models and estimation techniques along with the measurement of the proposed 
variables. Section 5.3 presents the outlier detection and treatment procedures and Section 
5.4 concludes the chapter. 
5.1. Sample Design 
This  section  describes  the  sample  selection  procedures  regarding  the  sample  period, 
sources of data used and sample formatting procedures. The section is further divided into 
three subsections. Section 5.1.1 presents the criteria for selecting the sample period, while 
Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 justify and discuss the sample selection procedures for the rated 
and non-rated firms’ samples, respectively.  
5.1.1. Sample Period 
The data for Standard and Poor’s credit ratings were acquired in September 2009 and the 
extraction of accounting data from Datastream was finished in January 2010. The data 
period  for  the  present  study  therefore  runs  from  January  1988  to  January  2009.  The 
selection of the initial year for both credit ratings and accounting data are driven by the 
availability of the first rated firm-year with Standard and Poor's. The final data before 
outlier treatment consist of 42,872 firm-years of 4,169 firms over 22 years. With respect to 
previous studies, the present study covers a comprehensive database in terms of the length 
of the period covered, and the sample size included. For example, prior studies on capital 
structure and debt maturity structure such as Bennett and Donnelley (1993) used data from 
1988 to 1988 (433 firms), Rajan and Zingales  (1995) from  1987 to 1991 (608 firms), 
Ozkan (2000)  from  1983 to  1996 (429 firms), Ozkan (2001) from  1984 to  1996 (390 
firms), and Bevan and Danbolt (2004) from 1991 to 1997 (1054 firms). Large sample sets, 
on the other hand, may raise some issues, as the variables under consideration may not  
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retain their consistency over the sample period. The study, therefore, also provides an in-
depth analysis of the determinants of capital structure and debt maturity structure on an 
annual basis, to examine whether the explanatory variables maintain their consistency over 
the  years. Moreover, regressions  are also  conducted with  year dummies to  reduce any 
potential time effects in the model.  
The  study  uses  two  data  sets  with  respect  to  the  hypotheses  set  in  the  study.  For  the 
purpose of investigating the impact of credit ratings on the level of debt and its maturity 
structure (H1a, H1b,  H1c, and H4a), a sample of rated and non-rated UK firms is used. This 
consists of 4,065 non-rated firms (41,998 firm-years) and 104 rated firms (874 firm-years). 
For examining the effects of potential as well as actual rating changes (H2a, H2b, H2c, H3a 
and H3b), a sample of rated UK firms is used, which consists of 104 rated firms (874 firm-
years). The following subsections discuss the sampling selection procedures of these rated 
and non-rated firms and present the related statistics of the sample selected. 
5.1.2. Data for Rated Firms 
Standard and Poor’s historical issuer credit ratings data were not readily accessible to the 
public  and  were  not  available  from  any  financial  database  or  website  at  the  time  of 
collection. For the present study, the data were purchased from the Standard and Poor’s. 
The credit rating data  were only acquired for  non-financial firms  as per Standard and 
Poor’s  classification  criteria.  Following  Shyam-Sunder  and  Myers  (1999),  Rajan  and 
Zingales (1995) and Kisgen (2006, 2009) for the US, and Ozkan (2000, 2001 and 2002) 
and Bevan and Danbolt (2004) for the UK, amongst others, financial firms, such as banks, 
insurance agencies and other financial institutions, are excluded from the sample. These 
firms may have a different capital structure, which may not be directly comparable with 
the  capital  structures  of  non-financial  firms.  For  example,  specifically  in  the  banking 
sector,  the  requirements  of  minimum  capital  may  directly  affect  the  capital  structure 
decisions of these firms. Additionally, insurance firms have investor insurance schemes 
such as deposit insurance, which are not comparable to the debt issued by non-financial 
firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Following Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler 
(1996) and Kisgen (2006, 2009), the dataset includes utility firms, as these firms actively 
acquire ratings, and the nature of the research questions allows for this inclusion. However, 
to be consistent with prior studies which have generally excluded regulated firms from 
their sample (e.g., Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Ozkan, 2000, 2001 and 2002; Shyam-Sunder  
85 
 
and Myers, 1999), the analysis is also carried out excluding utility firms. In addition, the 
effects of such inclusion are further controlled for by a dummy variable for utility firms.   
5.1.2.1.  Reason for Selecting Standard and Poor’s Ratings 
The dataset acquired from Standard and Poor’s contained 355 UK rated firms. Standard 
and  Poor’s  is  a  reputable  credit  rating  agency  recognised  by  Nationally  Recognised 
Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) in the US (see Chapter 2, for more details). 
Although these rating agencies do not have any recognition criteria in the UK market, 
Standard and Poor’s, according to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000), is 
among the well-recognised rating agencies in the UK market based on market recognition 
(p.51).  This  report  also  suggests  that  as  in  the  year  2000,  Standard  and  Poor’s  rating 
agency is  also  amongst  the two rating  agencies with  the largest  coverage  of UK non-
financial firms. (Table 5.1). However and as will be further discussed in Subsection 5.1.3, 
Standard and Poor’s are found to have the largest coverage of quoted public UK firms 
when datasets of different rating agencies are matched with Datastream. For example, the 
total number of firms rated by Standard and Poor’s are 119 compared to 48 by FITCH and 
38 by Moody’s. Given that the present study employs only public firms with data available 
from Datastream, choosing the Standard and Poor’s database for rated firms is appropriate 
for sample selection. 
Table 5.1 
Corporate Ratings by Agency and Country (G10) 
G10*  Duff & Phelps  FITCH  Moody’s  Standard and Poor’s 
US  434  245  2,645  2,224 
UK  26  72  155  147 
Japan  2  2  254  40 
Netherlands  2  1  56  39 
France  4  6  26  37 
Sweden  2  1  21  19 
Germany  1  1  18  18 
Switzerland  0  0  11  13 
Belgium  0  0  6  4 
Italy  27  0  1  4 
                          Source: Basel committee on banking supervision (2000).  
              * The report does not provide comparable figures for Canada  
Another reason for using credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s is the availability of 
historical data. Historical long-term credit ratings data from other agencies are either not 
accessible  or  not  suitable.  For  instance,  A.M.  Best  mostly  rates  the  financial  sector, 
particularly the insurance sector (Duff and Einig, 2009) while for FITCH, only current data  
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on credit ratings as of 2009 was available. Duff and Einig (2009) also find that in the UK, 
the demand for smaller or specialised rating agencies is less and generally firms acquire 
ratings from either Standard and Poor's or Moody's or both. In some cases, however, firms 
also acquire FITCH ratings. The use of the Standard and Poor’s ratings is in line with prior 
literature (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Kisgen, 2006 and 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2009) 
which will facilitate a direct comparison with these studies.  
Some previous studies, such as Stohs and Mauer (1996), also used Moody’s ratings for 
firm-years where Standard and Poor's ratings were not available. Therefore, Moody’s long-
term issuer credit ratings data are also matched with Datastream to identify the firms rated 
by Moody's but not by Standard and Poor’s. The total number of firms obtained from 
Moody's website was 128
15 during 1988-2009 but data for only 38 firms w ere available 
from Datastream. The matching of Standard and Poor's and Moody's datasets reveals that 
only 3 firms or 24 firm-years are not rated by Standard and Poor's. Given that prior studies 
have shown that both firms have issued nearly identical ratings (e.g., Beattie  and Searle, 
1992
16; Cantor and Packer, 1994), if only Standard and Poor's ratings are used presently, it 
can be expected that the results will be qualitatively similar to alternative rating agency 
data. Moreover, as the data available from Moody's  are inadequate, it is not economically 
feasible to conduct a separate analysis for this group of firms. The analysis in this study is 
therefore restricted to Standard and Poor's credit ratings. 
5.1.2.2.  Rationale for Selecting Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating   
The dataset acquired from Standard and Poor’s contains the long and short-term issuer 
ratings for the UK firms. Consistent with the objectives of the study, the present study 
employs the long-term issuer’s ratings only. The use of the long-term issuer ratings is 
essential for the analysis, as it will help understand how the overall ability to pay debt 
obligations affects a firm’s overall financial decision making rather than investigating the 
effects on any specific debt commitment. The issuer credit ratings do not take into account 
any debt instrument specific risk such as its standing in bankruptcy, statutory preferences 
or enforceability of the obligation, and instead only provides an opinion of the obligator’s 
capacity to meet the obligations when they come due (Standard and Poor’s, 2008). The 
                                                 
15 It can be noted that the number of rated firms by Moody’s available on their website appear to be different 
from  the  number  of  rated  firms  reported  by  the  Basel  committee  on  banking  supervision  (2000).  The 
difference may be because of the classification adopted by the authors of the committee’s report. 
16  Beattie and Searle (1992)  find a correlation of 0.97 between the ratings of Standard and Po or's and 
Moody's.   
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overall ability to fulfil long-term obligations measured by long-term issuer credit ratings is 
also argued to play an important role in determining the ratings of specific debt issues 
(Langhor and Langhor, 2008). Another reason to choose long-term issuer credit ratings is 
the strong relationship between long-term credit ratings and short-term credit ratings (see 
Standard and Poor's corporate rating criteria, 2008), which allows the use of long-term 
credit ratings even for debt maturity structure analysis. Besides, the database acquired from 
Standard  and  Poor's  firms  mostly  contains  long-term  issuer  ratings  and  only  a  limited 
number of firms have short-term ratings. Finally, the selection of long-term ratings is well 
in line with that employed in prior literature (e.g., Kisgen, 2006, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 
2009; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Rauh and Sufi, 2010). 
5.1.3. Data Matching between Standard and Poor’s and Datastream  
Firms  from  Standard  and  Poor’s  are  manually  matched  with  Datastream  using 
identification codes provided by Standard and Poor’s which included CUSIP, GICS, base 
CINS, SIC, NAICS, and TICKER  and other information such as firms’ name, previous 
names  of  firms,  industry  classification  (as  per  Standard  and  Poor’s  classification)  and 
parents of the firms. The initial matching is done by matching the tickers symbols in the 
Standard and Poor’s dataset with Datastream Ticker Symbol (Datastream code WC05601). 
If the ticker symbol was not available in Datastream, base CUSIP, GICS and SIC were 
compared to identify the firm. Since ticker symbols are only assigned to firms listed on the 
London  Stock  Exchange,  private  firms  were  excluded  from  the  sample.  Notice  that, 
delisted firms are included in the sample as long as their data are available within the 
sample period in order not to face a survivorship bias problem.  
With  initial  matching  of  355  Standard  and  Poor’s  rated  firms  with  Datastream,  the 
available firms were reduced to 119 firms as 234 excluded firms were non-quoted firms. 
The non-quoted firms are not part of the sample as such firms may have different financial 
structures  compared  to  the  listed  or  quoted  firms.  Listed  firms  have  better  access  to 
national and international markets and thus are subject to different local and international 
laws and policies (Hall et al., 2004) and as a result, unlisted firms may have a different set 
of variables influencing their capital structures (Giannetti, 2003; Hall et al., 2004), which 
is outside the scope of the present study.   
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The remaining 119 rated firms are classified into 10 major industries (i.e., Oil & Gas, 
Basic  Materials,  Industrials,  Consumer  Goods,  Health  Care,  Consumer  Services, 
Telecommunications,  Utilities,  Financials  and  Technology)  using  the  Datastream  code 
‘ICBIN’. This reduces available sample firms to 111, as 4 firms are classified as financials 
while  the  industry  classification  is  missing  for  the  other  4  firms.  7  firms  are  further 
excluded from the sample as no accounting data were available for any year in the sample 
period. The total number of rated firms used as a sample is therefore reduced to 104 over a 
period of 22 years with 874 firm-years available (See Table 5.2). The final sample consists 
of 57 active and 47 dead firms.   
Table 5.2 
Initial Matching of the Rated Firms 
  No. of firms 
Firms rated by Standard and Poor’s  353 
(-) Private or non-quoted firms  234 
     Classified as financial firms by Datastream code ICBIN  4 
     Firms with no Industry classification available  4 
     Firms with no accounting data available in Datastream  7 
Final sample of rated firms  104 
Active firms  57 
Dead firms  47 
Note: This table reports the steps followed for the initial matching of Standard and Poor’s firms 
with Datastream 
Table 5.3 shows the firm-year observations of 104 firms over the 2 1 years. The sample 
period starts from 1989 to 2009 but the first rated firm-year is available in 1989. Panel A of 
Table 5.3 shows the number of available rated firm -years across the sample and Panel B 
shows the frequency of data available for different firms. It can be noted that  the highest 
number of firm-years are available in 2003-2004. Both the panels shows that the data is not 
equally distributed across the years and the number of firm -years vary considerably aver 
years. This further provide support to conduct analysis across the sample period. 
Table 5.4  shows the industrial classification of  the  104  sample firms. The  sample is 
dominated by consumer services, having 29% weighting in the total sample, followed by 
industrial firms. From the statistics, it can be noted that data  are not evenly distributed 
which may pose problems in interpreting the results  as the results may be driven by  the 
large proportion of firms within one industry. This provides some motivat ion to include 
industry dummies to capture any effects that this may have on the results. Moreover, as can 
be noted, and was discussed earlier, the sample includes the utility firms. The proportion of  
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utility firms is only 14% of the sample, which although low as a proportion of total rated 
firms, suggests active use of credit ratings by regulated firms.  
 
 
 
5.1.4.  Data for Non-Rated Firms        
To examine the effects of credit ratings on capital structures and debt maturity structures, 
the construction of a credit quality coding scheme is done by using two coding methods. 
The first coding scheme is based purely on the actual credit ratings of firms, while the 
second  coding  scheme  includes  the  non-rated  firms  as  one  of  the  categories  of  credit 
quality.  In the second coding scheme, non-rated firms  are  classified  as  the firms  with 
relatively inferior credit quality and having less access to debt markets. Rated firms are 
Table 5.3 
Distribution of Firm across the Sample Period (Rated Firms Only) 
Panel A: Firm-years available and their weights in the sample 
Years  Firm-years  Percent  Year  Firm-years  Percent 
1989  1  0.1%  2000  61  7.0% 
1990  7  0.8%  2001  61  7.0% 
1991  10  1.1%  2002  69  7.9% 
1992  15  1.7%  2003  71  8.1% 
1993  21  2.4%  2004  74  8.5% 
1994  26  3.0%  2005  69  7.9% 
1995  29  3.3%  2006  63  7.2% 
1996  30  3.4%  2007  59  6.8% 
1997  36  4.1%  2008  54  6.2% 
1998  40  4.6%  2009  30  3.4% 
1999  48  5.5%  Total  874  100% 
Panel B: Number of Firms with their available data 
Years of  
Data 
No. of  
Firms  
Years of 
Data 
No. of  
Firms 
1  2  11  5 
2  11  12  3 
3  6  13  4 
4  8  14  2 
5  5  15  2 
6  5  16  1 
7  9  17  2 
8  10  18  4 
9  7  19  4 
10  14  Total  104  
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assigned a numerical code from 1 to 5 based on the broad rating category (see Subsection 
5.2.1.2 for more details) and non rated firms are assigned a numerical code of ‘6’. The 
numerical coding is assigned according to the actual rating of the firms starting from ‘1’ to 
AA+,  AA  and  AA-  rated  firms  (the  highest  broad  category  available  in  the  sample), 
numerical code of 2 to the second broad category of A+, A and A-, to ‘5’ to B+, B and B- 
rated firms (the lowest broad category available in the sample). This is followed by the last 
numerical code ‘6’ to non-rated or NR firms. The non-rated firms are considered to be of 
lower quality or firms with low creditworthiness due to various reasons. For example, there 
might be a self-selection bias in the rating process (Adam et al., 2003). Prior to being rated, 
the management of the rated firms may be aware and are confident that their firms would 
have a favourable outcome and thus they are more likely to get ratings from external rating 
agencies. In such cases, it can be assumed that firms whose management considers their 
credit quality to be superior are more likely to get rated. Stated differently, rated firms have 
better creditworthiness than non-rated firms.  
Table 5.4 
Industrial Classification of Rated Firms 
  Total No. of Rated 
Firms 
Total Weight of Firms 
within the Sample (%) 
Basic Materials  7  6.73 
Consumer Goods  14  13.46 
Consumer Services  30  28.85 
Health Care  3  2.88 
Industrials  18  17.31 
Oil & Gas  4  3.85 
Technology  2  1.92 
Telecommunications  11  10.58 
Utilities  15  14.42 
Total  104  100 
Apart from assigning the lowest code to the non-rated firms due to their creditworthiness, 
these firms may also face constrained  debt capacity. For example,  Lemmon and Zender 
(2010) argue that firms with credit ratings, whether investment or speculative grade, are 
not  constrained  by  the  debt  capacity,  while  firms  without  a  credit  rating  may  face 
difficulties in raising the amount of leverage they require. This implies that firms that have 
speculative grade ratings are expected to be better-off in terms of debt capacity than their 
counterpart non-rated firms. For example, a number of studies, using ‘rating status’ as a 
proxy for debt capacity (e.g., Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Judge and Mateus, 2009; 
Mittoo and Zhang, 2010), find that rated firms have higher leverage in comparison to non- 
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rated firms. Moreover, the rated firms have also an option to disclose or not their ratings to 
the public (Standard and Poor’s corporate rating criteria, 2008) and it is more likely that 
high rated firms disclose their ratings to the public more often.  Given that the present 
sample contains only firms that have disclosed their ratings, these firms are expected to be 
of  superior  quality  than  remaining  firms  not  included  in  the  sample  of  rated  firms.  A 
similar procedure has also been followed by Stohs and Mauer (1996) who argue that non-
rated firms have high liquidity risk but constrained access to long-term debt markets.  
Although  non-rated  firms  in  the  UK  market  may  be  considered  as  having  constrained 
access to public debt markets (the rating effect as suggested by the CR-MA hypothesis), it 
can be argued that they may not be strictly classified as firms with poor credit quality such 
as in the case of the US market. Since possession of credit ratings is more prevalent in the 
US market, firms that do not possess credit ratings in the US market can be classified as 
firms having poor credit quality. However, in the UK market, the assumption about credit 
quality may not always hold, as several firms that do not acquire credit ratings cannot be 
strictly classified as low creditworthy firms. Nevertheless, in relative terms, rated firms can 
still be expected to have better access to public debt market than non-rated firms where 
public  debt  arguably  have  longer  maturity  than  other  sources  of  financing  (e.g.,  bank 
loans). The results of the present study, as will be discussed further in Section 6.2.2 of 
Chapter 6 and Section 8.2.1 of Chapter 8, provide strong evidence for the validity of the 
assumption after controlling for several firm-level characteristics. It should also be noted 
that endogenous relationship in this case is also inevitable. Firms who do not want  to 
access public debt market are not likely to have credit ratings. The results for non-rated 
firms should, therefore, be interpreted with caution.  
To obtain a sample of non-rated firms, Datastream codes DEADUK 1-7 are used to extract 
the data for dead firms while Datastream code ‘FBRIT’ is used to extract data for all active 
firms. The data similar to rated firms extend over the period between 1989 and 2009. The 
initial sample contained 8,967 firms out of which 7,049/1,918 are dead/active firms (See 
Table  5.5  for  sample  selection  steps).  These  firms  are  classified  into  10  industries 
(Datastream code: ICBIN) to identify the financial firms. The classification reduces the 
number of firms to 6,013. A total of 1,320 firms with no industry classification available 
and 1,462 firms with missing accounting information during the sample period are also 
excluded from the sample.    
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As most of the explanatory and control variables are scaled by total assets, any firm that 
reports ‘zero’ total assets or where the data are not available for total assets had to be 
excluded from the sample. Out of the remaining 4,551 firms, 53 firms are deleted on this 
basis. Firms with no information available on total debt are also excluded although firms 
reporting  ‘zero’  total  debt  remains  part  of  the  sample  as  they  convey  meaningful 
information. From the remaining sample, 285 firms were identified which had similar data 
but reappear with different codes. Such firms may distort the analysis by their double or 
triple  inclusion  and  may  underestimate  the  effects  of  explanatory  or  control  variables, 
specifically for rated firms.  
Table 5.5 
Sample Selection Procedure 
  Dead  Active  Sub-Total  Total 
Initial Sample  7,049  1,918  8,967  8,967 
(-)Firms with no industry classification available  1,319  1  1,320   
    Financial Firms  1,147  487  1,634   
    Firms with no accounting data available      1,462   
    Firms with no total assets information 
available 
    53   
    Firms with no total debt information available      21   
    Firms included more than one time      285   
    Firms Rated by  FITCH      8   
    Firms Rated by  Moody’s      3   
Rated firms with previous names appearing as  
separate firm 
    12  (4,798) 
Final sample containing firms rated  
by Standard and Poor’s 
2,868  1,301  4,169  4,169 
 (-) Firms rated by Standard and Poor’s  47  57  104  104 
Non-rated Firms  2822  1,244  4,065  4,065 
Firm-Year Observations        42,872 
To ensure that the sample only comprises of non-rated firms, firms rated by the other two 
major rating agencies Moody’s and  FITCH, are  also  eliminated  from the sample. The 
credit rating data of the two rating agencies is extracted from their official databases.
17 As 
discussed earlier, these three credit rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and 
FITCH) have the largest share of rating business in the UK and it is believed that the 
chances of error due to inclusion of rated firm by other small agencies is minimal.  
FITCH  only  reports  the  current  issuer  rating  data  on  their  website  and  no  historical 
information  is  available.  There  are  potential  chances  of  error  that  firms,  which  were 
                                                 
17 Available at http://www.moodys.com and http://www.fitchratings.com  
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historically rated by FITCH, are not identifiable in the current database and are therefore 
not removed from the non-rated sample. However, after matching FITCH currently rated 
firms with Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s datasets, it is noted that most of the FITCH 
rated firms have also Moody’s and/or Standard and Poor’s ratings. This is likely to reduce 
any chances of erroneous inclusion of rated firms in the non-rated sample as those firms 
become part of the Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s sample set. 
A total of 131 firms are rated by FITCH as on September 2009 out of which 48 firms have 
accounting data available from Datastream. FITCH ratings information contains details 
about the CUSIP, Ticker’s, SIC code, GICS, NAICS of firms. Each firm is individually 
matched with Datastream firms ID’s. Eight firms were identified as having ratings from 
FITCH but not Standard and Poor’s and Moody's and are excluded from the sample. Data 
for  firms  rated  by  Moody’s  are  also  collected  from  their  official  website.  A  similar 
procedure is followed to eliminate rated firms from the sample. Three firms were identified 
which do not have ratings from Standard and Poor’s or FITCH and are also removed. 
Out of the remaining 4,181 firms, twelve firms were identified from FITCH, Moody’s or 
Standard and Poor’s databases with a different previous name. It is difficult to identify 
when they received a rating status or whether the rating status was before or after the 
change of their name. Therefore, these firms are excluded from the sample to ensure that 
the sample for ‘NR’ or code ‘6’ only contains firms not rated by Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s or FITCH. The final sample consists of 4,169 firms which includes the 104 firms 
rated by Standard and Poor’s. The total number of non-rated firms in the sample is 4,065. 
The final sample of 4,196 firms, without the exclusion of the 104 Standard and Poor’s 
firms, is dominated by the industrial sector followed by consumer services sector (see 
Table 5.6). The utility sector only carries 2.3% weight (lowest) in the total sample, the 
inclusion of which is not expected to change the results significantly. To minimise any 
potential  impact  of  the  industry-level  heterogeneity,  industry  dummies  are  also 
incorporated in the model (discussed in detail in Subsection 5.2.1.3). 
The final dataset is an unbalanced panel dataset containing 42,872 firm-years observations. 
It should be noted that the sampling procedures followed in this study are more reliable 
than a  majority  of prior studies, as  there are no minimum  criteria  for  the firms  to  be 
selected in the sample. For example, Ozkan (2001) only included firms with at least 5 
years of data available, De Miguel and Pindado (2001) for at least 6 consecutive years, and  
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Titman and Wessels (1988) and Auerbach (1985) amongst  others,  also excluded firms 
which did not have continuous data within the sample period. Prior studies, therefore, bias 
their sample towards large capitalisation firms. For this reason, the sample used in this 
study is large compared to that employed by previous studies on capital structure and debt 
maturity for UK firms (Ozkan, 2000, 2001 and 2002; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002 and 2004; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This study, therefore, aims to provide results for a wider market 
capitalization of firms. 
Table 5.6 
Industry Classification of Sample Firms 
  Dead  Activ
e 
Total  % Weight 
Basic Materials  284  155  439  10.53 
Consumer Goods  376  100  476  11.42 
Consumer Services  670  239  909  21.80 
Health Care  194  97  291  6.98 
Industrials  728  374  1102  26.43 
Oil & Gas  116  126  242  5.80 
Technology  341  159  500  11.99 
Telecommunications  27  87  114  2.73 
Utilities  71  25  96  2.30 
Total  2807  1362  4169  100 
5.2. Measures and Justification for Variables and Model specification 
This section concentrates on justifying the approach used in the study, focusing on defining 
variables  and  specifying  the  model  used.  The  section  is  further  divided  into  three 
subsections: Subsection 5.2.1 defines explanatory and control variables for the credit rating 
and capital structure examination, Subsection 5.2.2 provides the details of the explanatory 
and control variables to examine the impact of potential and actual credit rating changes on 
capital structures, and Subsection 5.2.3 gives an explanation of the variables and models 
related to the credit rating and debt maturity structure of the firms. The control variables 
selected  for  the  models  are  those  which  have,  theoretically  and  empirically,  been 
demonstrated in the prior literature to be significant in explaining the capital structure and 
debt maturity structure of firms in general and UK firms in particular (details of which can 
be found in Chapters 3 and 4).    
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5.2.1. Influence of Credit Rating on Capital Structure  
The  hypotheses  H1a,  H1b  and  H1c  presented  in  Chapter  3  jointly  postulate  a  non-linear 
relationship between firms’ credit rating and their capital structures; high and low rated 
firms are expected to have lower leverage compared to mid rated firms. To empirically test 
such  relationships,  credit  ratings  are  integrated  into  models  previously  developed  and 
tested by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Ozkan (2001) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) for 
examination of UK firms’ capital structures. The following subsection defines, discusses 
and justifies various elements of the models.  
5.2.1.1. Dependent variable  
The study uses the book debt ratio (scaled by total assets) as the main measure of capital 
structure.
18 Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that the selection of the measure of leverage 
depends on the objective of the analysis. As credit   ratings are incorporated into the 
previous models of capital structure, book debt ratios become more important when the 
relevance of credit rating is assessed relative to factors suggested by theories of capital 
structure including the trade-off and pecking order theories. For example, Banerjee  et al. 
(2004) argue that at the time of debt issuance, changes in the market value of debt do not 
affect  the  cash  saving  from  the  interest  tax  shield  of  the  firms.  Also,  in  the  case  of 
bankruptcy,  the  book  values  of  the  firms’  debt  are  taken  as  a  measure  of  the  firms’ 
outstanding liabilities. Therefore, the implications of credit ratings can be evaluated more 
directly using book debt ratios rather than market debt ratios. Kisgen (2006) also points out 
that  the  rating  agencies  use  book  values  of  financial  ratios  to  evaluate  firms’ 
creditworthiness.  
Book values of debt are argued to be more realistic measures of capital structure as they 
are composed of the assets’ value in place and are not the capitalised future value of assets 
(Myers, 1977). Taggart (1977) argues that firms’ market value of debt can be the result of 
their actions, but the firms’ book value is what firms control and use in their financial 
decision-making processes (also, Baskin, 1989; Marsh, 1982). When the choice of measure 
is concerned i.e., book debt ratio (the book value of debt scaled by book value of assets) 
versus market debt ratio (the book value of debt scaled by market value of assets), survey 
                                                 
18 Accounting standards have changed over the 22 years sample period and this may affect the way in which 
debt  and  total  assets  are  is  measured.  However,  testing  the  relationship  on  an  annual  basis  as  well  as 
regression analysis with time effects carried out in the study shows that the results are stable over time.   
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studies point towards the use of book debt ratio by firms’ managers. A survey study of 
financial  executives  of  French,  Japanese,  Dutch,  Norwegian,  and  American  firms  by 
Stonehill et al. (1975), confirms the use of book debt ratios in managerial decision-making. 
In a more recent survey study, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that the market value of 
equity may not reflect the adjustments in the capital structure made by firms. They note 
that firms do not rebalance their capital structure in response to equity price movements 
suggesting that market leverage numbers may not be very important in debt decisions (also 
see, Bessler et al., 2011). 
Despite the above, theories of capital structure are mostly based on the market values of 
debt (Sweeney et al., 1997; Bowman, 1980); the use of book debt ratio is prevalent in the 
empirical studies testing those theories (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; Friend and Lang, 
1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ozkan, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002, amongst others). 
Nevertheless, Bowman (1980) also documents a high correlation between cross-sectional 
values of book and market debt ratios, which might suggest substituting book debt ratio for 
market debt ratios. It is likely that this will not have a significant impact on the inferences 
of the present study. More importantly, the unavailability of data also does not permit the 
use of market values of debt as a dependent variable. The present study therefore uses book 
debt ratio as the measurement of capital structure. 
Four main empirical proxies are used by previous studies to measure capital structure: total 
book  debt  to  total  book  assets  (Rajan  and  Zingales,  1995;  Ozkan,  2001;  Bevan  and 
Danbolt, 2002; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Deesomsak et al., 2004), total book debt to total 
market  value of assets  (Rajan and Zingales, 1995;  Friend and  Lang, 1998;  Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002) and total book long-term debt to either book value or market value of total 
assets  (Titman  and  Wessels,  1988;  Jong  et  al.,  2008).  Jong  et  al.  (2008)  note  that 
differences  in  the definitions  do not  have any  material  impact  on the  results  and they 
maintain their consistency irrespective of the definition used. Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
also find that the market and book measures of the simple debt ratio result in similar signs 
of coefficients, yet the fit of the model improves when market debt ratios are used instead. 
To be consistent with prior studies, the dependent variable is measured by book debt ratio 
where debt ratio is equal to the total debt (sum of short-term debt and long-term debt) 
scaled by the total assets of a firm, symbolically expressed as:  
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Where: 
TDTAit is the debt ratio of the firm i at time t 
it TD  is the total book debt of the firm i at time t 
it TA  is the total book value of the assets of the firm i at time t 
The data for the book value of debt are extracted using Datastream code: WC03255, which 
defines total debt as ‘all interest bearing and capitalised lease obligations. It is the sum of 
long and short term debt’.
19 The book value of assets for industrial firms (Datastream 
code: WC02999) as defined by Datastream is ‘the sum of total current assets, long term 
receivables,  investment  in  unconsolidated  subsidiaries,  other  investments,  net  property 
plant and equipment and other assets’.  
For a robustness check, the market debt ratio is also used, which is defined as:  
 
Where: 
it MDR  is the market debt ratio 
it BVE  is the book value of equity (Datastream code: WC03501) 
it MVE  is the market value of equity (market price-year end*common shares outstanding, 
Datastream code: WC08002). 
Although  firms’  debts  may  be  argued  to  be  largely  composed  of  long-term  debt,  and 
studies generally tend to use long-term debt ratios as a proxy for capital structure (e.g., 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Jong et al., 2008), a growing literature suggest that a debt 
maturity  structure  has  different  set  determinants  and  that  it  should  be  recognised  as 
separate from the capital structure. Therefore, the present study focuses on analysing the 
long-term  debt  ratios  of  firms  separately  from  a  capital  structure  analysis.  Further 
discussion on the differences between debt ratio and debt maturity ratio is postponed until 
Subsection 5.2.3.1. 
5.2.1.2.  Explanatory Variable: Credit Rating  
As discussed earlier, the present study uses the issuer’s long-term credit ratings since they 
provide current opinions of rating agencies (at the time of ratings issuance) about firms’ 
                                                 
19 The data for total debt available from Datastream includes convertible debt. 
it
it
it TA
TD
TDTA 
it it it
it
it MVE BVE TA
TD
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 
 
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overall ability to meet their financial obligations. Section 5.1.2 has already discussed the 
rationale for using long-term issuer credit rating data in detail, as well as the data sources 
for the sample selected.  
The individual credit rating is matched with the financial year-end data to ensure that the 
credit rating always precedes fiscal  year-end accounting data. During the data entry of 
credit ratings, several assumptions are made. First, following Kisgen (2006, 2009) and 
Hovakimian et al. (2009), the difference between the date of the rating and the financial 
year-end is assumed to be constant. The rating changes can be at any time during the year, 
whereas financial year-ends are usually between 31
st December and 31
st March for most 
UK firms. Kisgen (2006, 2009) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) implicitly assume that the 
period between rating changes and capital structure measures is the same for all firms. 
Second, in cases where firms have more than one rating change in their financial year, the 
latest,  i.e.,  the  one  closest  to  the  financial  year-end,  is  assigned  as  the  rating  for  that 
particular year. Third, any rating change on the last day of the financial year is treated as 
the rating for that particular year. For example, there were a few cases where the date of 
rating change and the firm’s financial year-end were both on 31
st March. Since the ratings 
are communicated to respective firms well before the ratings are announced to the public 
(Standard  and  Poor’s,  2008),  it  is  assumed  that  firms  have  enough  time  to  make  the 
necessary adjustments in their capital structures and therefore the rating is assigned to the 
same year.  
Following a number of studies such as Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996) 
and  Hovakimian  et  al.  (2009)  amongst  others,  the  main  measure  of  credit  ratings  is 
constructed by assigning ordinal numerical codes to the rating agency’s alphabetical codes. 
As shown in Column 2 of Table 5.7, the broad credit rating [AA+, AA, AA-], [A+, A, A] - 
to [B+, B, B-] are assigned codes from ‘1’ to ‘5’. Non-rated firms are assigned code ‘6’ 
and they fall in the lowest category due to assumptions made about their quality, credit 
worthiness  and  access  to  the  capital  markets  (For  detailed  discussion,  refer  to  Section 
5.1.3).  
It can be argued that cardinalising the credit ratings by the method discussed above may 
suffer from some instability issues within the scale. For example, the distance between the 
rating ‘1’ and ‘2’ might not be the same as the distance between rating ‘4’ and ‘5’. This 
may raise issues in interpreting the results within the different broad ratings categories. To  
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address the issue, two robustness checks are used. First, for the purpose of ensuring the 
reliability of the measure, another set of codes are also assigned to the same data (see 
Table 5.7, Column 3). Each individual rating is assigned a separate numerical code in an 
ascending order where code ‘16’ is allocated to the non-rated firms. Previous studies are 
inconsistent regarding the use of both measures. For example, Hovakimian et al. (2009) 
use individual rating codes 1-19 whereas, Stohs and Mauer (1996) use codes for the broad 
credit rating and assigned 1-7 codes from highest to lowest credit rating. No preference of 
coding is noted from the previous studies. However, most studies, examining the influence 
of changes in credit rating on firm characteristics (Kisgen, 2006 and 2009) or movement of 
security prices (Goh and Ederington, 1993; Barron et al., 1997), use the second method of 
coding due to the nature of their research questions. If the results of the second method of 
coding are similar to results found in the first method, this would show that the method 
followed  does  not  exhibit  any  serious  problem  of  stability  within  rating  categories  or 
unequal distances within the rating classes.  
Table 5.7 
Issuer’s Long-term Ratings and Assigned Numerical Code 
1  2  3 
Credit ratings
20  Broad Rating coding  Individual Rating Coding 
AA+ 
1 
1 
AA  2 
AA-  3 
A+ 
2 
4 
A  5 
A-  6 
BBB+ 
3 
7 
BBB  8 
BBB-  9 
BB+ 
4 
10 
BB  11 
BB-  12 
B+ 
5 
13 
B  14 
B-  15 
NR  6  16 
The second method to reduce potential concerns of unequal distances within rating classes 
is by constructing a dummy variable for each broad rating category. Each broad rating 
category [AA+, AA, AA-], [A+, A, A-] to NR is assigned ‘1’ or ‘0’ such that if the firm 
falls in the first broad category [AA+, AA, AA-], the dummy variable takes the value of 
                                                 
20 See appendix (2A) for the definitions of the different ratings  
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‘1’  or  ‘0’  otherwise.  Similarly,  dummy  variables  are  constructed  for  all  broad  rating 
categories and the non-rated firms. The NR dummy takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm is 
rated and ‘0’ otherwise. The NR dummy, being the most representative category, is taken 
as a base category. It should be noted that AAA, CCC and CC have to be excluded, as 
there are no firm-years with these ratings within the sample period. Since this method does 
not make assumptions regarding the distance between categories, it is likely to eliminate 
the problem of unequal distances caused by ordinal scale constructed for credit rating.  
5.2.1.3.  Control variables  
The variables chosen are the firm specific factors which have previously been found to 
explain the capital structure of the firms in general and of the UK firms in particular. These 
factors, as Frank and Goyal (2003) argue, are a conventional set of factors which explain 
capital  structure  choices  as  they  have  sustained  many  tests  and  have  a  conventional 
interpretation. It is acknowledged that there may be many omitted variables not controlled 
for  in  the  model.  For  example,  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1995)  argue  that  firms’  specific 
variables are significant, yet the role of country specific variables can also be potentially 
important  in  explaining  the  capital  structure  of  firms.  Similarly,  Demirguc-Kunt  and 
Maksimovic (1999), Fan et al. (2011) and Jong et al. (2008) also find that country specific 
variables play an important role in determining the capital structures of the firms around 
the world. The country specific variables along with other extraneous firm-level variables 
may have impacts on the relationship proposed. However, they are not included in the 
model due to lack of theoretical link as well as to limit the scope of the study due to time 
constraints.  In addition, since the sample is  based only on UK firms, country  specific 
factors presumably will not have any impact on cross sectional variation.  
Control variables in the present study include: size (LOS), profitability (PROF), tangibility 
or fixed assets ratio (FAR), growth opportunities (MBR), liquidity (LIQD) and industry 
dummies (TECHdum, INDdum, CSdum, CGdum, HCdum, UTLdum, BMdum, and OGdum). A rating 
dummy  (RATdum)  is  also  included  in  the  model  to  understand  whether  the  non-linear 
relationship (if proved) is dependent on the inclusion of non-rated firms only. Chapters 2 
and 3 provide the justification for the use of these control variables, while the following 
subsections present the definitions of the control variables and discuss the weaknesses, if 
any, associated with the use of these variables.  
101 
 
i.  Size (LOS)  
As  discussed  in  Section  3.2.1,  the  size  of  the  firm  is  expected  to  have  a  positive 
relationship with the leverage of the firm. In the literature on capital structure, three main 
proxies are used to capture the size effect: log of sales, log of assets and log of market 
capitalization. Specifically, for determining the capital structure of the firms, log of sales or 
log of assets are extensively used by prior studies. Past studies do not report any significant 
difference in the results when the proxies are interchanged (Titman and Wessels (1988), 
and, more recently, Frank and Goyal (2009)). Frank and Goyal (2009) and Titman and 
Wessels (1988) report a correlation between log of sales and log of assets of 0.92 and 0.98, 
respectively. However, in the final reported regression results, Titman and Wessels (1988) 
use log of sales to measure the size of the firms. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Booth et al. (2001), Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 2004), Ozkan (2001), Barclay and Smith 
(2005) and Hovakimian et al. (2009) use log of sales, whereas Fama and French (2002), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), Fan et al. (2011) and Jong et al. (2008) employ log of assets to 
capture the size of the firms. It is noted that there is no consistency in the use of any single 
proxy for size or any justification for their preference. It is therefore left at the discretion of 
the researcher to choose between these commonly used proxies. To be consistent with prior 
studies on UK firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Danbolt, 2002, 2004; 
Ozkan, 2001), the present study uses log of sales to capture the size effect in the model. It 
is  symbolically  represented  as ,  where  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  sales  or 
revenue (Datastream code: WC01001). Note that the correlation coefficient of log of sales 
and log of assets for the present sample is 0.95 (p-value<1%). It is likely that the use of log 
of assets or sales will not lead to any material differences in the results. 
ii.  Profitability (PROF)  
The study tests the implications of the pecking order theory, which suggests a negative 
relationship between profitability and a firm’s leverage. The proxy of profitability used in 
this study is identical to the measure used in prior studies to maintain consistency in the 
model. Following previous studies (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Baskin, 1989; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002 and 2004; Frank and Goyal, 
2003;  Barclay  et  al.,  2003;  Jong  et  al.,  2008;  and  Fan  et  al.,  2011),  profitability  is 
measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation, scaled by the 
total assets of the firm i in time t, symbolically this is represented as: 
it LOS it LOS 
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it
it
it TA
EBITDA
PROF   
Where: 
it EBITDA   is  the  earnings  before  interest,  taxes  and  depreciation  (Datastream  code: 
WC18198) 
it TA  is the total assets of the firm i at time t (Datastream code: WC02999) 
iii. Tangibility/ Fixed Assets Ratio (FAR) 
Tangibility of assets is regarded as the level of collateral the firms have when they seek 
external financing. Therefore, tangibility is expected to have a positive association with the 
leverage of the firms. There has been consensus in the usage of tangibility measures by 
previous  studies  (Titman  and  Wessels,  1988;  Rajan  and  Zingales,  1995;  Bevan  and 
Danbolt,  2002;  Booth  et  al.,  2001;  Deesomsak  et  al.,  2004;  and  Jong  et  al.,  2008). 
Following these studies, tangibility is measured as the ratio of the net value of property, 
plant and equipment by the total assets of the firm, symbolically represented as: 
it
it
it TA
PPE
TANG   
Where: 
it PPE is the net value of property, plant and equipment of firm i at time t (Datastream 
code:WC02501) 
it TA  is total assets of firm i at time t  
 
iv. Growth Opportunities (MBR)  
Among the proxies widely used by prior studies to capture the investment opportunities set 
is the market to book value of assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Fama 
and French, 2002; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002, 2004; Frank and Goyal, 2009; and Jong et al., 
2008). This measure may effectively proxy the investment opportunities set a firm has, as 
in an efficient capital market the share prices should reflect all the available information 
and they will capture the capitalised value of future growth opportunities. The balance 
sheet value of assets does not capture intangibles, such as the option of project expansions, 
acquisitions  of  other  firms,  investment  in  new  product,  spending  on  research  and 
development, and advertising. Such options may increase the market value of the firm’s 
assets relative to the book values reflected in the market prices (Barclay and Smith, 1995).  
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Adam  and  Goyal  (2008)  compare  different  proxies  of  investment  opportunities  and 
conclude that the market to book value of assets is the most suitable proxy as it has ‘the 
highest information content with respect to investment opportunities’ (p.41). Following 
previous literature, the investment opportunity set of firms is measured by the ratio of the 
market value of the assets, divided by the book value of the assets. Market to book value is 
symbolically represented as: 
it
it it it
it BVA
MVE BVE BVA
MBR
 
  
Where:  
it BVA  is the book value of the assets (Datastream code: WC02999 ) 
it BVE is the book value of the equity (Datastream code: WC03995 ) 
it MVE is the market value of equity (Datastream code: WC08002) 
v.  Liquidity (LIQD)  
The most common proxy used to measure liquidity, is the current ratio defined as current 
assets divided by current liabilities (Ozkan, 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Jong et al., 
2008). It is a rough measure to observe the ability of a firm to meet its obligations when 
they come due. In line with the prior literature, liquidity of the firms is proxied by the ratio 
of current asset to current liabilities, symbolically represented as: 
it
it
it CL
CA
LIQD   
Where: 
it CA is the total current assets of the firm (Datastream Code: WC0220) 
it CL is the total current liabilities of the firm (Datastream Code: WC03101 )   
vi. Industry Dummies  
Industry dummies are constructed on the basis of the industry classifications available from 
Datastream (Datastream code: ICBIN). As discussed in Section 5.1.2.3, Datastream code 
ICBIN  classifies  industries  into  nine  categories,  after  excluding  financial  firms.  Eight 
industry  dummies  are  created:  technology  (TECHdum),  industrial  (INDdum),  consumer 
services (CSdum), consumer goods (CGdum), health care (HCdum), utility (UTLdum), basic  
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material (BMdum) and oil and gas (OGdum), leaving telecommunication as the base industry 
in order to avoid the dummy-variable trap.    
vii. Rating Dummy (RATdum)  
Subsection 5.2.1.2 above mentions that non-rated firms are assumed to have relatively 
restricted access to debt markets compared with rated firms. With or without the inclusion 
of  non-rated  firms,  it  is  hypothesised  that  firms’  credit  ratings  have  a  non-linear 
relationship with firms’ leverage. The introduction of a rating dummy in the model isolates 
the effect of actual credit ratings on leverage and observes whether the non-monotonous 
relationship (if proved) is driven by the inclusion of a large sample of non-rated firms. The 
rating dummy (symbolically represented as RATdum) takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm is 
rated, and ‘0’ otherwise.  
5.2.1.4.  Model Specification and Estimation Techniques  
To test the potential relationship of credit rating and capital structure, Pooled Ordinary 
Least Square Regression (OLS) is applied. Equation 1 shows the OLS specification of the 
model. The components of the model, as stated earlier, are similar to previous studies 
investigating the capital structure of firms, with additions of the omitted variables deemed 
important  to  the  capital  structure  model  (i.e.,  industry  dummies  and  a  measure  of  the 
liquidity of the firms). Credit rating and its squared form are added to the previously tested 
models  to  empirically  analyse  the  relevance  of  credit  ratings  in  capital  structure 
determination.  
The hypotheses to be tested were presented in Section 3.6 of Chapter 3. H1a, H1b and H1c 
jointly postulate a non-monotonous, inverted U-shaped relationship between credit rating 
and capital structure, restated here:  
 H1a = Other things being equal, low rated firms are likely to have low levels 
of leverage in their capital structure.  
 H1b = Other things being equal, high rated firms are likely to have low 
levels of leverage in their capital structures.   
 H1c = Other things being equal, mid rated firms are likely to have high 
levels of leverage in their capital structures.    
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To empirically test the above hypotheses, the debt ratio is estimated as a function of credit 
ratings, as specified below: 
t i t i
n
i
i t i t i t i X CR CR TDTA , ,
1
2
, 2 , 1 0 ,           

 ...(1)
 
Where:   
TDTAi,t
  is the debt ratio of a firm 
0    is a constant term 
t i CR ,   is the credit rating of the firm, with cardinalzed values of 1,2,…5, 
where AA=1 to B=5, or with cardinalzed values of 1,2,…6, where 
AA=1 to B=5 and NR=6 
2
,t i CR   is the square of the credit rating 
t i X ,   represents  control  variables:  size  (LOS),  profitability  (PROF), 
tangibility or fixed assets ratio (FAR), growth opportunities (MBR), 
liquidity  (LIQD)  and  industry  dummies  (technology  (TECHdum), 
Industrial  (INDdum),  consumer  service(CSdum),  consumer  goods 
(CGdum),  health  care  (HCdum),  utility  (UTLdum),  basic  material 
(BMdum), oil& gas (OGdum) and Rating dummy (RATdum) 
It is expected that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 and that the coefficients are significantly different from 
zero.  For the model presented above, two samples are used: a sample of rated firms only 
and a sample of both rated and non-rated firms. As the data are pooled with cross-sectional 
and time series elements combined together, pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) will be 
used to analyse the models. OLS, specifically pooled OLS, is extensively used in capital 
structure  literature  (e.g.,  Berger  et  al.,  1997;  Shyam-Sunder  and  Myers,  1999;  Ozkan, 
2001; Booth et al., 2001; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Jong et al., 2008; Deesomsak et al., 
2004; Frank and Goyal, 2009). For comparison purposes, and to be consistent with prior 
literature, specifically with studies investigating the relationship between credit ratings and 
capital structures (see Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Kisgen, 2006, 2009; Tang, 2009, 
Hovakimian et al., 2009; Judge and Mateus, 2009; Mittoo and Zhang, 2010), it seems 
appropriate to use OLS as one of the main estimation techniques. However, where the 
analysis  is  affected  by  the  limitation  of  OLS  and/or  the  assumptions  of  OLS  are  not 
satisfied, other estimation techniques such as two-stage least squares will also be used.  
OLS rests on several assumptions, one of them being the linearity of parameters. OLS 
assumes  that  the  regression  model  is  linear  in  parameters  or  coefficients.  Although 
linearity in parameters is essential, it does not imply that there should be linearity in the 
variables as well (Studenmund, 2000). A model may have non-linearity in the variables  
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and it can still be estimated through OLS. In this case, CR is expected to have a non-linear 
relationship with the dependent variable, and a second degree polynomial form (also called 
quadratic functional form) is used to quantify the relationship. The model thus remains 
linear in parameters, regardless that it is non-linear in variables; it does not, therefore, 
violate the assumption of ‘linearity in parameters’. Other assumptions of OLS include the 
normality of data, and no heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity or serial correlation. Prior to 
the analysis, tests will be conducted to ascertain whether the data satisfies the assumptions 
of OLS. Diagnostic tests including examination for the normality of data using visual aids, 
descriptive statistics of variables, and correlation analysis, VIF and Eigen values, amongst 
others,  will  be  used  to  identify  any  problems  with  the  data.  Chapter  6  will  provide  a 
detailed discussion of any possible violations of OLS assumptions, their implications, and 
counteractive measures.  
5.2.2.  Potential and Actual Credit Rating Change and Capital Structure  
The second and third research objectives of the study are to test whether the potential and 
actual rating changes, respectively, may have an impact on capital structures of the firms. 
In an attempt to test the predictive ability of potential and actual credit rating changes in 
influencing firms’ debt ratios, the subsections below present the measures for dependent, 
explanatory and control variables, along with the model specifications.  
5.2.2.1.  Dependent variable 
Potential and actual credit rating changes may force firms to make necessary adjustments 
to circumvent any possibility of downgrades and enhance the chances of upgrades (Kisgen, 
2006). One of the important adjustments firms can make is to the amount of debt they 
employ, as this factor is argued to influence their credit ratings. Kisgen (2006) finds that 
firms engage in debt reducing behaviour when they are faced with potential rating changes 
and continue with the same behaviour even after they have actually been downgraded. 
Following Kisgen (2006), the present study also hypothesises that potential credit rating 
changes may have a negative impact on debt ratios, with firms more likely to reduce their 
amount of leverage when they are expecting a downgrade or an upgrade in the periods to 
come. Firms faced with actual downgrades are more likely to continue with this behaviour, 
while rating upgrades are not likely to have an impact on the capital structure of the firms.   
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To analyse this supposition, two measures of the dependent variable are used. The first 
measure is the change in the debt ratio, constructed from the balance sheet information. 
Change in the debt ratio is calculated by the difference of the total debt between time t and 
t-1 of firm i, scaled by the total assets at time t-1, and which is symbolically represented as:  
1 ,
1 ,

 
 
t i
t i it
it TA
TD TD
DR  
The second measure is constructed with cash flow data, which is argued to be a more 
thorough measure of debt issuance and reduction (Kisgen, 2006). Although these measures 
are not accurate substitutes for the incremental debt issuance approach, they may provide a 
more precise estimation of capital structure changes than can be found from simple balance 
sheet  ratios.  To  elaborate,  MacKie-Masson  (1990)  argues  that  simple  debt  ratios  are 
computed with annual balance sheet data and therefore these ratios represent a cumulative 
outcome of several separate decisions made in the past. Therefore, these ratios may not be 
appropriate  for  investigating  the  effects  of  a  particular  event  on  subsequent  financial 
decisions. Ideally, to understand the effect of potential or actual credit rating changes on 
financial decisions, incremental issuance data should be used. Studying individual security 
issuance and purchases may help to understand actual decision making prompted by  a 
specific event (MacKie-Mason, 1990). However, due to data unavailability and in order to 
be consistent with Kisgen (2006, 2009), the study has to rely on the accounting information 
contained in financial statements.  
Moreover, changes in debt ratios constructed from balance sheet data may contain non-
cash  changes  such  as  accretion  of  debt  which  had  initially  been  issued  at  discount, 
differences in marking to market of hedging instruments includable with the debt (e.g., if 
the hedging instrument is related to debt), or differences in foreign debt due to fluctuation 
in exchange rates (Kisgen, 2006). Such items may not truly represent any capital structure 
activity, though they are included in the debt ratio calculated from the balance sheet data. 
To avoid such misspecifications, a cashflow measure is also used. This measure is likely to 
better capture the relationship hypothesised for potential and actual credit rating on capital 
structure as being a direct measure of specific debt issuance and reduction activity. Kisgen 
(2006) uses both cashflow and balance sheet debt ratios and finds that both the measures 
produce similar results, although the significance of the measures constructed from balance  
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sheet  data  is  reduced  in  some  cases.  Following  Kisgen  (2006,  2009)  the  measure  is 
calculated as: 
1 ,
, ,
,

  

t i
t i t i
t i TA
E L
KDR  
Where:  
KDR is the net debt issuance termed after Kisgen’s (2006, 2009) dependent variable as the 
Kisgen Debt Ratio (KDR) 
t i L ,    is  long  term  borrowings  (Datastream  code:WC04401)  minus  long-term  debt 
reduction (Datastream code: WC04701) plus increase/decrease in short-term borrowings 
(Datastream code: WC04821)  
t i E ,   is the net proceeds from sale/issue of common stock (Datastream code:WC04251) 
minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted etc (Datastream code: WC04751)  
1 ,  t i TA  is the total asset of the firm i at time t-1 
KDR measures the net debt issuance activity of a firm. For example, if a firm issues equal 
amounts of debt and equity in a specific year, KDR would be zero. If KDR is positive, it 
would suggest that firms have issued more debt than equity as a proportion of previous 
year’s total assets (i.e., ∆L>∆E) and vice versa. To further distinguish the real financial 
decisions, which might have taken place following an event, certain criteria have to be laid 
down.  For  example,  previous  studies  (Berger  et  al.,  1997;  Hovakimian  et  al.,  2001; 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003 and Leary and Roberts, 2005) apply a 5% cut-off for the ratio in 
order to distinguish a real financial decision from any other change in the capital structure 
not triggered by any specific event. The assumption underlying such a cut-off level is that 
when  firms  issue  or  reduce  debt  by  5%  or  more,  it  should  be  apparent  that  a  capital 
structure decision has taken place, which can be distinguished from a small change in the 
level of debt due to other factors. The cut-off of 5%, although arbitrary, has been shown to 
produce similar results when analysis is carried out using debt and equity issuances data 
(Hovakimian et al., 2001). However, in a few instances, Hovakimian et al. (2001) also find 
misspecification using this procedure. 
Following Kisgen (2009), binary variables are constructed by splitting the KDR into four 
separate variables:  debt  issuance, debt  reduction, equity issuance  and equity  reduction. 
These are expected to provide further insight into capital structure activities, by analysing 
each activity individually. Debt issuance according to the criterion is defined as the case 
where  an increase in  long-term borrowing is  greater than 5% of the total asset of the  
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previous  year.  If  the  condition  is  satisfied,  the  variable  takes  the  value  of  ‘1’,  or  ‘0’ 
otherwise. Likewise, debt reduction is also a binary variable, which takes the value of ‘1’ if 
the reduction in the long-term debt is greater than 5% of the total assets. Equity issuance 
and equity reduction are also defined in a similar manner. Although the 5% cut-off is 
empirically justified, for the purpose of robustness checks, a 2.5% cut-off is also used to 
define various financing spikes.  
5.2.2.2.  Explanatory Variables  
The following subsections discuss the proxies used to measure potential and actual credit 
rating changes. Along with their definitions, the possible limitations of these measures are 
also discussed.  
i.  Potential Credit Rating Change 
As stated in Subsections 2.1.2 and 5.2.1.2, credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s have 
broad rating categories and within each rating category, symbolic modifiers are assigned to 
distinguish the firms within one broad rating class. For example, a firm with broad rating 
category BBB can have any of the three modifiers, BBB+, BBB or BBB-, within this 
category. Following Kisgen (2006), it is assumed that firms are more likely to be upgraded 
to the immediately higher broad rating category when they have a ‘+’ sign with their credit 
rating and are more likely to fall into the next broad category when they have a ‘-’ modifier 
with their rating. In this case, for example, BBB+ is more likely to achieve an upgrade to 
the next higher broad category ‘A’. Similarly, firms assigned BBB- are expected to be 
more careful as they are relatively more likely to be downgraded to BB. Consequently, 
firms with BBB+ and BBB- are expected to have debt reducing behaviour to achieve an 
upgrade or to avoid downgrade in the subsequent period. There are three proxies to test the 
impact  of  potential  credit  rating  change  on  capital  structure:  POMi,  t-1, PLUS  i,  t-1  and 
MINUS i, t-1. They are dummy variables, where POM i, t-1 is a joint proxy which takes the 
value of 1 if the firm has a plus or minus sign with its rating, and ‘0’ otherwise. PLUS i, t-1 
and MINUS i, t-1 are individual proxies, and are binary variables which take the value of ‘1’ 
if  credit  rating  has  a  ‘+’  or  a  ‘-’  sign,  respectively,  in  the  previous  period,  and  ‘0’ 
otherwise.  
This  classification  scheme  is  subject  to  a  methodological  limitation.  The  classification 
scheme  assumes  that  firms  are  only  careful  about  the  changes  from  one  broad  rating  
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category  to  another  and  are  not  very  concerned  about  the  rating  changes  within  the 
categories. Another limitation of the measure is that it may not truly capture what it is 
intended to measure. For example, a strong BBB- may have more chance of gaining an 
upgrade than a weak BBB+. If this is the case, then the basic assumption underlying the 
measure will not suffice and it may require more sophisticated measures to capture the 
potential rating changes. There are two possible measures, which can be used as a proxy of 
the  potential  rating  change:  CreditWatch  and  Rating  Outlooks;  however,  due  to  the 
technical limitations of these measures (discussed below) they are not incorporated in this 
study.  
Credit ratings are placed on CreditWatch if any unexpected event has occurred or when 
there is a likelihood that it will occur and additional information is necessary to confirm or 
change the rating. The CreditWatch status lasts less than 90 days and is resolved in most of 
the cases within this period (Standard and Poor’s, 2010b). The nature of the variable is 
therefore not suitable as a proxy for potential credit rating changes for this study, since 
these changes are temporary and the status is expected to be resolved within a short period. 
On the other hand, Outlooks are for a longer time horizon. However, they incorporate 
trends  and  developments  which  have  less  impact  on  credit  quality  compared  to 
CreditWatch (Standard and Poor’s, 2010b). Additionally, the data for Outlooks is difficult 
to isolate from CreditWatch in the main dataset acquired from Standard and Poor’s ratings. 
For these reasons, and for the comparison purposes with prior studies from the US market, 
potential credit rating changes are measured in a similar manner to Kisgen (2006). It is 
admitted that the proxy might be noisy but it has some potential to capture the effect the 
phenomenon it is intended to measure, as depicted by Kisgen’s (2006) study.  
ii. Actual Credit Rating Change 
It  is  hypothesised  (hypotheses  3a  and  3b)  that  firms,  which  were  downgraded  in  the 
previous period, have a higher likelihood of decreasing the amount of leverage compared 
to  counterpart  firms  that  were  not  downgraded.  On  the  other  hand,  firms  which  were 
upgraded in the previous period are expected not to change their leverage significantly, due 
to the benefits attached with rating upgrades. The actual credit rating changes are measured 
by two dummy variables, UG i, t-1 and DGi, t-1. These explanatory variables are lagged to 
reduce the potential endogeneity issues. The UG i, t-1 dummy takes the value of ‘1’, if a firm 
was upgraded in the previous year, and ‘0’ otherwise. Similarly, for DGi, t-1, the dummy  
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takes  the  value  of  ‘1’,  if  a  firm  was  been  downgraded  in  the  previous  year,  and  ‘0’ 
otherwise.  
5.2.2.3.  Control variables 
Kisgen (2006, 2009) employs a set of control variables, which have been demonstrated in 
prior literature to be important in capital structure decisions. This helps in analysing the 
relative  importance  and  impact  of  each  variable  of  interest  on  the  response  variable. 
Following Kisgen, the set of control variables for the present study are the same as those 
discussed in Subsection 5.2.1.3 above for UK firms. The basic model used to analyse the 
impact of potential credit rating changes and actual credit rating changes remains the same 
for both cases except for the proxies for potential and actual credit rating. Given that the 
dependent variables are measured as change variables and binary variables, the control 
variables are also measured in changes rather than levels. The control variables for the 
model are: lagged changes in size (ΔLOA i, t-1), profitability (ΔPROF i, t-1), tangibility or 
fixed assets ratio (ΔFAR i, t-1), growth opportunities (ΔMBR i, t-1) and liquidity (ΔLIQD i, t-
1). Changes in the ratios are calculated by the difference such as ΔPROF i, t-1 is PROF i, t-1 
minus PROF i, t-2. Kisgen (2009) also uses a similar procedure to calculate change in the 
variables. However, for the purpose of comparison with Kisgen’s studies, the analysis will 
also be carried out using the set of control variables employed in Kisgen’s 2006 and 2009 
models.   
5.2.2.4.  Model Specification 
This section specifies the models for estimating the effect of potential and actual credit 
rating changes. Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c state that: 
H2a  =  Other  things  being  equal,  firms  with  a  higher  likelihood  of  rating 
changes are more likely to reduce the amount of leverage. 
H2b = Other things being equal, firms with a higher likelihood of downgrade 
are more likely to reduce the amount of leverage. 
H2c= Other things being equal, firms with a higher likelihood of upgrade are 
more likely to reduce the amount of leverage.   
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The following equation models the OLS specification for the relationship. Coefficients of 
POM i,t-i, PLUS i,t-i and MINUS i,t-i are expected to have a negative relationship with the 
change in debt. All the explanatory and control variables are lagged by one year. 
∆DRi,t 1 , 1 ,
1
1 , 1 0  

       t i t i i
n
i
t i X POM         (2a) 
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i
t i t i X MINUS PLUS         (2b) 
Where:   
∆DRi,t  is the change in debt ratio either measured by change in simple debt 
ratio (CDR) or net debt issuance (KDR) 
0    is the constant term 
POMi, t-1
  a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm as a ‘+’ or a 
‘– ’sign with its credit rating in the previous year or zero otherwise 
PLUS i, t-1
  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if firm has a ‘+’ sign with 
its credit rating  in the previous year or zero otherwise 
MINUS i, t-1  a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has a ‘–’ sign with 
its credit rating in the previous year or zero otherwise 
        is a set of control variables including  lag change in log of sales 
(∆LOSt-1), lag change in profitability ratio (∆PROF t-1), lag change 
in fixed assets ratio (∆FAR t-1), lag change in market to book value 
(∆MBR t-1) and lag change in liquidity ratio(∆LIQD t-1) 
As discussed in Section 5.2.2.1, the individual components of Kisgen’s Debt Ratio (KDR) 
are also tested in order to provide a detailed examination of the effects of rating changes on 
capital structure activities. As dependent variables are binary in nature, they are analysed 
by  logistic  regressions.  Logistic  regression  is  an  appropriate  model  to  test  such 
relationships, as it has the ability to predict the likelihood of certain  events occurring. 
Further,  logistic  regression  also  requires  less  restrictive  assumptions  than  OLS  as 
homogeneity of variance and normality of errors are not assumed. Logistic regressions, 
however, do require other assumptions  than OLS (Menard, 2001). Diagnostic tests are 
performed to ensure that the assumptions of logistic regression are fully met. The general 
relationship to be tested is presented in logistic function as: 
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The above equation shows the general relationship of a potential credit rating downgrade 
or upgrade with the likelihood of any capital structure activity. The above equation can be 
split  into  four  separate  models,  for  debt  issuance,  debt  reduction,  equity  issuance  and 
equity reduction. In the above logistic function,   is the probability of success which 
represents the probability that the firm will issue 5% or more debt, reduce 5% or more 
debt, issue 5% or more equity or reduce 5% or more equity, depending on the formulation 
of the model.   represents the odd of  ,  is the coefficient of potential upgrade 
(PLUS) and  is the coefficient of potential downgrade (MINUS). The credit rating – 
capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) predicts a higher likelihood of debt reduction and 
equity issuance and a lower likelihood of debt issuance and equity reduction if firms have 
higher probability of rating changes. 
The actual credit rating changes can be modelled in a similar manner to the potential rating 
changes. The hypothesis H3a postulates a negative relationship between an actual credit 
rating downgrade and the subsequent year’s debt ratios, while H3b predicts a significant 
change in capital structure when firms are upgraded. The hypotheses are restated here as: 
H3a = Other things being equal, downgraded firms will decrease the amount 
of leverage in their capital structure. 
H3b = Other things being equal, upgraded firms are likely to have significant 
change in their capital structure.  
Similar procedures for analysing the impact of potential credit rating changes are followed 
in order to test the impact of actual credit rating changes on capital structure activities. The 
first  specification  is  therefore  an  OLS  regression  equation  which  tests  the  relationship 
between an actual credit rating change and changes in debt ratios in the subsequent year. 
The model is specified below as: 
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Where:   
∆DR  is the change in debt ratio either measured by change in simple debt 
ratio (CDR) or net debt issuance (KDR) 
0    is the constant term 
UGi, t-1
  a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm was upgraded in 
the previous year or zero otherwise 
DG i, t-1
  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if firm was downgraded  in 
the previous year or zero otherwise 
        is a set of control variables including  lag change in log of sales 
(∆LOSt-1), lag change in profitability ratio (∆PROF t-1), lag change in 
fixed assets ratio (∆FAR t-1), lag change in market to book value 
(∆MBR t-1) and lag change in liquidity ratio(∆LIQD t-1) 
The  coefficient  of  DGi,t-1,  β2,  is  expected  to  have  a  significant  negative  relationship, 
whereas the coefficient of UGi,t-1, β1, is expected not to be significantly different from zero. 
Similar to Equations 2 to 4, the set of control variables are measured in changes rather than 
levels  and  all  explanatory  and  control  variables  are  lagged  by  one  year  to  avoid  any 
possible endogeneity problems or spurious correlation.  
Similar to the procedure followed for potential credit rating changes, an in-depth analysis 
is also carried out by individually testing each component of KDR through the logistic 
regression  models  to  understand  the  capital  structure  activities  of  the  UK  firms.  The 
general logistic model is specified as: 
  
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

 1
 is the odds of 5% or more debt issuance, debt reduction, equity issuance and equity 
reduction.  These  individual  tests,  in  the  case  of  either  potential  or  actual  credit  rating 
changes, do not suggest any specific capital structure activity as they are only intended as 
an elaboration of what kind of mechanism firms choose to alter their capital structure if 
they  are  faced  with  rating  changes.  Also,  these  tests  are  used  to  assess  the  relative 
predictive ability of rating changes when compared with factors proposed by traditional 
theories  of  capital  structure.  However,  the  credit-rating  capital  structure  hypothesis 
predicts a higher likelihood of debt reduction and equity issuance and a lower likelihood of 
debt issuance and equity reduction following a downgrade. 
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5.2.3. Influence of Credit Rating on Debt Maturity Structure  
The fourth objective of the study is to examine the relationship between credit ratings and 
the debt maturity structures of UK firms. This section stipulates the dependent, explanatory 
and control variables for testing the potential impact of credit ratings on the debt maturity 
structure of the firms.   
5.2.3.1.  Dependent variable 
It is hypothesised (hypothesis H4) that the credit rating of a firm is expected to have an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with its debt maturity structure, where the debt maturity 
structure can be defined as the proportion of long-term debt in the total debt of a firm. It is 
measured  by  several  different  proxies  in  the  prior  empirical  studies  investigating  the 
determinants  of  maturity  structure.  Similarly  to  capital  structure  measures,  no  single 
definition  is  generally  accepted  or  commonly  used.  Prior  studies  on  capital  structure 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Jong et al., 2008) use a long-term debt ratio measured by total 
long-term debt to total assets, to proxy the capital structure. Such measures might work 
well to understand the capital structure but it should be noted that they might provide only 
a limited understanding of the debt maturity structure of the firms. The long-term debt ratio 
may change due to variations in equity, while no long-term debt issuance or reduction 
decision  has  in  fact  taken  place.  Moreover,  the  specification  does  not  provide  a  clear 
representation  of the variations  of long and short-term  debt  due to  firm characteristics 
(Barclay and Smith, 1995). On the other hand, the ratio of long-term debt to total debt may 
offer an exhaustive measure to identify the use of long-term debt and short-term debt as a 
proportion of total debt and how firm characteristics influence the choice between the two. 
Although  there  is  no  established  measure  for  debt  maturity  structures,  two  main 
approaches are followed in the literature for measuring the maturity of the capital structure: 
(1) the balance sheet approach and (2) the incremental debt issuance approach. The balance 
sheet approach, which involves using balance sheet information concerning the long-term 
debt proportion within a capital structure, is dominant in the prior studies, with several 
variations in the definitions within this approach. For instance, Scherr and Hulburt (2001), 
Antoniou et al. (2006), Cai et al. (2008) and Fan et al. (2011) regard debt as long-term if it 
is payable in more than one year, Barclay and Smith (1995) consider debt to be long-term 
if it is payable in more than three years, while Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1997) and  
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Ozkan (2000 and 2002) use a five years criteria. Since balance sheet maturity ratios cannot 
distinguish between debt maturing within alternative periods (i.e., no distinction is made 
between debt maturing in 3 years and in 20 years), Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Scherr and 
Hulburt (2001) use an average maturity of a firm’s liabilities to proxy the debt maturity 
structure.
21 Although superior to the rest of the maturity measurements, due to the data 
unavailability and the complexity of the measure it has not been used frequently in 
maturity structure literature.  
The  incremental  debt  issuance  approach  for  measuring  debt  maturity  structures  has 
received little importance in   the  debt maturity structure lite rature compared to capital 
structure literature. A few studies have used long-term debt issuance data (e.g., Guedes and 
Opler, 1996). Each approach has its own advantages and limitations, all of which need to 
be considered. For example, for signalling models for debt maturity structure, incremental 
debt issuance is more suitable as these models are  based on informational asymmetry 
issues between management and outsiders . However, the approach is not suitable for 
theories such as the maturity matching theory since the maturity of the new issuance might 
be quite different  from the present assets structure (Guedes and  Opler, 1996). Debt 
issuance data also poses limitations because of the variations in debt issue characteristics 
(Rokkanen, 2010) and when issuance data is matched with the firm level characteristics, 
whose data are less frequently available.  
Ideally, for testing Diamond’s theory for the credit rating – maturity structure relationship, 
incremental debt issuance data should be used. Diamond’s theory is based on two periods, 
where firms, in the presence of information asymmetry, select maturity structures based on 
the liquidity risk they face. This would require firms to make decisions about the maturity 
structure  of  their  debt  given  the  occurrence  of  such  conditions.  Given  that  the  ratios 
calculated from balance sheet data are likely to be a mixture of several maturity structure 
decisions accumulated over the years, it would be difficult to isolate the effect for any 
given occurrence of such risk. This  may underestimate the effects  of liquidity  risk on 
maturity structure decisions and may also pose problems in the interpretation of the results. 
However, due to the unavailability of incremental debt issuance data, the present study has 
to rely on the balance sheet approach.  
                                                 
21 The weight average maturity ratio is calculated by weighing the average maturities of all individual debt 
instruments, debt like obligations such as capital and operating leases and current liabilities.  
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In analysing the effects of credit ratings on the debt maturity structure of firms, the debt 
maturity ratio is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt payable in more than one year, 
scaled by the total debt of the firm in that particular year. Datastream also offers some data 
for debt payable in more than one year, debt due in 2-5 years, in 6-10 years and over 10 
years. However, Datastream only infrequently reports debt values within each maturity 
band. Whether this is due to the data being missing or not fully reported, it is difficult to 
economically identify the information. Therefore, previous UK studies by Ozkan (2000 
and 2002) had to rely on very small and balanced samples with criteria of 5 years and 
above.  This  potentially  introduces  survivorship  bias  into  their  studies.  Antoniou  et  al. 
(2006), examining the determinants of the debt maturity structures of French, German and 
UK firms, also used one year and above criteria to define long-term debt ratios.  Barclay 
and Smith (1995), however, argue that the choice of long-term debt maturing in more than 
one year, three years, and five years or more is purely arbitrary and that the results are 
qualitatively similar using different measures. Therefore, using one year and above as the 
criteria  for  categorising  long-term  debt  seems  reasonable  and  empirically  justified. 
Consequently, the debt maturity ratio used here is defined as the ratio of long-term debt 
payable in more than one year by the total debt, symbolically represented as: 
 
 
 
Where: 
it LTD   is  the  total  long-term  debt  payable  in  more  than  one  year  (Datastream  code: 
WC03255) 
it TD  is the total debt of the firm (Datastream code: WC03251) 
5.2.3.2.  Explanatory variable 
To analyse the relationship of credit rating with debt maturity structure, the measures for 
the credit ratings are the same as those described in Subsection 5.2.1.2, above. The main 
measure is the ordinal numerical coding assigned to each broad rating category from 1 to 5, 
assigning the lowest number to the highest broad category. Following Stohs and Mauer 
(1996), non-rated firms are assigned the lowest code, assuming them to have relatively 
higher liquidity risk than rated firms. Prior studies, investigating debt maturity structure, 
such as Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Bali and Skinner (2006) 
it
it
it TD
LTD
DMR  
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amongst others, have used similar coding procedures particularly for the rated firms with 
differences in coding broad rating categories or micro/individual ratings.  
5.2.3.3.  Control variables 
The control variables of the models are drawn from the earlier studies on debt maturity 
structures around the world and specifically in the UK. Some variables are defined in the 
same manner as with the capital structure models, although their implication for the case of 
debt maturity structure may vary due to the choice between short-term debt and long-term 
debt. Most of the variables are based on theories which are empirically tested to explain the 
debt maturity structure of firms. The definitions of the corresponding proxies of variables 
are discussed below: 
i.  Size (LOS) 
Size is expected to have a positive relationship with the debt maturity structure of firms. 
Similar to capital structure literature, no consistent measure is used for firms’ size by the 
previous studies. For example, Deesomsak et al. (2009) and Fan et al. (2011) use logs of 
total assets, Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) use logs of market 
value, and Cai et al. (2008), Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Guedes and Opler (1996), Ozkan 
(2000 and 2002) and Antoniou et al. (2006) use logs of sales. Following prior UK studies 
(Ozkan, 2000, 2002; Antoniou et al., 2006), the size of a firm is measured in this study by 
the natural logarithm of sales (LOSit). 
ii.  Assets Maturity (AMAT) 
It is expected that assets maturity and debt maturity have a direct relationship. The ratio of 
property, plant and equipment, scaled by annual depreciation, is commonly used as the 
proxy for assets maturity with the underlying rationale that assets with longer maturity 
depreciate at a slower rate. It is however argued that this proxy tends to be noisy, as the 
lives of the assets are mostly determined by the tax authorities (Guedes and Opler, 1996). 
The  measures  also  assume  that  all  other  assets,  such  as  intangibles,  do  not  have  any 
maturity,  which  otherwise  would  have  a  meaningful  implication  for  the  debt  maturity 
structure. Guedes and Opler (1996), therefore, incorporate the maturity of the short-term 
debt  into  their  calculations.  However,  their  results  remain  qualitatively  similar  to  the 
traditional assets maturity ratio which substantiates the ability of the proxy to measure the  
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maturity  structure  of  the  firms’  assets.  Despite  the  limitations  of  the  traditional  asset 
maturity ratio, it is consistently used in previous literature, specifically in explaining the 
factors affecting the UK firms’ debt maturity structures. Therefore, following the empirical 
literature (Guedes and Opler, 1996; Ozkan, 2000, 2002; Antoniou et al., 2006; Cai et al., 
2008) and due limitation of the available data, the proxy is measured as: 
it
it
it D
PPE
AMAT   
Where: 
it PPE is the value of net property, plant and equipment (Datastream code: WC02501) 
it D  is the total annual depreciation (Datastream code: WC01148) 
iii. Quality (QUAL) 
The implications  of Flannery’s (1986) study suggest that firms’ quality is likely to be 
negatively related to their debt maturity structures. Most of the prior literature relies on 
future change in  earnings (EPSt+1- EPSt) as a measure of firms  ‘quality’ (Barclay and 
Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Cai et al., 2008; Ozkan, 2000 and 2002). However, 
there are variations in the dominator. For example, Ozkan (2000, 2002) used change in 
earning per share (EPS) between time t+1 and t divided by EPS at time t to measure firms’ 
quality. It should be noted that this proxy might work well when EPS is positive, but it 
fails providing spurious values when firms report losses or zero EPS. To eliminate the 
possibility of flawed results, change in earnings (t+1 and t) is divided by the share price at 
time t. The justification of using this measure is based on the assumption that, unlike 
outsiders  (investors),  insiders  or  management  can  anticipate  next  year’s  earnings,  and 
based on this information, they then make their maturity structure decisions.  
A possible concern with using EPS change might be the inability of the measure to capture 
the true quality of a firm, as the quality of firms is a long-term phenomenon and changes in 
earnings might not be an appropriate proxy for capturing this long term quality. However, 
it should be noted that Flannery’s (1996) model is a two-period model where firms, due to 
information asymmetry, choose a maturity structure in order to signal to outsiders about 
the quality of their firm. In the next period, the true quality of the firm is revealed to the 
outsiders. If the long-term debt ratio is defined by long-term debt payable in more than one 
year, where annual data are used, next year’s earnings will be known to outsiders at the  
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time of refinancing the firm’s short-term debt. Therefore, it can arguably capture what it 
intends to measure despite being a rough measure. The proxy is symbolically represented 
as:  
it
it t i
it SP
EPS EPS
QUAL


1 ,  
Where: 
1 ,  t i EPS is the earning per share in t+1 
it EPS is  the  earning  per  share  in  time  t  (Datastream  code:  EBIT  (WC18191)-Interest 
expense (WC01451)-Income Taxes (WC01451)/Common shares outstanding (WC05301) ) 
it SP is the share price at time t (Datastream code: Market Capitalization -Fiscal Period 
End (WC08002)/ Common shares outstanding (WC05301)) 
 
iv. Growth Opportunities (MBR) 
Growth opportunities are expected to have a negative relationship with the debt maturity 
structure of firms. Following previous studies (Barclay and Smith, 1995 and 1996; Guedes 
and Opler, 1996; Scherr and Hulburt, 2001; Ozkan, 2000 and 2002; Antoniou et al., 2006; 
Fan  et  al.,  2011;  Cai  et  al.,  2008  and  Deesomsak  et  al.,  2009),  and  as  discussed  in 
Subsection 5.2.1.3 above, the market  to  book value of assets  is  used as  the proxy for 
growth opportunities. 
v.  Rating Dummy (RATdum) 
Following the assumptions made about the non-rated firms (see Subsection 5.2.1.2 above) 
and to be consistent with prior studies testing Diamond’s theory (Stohs and Mauer, 1996; 
Barclay and Smith, 1995), the rating dummy is used in the model. 
vi. Industry Dummies 
As discussed in Section 3.2.6, prior studies (Schwartz and Aronson, 1967; Balakrishnan 
and Fox, 1993; Scott, 1972; Scott and Martin, 1975; Bradley et al., 1984) suggest that debt 
ratios  differ  across  industries,  due  to  the  regulations  related  to  specific  industries  and 
economic and global influences affecting each industry differently so the proportion of 
long-term debt may differ too. Some industries may rely more on, or have better access to, 
public debt markets. For example, some firms may find it easier to issue public debt, which  
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is arguably more long-term debt, when its competitors have also public debt outstanding 
(Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). In such cases, the bond market can easily recognise the 
risk associated with the instruments issued by those firms, and the costs of monitoring and 
evaluating these firms are also lower. To capture this industry-level heterogeneity, industry 
dummies are incorporated in the debt maturity structure models. For a detailed discussion, 
definitions and sources of data, see Subsection 5.2.1.3 above. 
5.2.3.4.  Model Specification 
The hypothesis H4, presented in Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4, postulates a non-monotonous, 
inverted U-shaped relationship between credit ratings and the debt maturity structure of 
firms:  
H4a:  If  other  things  remain  constant,  there  is  a  non-linear,  inverted  U-
shaped  relationship  between  the  credit  ratings  and  debt  maturity 
structure of firms. 
To empirically test the above hypothesis, the debt maturity ratio is estimated as a function 
of credit rating, as specified below, as an OLS equation: 
   
t i t i
n
i
i t i t i t i X CR CR DMR , ,
1
2
, 2 , 1 0 ,           

...(6) 
Where:   
t i DMR,   is the debt maturity ratio of the firm 
0    is the constant term 
t i CR ,   is the credit rating of a firm with cardinalsed values of 1,2,…5, where 
AA=1 to B=5 or with cardinalsed values of 1,2,…6, where AA=1 to 
B=5 and NR=6 
2
,t i CR   is the square of the credit rating 
t i X ,   is the set of control variables: size (LOS), assets maturity (AMAT), 
growth opportunities (MBR), firms quality (QUAL) and industry 
dummies (technology (TECHdum), Industrial (INDdum), consumer 
service (CSdum), consumer goods (CGdum), health care (HCdum), utility 
(UTLdum), basic material (BMdum), oil& gas (OGdum) and Rating 
dummy (RATdum) 
Following most of the previous studies, which have used OLS with panel data as one of the 
main  estimation  techniques  (Barclay  and  Smith,  1995,  1996;  Stohs  and  Mauer,  1996; 
Guedes  and  Opler,  1996;  Demirguc-Kent  and  Maksimovic,  1999;  Scherr  and  Hulburt,  
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2001; Ozkan, 2002; Cai et al., 2008), the present study also uses OLS for analysing the 
relationship  between  credit  ratings  and  debt  maturity  structures.  To  minimise  the  time 
invariant firm-level heterogeneity, a few studies have also used fixed effects regression. 
However,  they  do  not  find  any  variation  in  the  results  with  alternative  estimation 
techniques (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Cai et al., 2008). For a 
direct comparison with the previous studies on debt maturity structures, the analysis of the 
credit rating – maturity structure relationship in this study relies on more commonly used 
estimation techniques, i.e., OLS.  
5.3.   Outliers Diagnostics and Treatment 
As discussed in Section 5.1.1, two data sets are used in the study: a whole sample of rated 
and non-rated firms (42,872 firm-year observations) and a sample with rated firms only 
(874 firm-year observations). Both datasets require different outlier treatment procedures 
depending on the size of sample, as is discussed further below.  
The  initial  sample  contained  42,872  firm-year  observations.  As  was  discussed  in  the 
previous chapter, the sample selected for the study contains several outliers. These extreme 
values can be due to incorrect data entry, or might be correct values which are distant from 
the  rest  of  the  observations.  Such  observations  may  cause  potential  problems  in  the 
analyses by influencing the results. Further, it may increase the heteroskedasticity problem 
in the models and thus make the results biased (Gujarati, 2004, p.390). Since the control 
variables proposed in the study are mostly in the form of ratios, which have a tendency to 
be skewed, flat or dominated by issues of sample variance (Frecka and Hopwood, 1983), 
they are likely to decrease precision in the study irrespective of the fact that the present 
study uses a large dataset.
22 
Various techniques can be employed to resolve the concern of extreme values in the da ta, 
including winsorising, trimming, and transformation into logarithmetic, squared or inverse 
form. In the literature of capital structure, studies do not generally use transformation of 
data and tend to use winsorising and trimming, depending on the sample size. It is argued 
that the issue of extreme observations may not be completely resolved by simple log or 
square transformation (Deakin, 1976; Frecka and Hopwood, 1983) and that elimination of 
the  outliers  is  possibly  a  better  solution  (Frecka  and  Hopwo od,  1983).  Conversely, 
                                                 
22 Gujarati (2004) argues that when the data set is small, outliers’ inclusion and exclusion may have a more 
significant effect on the regression model than in a large dataset.  
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Bollinger and Chandra (2005) and others argue that trimming or winsorising data may 
induce bias in the data.  
Previous studies do not suggest any consistent procedure for the detection and treatment of 
outliers. However, two measures are relatively common in the literature: eliminating the 
outliers by winsorising at certain percentages, or deleting specific (or a certain percentage 
of) observations. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Barclay and Smith (1995) have trimmed 
the data at certain percentages, whereas others (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Johnson, 2003; 
Aivazian et al., 2005; Frank and Goyal, 2009) have winsorized the variables at various 
percentages. For the whole sample, data trimming is used, which appears to be superior 
compared  to  winsorising  given  that  the  study  utilises  a  large  sample  size.  Moreover, 
theoretical and empirical literature support the use of this method (Frecka and Hopwood, 
1983; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Baker and 
Wulgler, 2002; Alti, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2009). To maintain the integrity of data, most 
of the variables are trimmed at  0.50% at  either or both  sides of the  distribution. This 
percentage  would  only  remove  the  most  extremely  misrecorded  data;  using  a  higher 
percentage may induce bias in the sample. A summary of the method followed to identify 
outliers and treatment and the effect outlier treatment on the number of observations is 
presented in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9. 
The first dataset contains 4,169 firms over an extended period of 22 years. Visual aids such 
as  scattered  plots  and  box  plots  and  logical  reasoning  are  used  to  assess  the  outlying 
observations. In the case of the debt ratio, outcomes of more than one and less than zero do 
not theoretically make sense, as the assets have to be financed by equity or debt or by a 
combination  of  both.  The  possible  reason  for  this  may  be  that  firms  are  experiencing 
negative equity or there might be recording error in the database. Likewise, the total debt 
maturity ratio may be composed of either short-term debt or long-term debt, or both, and 
cannot exceed the total debt. Following previous studies (Baker and Wulgler, 2002; Alit, 
2006; Aivazian et al., 2005) such firm-year observations are discarded from the sample.  
For the MB ratio (MBR), the quality of firm (QUAL), the profitability ratio (PROF), the 
assets maturity ratio (AMAT) and the liquidity ratio (LIQD), 0.50% of both tails or either 
tail are discarded depending on the distribution of outlier, while for the fixed assets ratio 
(FAR), values above 1 and below 0 are discarded. Only the top three values are discarded 
which were found to be greater than one. After trimming the profitability ratio by 0.50%,  
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the dataset still contained values above +1 or below -1. Thus, all values above or below 
one are discarded. Berger and Ofek (1995) also truncate the values lying above or below 1 
and -1 respectively.  
The second dataset contains only 104 firms, with 874 firm-year observation. Relative to 
the first dataset containing rated and non-rated firms, this dataset is very small and contains 
few outliers. The size of the dataset does not allow trimming as this would seriously affect 
the sample size. In this case, therefore, winsorising is used for extreme values, using a 
0.50% cut off where variables have extreme observations. The profitability (PROF) and the 
market to book ratio (MBR) are  winsorised at both tails while the liquidity (LIQD) is 
winsorised at right tail. Similar to the procedure used for the combined sample of rated and 
non-rated firms, profitability is further truncated at ±1.  
For the analyses of potential and actual rating changes, the dependent variables (change in 
debt ratio (CDR) and Kisgen’s debt Ratio (KDR)) had a few observations greater than ±1 
which do not make theoretical sense. Therefore, they are truncated to ±1. Debt issuance 
and reduction ratios had also a few observations above 1 which are truncated to 1. Lagged 
change in the fixed assets ratio (∆FARt-1) and the market to book ratio (∆MBRt-1) do not 
indicate any outlying observation, but lagged change in log of sales (∆LOSt-1), liquidity 
(∆LIQDt-1) and profitability (∆PROFt-1) had a few extreme observations at both ends and 
therefore they have been winsorised at 0.50%. A detailed analysis on the effects of outlier 
treatment is presented within each empirical chapter.  
5.4.  Conclusion 
This chapter presented the research design and methodology of the present study. It began 
by discussing data sources, followed by a detailed discussion of the sampling procedures. 
The study utilises two types of data: Standard and Poor’s long-term issuers’ ratings and 
accounting data sourced from Datastream. The final sample consists of 4,169 firms over a 
period of 22 years (42,872 firm-years), from which 104 are rated firms and 4,065 are non-
rated firms. The chapter also discussed various elements of the models used in the study. It 
explained in detail the methodological choices made for measurements of the proxies for 
the dependent, independent and control variables, along with the model specifications for 
the four main research questions of the study.     
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Table 5.8 
Variables, Outlier Treatment and its Effects (Rated and Non-Rated Firms) 
Variables  Definition  Outlier treatment  Number of Observations Before and 
After Outlier Treatment  
Before  After  Difference 
Panel A: Credit Rating and Capital Structure Analysis 
TDTA  total debt to total assets  Values above +1 and 
below -1 are 
discarded 
 
42,872  42,346  436 
LOS  natural logarithm of sales  do not suggest the 
presence of outliers 
40,971  40,971  0 
PROF  earnings before interest, 
taxes and depreciation, to 
total assets 
trimmed at 0.50% at 
each tail and used ±1 
criteria 
42,869  41,767  1,103 
FAR  fixed assets ratio (FAR) is 
the ratio of fixed assets to 
total assets 
Values below zero 
and above one are 
discarded 
42,872  42,869  3 
MBR  book value of the assets 
minus the book value of the 
equity minus market value of 
equity divided by book value 
of assets  
trimmed at 0.50% at 
each tail 
42,851  42,423  428 
LIQD  current assets to total assets.  trimmed at 0.50% at 
right tail 
42,056  41,846  210 
 
Panel B: Credit Rating and Debt Maturity Structure Analysis 
DMR  total long-term debt 
(payable in more than one 
year) to total debt  
do not suggest the 
presence of outliers 
37,405  37,405  0 
LOS  natural logarithm of sales  do not suggest the 
presence of outliers 
40,989  40,989  0 
QUAL  difference between 
earnings before interest 
and taxation EBITt+1 and 
EBITt scaled by share 
price at time t 
trimmed at 0.50% at 
each tail 
38,024  37,644  380 
AMAT  total property, plant and 
equipment to total annual 
depreciation  
trimmed at 0.50% at 
right tail 
30244  30,093  151 
MBR  book value of the assets 
minus the book value of the 
equity plus market value of 
equity divided by book 
value of assets  
trimmed at 0.50% at 
each tail 
42,872  42,444  428 
ETR  total amount of tax 
charged by total taxable 
income 
winsorised at 0 and 1  42,345  42,345  0 
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Table 5.9 
Variables, Outlier Treatment and its Effects (Rated Firms Sample) 
Variables  Definition  Outlier treatment  No. of 
Observation 
Affected 
Panel A: Credit Rating and Capital Structure Analysis   
TDTA    winsorised using ±1 criteria  9 
LOS    do not suggest the presence of 
outliers 
0 
 
PROF    0.50% of both tails and used ±1 
criteria 
17 
 
FAR    Values below zero and above 
one are winsorized to 0 and 1 
respectively 
3 
MBR    winsorised at 0.50% at each tail  8 
LIQD    winsorised at 0.50% at right tail  8 
Panel B: Credit Rating and Debt Maturity Structure Analysis   
DMR    do not suggest the presence of 
outliers 
0 
 
LOS    do not suggest the presence of 
outliers 
0 
 
QUAL    winsorised at 0.50% at each tail  8 
AMAT    winsorised at 0.50% at each tail  8 
MBR    winsorised at 0.50% at each tail  8 
ETR    winsorised using 0 and 1criteria  19 
Panel C: Credit Rating Changes and Capital Structure Analysis   
CDR  first difference in the total debt scaled 
by previous year’s total assets 
    winsorised using ±1 criteria  2 
KDR  (long term borrowings minus long-term 
debt reduction plus increase/decrease 
in short-term borrowings)-(net 
proceeds from sale/issue of common 
stock minus common/preferred 
redeemed, retired, converted etc) scaled 
by previous year’s total assets  
winsorised using ±1 criteria           3 
DITA  long-term borrowing by the  total assets 
of previous year 
winsorised using 0 and 1 criteria  3 
DRTA  long-term debt reduction by the  total 
assets of previous year 
winsorised using 0 and 1 criteria  2 
EITA  net proceeds from sale/issue of common 
stock by the total assets of previous 
year 
winsorised using 0 and 1 criteria  0 
ERTA  common/preferred redeemed, retired, 
converted etc by the total assets of 
previous year 
winsorised using 0 and 1 criteria  0 
∆LOSt-1  lag of first difference in the log of sales  winsorised at 0.50% at each tail  8 
∆PROFt-1  lag of first difference in the profitability   winsorised at 0.50% at each tail  8 
∆FARt-1  lag of first difference in the fixed assets 
ratio  
do not suggest the presence of 
outliers 
0 
 
∆MBRt-1  lag of first difference in the market to 
book ratio 
do not suggest the presence of 
outliers 
0 
 
∆LIQDt-1  lag of first difference in the liquidity 
ratio 
winsorised at 0.50% at each tail  8  
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To test the implications of the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS), credit 
ratings  are  incorporated  into  previously  tested  models  for  capital  structure  and  debt 
maturity structure. Specifically, to test the relationship between levels of credit ratings and 
leverages, quadratic regression models are proposed in order to capture the hypothesised 
non-linearity between the two variables. As the quadratic regression models are used for 
the first time to analyse the impact of credit ratings on capital structure, they are likely to 
extend the limited view of the relationship between the two variables. This will ensure 
correct  inferences  about  the  capital  structure  determinants  and  will  provide  a 
comprehensive  depiction  of  actual  capital  structure  decision  making  behaviour.  These 
models are tested in Chapter 6.  
The chapter also presented the methodology followed to test the implications of the credit 
rating – capital structure hypothesis for the relationship between credit rating changes and 
the capital structure decisions of firms. Despite an extension of Kisgen’s (2006 and 2009) 
studies to a different market, the proxies of rating changes are incorporated in models 
which have been specifically tested in the UK market. However, control variables in the 
model  are  measured  as  lagged  change  variables  due  to  the  nature  of  the  dependent 
variables. For consistency with Kisgen (2006, 2009), similar models are also tested to 
ensure direct comparison with US studies. These models are tested in Chapter 7.   
Finally, the chapter also presented a detailed discussion of the measurement of variables 
and the model proposed to test Diamond’s 1991 liquidity risk hypothesis. The proposed 
relationship between credit ratings and the debt maturity structures of firms are modelled 
using a quadratic regression model, which is likely to capture the non-linear relationship 
hypothesised between the two variables. Chapter 8 provides empirical results for the model 
proposed.        
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Chapter 6  
Credit Ratings and Capital Structure  
6. Introduction 
The overall objective of this chapter is to present and discuss a detailed empirical analysis 
of the potential impact of credit ratings on the capital structures of UK firms. Since early 
2000, there has been a growing theoretical and empirical literature on the importance of 
credit  ratings  for  the  financial  structure  of  the  firms.  Specifically,  after  Graham  and 
Harvey’s  (2001)  survey  study,  highlighting  the  relevance  of  credit  ratings  for  capital 
structure  determination,  a  shift  can  be  noted  towards  exploring  the  influence  of  credit 
ratings on capital structures and their components. However, so  far studies are largely 
concentrated on the US market and provide limited insight into the relationship and its 
applicability to other markets, which are also actively using credit ratings. In this regard, 
the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 extend the previous studies investigating the credit 
rating  –  capital  structure  relationship.  Unlike  previous  studies,  which  implicitly  or 
explicitly postulate a linear relationship between credit ratings and capital structures, the 
present  study  predicts  a  non-monotonous  relationship  between  the  two  variables,  as 
discussed  in  Section  3.3.1.  This  chapter  specifically  provides  detailed  univariate  and 
multivariate analyses to examine the hypothesised relationship between credit ratings and 
the capital structures of UK firms.   
The present chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 6.1 provides a detailed 
description of the selected sample to analyse the impact of credit ratings on the amount of 
leverage  in  firms’  capital  structures.  It  also  discusses  in  detail  the  potential  issues 
concerning the estimation techniques and limitation of the methodologies with the possible 
remedies to address those concerns. Section 6.2 presents  a multivariate analysis of the 
impact of credit ratings on overall capital structures to affirm or negate the non-linearity 
hypothesis for credit ratings and capital structures. Section 6.3 presents and discusses the 
robustness and sensitivity checks against the alternative coding schemes and estimation 
techniques.  Particular  emphasis  will  be  placed  on  addressing  the  potential  reverse 
causation of credit rating in the models. Section 6.4 concludes the chapter. 
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6.1.  Sample Statistics and Diagnostics 
This  section  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  the  variables  selected  for  the  proposed 
models when testing the impact of credit ratings on the capital structure of firms. The 
section is  divided into two main subsections.  Subsection 6.1.1 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the variables before and after outlier treatment with other descriptive analysis 
related to the study. Subsection 6.1.2 presents diagnostic tests for the sample suitability of 
the specific estimation techniques and suggests possible remedial measures, if  the data 
violate any assumptions for the estimation techniques used.     
6.1.1.  Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent, Independent and Control 
Variables 
This section presents detailed descriptive statistics of the variables of the study along with 
the graphical presentation of debt ratios of UK firms and a comparison of the firm-level 
characteristics of rated and non-rated firms.  
6.1.1.1.  Descriptive Statistics Before and After the Outlier treatment 
As discussed in the previous Chapter (Section 5.3), the sample selected for testing the 
relationship  of  credit  ratings  on  the  capital  structures  of  UK  firms,  contains  several 
outlying observations. The observations sometimes theoretically do not make sense and 
their inclusion may distort the analysis. Therefore, they are either trimmed or truncated 
depending on the nature and severity of the extreme values. (For a detailed discussion on 
the outlier treatment, see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). Panel A (B) of Table 6.1 reports the 
descriptive statistics of the sample before (after) the trimming. 
As can be observed from the table, all variables except for LOS have extreme observations, 
which necessitate an outlier treatment. For example, TDTA ranges from 0.00 to 170.20, 
where several observations lie above 1 which theoretically and economically do not make 
sense. Similarly, the PROF also  has  several  extreme values  (above +1  and below  -1). 
Consequently, means and standard deviations of the variables are seriously affected by 
such observations. As regression procedures incorporate such statistics in the calculations, 
the  outcomes  thus  generated  may  not  be  reliable  and  accurate  as  they  may  not  be 
representative of the sample as a whole.  
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Table 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Before and After Trimming 
Panel A: Before Trimming 
  N  Range  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Median  S.D 
TDTA  42,872  170.20  0.00  170.20  0.25  0.17  1.49 
LOS  40,971  24.53  0.69  25.23  12.07  11.63  3.41 
PROF  42,869  562.28  -412.00  150.28  -0.02  0.11  3.83 
FAR  42,872  2.55  0.00  2.55  0.31  0.26  0.25 
MBR  42,851  13937.00  -960.47  12976.53  2.48  1.37  65.75 
LIQD  42,056  2974.35  0.00  2974.35  2.64  1.38  21.05 
Panel B: After Trimming   
  N  Range  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Median  S.D 
TDTA  42,346  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.20  0.18  0.18 
LOS  40,971  24.53  0.69  25.23  12.07  11.69  3.41 
PROF  41,767  1.56  -1.00  0.56  0.08  0.12  0.19 
FAR  42,869  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.31  0.27  0.25 
MBR  42,423  20.04  0.12  20.15  1.91  1.37  1.83 
LIQD  41,846  36.94  0.00  36.94  2.10  1.37  2.94 
Notes: This table displays the descriptive statistics of variables of the sample before and after the outlier treatment. 
Variables are defined as the total debt to total assets (TDTA) as dependent variable, log of sales (LOS) refers to 
natural logarithm of sales, profitability (PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, to 
total assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book 
value of the assets minus the book value of the equity minus market value of equity divided by book value of assets 
while and liquidity ratio (LIQD) is the ratio of current assets to total assets. 
Following the trimming and truncation procedures proposed in  Chapter 5, the overall 
statistics of the variables have considerably improved. Panel B of Table 6.1 reports the 
statistics after the outlier treatment. As can be noted, the mean of the dependent variable, 
total debt to total assets ratio (TDTA), has been reduced from 0.25 to 0.20, which suggests 
that 526 firm-year observations that were lying outside the range of 0 and 1 were inflating 
the average TDTA of the remaining sample of 42,346 observations by 5 percentage points. 
Similarly, other variables such as the market to book ratio (MBR) and liquidity (LIQD) 
also  show  extreme  values,  which  after  trimming  (excluding  428  and  214  firm -year 
observations, respectively), has reduced the standard deviation from 65.75 and 21.05 to 
1.83 and 2.94, respectively. Table 6.2 reports the final sample with the balanced firm-year 
observations for each variable, as used in the regression analysis.  
When comparing with Table 6.1, it can be noticed in Table 6.2 that the statistics of the data 
are not strikingly changed even after losing approximately 7% of data. This may suggest 
that the variables are fairly well distributed. Moreover, by observing the mean and median 
statistics  of  the  dependent  and  control  variables,  it  seems  to  indicate  that  the  outlier 
problem is now minimal. As can be seen in Table 6.2, the average debt ratio of the sample 
of UK firms is 0.20, which is comparable to previous studies by Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Bevan and Danbolt (2002), who report mean debt ratios for UK firms of 0.21 and 0.18,  
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respectively.  However,  the  average  debt  ratio  is  slightly  higher  than  Ozkan  (2001) 
reporting 0.16 for the UK sample firms. The standard deviation of book debt ratios shows 
that there is variety of firms in terms of their capital structures. Although the variable has 
been trimmed, it shows that there are firms that do not have debt at all in their capital 
structure, compared to firms which have all their assets financed by debt. Other variables, 
including log of sales (LOS), profitability (PROF), fixed assets ratio (FAR), market to 
book value (MBR) and liquidity (LIQD), show considerable variation among themselves 
but they are generally consistent with the reported statistics by the previous UK studies 
(Ozkan, 2001; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). Thus, the results of the present study can be 
directly compared to prior studies investigating the capital structures of UK firms.  
Table 6.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables (Final Sample) 
  N  Range  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Median  S.D 
TDTA  38,880  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.20  0.18  0.17 
LOS  38,880  24.53  0.69  25.23  12.22  11.73  3.32 
PROF  38,880  1.56  -1.00  0.56  0.09  0.12  0.18 
FAR  38,880  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.32  0.28  0.24 
MBR  38,880  20.04  0.12  20.15  1.81  1.35  1.57 
LIQD  38,880  36.81  0.00  36.81  1.89  1.37  2.20 
Notes: This table displays the mean, median, minimum values, maximum values and standard deviation over the 
sample period from 1988-2009 the whole sample of rated and non-rated firms. Variables are defined as total debt to 
total assets (TDTA) as dependent variable, log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, profitability 
(PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, to total assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value 
of the equity minus market value of equity divided by book value of assets while and liquidity ratio (LIQD) is the 
ratio of current assets to total assets. 
To examine the effect of credit ratings on the capital structures of the firms, two sample 
sets are used to construct the credit rating coding scheme. The first dataset consists of only 
the rated firms while the second dataset contains all rated and non-rated firms. The reasons 
underlying the combination of the two sample sets are discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter. Table 6.3 displays the descriptive statistics of both groups separately to highlight 
the differences, if any. Panel A consists of the descriptive statistics of rated firms, Panel B 
displays the descriptive statistics for the non -rated firms only  and Panel C reports the 
independent  sample  t-tests  for  the  differences  in  mean  values  of  the  firm  lev el 
characteristics of rated and non-rated firms.   
As can be seen in Table 6.3, rated firms have on average 33% of assets financed by debt, 
which is significantly higher (as indicated in Panel C) than the sample of non-rated firms, 
having an average debt ratio of 20%. The higher average debt ratios for rated firms indicate 
their better access to debt markets. These statistics are comparable to the mean of 30.40%  
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reported in a previous UK study by Judge and Mateus (2009)
23 for firms having access to 
debt markets (as measured by the possession of credit ratings or not) and 21.86% for firms 
having no access (non-rated firms). The mean debt ratios of the present study are also close 
to the previous studies on the US market (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006) reporting 37.2% 
for rated firms and 26.1% for non-rated firms and Canadian firms with market debt ratio of 
30.91% and 15.25%, respectively (Mittoo and Zhang, 2010).  
Table 6.3 
Comparison of Rated and Non-Rated Firms 
Panel A: Rated firms 
Variables  N  Range  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  S.D 
TDTA  844  0.96  0.00  0.96  0.33  0.17 
LOS   844  9.13  9.97  19.09  15.15  1.19 
PROF  844  1.37  -0.87  0.51  0.13  0.11 
FAR  844  0.94  0.01  0.95  0.42  0.25 
MBR  844  11.57  0.41  11.97  1.80  1.11 
LIQD  844  9.40  0.00  9.40  1.12  0.56 
Panel B: Non-Rated firms   
Variables  N  Range  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  S.D 
TDTA  38,036  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.20  0.17 
LOS   38,036  24.53  0.69  25.23  12.16  3.32 
PROF  38,036  1.56  -1.00  0.56  0.09  0.18 
FAR  38,036  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.32  0.24 
MBR  38,036  20.04  0.12  20.15  1.81  1.58 
LIQD  38,036  36.81  0.00  36.81  1.91  2.22 
Panel C: Independent Sample t-test for comparing of means 
  Status  N  Sample Mean  Mean Difference 
TDTA  Rated  844  0.33  0.13*** 
    Non-rated  38,036  0.20 
LOS   Rated  844  15.15  3.00*** 
    Non-rated  38,036  12.16 
PROF  Rated  844  0.13  0.04*** 
    Non-rated  38,036  0.09 
FAR  Rated  844  0.42  0.10*** 
    Non-rated  38,036  0.32 
MBR  Rated  844  1.80          -0.01     
    Non-rated  38,036  1.81 
LIQD  Rated  844  1.12  -0.79*** 
    Non-rated  38,036  1.91 
Notes: Panel A and B displays the mean, minimum values, maximum values and standard deviations 
over the sample period from 1988-2009 for the rated and non-rated UK firms respectively. Panel C 
reports the independent t-test of mean values for the rated and non-rated firms. *** denotes that p-
values are significant at 1% level. 
                                                 
23  The  sample  of  Judge  and  Mateus  (2009)  consists  of  only  the  top  500  UK  firms  with  821  firm-year 
observations  of  rated  firms  and  2,959  of  non-rated  firms.  The  present  sample  is,  however,  much  more 
diversified with 844 firm-years of rated firms and 38,036 of non-rated. Given that the mean debt ratios of the 
present study are comparable to Judge and Mateus (2009), it lends support to the inclusion of the large 
number of non-rated firms suggesting that it will not significantly change the results. However, a larger 
dataset will ensure precision in the results and will strengthen the statistics.  
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Other firm-level characteristics are also different between the two groups of firms. It can 
be noted, that the rated firms are significantly larger than the counterpart non-rated firms 
(p<0.01). This suggests that larger firms are more likely to get credit ratings. Diamond and 
Verrecchia  (1991)  argue  that  large  firms  acquire  ratings  to  attract  large  institutional 
investors. Moreover, it can be argued that large firms have higher credit quality and are 
also more confident about their creditworthiness, thereby being more likely to get rated. 
Such firms are also likely to have a lower degree of information asymmetry compared to 
small firms as they are inclined towards disclosing more information than the small firms 
through the use of rating services. The size effect is also reported by prior US, UK and 
Canadian studies by Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Judge and Mateus (2009) and Mittoo 
and Zhang (2010), respectively. 
Moreover, rated firms have higher tangibility in their assets structures (0.42 versus 0.32, 
p<0.01) and are more profitable (13% versus 9%, p<0.01) than non-rated firms. However, 
rated  firms  are  less  liquid  than  non-rated  firms,  possibly  because  non-rated  firms  are 
expected to have higher cost of financial distress and therefore they are likely to maintain 
larger proportion of liquid assets, which can minimise such costs. These differences are in 
line with the findings in prior literature (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Judge and Mateus 
2009; Mittoo and Zhang, 2010). Given that rated firms have such firm characteristics, 
which predict higher leverage according to the previous theoretical evidence, it becomes 
essential to control for these characteristics when evaluating the relative importance of 
credit ratings for the capital structures of the firms.   
6.1.1.2.  Capital Structure During the Sample Period 
Figure 6.1 displays the average debt ratios of the UK firms over the sample period and 
shows that the average total debt to total assets ratio (TDTA) is relatively consistent during 
the sample period  with  minor changes  from  year to  year. The average debt  ratio rose 
during the start of the sample period from 1988 to 1991, and remained above 20% till 
1993. One of the reasons for the initial change may be the decline in the interest rates 
during that period. Another reason for slightly inflated statistics might be the numbers of 
sample firms (both rated and non-rated) in the first three years of the sample period which 
are 11, 24 and 56, respectively. After 1993, there was a slight decline but the ratio remains 
stable for the next five years. The range of the average debt ratio is 17% to 22% for the 
period of 22 years suggesting that the level of gearing of UK firms is stable over time.  
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From year to year, the maximum change in the leverage is 1 percentage point, which does 
not suggest any major variation over the sample period. 
 
Table 6.4 presents the mean, median and standard deviation of debt ratios over the years. It 
can be noted that overall the mean level of leverage of the UK firms consistently ranges 
from 17% to 22%, although considerable variations, as shown by standard deviation, can 
be noted within each year. The median debt ratios generally are close to the mean debt 
ratios. However, minor differences in mean and median suggest that the debt ratios of the 
UK firms are slightly positively skewed which can be expected from a diverse sample of 
firms  observed  over  a  longer  period  of  time.  As  it  will  be  discussed  in  detail  later, 
skewness in the data is not likely to affect the models tested.    
Table 6.4 
Descriptive Statistics of the Average Debt Ratio over the Sample Period 
Years  Mean  Median  S.D  Years  Mean  Median  S.D 
1988  0.17  0.15  0.14  1999  0.21  0.19  0.17 
1989  0.20  0.18  0.15  2000  0.20  0.17  0.18 
1990  0.21  0.20  0.16  2001  0.21  0.18  0.18 
1991  0.22  0.20  0.16  2002  0.22  0.19  0.19 
1992  0.22  0.20  0.16  2003  0.21  0.18  0.20 
1993  0.21  0.19  0.16  2004  0.20  0.17  0.19 
1994  0.19  0.17  0.16  2005  0.20  0.16  0.19 
1995  0.19  0.18  0.15  2006  0.19  0.16  0.19 
1996  0.19  0.18  0.16  2007  0.19  0.16  0.18 
1997  0.19  0.17  0.16  2008  0.20  0.17  0.18 
1998  0.20  0.18  0.17  2009  0.20  0.17  0.19 
       
Total  0.20  0.18  0.17 
Notes: This table displays the mean, median and standard deviation over the sample period from 1988 to 2009.  
Sector-wise distribution presented in Table 6.5 also indicates substantial variation in the 
average debt ratio between different sectors. The technology sector has the lowest average 
ratio  of  13%  while  utility  firms  have  the  highest  average  gearing  ratio  of  33%. 
Figure 6.1: Average Debt Ratio of the UK Firms over the Sample Period 
Period  
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Nevertheless, utility firms, being highly geared, show less deviation within the group. This 
indicates  that  within the  industry,  utility  firms  tend  to  have  a  similar  level  of  gearing 
compared  to  other  industries  where  the  deviation  is  larger.  For  example,  firms  in  the 
technology and healthcare sector on average vary the most among themselves, having a 
standard deviation (mean) of 0.16 (0.13) and 0.17 (0.17), respectively. This suggests that 
among the industries there are differences in the leverage ratios and that may negate the 
earlier assumption made that firms in one industry have similar leverages. Nevertheless, 
this also provides further motivation to include industry dummies in the regression models. 
Separate regression analyses are also conducted at industry-level to assess the impact of 
the firm-level factors specifically to determine the non-linearity affect of credit ratings on 
the gearing ratios of the firms within the industries. Appendix 6A also presents the sector-
wise descriptive statistics of the control variables.  
Table 6.5 
Descriptive Statistics: Sector-wise 
Industries  Mean  Median  S.D   
Basic Materials  0.23  0.21  0.17   
Consumer Goods  0.21  0.20  0.15   
Consumer Services  0.22  0.19  0.19   
Healthcare  0.17  0.14  0.17   
Industrials  0.20  0.18  0.16   
Oil & Gas  0.21  0.18  0.18   
Technology  0.13  0.06  0.16   
Telecommunications  0.30  0.31  0.20   
Utilities  0.33  0.33  0.18   
Notes: This table displays the descriptive statistics of dependent variable for 
the nine sectors as classified by DataStream code: ICBIN. Financial firms are 
excluded from the sample. 
6.1.1.3.  Credit Rating and Average Debt Ratios 
Table 6.6 illustrates the capital structures of the firms with respect to their credit ratings. 
Panel A of Table 6.6 shows the average debt ratios with respect to credit ratings coded 1 to 
6 and Panel B shows the average debt ratios with respect to credit ratings codes 1-16. Panel 
A shows that firms with the highest credit ratings have lower average debt ratios while the 
change in mean debt ratio between each broad rating category is close to 9 percentage 
points, on average. For example, from AA to A, the difference in the average debt ratio is 9 
percentage points and then continues to increase by 7 and 10 percentage points until the B 
category. After broad rating category B, the average ratio starts declining. Also to note, the 
standard deviation of the debt ratio for top rated firms is very low, suggesting that such 
firms attempt to keep the amount of leverage not only low but also close to other firms in  
136 
 
the market having higher ratings. As the credit ratings decline, the debt ratio gradually 
starts increasing. At the same time, the standard deviation and coefficient of variation start 
increasing,  implying  that  low  rated  firms  and  non-rated  firms  have  more  dispersion 
between themselves with respect to capital structure, compared to high rated firms.  
Table 6.6 
Alternative Credit Ratings codes and Debt Ratios 
Panel A: Broad Credit Ratings Categories and Debt Ratios 
CR  Codes 1-6  Mean  Median  Std. Dev 
AA  1  0.21  0.23  0.08 
A  2  0.30  0.28  0.13 
BBB  3  0.37  0.35  0.15 
BB  4  0.47  0.49  0.24 
B  5  0.43  0.44  0.20 
NR  6  0.20  0.17  0.17 
Panel B: Individual Credit ratings and Debt Ratios 
CR  Codes 1-16  Mean  Median  Std. Dev 
AA+  1  0.10  0.10  0.06 
AA  2  0.23  0.24  0.06 
AA-  3  0.24  0.25  0.07 
A+  4  0.27  0.27  0.11 
A  5  0.30  0.29  0.14 
A-  6  0.32  0.30  0.14 
BBB+  7  0.33  0.31  0.15 
BBB  8  0.39  0.37  0.14 
BBB-  9  0.38  0.37  0.18 
BB+  10  0.46  0.48  0.22 
BB  11  0.42  0.39  0.26 
BB-  12  0.51  0.51  0.23 
B+  13  0.56  0.64  0.20 
B  14  0.33  0.36  0.14 
B-  15  0.39  0.42  0.20 
NR  16  0.20  0.17  0.17 
Notes: This table displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (total debt by total 
assets) with respect to the broad rating categories (1-6) and individual ratings (1-16) where the 
last code in both the scales is assigned to the non-rated firms. 
A similar pattern can be noted for individual credit ratings. Panel B of Table 6.6 indicates 
that the average debt ratio is lower for the top rated firms and increases as the rating 
declines. Firms with B+ rating have the highest debt ratios at an average of 0.56 whereas 
the firms with AA+ have the lowest debt ratio at 0.10.  In some broad rating categories 
firms with a‘+’ sign appear to have lower leverage than other ratings i.e., AA, A and BBB 
categories, but this trend is not consistent. Similarly, for some ratings categories, the mean 
debt ratio is also lower when the firms have a ‘-’ sign with their credit rating, although it is 
less common. This does not provide any clear evidence whether firms have lower leverage 
when they are near upgrades and downgrades. Formal analysis in the next chapter will  
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Individual Credit Ratings 
Figure 6.2 (b): Individual Credit Ratings and Average Debt Ratios 
Broad Credit Ratings 
Figure 6.2 (a): Broad Credit Ratings and Average Debt Ratios 
further explore the relationship and the discussion on the possible reverse causation is 
postponed until then.  
Figure 6.2 (a) and (b) presents a graphical representation of debt  ratios with respect to 
broad and individual credit ratings and Figure 6.3 presents the average debt ratios of the 
UK firms with respect to credit ratings over the sample period.  
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All three figures show a clear non-linear pattern of average debt ratios with respect to the 
credit  ratings.  As  can  be  observed,  non-rated  firms  have  the  lowest  level  of  gearing 
compared to all broad rating categories which indicates that such firms have lesser access 
to debt markets compared to rated firms, whether investment grade or speculative grade 
firms. This supports Lemmon and Zender (2010) who find that the rated firms, irrespective 
of their ratings, have higher debt capacity compared to the non-rated firms. On the other 
hand, the top rated firms have an extremely low level of leverage, which indicates other 
motives of top rated firms for acquiring credit ratings, besides accessing debt markets. 
Further discussion is postponed until Section 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.3 shows that the debt ratio of the non-rated firms remain on average around 0.20 
in almost all the years, whereas the firms with credit ratings do not just change over years, 
but  also  with  each  ratings  category.  However,  the  figures  have  to  be  interpreted  with 
caution, as the rated firm-years are relatively fewer than non-rated firm-years, which affect 
the average debt ratio of both the groups. A slight non-linearity can be observed in the debt 
ratio with reference to the credit ratings, irrespective of the years or the inclusion of non-
rated firms. Moreover, the rated firms also show higher leverage at the start of the sample 
period which over the years has a decreasing trend. It is likely that during the initial few 
years of rating services in the UK market, newly rated firms widely accessed the debt 
market resulting in higher gearing ratios. However, the decreasing trend in the debt ratios 
                             Figure 6.3: Broad Credit Ratings and Mean Debt Ratios over the Sample Period 
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suggests that firms had to maintain relatively conservative debt ratios in order to maintain 
their current  ratings status  or achieve higher  ratings  as per the threshold of the  rating 
agencies. Prior evidence from the US and UK market suggests that rating agencies over the 
period have become stringent (Blume et al., 1998; Gonis and Taylor, 2009). Gonis and 
Taylor (2009) also document that UK firms’ credit quality has also deteriorated over the 
past few years. This might be another reason for the decreasing trend in the debt ratios.  
6.1.2.  Testing OLS assumptions  
Ordinary least square (OLS) is used as the main estimation technique for the present study, 
specifically for the analysis of the factors affecting the capital structure and debt maturity 
structure of the firms. Using OLS as an estimation technique, it necessitates that all the 
assumptions  regarding  the  data  are  met,  failing  which  the  results  may  be  misleading. 
Therefore, all OLS assumptions are tested before applying the model; results for the main 
diagnostic tests are presented in Appendices 6B to 6E. The following is the discussion on 
some of the diagnostics of the assumptions, which need special attention and discussion 
before proceeding further with the analysis of the proposed models. Any violations of the 
assumptions may require some adjustments and remedies, which will be discussed within 
the analysis section. 
An important assumption for the OLS is ‘no multicollinearity’ which requires that the 
explanatory variables and control variables are not perfectly or highly intercorrelated with 
each  other  (Gujarati,  2004,  p.342).  Different  tests  are  conducted  to  examine 
multicollinearity issues in the sample, such as bi-variate matrix, Eigenvalues and VIF. The 
Pearson correlation matrixes of dependent, interest and control variables for the whole 
sample  (rated  and  non-rated  firms)  are  displayed  in  Table  6.7  and  for  rated  firms  are 
displayed in Table 6.8. As can be seen in both the tables, none of the variables indicates 
any serious collinearity issues other than the polynomials and rating dummy (RATdum). 
Most of the variables are correlated at the 1% or 5% level, but the coefficients mostly lie 
close to or below 0.30, which seems tolerable for the OLS. A correlation coefficient close 
to or equal to +1 and -1 suggests high collinearity or perfect multicollinearity among the 
variables.  
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Table 6.7 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Dependent, Explanatory and Control Variables (Rated and Non-Rated Firms) 
 
T
D
T
A
 
C
R
 
C
R
2
 
R
A
T
d
u
m
 
L
O
S
 
P
R
O
F
 
F
A
R
 
M
B
R
 
L
I
Q
D
 
T
E
C
H
d
u
m
 
I
N
D
d
u
m
 
C
S
d
u
m
 
C
G
d
u
m
 
H
C
d
u
m
 
U
T
L
d
u
m
 
B
M
d
u
m
 
O
G
d
u
m
 
T
E
L
E
d
u
m
 
TDTA  1                                   
CR  -.092
**  1                                 
CR
2  -.099
**  .995
**  1                               
RATdum  .111
**  -.963
**  -.981
**  1                             
LOS  .261
**  -.133
**  -.134
**  .132
**  1                           
PROF  -.024
**  -.038
**  -.037
**  .033
**  .309
**  1                         
FAR  .244
**  -.066
**  -.063
**  .060
**  .101
**  .152
**  1                       
MBR  -.164
**  -.001  .000  -.001  -.100
**  -.025
**  -.184
**  1                     
LIQD  -.279
**  .052
**  .053
**  -.053
**  -.234
**  -.172
**  -.252
**  .199
**  1                   
TECHdum  -.165
**  .049
**  .050
**  -.047
**  -.083
**  -.069
**  -.258
**  .189
**  .114
**  1                 
INDdum  -.008  .053
**  .053
**  -.053
**  .003  .057
**  -.106
**  -.089
**  -.073
**  -.242
**  1               
CSdum  .043
**  -.031
**  -.036
**  .041
**  -.067
**  .019
**  .134
**  -.013
*  -.121
**  -.190
**  -.331
**  1             
CGdum  .012
*  -.006  -.007  .004  .065
**  .042
**  -.034
**  -.076
**  .00  -.152
**  -.266
**  -.208
**  1           
HCdum  -.041
**  .002  .007  -.012
*  -.085
**  -.126
**  -.106
**  .154
**  .186
**  -.097
**  -.169
**  -.132
**  -.106
**  1         
UTLdum  .119
**  -.107
**  -.103
**  .097
**  .110
**  .024
**  .238
**  -.060
**  -.054
**  -.063
**  -.109
**  -.085
**  -.069
**  -.044
**  1       
BMdum  .041
**  -.009  -.007  .004  .089
**  .003  .170
**  -.062
**  .016
**  -.109
**  -.190
**  -.149
**  -.120
**  -.076
**  -.049
**  1     
OGdum  .005  -.011
*  -.008  .005  -.025
**  -.013
*  .120
**  -.016
**  .054
**  -.074
**  -.130
**  -.101
**  -.082
**  -.052
**  -.033
**  -.058
**  1   
TELEdum  .090
**  -.028
**  -.032
**  .043
**  .088
**  .019
**  .058
**  .018
**  -.041
**  -.059
**  -.102
**  -.080
**  -.065
**  -.041
**  -.026
**  -.046
**  -.031
**  1 
Notes 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Variables are defined as total debt to total assets (TDTA) as dependent variable, numerical code 1-6 for credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2),rating dummy (RATdum), log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, 
profitability (PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book 
value of the equity minus market value of equity divided by book value of assets and liquidity ratio (LIQD)is the ratio of current assets to total assets, technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy 
(CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy (BMdum), oil and gas dummy (OGdum), and telecommunication dummy (TELEdum).  
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Table 6.8 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Dependent, Explanatory and Control Variables (Rated Firms only) 
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TDTA  1                                 
CR  .397
**  1                               
CR
2  .364
**  .974
**  1                             
LOS  -.368
**  -.443
**  -.454
**  1                           
PROF  .065  -.226
**  -.241
**  .072
*  1                         
FAR  .061  -.168
**  -.122
**  -.101
**  .041  1                       
MBR  .061  -.112
**  -.094
**  -.009  .278
**  -.326
**  1                     
LIQD  -.158
**  .068
*  .092
**  -.200
**  -.083
*  -.213
**  .122
**  1                   
TECHdum  .031  .250
**  .299
**  -.116
**  -.085
*  -.074
*  -.017  .108
**  1                 
INDdum  -.050  .051  .036  -.116
**  -.022  -.054  -.112
**  .025  -.053  1               
CSdum  -.001  .146
**  .097
**  -.039  -.036  -.115
**  .143
**  -.044  -.095
**  -.268
**  1             
CGdum  .168
**  -.026  -.065  .069
*  .106
**  -.288
**  .046  -.035  -.059  -.167
**  -.301
**  1           
HCdum  -.121
**  -.271
**  -.207
**  .180
**  .252
**  -.073
*  .339
**  .030  -.029  -.081
*  -.146
**  -.091
**  1         
UTLdum  .040  -.148
**  -.131
**  -.153
**  -.067
*  .414
**  -.173
**  -.086
*  -.053  -.149
**  -.269
**  -.168
**  -.081
*  1       
BMdum  -.104
**  -.123
**  -.112
**  .149
**  .044  .105
**  -.052  .056  -.041  -.116
**  -.210
**  -.131
**  -.063  -.117
**  1     
OGdum  -.047  -.138
**  -.097
**  .087
*  .056  .149
**  -.071
*  .074
*  -.029  -.082
*  -.148
**  -.092
**  -.045  -.083
*  -.064  1   
TELEdum  .002  .226
**  .248
**  .016  -.216
**  .011  -.100
**  .011  -.037  -.105
**  -.189
**  -.118
**  -.057  -.105
**  -.082
*  -.058  1 
Notes 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Variables are defined as total debt to total assets (TDTA) as dependent variable, numerical code 1-5 for credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2), log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, profitability 
(PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book 
value of the equity minus market value of equity divided by book value of assets and liquidity ratio (LIQD)is the ratio of current assets to total assets, technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer 
services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy (BMdum), oil and gas dummy (OGdum), and telecommunication dummy (TELEdum).  
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In this case, CR and CR
2 show very high correlation of 99.5% which is because the CR
2 is 
derived from the CR, and due to the functional relationship between them in the form of 
squared or cubed transformation,  both  variables by construction will have a very high 
correlation.
24 Gujarati (2002) states that multicollinearity can exist only when variabl es 
have linear relationship as opposed to variables, which are functionally related.  
Formal  tests  for  multicollinearity  diagnostics,  Variance  Inflation  Factor  (VIF)  and 
Eigenvalues for both the sample sets als o suggest that the variables do  not suffer from 
multicollinearity except the CR, CR
2 and RATdum, which shows high VIF (exceeding 10) 
and near zero Eigenvalues (Gujarati, 2004, p.362).  RATdum is also highly correlated with 
the  CR  and  CR
2  because  the  dummy  is  constructed  from  these  variables  where 
approximately 98% of the observations are based on the non-rated firm-years. This high 
correlation or near multicollinearity does not make the estimators biased (Studenmund, 
2000, p.249) although it will make it difficult to estimate the parameters with precision due 
to the high standard errors of the highly correlated variables in the model. Moreover, the 
actual contribution of the variable cannot be interpreted from the model due to the large 
standard errors of the actual and function term of the variables (Gujarati, 2004). Due to 
underestimation of the standardized beta coefficients, small t-statistics and large p-values 
in  the  presence  of  high  standard  error,  it  may  not  be  possible  to  gauge  the  actual 
contribution of the proposed variable CR, CR
2 and the RATdum.
25 
Another assumption of OLS requires that the error terms follow a normal distribution, ui ~ 
N (0, σ
2). To test the assumption of normality, histogram of residuals, Normal P-P plots, 
Skewness, Kurtosis statistics and Jarque-Bera are conducted for both samples. All tests 
show  non-normality  in  the  distribution  of  residuals  and  hence  the  null  hypothesis  of 
normality of residuals is rejected. It should be noted however, that the present case non-
                                                 
24 Also to note, CR on its own has a negative relationship with the TDTA showing that as CR moves from 1 
to 6, the debt ratio gradually start declining. The CR
2 also shows similar sign and coefficient. Columns 3 and 
4 show that CR and CR
2 both have similar sign and coefficients with all the variables in the model proposed. 
This is because of the nature of the variable itself and by construction, the variable should have the same sign 
when independently analysed. In the regression model, this functional form of the variable serves to capture 
the  quadratic  nature  of  the  relationship  and  may  show  a different  sign  based  on  the  actual  relationship 
between the two.   
25 A possible and widely used remedy is centring or standardizing the actual term  i.e., CR in this case, and 
constructing  the polynomials from these centred or standardized values. This may possibly reduce the 
multicollinearity issue between the variables, increase the precision (in terms of the contribution) of the 
estimated model and make the interpretation s traightforward. In this case, centring and standardizing the 
variable did not reduce the correlation coefficient (became inverse from 99.5% to  -98.5%) yet the VIF 
improved considerably (although still very high and above the tolerance level of 10). This indicates that the 
method is not suitable in this case.  
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normality of the residuals is not likely to create any serious concerns in the whole sample 
due  to  the  large  sample  size  of  38,800.
26  Conversely,  the  rated  firms’  sample  can  be 
affected by non-normality in the distribution of residuals. The statistics and plots also show 
a mild level of non-normality in comparison with the whole sample, which may somewhat 
affect the reliability of the results. 
Another possible concern in Model (1), which will be tested to examine the relationship of 
credit ratings and capital structures, is the non-independence of the error term and the 
independent variables. In case the error terms and explanatory variables are correlated with 
each other, OLS estimates may attribute to the independent variables some of the variation 
in the dependent variable which actually comes from the residuals (Studenmund, 2000, 
p.88).  This  would  make  the  estimators  biased  or  inconsistent  (Verbeek,  2008,  p.129). 
Among other causes of the problem such as omitted variables and measurement errors, the 
most important in  the present  case is  the simultaneous  nature of the model or reverse 
causality  among  the  dependent  and  some  explanatory  variables.  In  the  Model  (1) 
theoretically, credit rating and the leverage of the firms might have a causal relationship 
where credit ratings determine the leverage of the firm and the leverage of the firm in turn 
influences the credit ratings of the firms. Therefore, this is not truly a unidirectional cause 
and effect relationship and thus calls for appropriate treatment to minimise such errors. 
Credit ratings (CR) and its squared form, CR
2, are the endogenous variables in the model. 
A  formal  test  for  identifying  endogeneity  is  the  Durbin–Wu–Hausman  test  for  linear 
models (Wooldridge, 2002). Due to the quadratic nature of the model however, the test 
cannot  be  directly  applied  to  this  case.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  rely  upon  the 
theoretical  evidence  (see  for  example,  Kaplan  and  Urwitz  (1979),  Ederington  (1985), 
Molina (2005) and Gray et al. (2006) on the importance of leverage for credit ratings). Due 
to the simultaneous nature of the relationship, the estimators produced will be biased and 
inconsistent. To resolve the endogeneity issue, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) may be 
estimated for the rated firms only. This will help establish the relationship of credit rating 
and capital structure by ruling out any endogeneity bias present in the initial model. More 
details on the technique and results are provided in Section 6.3.4.2 below. 
                                                 
26 As Brooks (2008) states, ‘for sample size that are sufficiently large, violation of the normality assumption 
is virtually inconsequential’ (p.164). This is because ‘the law of large numbers states that the average of a 
sample (which is a random variable) will converge to the population mean (which is fixed), and the central 
limit theorem states that the sample mean converges to a normal distribution’ (p.164).   
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Overall diagnostics for the assumptions suggests that the OLS as a main estimation is still 
valid  and  statistically  justified  despite  some  of  the  assumptions  not  being  met.  The 
problems  associated  with  certain  assumptions  highlighted  above  are  resolved  by 
appropriate remedial measures as discussed above and will further be discussed in the 
analysis section.  
6.2.  Testing the Impact of Credit Rating on the Capital Structure 
In this section, the three main hypotheses specified in Chapter 3 are tested using Model (1). 
The hypotheses are re-stated as follows: 
H1a = Other things being equal, low rated firms are likely to have low levels 
of leverage in their capital structures.  
H1b = Other things being equal, high rated firms are likely to have low 
levels of leverage in their capital structures.   
H1c = Other things being equal, mid rated firms are likely to have high 
levels of leverage in their capital structures.   
As discussed in Section 5.2.1.4 of Chapter 5, Model 1 explores the relationship between 
credit ratings and the leverage of the firms. The model is re-stated as:  
t i t i
n
i
i t i t i t i X CR CR TDTA , ,
1
2
, 2 , 1 0 ,           

..... (1) 
As already stated in Chapter 5 (Section 5.1) and Section 6.1.1.1 above, the model will be 
tested both for rated firms and for a combination of rated and non-rated firms.  
6.2.1.  Regression Results for Rated Firms 
Table 6.9 presents the results of the pooled OLS for Model (1) based on the book debt ratio 
for the sample of rated firms only. Column 1 shows the OLS results of the book debt ratio 
regressed upon credit ratings and their squares. Column 2 shows the results of the full 
model, containing all the control variables, and Column 3 displays the results for Model (1) 
based on the rated firms’ sample without the inclusion of the utility firms.  
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Column 1 shows that the F-value is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the model 
without  control  variables  is  significant  in  explaining  variations  in  capital  structures. 
Therefore,  the  null  hypothesis,  that  the  slopes  of  the  explanatory  variables  are 
simultaneously zero, is rejected. An adjusted-R
2 of 16.6% suggests that CR and CR
2 can 
jointly explain 16.6% of the variation in the debt ratio of rated firms. Consistent with the 
hypotheses, the coefficient of CR is positive  and significant at the 1% level while the 
coefficient of CR
2 is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the credit ratings and capital structures of UK firms.  
Table 6.9 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Book Debt Ratio 
on Credit Ratings and Control Variables (Rated Firms only) 
Variables  1  2  3 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
    0.029 (0.84) 
    0.167 (6.62)*** 
   -0.017 (-3.85)*** 
    0.533 (5.11)*** 
    0.187 (6.99)*** 
   -0.021 (-4.45)*** 
   -0.041 (-7.57)*** 
    0.099 (2.07)** 
    0.107 (4.19)*** 
    0.025 (5.22)*** 
   -0.046 (-6.68)*** 
    0.003 (0.07) 
   -0.007 (-0.27) 
    0.002 (0.11) 
    0.105 (4.25)*** 
    0.024 (0.68) 
    0.037 (1.43) 
    0.022 (0.81) 
    0.074 (2.29)** 
    0.565 (4.88)*** 
    0.169 (5.84)*** 
   -0.017 (-3.40)*** 
   -0.041 (-6.95)*** 
    0.128 (2.48)** 
    0.078 (2.95)*** 
    0.023 (4.65)*** 
   -0.043 (-5.98)*** 
   -0.013 (-0.31) 
   -0.006 (-0.22) 
    0.005 (0.24) 
    0.104 (4.17)*** 
    0.023 (0.64) 
 
    0.027 (0.98) 
    0.077 (2.36)** 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.166 
87.516 
.000 
874 
.338 
21.963 
.000 
874 
.429 
30.741 
.000 
760 
Notes: This table displays the OLS regression results for the rated firms only with (Columns 1 and 2) 
and without utility firms (Column 3) for Model (1). Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-
values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variables are defined as total debt to total assets (TDTA) as dependent variable, numerical 
code 1-5 for credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2), log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm 
of sales, profitability (PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total 
assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, market to book ratio (MBR) is 
the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity minus market value of equity divided by 
book value of assets and liquidity ratio (LIQD)is the ratio of current assets to total assets, technology 
dummy  (TECHdum),  industrial  dummy  (INDdum),  consumer  services  dummy (CSdum),  consumer  goods 
dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy (BMdum) and  
oil and gas dummy (OGdum). 
After adding the restrictions of firm-level factors into the model, the adjusted-R
2 increases 
from 16.6% to 33.8% with an F-value of 21.96 at p<0.01.This adjusted-R
2 is higher than 
the  prior  UK  studies  reporting  18%  (Rajan  and  Zingales,  1995),  8.22%  (Bevan  and 
Danbolt, 2002)  and 31% (Jong  et  al., 2008) adjusted-R
2. This  is  possibly because the 
inclusion of credit ratings as a determinant of rated firms’ capital structures has improved  
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the overall model. Such differences however, can also be attributable to a different sample 
period  and  sample  size  along  with  differences  in  the  specification  of  the  model.  For 
example, these studies do not control for industry effects and/or liquidity in their models.  
The coefficients of CR and CR
2 remain qualitatively similar after other firm-level factors 
are controlled for in the model. The coefficients are highly significant and are of expected 
signs. The positive coefficient on CR and the negative coefficient on CR
2 indicate that the 
leverage  increases  with  18.7  percentage  points  but  the  rate  of  increase  simultaneously 
decreases  by  2.1  percentage  points  with  each  consecutive  squared  rating.  After  it  has 
attained its peak, leverage then diminishes with the increase in CR (i.e., with a decrease in 
the credit quality of the firm) which would imply a non-linear relationship. This suggests 
that firms with high and low credit ratings have lower leverage in their capital structures 
compared to their counterpart mid rated firms. This provides strong evidence for the credit 
rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) in predicting that concerns for the costs and 
benefits of credit ratings drive firms to follow conservative debt policies despite having 
better  access  to  debt  markets,  as  is  suggested  by  the  credit  rating  –  market  access 
hypothesis (CR-MA).  
The  non-linear  relationship  between  the  credit  ratings  and  capital  structures  of  firms 
suggests that previous studies such as that by Mittoo and Zhang (2010) have been unable 
to fully capture the complex relationship between the credit ratings and capital structures 
of firms. For example, they empirically find a negative relationship between credit ratings 
and  leverage.  Mittoo  and  Zhang  argue  that  before  acquiring  credit  ratings,  speculative 
grade firms were constrained by debt capacity and their rating status facilitated them in 
accessing public debt markets, resulting in high levels of gearing. However, inconsistently 
with Mittoo and Zhang (2010), the results of the present study (Table 6.9) indicate that, 
similar  to  high  rated  firms,  lowest  rated  firms  within  the  speculative  grade  have  also 
relatively low levels of leverage. Low rated firms are likely to face supply-side constraints 
due to their credit ratings relative to medium rated and high rated firms. Moreover, they 
can be expected to have higher concerns for the costs imposed by their credit ratings, as 
downgrades would have relatively more serious implications than their counterpart high 
rated and medium rated firms. Consistent with the CR-CS hypothesis, the results indicate 
that they will prefer to have low gearing ratios. For such firms, as predicted by the CR-CS 
hypothesis, the costs of low ratings and any subsequent downgrades are higher than the 
benefits of employing more leverage. As discussed in Chapter 2, the institutional settings  
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of the UK market would also increase the concerns over low ratings. For example, the 
creditor friendly bankruptcy code and lower proportion of low rated firms would make low 
rated firms particularly concerned about their credit ratings leading to low gearing ratios. 
This finding, however, is inconsistent with Lemmon and Zender (2004), who argue that 
rated firms, irrespective of whether they are investment grade or speculative grade, will 
have better access to debt markets and have high levels of leverage.  
Consistent with the hypothesis and prior study by Mittoo and Zhang (2010), high rated 
firms seem to have relatively low gearing ratios. This suggests that despite having better 
access to debt markets, as is suggested by the CR-MA hypothesis, high rated firms have a 
preference  for  low  gearing  ratios,  which  appears  to  be  due  to  the  higher  incentive  to 
maintain their credit ratings. The CR-CS hypothesis implies that for high rated firms, the 
benefits of high ratings outweigh the benefits of high leverage. High rated firms arguably 
have low cost of capital, easier access to the commercial paper market, favourable terms 
and conditions in debt contracts, access to alternative sources of financing and they can 
also benefit from greater financial flexibility due to their high credit ratings. Apart from 
these financial benefits, high rated firms can also enjoy the non-financial benefits of high 
ratings, such as a good managerial reputation in the labour market, employee loyalty and 
favorable suppliers’ terms and conditions. As high rated firms, over a period of time, have 
gained a market reputation for being successful and highly creditworthy firms, they should 
therefore have more incentive to maintain their credit ratings than other rated firms. As 
predicted by the CR-CR hypothesis, these benefits of high credit ratings induce high rated 
firms to choose low gearing ratios.  
It should be noted that the implications of the CR-CS hypothesis differ from traditional 
trade-off theory. The trade-off theory, which predicts a negative relationship between risk 
and  leverage,  implies  that  high  rated  firms,  which  arguably  have  low  chances  of 
bankruptcy, have high leverage. However, the implications of the CR-CS hypothesis are 
distinct from the trade-off theory as it suggests that the benefits of high ratings are material 
for high rated firms, which would lead high rated firms to choose low levels of gearing.  
Mid rated firms seem to have a preference for high gearing ratios. Given that these firms 
have better credit ratings than low rated firms, they have less constrained access than low 
rated firms. Despite the fact that the CR-CS hypothesis predicts that considerations for 
ratings in capital structure decisions should be somewhat similar across different rating  
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levels, mid-rated firms arguably have less concern for their credit ratings. Mid-rated firms 
would be likely to require large changes in their capital structures to get into a category 
where they would benefit from being top rated. Moreover, the high gearing ratios of mid 
rated firms also suggest that they are stable firms with a limited risk of falling towards low 
ratings.  As these firms  are far from  low and high ratings  categories,  their good credit 
ratings help them in accessing more debt. This imply that the results of prior empirical 
studies (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Judge and Mateus, 2009; Mittoo and Zhang, 2010) 
are dominated by mid-rated firms. Overall, the results of the present study suggest that 
credit ratings have a non-linear relationship with the capital structures of firms.   
An  interesting  observation  about  the  capital  structures  of  rated  firms  is  that  the 
characteristics, which appear to affect the capital structures of rated firms, are different 
from those suggested by prior studies. For example, for the rated firms’ sample, large firms 
have less debt and the coefficient is significantly different from zero. This is inconsistent 
with prior literature, which suggests that larger firms have higher leverage due to their 
better access to debt markets, more remote chance of failure and economies of scale. One 
possible reason could be due to the positive relationship between size and leverage; large 
firms are expected to have high credit ratings and therefore have low leverage in their 
capital structure. Nevertheless, it is noted that even after controlling for the size of the firm, 
which has previously been used as a proxy for firms’ access to capital markets and chances 
of bankruptcy (see for example, Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Bevan  and  Danbolt,  2002,  amongst  others),  the  credit  ratings  variables  maintain  their 
statistical significance. The size variable does not have any serious multicollinearity or 
abnormal correlation with the credit ratings as suggested by the bi-variate analysis, VIF 
and Eigenvalues presented in Section 6.1.2, Appendices 6A and 6B. Consolidating the 
findings of correlation, multicollinearity statistics and the regression output of Table 6.9, 
the results suggest that firms’ credit ratings offer some unique benefits and costs to the 
firms at each rating level, which can play a role in determining the capital structures of the 
firms.  
Similarly, significant at the 5% level, profitability has a positive sign, which means that 
when rated firms are profitable they have higher leverage. Although this is inconsistent 
with the pecking-order theory and prior empirical evidence (Jong et al., 2008; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002), the results are more supportive of the trade-off 
theory. Profitable firms are less likely to fail but they may have to pay high corporate taxes  
149 
 
because of their high profits. Such firms have therefore a higher incentive to safely employ 
more leverage, in order to reduce their tax burdens. As hypothesised, the coefficient of 
tangibility has a positive relationship with the leverage of the firms. The significance and 
sign of the coefficient signifies the role of collateralisable assets towards the leverage. 
Inconsistently with Myers (1984), rated firms with high growth opportunities are shown to 
be  likely  to  have  high  debt  as  well.  It  seems  that,  when  firms  have  an  advantageous 
position in the market by possessing credit ratings, they are likely to behave differently 
when faced with a higher growth opportunities set. It indicates that rated firms possibly 
have less underinvestment problems that lead these firms to choose high gearing in the 
presence of growth opportunities. The relationship of liquidity and leverage is also found 
to be negative and significant at the 1% level which is in line with past studies such as 
Ozkan (2001) and Deesomsak et al. (2004), who report a negative relationship. Most of the 
industry dummies on the other hand are insignificant, which is either  due to the small 
sample size or implies that the rated firms generally have similar capital structures across 
the industries.  
The inclusion of utility firms in the sample may receive some criticism. The utility firms, 
being largely regulated, are governed under a different set of regulations than the non-
regulated firms. Therefore, they are likely to have different capital structures, which cannot 
be directly compared with other rated firms. Previous studies investigating firms’ capital 
structures tend to exclude utility firms from their sample (Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Ozkan, 
2000, 2001 and 2002; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). To be consistent with the prior 
literature, Column 3 presents the regression results for Model (1), estimated only for the 
sample without the utility firms. It can be noted that the results remain qualitatively similar 
those reported in to Column 2. However, the fit of the model has considerably improved. 
The CR and CR
2 have a similar sign to Column 3 and remain statistically significant at the 
1%  level.  Moreover,  the  control  variables  also  possess  similar  signs  and  significance 
levels,  suggesting  that  the  inclusion  of  the  utility  firms  has  not  distorted  the  previous 
analysis. Also worth mentioning here is that the utility firms also show that the credit 
ratings have a non-linear relationship with leverage.  
Overall, the results of the present section provide strong support to accept hypotheses H1a, 
H1b and H1c that the implications of the CR-CS hypothesis induce a non-linear relationship 
between the credit ratings and capital structures of UK firms. It can be noted that relative  
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to the factors proposed by traditional theories of capital structure, credit ratings seem to 
have a higher contribution in explaining the capital structure decisions of rated firms. The 
results of the control variables seem to indicate that rated firms have a different capital 
structure  and  are  affected  by  the  same  firm  characteristics  in  different  ways  as  well. 
Caution has to be exercised when attempting to understand the capital structure of such 
firms,  as  this  small  group  has  unique  characteristics  which  may  not  be  observed 
collectively with other firms and may require a separate analysis.  
6.2.2.  Regression Results for Non-Rated and Rated Firms 
This section presents empirical results for Model (1) based on the sample containing both 
non-rated firms and rated firms. Non-rated firms are assigned the lowest code in the credit 
rating scheme (i.e., 6). Although these firms, being non-rated, are unlikely to have credit 
rating considerations in mind when they make their capital structure decisions, they can 
still  be  expected  to  have  low  leverage  in  their  capital  structure.  Prior  literature  has 
suggested  that  rated  firms,  whether  investment  grade  or  speculative  grade,  are  more 
creditworthy than non-rated firms and therefore they do not have constrained debt capacity 
(Lemmon  and  Zender,  2010).  The  CR-MA  hypothesis  presented  by  Faulkender  and 
Petersen  (2006)  further  suggests  that  rated  firms  have  less  information  asymmetry 
compared with  their counterpart non-rated firms.  This  implies that non-rated firms  are 
likely to have lower gearing ratios and, if categorised as the lowest rated firms, would not 
significantly change the results of the previous section. It is expected, therefore, that credit 
ratings  have  a  non-linear  relationship  with  capital  structures  where  the  lowest  rated 
category indicates the non-rated firms (for a detailed discussion see Section 5.1.4).  
Table 6.10 presents the results of pooled OLS for Model (1) based on the book debt ratio 
(TDTA) for the whole sample of rated and non-rated firms. Column 1 contains the results 
where the leverage of the firm is regressed upon the credit rating and its square only, 
without  controlling  for  other  firm  level  factors.  Column  2  presents  the  results  after 
controlling for other firm-level factors and Column 3 shows the results when the rating 
dummy (RATdum) is introduced into the main model. Finally, Column 4 presents the results 
for the main model without the utility firms.  
Column 1 shows that the adjusted-R
2 is 1.5% and the model is still significant with F-value 
291.21 at p<0.01. The adjusted-R
2 is lower than what has been reported in Column 1 of  
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Table  6.9  because  the  sample  consists  of  both  rated  and  non-rated  firms,  with  the 
proportion of rated firm-years being only 2.25% in the whole sample. As hypothesised, CR 
and CR
2 without restrictions in the model have the predicted signs and are statistically 
significant  at  the  1%  level,  indicating  that  credit  ratings  have  an  inverted  U-shaped 
relationship with the capital structures of firms.  
Table 6.10 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Book Debt Ratio 
on Credit Ratings and Control Variables (Rated and Non-Rated Firms) 
Variables  1  2  3  4 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
-0.046 (-1.58) 
 0.246 (13.93)*** 
-0.034 (-15.74)*** 
-0.196 (-7.13)*** 
 0.251 (15.61)*** 
-0.033 (-16.47)*** 
 
 0.012 (44.79)*** 
-0.153 (-32.05)*** 
 0.112 (29.59)*** 
-0.007 (-13.82)*** 
-0.015 (-37.74)*** 
-0.097 (-17.07)*** 
-0.060 (-11.16)*** 
-0.056 (-10.26)*** 
-0.058 (-10.44)*** 
-0.043 (-7.09)*** 
-0.013 (-1.84)* 
-0.062 (-10.69)*** 
-0.058 (-8.92)*** 
-0.308 (-8.55)*** 
 0.161 (6.53)*** 
-0.014 (-3.42)*** 
 0.209 (4.81)*** 
 0.012 (44.79)*** 
-0.153 (-32.02)*** 
 0.112 (29.49)*** 
-0.007 (-13.81)*** 
-0.015 (-37.76)*** 
-0.096 (-16.89)*** 
-0.058 (-10.93)*** 
-0.054 (-10.01)*** 
-0.056 (-10.17)*** 
-0.042 (-6.93)*** 
-0.012 (-1.68)* 
-0.061 (-10.47)*** 
-0.057 (-8.77)*** 
-0.338 (-8.77)*** 
 0.152 (5.70)*** 
-0.012 (-2.64)*** 
 0.250 (5.35)*** 
 0.012 (43.89)*** 
-0.151 (-31.44)*** 
 0.108 (28.25)*** 
-0.007 (-13.91)*** 
-0.015 (-37.87)*** 
-0.097 (-17.01)*** 
-0.059 (-10.99)*** 
-0.054 (-10.02)*** 
-0.056 (-10.20)*** 
-0.042 (-6.95)*** 
 
-0.061 (-10.38)*** 
-0.057 (-8.70)*** 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.015 
291.210 
.000 
38880 
.194 
625.758 
.000 
38880 
.195 
588.427 
.000 
38880 
.184 
570.480 
.000 
37814 
Notes: This table displays the OLS regression results of Model 1 for the whole sample (Columns 1-3) and without utility firm 
(Column 4). Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as total debt to total assets (TDTA) as dependent 
variable, numerical code 1-6 for credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2), rating dummy (RATdum), log of sales (LOS) 
refers to natural logarithm of sales, profitability (PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total 
assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the 
assets minus the book value of the equity minus market value of equity divided by book value of assets and liquidity ratio 
(LIQD)is  the  ratio of  current  assets  to  total  assets,  technology  dummy (TECHdum),  industrial dummy  (INDdum),  consumer 
services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material 
dummy (BMdum) and  oil and gas dummy (OGdum). 
Column 2 reports the results with all restrictions except RAT dum and shows that CR and 
CR
2 maintain not only the expected relationship but also remains significant at the 1% 
level. The positive coefficient of the CR suggests that as credit ratings move from 1 to 6 or 
from AA to NR, initially the leverage increases but at a decreasing rate. Although evident 
from Table 6.9 that rated firms on their own have a non-linear relationship, the inclusion of 
a large number of non-rated firms  (approximately 98% of the total  sample) may pose 
problems in interpretation. For example, it can be argued that non-rated firms, which are 
typically less leveraged than an average rated firm (see, Faulkender and Petersen, 2006;  
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Judge  and  Mateus,  2009;  Mittoo  and  Zhang,  2010),  may  underestimate  the  relative 
contribution of credit ratings in determining the capital structure. Therefore in Column 3, 
Rating  Dummy  (RATdum)  is  introduced  in  the  model  to  control  for  the  effects  of  the 
inclusion of a large proportion of the firms which do not possess a credit rating, on the 
regression output of the model.   
Column 3 reports the results for the full model. After the inclusion of the RATdum, CR and 
CR
2 still maintains the expected sign and are significantly different from zero. Though 
RATdum is statistically significant at the 1% level, the model estimations show that the 
results are independent of the inclusion of non-rated firms. Rather, the significance of the 
RATdum tends to support the assumption made about non-rated firms as having inferior 
credit quality, constrained debt capacity and less access to debt markets. The RATdum is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that rated firms have higher leverage than the non-
rated firms. The significance of CR
2 for the sample including non-rated firms suggests that 
non-rated firms have lower leverage than the lowest grade firms available in the sample. It 
is noted that the inclusion of RATdum has had an impact on the t-statistics of the CR and 
CR
2, lowering it from 15.61 and -16.47 to 6.53 and -3.42, respectively. These results are 
expected as the CR is constructed from the inclusion of non-rated firms and the assumption 
will  only  suffice  when  the  rating  dummy  is  significant.  This  suggests  that  the  coding 
procedure for the credit ratings is sufficiently reliable and does not suffer from any serious 
shortcoming  due  to  the  inclusion  of  a  large  number  of  non-rated  firms.  Moreover  the 
results  are  consistent  with  Faulkender  and  Petersen  (2006),  Judge  and  Mateus  (2009), 
Mittoo and Zhang (2010) and Judge and Korzhenitskaya (2011), and supports the credit 
rating – market access hypothesis (CR-MA) which suggests that rated firms have better 
access to debt markets with lower cost compared to the firms, which do not have credit 
ratings at all. Notwithstanding the difference in the sample, control variables and credit 
rating coding selected for the model, the coefficient of rating dummy in Table 6.10 is far 
higher than what has been reported in these studies. 
Unlike the results for the sample of rated firms, control variables, firms’ size, profitability, 
tangibility,  the  market  to  book  ratio  and  liquidity,  have  expected  coefficients  and  are 
significantly different from zero. Consistent with prior literature (Bennett and Donnelly 
1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Fama and French, 
2002; Deesomsak et al., 2004), the positive sign of log of sales (LOS) indicates that large 
firms have significantly higher leverage than small firms. The negative and significant sign  
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of profitability is consistent with the predictions of Myer’s (1984) pecking order theory. It 
suggests that when firms have internal resources available, they are more likely to rely on 
such resources and will not depend on external financing. The result is also in line with the 
previous studies on UK firms such as Jong et al. (2008), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002). Similarly, firms with more collateralisable assets have more 
debt. These results are consistent with prior studies (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Jong et al., 2008).  
Also in line with the theoretical and empirical findings (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ozkan, 
2001; Jong et al., 2008), growth opportunities have a significant negative relationship with 
the leverage of the firms. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms whose total 
values  are  largely  composed  of  growth  options  tend  to  have  lower  leverage.  The 
significance of industry dummies in the model shows that the leverage is different across 
different  industries  implying  some  common  debt  policy  or  norm  of  firms  within  each 
industry.  All  industry  dummies  are  significant  at  the  1%  level  and  have  a  negative 
coefficient, indicating that these industries have significantly less leverage than the base 
industry, telecommunication.   
In sum, several interesting observations emerge from Table 6.10. First, irrespective of the 
sample of rated firms, the coefficients on both CR and CR
2 are highly significant for the 
whole sample, before and after controlling for other firm-level factors important for capital 
structure determination. This provides sufficient evidence to conclude that credit ratings 
are relevant for the capital structure of UK firms. Second, CR and CR
2 maintain their 
significance and sign in the model after controlling for the rating status. The significance 
of the rating dummy suggests that compared with nonrated firms, rated firms have higher 
leverage irrespective of their ratings. Third, the positive coefficient of CR and the negative 
coefficient of CR
2 provide sufficient support to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the 
alternative hypotheses that, credit ratings have a non-linear relationship with the capital 
structures of UK firms.   
6.3.  Robustness and Sensitivity Checks 
This section presents several robustness and sensitivity checks to ensure the results are 
robust  to  different  coding  schemes,  alternative  measures  of  leverage  and  estimation 
techniques.  The  section  also  presents  yearly  and  sector-wise  analysis  to  assess  the  
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relevance  of  credit  ratings  for  the  capital  structure  over  years  and  within  industries, 
respectively. Moreover, the section also addresses the possible violations of OLS in the 
data or/and model and presents remedial alternative analysis depending on the severity of 
the violation.  
6.3.1.  Regression Results based on Alternative Measures of Credit Ratings 
It can be argued that the coding procedure for the credit ratings may have a shortcoming 
due to unequal distances between the points on the scale. Credit rating (CR) is an ordinal 
variable where it has a clear order but the spacing between these points may not be the 
same across all the levels of the variable. For example, AA is better than A, BBB is better 
than BB but the difference between AA and A might not be the same as the distance 
between  BBB  and  BB.  These  inconsistencies  within  the  scale  may  pose  problems  in 
interpreting the results, specifically if the results are strongly dependent on the type of 
scale chosen for the analysis.  
To minimise any such concerns, two measurement techniques are used. First, a 15 points 
scale (16 points scale) is used instead of the initial credit ratings codes for rated firms only 
(whole sample). This 15 points scale is constructed by assigning a numerical code to each 
individual rating within the broad rating category and code 16 is assigned to non-rated 
firms when the 16 points scale is used. This scale will serve two purposes. One, if using 
this scale provides qualitatively similar results as above, it may suggest that the initial 
coding does not suffer from any serious flaw in the measurement. Second, if results are 
similar to the previous analysis in Tables 6.9 and 6.10, the non-linearity in the leverage 
structure  can  also  be  confirmed  for  individual  credit  ratings.  The  second  remedy  to 
minimise the potential coding error is using a sequence of dummy variables for broad 
credit  ratings  (AAdum,  Adum,  BBBdum,  BBdum,  Bdum  and  NR).  Dummy  variables  are 
constructed by assigning a binary code to each broad ratings category. For example, if 
firms have credit ratings within AA broad ratings category, it will take the value of one for 
the AAdum and zero otherwise. The dummy for A rated firms and non-rated firms are used 
as base categories when the models are tested for the rated sample and combined sample of 
both rated and non-rated firms, respectively. Both base categories are well-defined groups 
in their respective samples with a sufficient number of cases to make precise estimates 
about  the  other  groups  in  the  model  (for  detailed  discussion  on  the  selection  of  base 
category, see Hardy, 1993, p.10).  
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6.3.1.1. Regression Results based on Individual Rating Categories 
Table 6.11 presents the results based on individual rating coding. Columns 1-3 present the 
results  for  the  rated  firms’  sample  and  Columns  4-7  present  the  results  for  the  whole 
sample i.e., including non-rated firms. As can be noted, the statistical significance and the 
direction of coefficients on both CR and CR
2 remain qualitatively similar throughout all 
the  columns  in  Table  6.11  as  in  Table  6.9  and  6.10.  Similarly  and  in  line  with  the 
predictions, credit rating shows a non-linear relationship with the leverage of the firms. 
However,  the  adjusted  R  squares  in  the  case  of  the  rated  firms’  sample  have  slightly 
improved from the reported results in Table 6.9. As can also be observed in Figure 6.2 (b), 
the non-linearity in the relationship between credit ratings and leverage is better captured 
by individual rating coding than  with  the broad rating coding. Nevertheless, given the 
results offer similar findings, it can be concluded that the scale based on broad credit rating 
categories used earlier do not bias the results and they remain robust with alternative credit 
rating schemes.  
Furthermore, the results offer support to acceptance the hypotheses for individual credit 
ratings and capital structures, where firms with low and high credit ratings within their 
broad ratings category have also low leverage, whereas mid rated firms have high leverage. 
It  is  noted  that  the  t-values  in  all  the  columns  have  actually  improved,  although  the 
coefficients of CR and CR
2 have decreased. This is due to the differences in the scale 
where the broad rating coding carry less data points than the individual rating coding, thus 
making  the  relationship  of  CR  and  CR
2  with  the  capital  structure  less  steep  than  the 
original scale (It can also be observed in Figure 6.2 (a & b)). In other words, the debt ratio 
with respect to the individual rating coding will have less absolute change than the broad 
rating coding. 
6.3.1.2.  Regression Results based on Broad Rating Dummy Techniques 
The second measurement technique, containing dummy variables for each broad rating 
category, will essentially reduce the inconsistency issue within both of the scales. Table 
6.12 reports the results using the second method. Columns 1-3 report the results for the 
rated firms’ sample and Columns 4-6 present the results for a combined sample of both 
rated and non-rated firms. Columns 3 and 6 report the results for the samples without the 
inclusion of the utility firms.   
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Table 6.11 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Book Debt Ratio 
on Credit Ratings and Control Variables Using Credit Rating Coding 1-15 (for Rated Firms) and 1-16 code (for Rated and Non-Rated Firms) 
  Rated Firms  Rated and Non-Rated Firms 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
 0.074 (2.86)*** 
 0.055 (7.56)*** 
-0.002 (-4.34)*** 
 0.459 (4.43)*** 
 0.063 (8.18)*** 
-0.002 (-5.04)*** 
 
-0.033 (-6.29)*** 
 0.103 (2.20)** 
 0.110 (4.45)*** 
 0.023 (4.86)*** 
-0.045 (-6.58)*** 
 0.004 (0.10) 
-0.009 (-0.38) 
 0.004 (0.18) 
 0.124 (5.05)*** 
 0.064 (1.80)* 
 0.044 (1.74)* 
 0.026 (0.98) 
 0.082 (2.58)*** 
 0.466 (3.98)*** 
 0.060 (7.08)*** 
-0.002 (-4.09)*** 
 
-0.033 (-5.56)*** 
 0.128 (2.54)** 
 0.082 (3.15)*** 
 0.021 (4.31)*** 
-0.040 (-5.68)*** 
-0.008 (-0.19) 
-0.007 (-0.28) 
 0.008 (0.36) 
 0.125 (4.95)*** 
 0.065 (1.78)* 
 
 0.032 (1.18) 
 0.087 (2.69)*** 
-0.002 (-0.09) 
 0.086 (14.70)*** 
-0.005 (-16.64)*** 
-0.144 (-6.10)*** 
 0.086 (16.15)*** 
-0.004 (-17.06)*** 
 
 0.012 (44.85)*** 
-0.153 (-32.01)*** 
 0.112 (29.53)*** 
-0.007 (-13.80)*** 
-0.015 (-37.78)*** 
-0.097 (-17.13)*** 
-0.06 (-11.26)*** 
-0.056 (-10.33)*** 
-0.058 (-10.47)*** 
-0.043 (-7.10)*** 
-0.014 (-1.91)* 
-0.063 (-10.75)*** 
-0.058 (-8.93)*** 
-0.259 (-8.18)*** 
 0.059 (8.15)*** 
-0.003 (-4.64)*** 
 0.185 (5.45)*** 
 0.012 (44.84)*** 
-0.153 (-31.98)*** 
 0.112 (29.45)*** 
-0.007 (-13.79)*** 
-0.015 (-37.80)*** 
-0.096 (-16.82)*** 
-0.058 (-10.88)*** 
-0.054 (-9.95)*** 
-0.056 (-10.07)*** 
-0.042 (-6.83)*** 
-0.012 (-1.66)* 
-0.061 (-10.40)*** 
-0.057 (-8.69)*** 
-0.277 (-8.22)*** 
 0.058 (7.56)*** 
-0.003 (-4.11)*** 
 0.207 (5.80)*** 
 0.012 (43.93)*** 
-0.150 (-31.41)*** 
 0.108 (28.22)*** 
-0.007 (-13.90)*** 
-0.015 (-37.90)*** 
-0.096 (-16.94)*** 
-0.058 (-10.94)*** 
-0.054 (-9.96)*** 
-0.056 (-10.11)*** 
-0.042 (-6.85)*** 
 
-0.06 (-10.32)*** 
-0.056 (-8.62)*** 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.177 
94.788 
.000 
874 
.351 
32.523 
.000 
874 
.494 
16.713 
.000 
760 
.015 
294.490 
.000 
38880 
.194 
626.609 
.000 
38880 
.195 
589.738 
.000 
38880 
.185 
571.511 
.000 
37814 
Notes: This table displays results for OLS regression for Model 1, using 1-15 for credit rating coding for the rated firms sample (Columns 1-3) and  1-16 for credit ratings coding for the whole sample (rated and non-rated 
firms) (Columns4-7) Columns 3 and 7 reports the results for samples excluding utility firms. Variables are defined as total debt to total assets (TDTA) as dependent variable, numerical code 1-15 or 1-16 for credit rating 
(CR), credit rating square (CR
2), log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, profitability (PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity minus market value of equity divided by book value of assets and liquidity ratio (LIQD)is the ratio 
of current assets to total assets, technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic 
material dummy (BMdum) and  oil and gas dummy (OGdum). Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 6.12 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Book Debt Ratio  
on Explanatory and Control Variables (Using Broad Dummy Variable Technique) 
 
Rated Firms  Rated and Non-Rated Firms 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6 
(Constant) 
AAdum 
Adum 
BBBdum 
BBdum 
Bdum 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
    0.288 (33.99)*** 
   -0.088 (-4.78)*** 
    
    0.089 (7.00)*** 
    0.180 (9.11)*** 
    0.132 (4.89)*** 
    0.803 (8.68)*** 
   -0.094 (-5.01)*** 
 
    0.094 (7.40)*** 
    0.174 (8.90)*** 
    0.114 (3.88)*** 
   -0.039 (-7.49)*** 
    0.086 (1.83)* 
    0.113 (4.48)*** 
    0.022 (4.66)*** 
   -0.043 (-6.28)*** 
    0.011 (0.26) 
   -0.011 (-0.44) 
   -0.004 (-0.18) 
    0.113 (4.61)*** 
    0.028 (0.80) 
    0.031 (1.22) 
    0.019 (0.70) 
    0.061 (1.89)* 
    0.823 (8.21)*** 
   -0.063 (-2.92)*** 
 
    0.102 (7.83)*** 
    0.211 (9.76)*** 
    0.127 (4.11)*** 
   -0.040 (-7.09)*** 
    0.123 (2.42)** 
    0.082 (3.14)*** 
    0.018 (3.74)*** 
   -0.038 (-5.39)*** 
    0.001 (0.03) 
   -0.011 (-0.46) 
   -0.002 (-0.08) 
    0.116 (4.72)*** 
    0.020 (0.56) 
 
    0.025 (0.92) 
    0.059 (1.78)* 
     0.199 (225.06)*** 
     0.011 (0.59) 
     0.096 (10.43)*** 
     0.167 (16.19)*** 
     0.271 (14.14)*** 
     0.226 (7.63)*** 
 
    0.134 (20.17)*** 
    -0.070 (-4.25)*** 
    0.021 (2.50)** 
    0.121 (12.87)*** 
    0.204 (11.72)*** 
    0.181 (6.76)*** 
    0.012 (44.77)*** 
    -0.153 (-32.02)*** 
    0.112 (29.48)*** 
    -0.007 (-13.83)*** 
    -0.015 (-37.75)*** 
    -0.096 (-16.87)*** 
    -0.058 (-10.92)*** 
    -0.054 (-10.01)*** 
    -0.056 (-10.15)*** 
    -0.042 (-6.95)*** 
    -0.012 (-1.64) 
    -0.061 (-10.45)*** 
    -0.058 (-8.78)*** 
    0.137 (20.50)*** 
   -0.061 (-3.37)*** 
    0.016 (1.73)* 
    0.122 (12.92)*** 
    0.235 (12.38)*** 
    0.182 (6.80)*** 
    0.012 (43.88)*** 
   -0.151 (-31.45)*** 
    0.108 (28.25)*** 
   -0.007 (-13.96)*** 
   -0.015 (-37.86)*** 
   -0.097 (-16.98)*** 
   -0.059 (-10.97)*** 
   -0.054 (-10.02)*** 
   -0.056 (-10.16)*** 
   -0.042 (-6.97)*** 
 
   -0.060 (-10.35)*** 
   -0.057 (-8.71)*** 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
.171 
46.141 
.000 
874 
.343 
27.851 
.000 
874 
.429 
10.432 
.000 
760 
.016 
124.416 
.000 
38880 
.195 
573.471 
.000 
38880 
.185 
504.299 
.000 
37814 
Notes: This table displays OLS regression results for dummy variable technique for Model 1. Columns 1-3 report results for rated firms only and Columns 4-6 report results for the whole sample. Columns 3 and 6 
report the results for samples without utility firms. Variables are defined as: dependent variable  (TDTA) is total debt to total assets, AAdum, Adum, BBBdum BBdum, and Bdum  takes the value of 1, if firm has a rating within 
broad rating category AA, A, BBB, BB or B respectively or 0 otherwise. ’A’ rated firms (Adum) and non-rated firms’ NR are the base categories for rated firms sample and combined sample of rated and non-rated 
firm, log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, profitability (PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity minus market value of equity divided by book value of assets and liquidity ratio (LIQD)is the ratio of current assets 
to total assets, technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material 
dummy (BMdum) and  oil and gas dummy (OGdum). Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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The results of Table 6.12 are consistent with Tables 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11. Non-linearity is 
observed between the relationship of the dummy variables of broad ratings categories and 
firms’ leverage. Column 1 shows that AA rated firms  have approximately 20% assets 
financed by debt. BB rated firms have highest leverage in their capital structure, whereas 
AA rated firms have the lowest leverage across the rating scales. When firm-level factors 
are controlled for in the model, the coefficients of the rating dummies still suggest a non-
linear pattern in the debt ratios where BB rated firms on average have the highest leverage.  
Compared to the base category of A rated firms, the results in Column 2 indicate that AA 
rated firms have 9 percentage points less leverage, BBB have 9 percentage points more 
leverage and BB rated firms have 17 percentage points more leverage. The coefficients 
start dropping after BB rated firms. B rated firms have 11 percentage points more leverage 
than the base category firms. Similar results are noted for the rated firms’ sample without 
utility firms in Column 3.  
Turning to the results for the sample of rated and non-rated firms combined in Column 4, 
the AAdum is insignificant in the reduced model but becomes significant when restrictions 
are added to the model. The results of the full model in Columns 5 and 6 show a strong 
non-linear relationship for the dummy variables of rating categories. The coefficients of 
the dummy variables show an increase in leverage from AAdum to BBdum with respect to the 
base category NR, but the coefficients start to decline after BB rated firms. 
Overall, this not only suggests that rated firms have higher leverage, but also suggests that 
the trend is not consistent in all the rating categories. The results provide strong support 
against the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypotheses that credit ratings have a 
non-linear relationship with capital structures. Other variables in the model tend to behave 
in  a  similar  way  as  before.  Interestingly,  the  control  variables  have  very  similar 
coefficients and signs as in Tables 6.9 and 6.10. The adjusted R
2 with the inclusion of 
control variables also show similar statistics and the model remains highly significant in 
both the partial and full versions of the model. This suggests that the results are robust to 
any coding procedure used for the credit ratings.  
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6.3.4.  Regression Results based on Alternative Measures of Leverage 
As already discussed in Subsection 5.2.1.1 of Chapter 5, the debt ratios of firms are mainly 
measured using book values of debt as they are argued to be the most realistic measure of 
firms’ debt. Moreover, prior theoretical and empirical literature (Myers, 1977; Taggart, 
1977; Baskin, 1989; Marsh, 1982; Stonehill et al., 1975) also suggests that management 
actively use book values  of  leverage in  their decision-making processes,  while Kisgen 
(2006) argues that credit rating agencies also base their judgement on book values of debt. 
Since  the  present  study  examines  firms’  financial  behaviour  with  respect  to  the  credit 
ratings  they  possess,  book  debt  ratios  seem  the  most  appropriate  measure  to  test  the 
relationship (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 5).  
The unavailability of data, however, has possibly restricted the use of ratios which are 
computed with actual market values of debt. Prior studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Friend and Lang, 1998; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002) have therefore extensively used market 
debt ratios to substitute ratios based on actual market values of debt. Generally, market 
debt ratios are calculated as: total book debt scaled by book value of assets minus book 
values of equity plus market value of equity. Following these studies, market debt ratios 
(MDR) are substituted in Model (1) to allow examination of the effects of credit ratings on 
firms’ financing patterns.  
As can be observed from Figure 6.4, market values of equity scaled by book value of total 
assets differ across rating levels, where high rated firms have high market values of equity 
but lower book values of equity compared with their counterpart low rated firms. As the 
market debt ratios are computed by using book values of debt scaled by market values of 
equity, it can be expected that market debt ratios will be lower for high rated firms and 
higher for low rated firms. Moreover, the relationship between credit ratings and market 
debt ratios is expected to be linear instead of nonlinear as in the case of book debt ratios 
(total debt to total assets, TDTA)  
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Figure  6.5  (a  &  b)  shows  average  market  debt  ratios  across  broad  credit  ratings  and 
individual credit ratings. As expected, market debt ratios are lower on average for high 
rated firms compared with lower rated firms. Moreover, they indicate that credit ratings are 
linearly related with capital structures. Table 6.13, which displays the regression results to 
test  the relationship  between credit ratings  and market  debt  ratio (MDR), also  suggest 
linear patterns between the two variables.  
The regression results reported in Columns 1-3 based on the rated firms’ sample, indicate 
that broad credit ratings do not significantly explain the variation in debt ratios, while 
individual  credit  ratings  are  positively  associated  with  the  level  of  debt  in  the  capital 
structures. However, in Column 3, dummy variables for broad rating categories, also show 
that the market debt ratio tends to increase with a decrease in each broad rating category, 
suggesting a linear relationship between the two variables. For example, AA rated firms 
have 5 percentage points less leverage while BBB, BB and B rated firms have 5, 11 and 20 
percentage points more leverage respectively, than A rated firms. 
Similar patterns are observed when non-rated firms are added to the sample. Columns 4-6 
report the results for the combined sample of rated and non-rated firms. The significance of 
the rating dummy in Columns 4 and 5 shows that rated firms have higher leverage than 
Figure 6.4: Market Values of Equity/Book Value of Assets across Credit Ratings 
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non-rated firms. However, inconsistent with the results of Table 6.9, CR has a positive 
coefficient  significant  at  the  1%  level  while  CR
2  has  a  negative  coefficient  but  is 
insignificant in the model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 6.5 (b): Individual Credit Ratings and Market Debt Ratios  
 
Figure 6.5 (a): Broad Credit Ratings and Market Debt Ratios  
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Table 6.13 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Market Debt Ratio (MDR) on Credit Ratings and Control Variables  
Variables 
Rated Firms Only   Rated and Non-Rated Firms 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
CR (1-5)  CR (1-15) 
CR (Dummy 
Variables)  CR (1-6)  CR (1-16) 
CR (Dummy 
Variables) 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
AAdum 
Adum 
BBBdum 
BBdum 
Bdum 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
 0.54 (7.01)*** 
 0.030 (1.54) 
 0.005 (1.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.026 (-6.64)*** 
-0.099 (-2.80)*** 
 0.138 (7.31)*** 
-0.037 (-10.45)*** 
-0.018 (-3.51)*** 
-0.111 (-3.51)*** 
-0.022 (-1.19) 
-0.003 (-0.19) 
 0.050 (2.74)*** 
 0.045 (1.70)* 
 0.014 (0.71) 
-0.016 (-0.79) 
 0.018 (0.76) 
 0.455 (5.84)*** 
 0.021 (3.61)*** 
 0.000 (0.10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.023 (-5.70)*** 
-0.091 (-2.59)*** 
 0.141 (7.59)*** 
-0.037 (-10.58)*** 
-0.018 (-3.52)*** 
-0.085 (-2.77)*** 
-0.017 (-0.93) 
 0.005 (0.29) 
 0.064 (3.48)*** 
 0.068 (2.56)*** 
 0.024 (1.25) 
-0.005 (-0.27) 
 0.031 (1.30) 
    0.624 (8.96)*** 
 
 
 
  -0.053 (-3.76)*** 
 
   0.052 (5.44)*** 
   0.119 (8.10)*** 
   0.205 (9.27)*** 
  -0.026 (-6.63)*** 
  -0.098 (-2.77)*** 
   0.137 (7.21)*** 
  -0.037 (-10.37)*** 
  -0.019 (-3.57)*** 
  -0.113 (-3.54)*** 
  -0.020 (-1.11) 
  -0.002 (-0.10) 
   0.05 (2.72)*** 
   0.048 (1.78)* 
   0.014 (0.73) 
  -0.015 (-0.77) 
  0.021 (0.87) 
-0.235 (-7.27)*** 
 0.070 (3.15)*** 
-0.001 (-0.27) 
 0.225 (5.75)*** 
  
 
 
 
 
0.008 (33.27)*** 
-0.153 (-35.66)*** 
 0.124 (36.33)*** 
-0.028 (-59.57)*** 
-0.009 (-26.64)*** 
-0.060(-11.83)*** 
-0.036 (-7.46)*** 
-0.035 (-7.27)*** 
-0.034 (-6.78)*** 
-0.035 (-6.38)*** 
 0.015 (2.39)** 
-0.032 (-6.12)*** 
-0.035 (-5.99)*** 
 -0.201 (-7.06)*** 
  0.028 (4.30)*** 
 -0.000 (-0.94) 
  0.196 (6.42)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.008 (33.32)*** 
 -0.153 (-35.63)*** 
  0.124 (36.31)*** 
 -0.028 (-59.56)*** 
 -0.009 (-26.67)*** 
 -0.060(-11.72)*** 
 -0.035 (-7.35)*** 
 -0.035 (-7.15)*** 
 -0.033 (-6.63)*** 
 -0.034 (-6.24)*** 
  0.016 (2.47)** 
 -0.031 (-6.00)*** 
 -0.035 (-5.88)*** 
 0.145 (24.27)*** 
 
 
 
-0.085 (-5.74)*** 
-0.021 (-2.78)*** 
 0.041 (4.86)*** 
 0.114 (7.31)*** 
 0.176 (7.30)*** 
 0.008 (33.27)*** 
-0.153 (-35.65)*** 
 0.124 (36.30)*** 
-0.028 (-59.56)*** 
-0.009 (-26.65)*** 
-0.060 (-11.8)*** 
-0.036 (-7.41)*** 
-0.035 (-7.22)*** 
-0.033 (-6.73)*** 
-0.035 (-6.35)*** 
 0.016 (2.45)** 
-0.032 (-6.08)*** 
-0.035 (-5.96)*** 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.248 
803.239 
.000 
38880 
.470 
52.577 
.000 
874 
.469 
53.923 
.000 
874 
.469 
46.342 
.000 
874 
.248 
803.239 
.000 
38880 
.248 
802.049 
.000 
38880 
Notes: This table displays results for OLS regression for Model 1 using Market Debt Ratio as the dependent variable. Columns 1-3 shows the results for the rated firms only and Columns 4-6 shows the results for the 
combined sample of rated and non-rated.  Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Similarly, Column 6 reports the results for the broad rating dummy technique and indicates 
a linear relationship between credit ratings and the market debt  ratio, where non-rated 
firms  have  significantly  less  leverage  than  rated  firms.  The  results,  therefore,  do  not 
provide enough support to accept the alternative hypotheses that credit ratings and capital 
structures have a non-linear relationship when capital structures are measured by markets 
debt ratios. 
6.3.4.  Yearly and Sector-wise Analysis 
Yearly regressions of Model (1) for the combined sample of both rated and non-rated firms 
presented in Table 6.14 also confirm the results of Table 6.9 and the preliminary results of 
Figure 6.3. Only the results of CR and CR
2 are reported in the table although the analysis 
has been based on the full model (without Rating Dummy) as in Column 2 of Table 6.9. 
For  each  individual  year,  the  sign  of  CR  and  CR
2  is  as  expected  and  is  significantly 
different from zero, with the exception of the first three years. The insignificance of the 
coefficients of credit ratings in the initial years may be because acquiring ratings were 
relatively new for UK firms at that time. It can be expected that the effects of credit ratings 
would be more pronounced after the initial period. From 1994 onwards, it can be noted that 
the CR and CR
2 becomes significant in the model. Although yearly regression results tend 
to support the non-linearity hypothesis for Model 1, the results should be interpreted with 
caution  as  the  rating  dummy  RATdum  is  not  included  in  the  model  due  to  the  limited 
number of rated firm-years in the sample. The inclusion of RATdum automatically excludes 
either  CR  or  CR
2  or  both  from  some  yearly  regression  output  due  to  serious  partial 
correlation of the variables not tolerable for estimating OLS.
27 However, in most of the 
cases the inclusion of RAT dum does not change the expected relationship of CR and CR
2 
but occasionally makes the variables insignificant. When the model is tested for the rated 
firms’  sample  only,  the  results  do  not  provide  support  for  the  expected  relationship 
suggesting that the non-linearity in yearly regressions is solely driven by the inclusion of 
non-rated firms in the sample.   
 
 
                                                 
27 Regressions have also been conducted with year dummies for the rated sample and the whole sample. The 
results  remain  unchanged;  CR  and  CR
2  are  highly  significant  with  positive  and  negative  coefficient, 
respectively.   
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Table 6.14 
OLS Regression Results of Model (1)-Yearly Comparisons 
Years  CR  CR
2  F  Sig  R
2 
1988-1990     -0.087 (-0.53)       0.009 (0.40)  137.941  .000  0.18 
1991      0.137 (0.82)      -0.018 (-0.82)  48.302  .000  0.18 
1992      0.132 (0.98)      -0.018 (-1.00)  67.726  .000  0.23 
1993      0.145 (1.12)      -0.019 (-1.13)  72.995  .000  0.24 
1994      0.189 (1.83)*      -0.025 (-1.84)*  76.277  .000  0.24 
1995      0.224 (2.52)**      -0.029 (-2.59)***  66.690  .000  0.22 
1996      0.194 (2.15)**      -0.026 (-2.19)**  58.302  .000  0.17 
1997      0.390 (4.66)***      -0.052 (-4.83)***  57.661  .000  0.16 
1998      0.409 (5.18)***      -0.054 (-5.41)***  64.881  .000  0.18 
1999      0.328 (4.55)***      -0.042 (-4.68)***  70.169  .000  0.20 
2000      0.307 (4.88)***      -0.040 (-5.11)***  87.410  .000  0.24 
2001      0.272 (4.36)***      -0.035 (-4.59)***  85.763  .000  0.23 
2002      0.340 (5.01)***      -0.043 (-5.28)***  67.836  .000  0.19 
2003      0.272 (3.96)***      -0.035 (-4.27)***  53.662  .000  0.15 
2004      0.238 (3.58)***      -0.031 (-3.89)***  65.673  .000  0.18 
2005      0.224 (3.35)***      -0.029 (-3.67)***  68.726  .000  0.19 
2006      0.251 (3.55)***      -0.032 (-3.83)***  67.108  .000  0.18 
2007      0.226 (3.26)***      -0.030 (-3.63)***  71.793  .000  0.20 
2008      0.233 (3.09)***      -0.03 (-3.41)***  76.749  .000  0.23 
2009      0.171 (1.89)*      -0.024 (-2.19)**  39.918  .000  0.25 
Notes: This table displays OLS results of Model (1) for the combined sample. Only Coefficients of CR and CR
2 
are  reported  for  brevity  reasons.  Coefficients  are  reported  outside  parenthesis  while  t-values  are  in  the 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables 
are defined as total debt to total assets (TDTA) as dependent variable, credit rating 1-6 (CR), credit rating 
square (CR
2). 
Sector wise regression results in Table 6.15 support to some extent the initial results. The 
results for the rated firms’ sample indicate a non-linear relationship for firms in consumer 
goods,  and  the  industrial  and  utility  sectors.  Firms  in  the  oil  and  gas  and 
telecommunication sectors have also the expected sign but the coefficients of CR and CR
2 
are not significant, possibly due to the small sample size. The results are also presented for 
the combined sample but they do not include the rating dummy. The coefficients of CR 
and CR
2 for the combined sample show the expected signs and significances in all the 
industries  except  for  the  basic  materials,  healthcare  and,  partially,  for  the  technology 
sector, where the coefficients possess the expected sign but are not significant. However, 
the results are sensitive towards the inclusion of the non-rated firms. The results show that 
rated firms have higher leverage than non-rated firms, but once the effect of their inclusion 
is controlled in the model, the results no longer hold.  
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6.3.4.  Addressing the Violations of OLS 
This section presents the remedies to address the violations of OLS. 
6.3.4.1.  Addressing Heteroskedasticity  
As discussed in Subsection 6.1.2, OLS assumptions are tested to identify possible violation 
and to assess the suitability of OLS as an estimation technique. Having established that 
data  do  not  meet  homoscedasticity  of  variances  and  independence  of  error  term 
assumptions, measures are taken to alleviate such concerns.  Both graphical presentation 
and the White Heteroskedasticity test suggest that the combined sample of rated and non-
rated firms suffers from serious heteroskedasticity, while the rated firms’ sample suffers 
from  mild  heteroskedasticity.  Therefore,  White  Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard 
Errors  and  Covariance,  also  known  as  white  standard  errors  or  robust  standard  errors 
(Gujarati, 2004) are obtained to ensure reliable and efficient estimators from OLS in the 
presence of Heteroskedasticity. Table 6.16 displays the OLS results after correcting any 
Heteroskedasticity present in the model.  
Table 6.15 
OLS Regression Results of Model (1) - Sector-wise Comparison 
Industry  CR          CR
2  F-Value  Sig.  Adj-R
2 
Panel A: Rated Firms 
Basic Materials   0.015 (0.32)  -0.005 (-0.62)  8.200  .000  .407 
Consumer Goods   0.309 (2.85)***  -0.035 (-1.97)*  23.114  .000  .525 
Consumer Services   0.116 (2.30)**   0.002 (0.24)  31.714  .000  .413 
Health Care   +   0.009 (0.55)  4.456  .002  .387 
Industrials   0.214 (3.09)***  -0.030 (-2.49)**  19.013  .000  .496 
Oil & Gas   0.010 (0.24)  -0.001 (-0.21)  78.935  .000  .937 
Technology  -0.721 (-1.47)   0.096 (1.53)  2.155  .152  .421 
Telecommunications   0.040 (0.25)  -0.008 (-0.33)  8.195  .000  .463 
Utilities   0.234 (3.57)***  -0.025 (-1.97)*  16.713  .000  .429 
Panel B: Rated and Non-rated Firms 
Basic Materials  0.016 (0.28)  -0.002 (-0.33)  111.531  .000  .201 
Consumer Goods  0.470 (7.84)***  -0.061 (-8.37)***  226.819  .000  .155 
Consumer Services  0.372 (9.56)***  -0.047 (-10.19)***  181.413  .000  .163 
Health Care  0.155 (1.58)  -0.021 (-1.54)  69.1769  .000  .202 
Industrials  0.269 (6.33)***  -0.034 (-6.55)***  418.569  .000  .187 
Oil & Gas  0.346 (5.35)***  -0.046 (-5.38)***  49.789  .000  .138 
Technology  0.228 (1.57)  -0.034 (-2.14)**  109.176  .000  .129 
Telecommunications  0.219 (2.41)**  -0.025 (-2.31)**  21.003  .000  .199 
Utilities  0.188 (3.71)***  -0.024 (-3.73)***  38.878  .000  .201 
Notes: The table displays the results of Model (1) for rated firms’ sample and combined sample of both rated and non-rated 
firms. Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values 
significant  at  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  levels,  respectively.  Variables  are  defined  as  total  debt  to  total  assets  (TDTA)  as 
dependent variable, credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2) (broad credit ratings) 
+:OLS do not report results due to partial correlation  
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Columns 1 and 4 present the results for the full model with CR code 1-6. Columns 2 and 5 
present the results for CR code 1-16 whereas Columns 3 and 6 show results for the broad 
rating dummy method used instead of codes. The results in all the columns substantiate the 
results reported earlier in Tables 6.9 to 6.12. The coefficients of credit ratings maintain 
their significance in the model at the 1% level, where CR has a positive relation and CR
2 
has  a  negative  relation  with  the  leverage  of  the  firm,  irrespective  of  the  CR  coding. 
Similarly, the results of the broad rating dummy technique indicate an increase in leverage 
with a decrease in broad rating categories. The leverage starts to decline after BB rated 
firms. The remaining firm-level factors possess the expected signs and significances and 
remain  similar  to  the  results  reported  earlier.  The  correction  of  heteroskedasticity, 
however, has slightly lowered the t-statistics of most of the variables.  
6.3.4.2.  Addressing Endogeneity 
Concerning the non-independence of error terms, the two most common formal techniques 
used  are  the  Instrumental  Variable  Technique  (IV)  and  the  Two-Stage  Least  Square 
method (2SLS) (Wooldridge, 2002). Both the techniques result in unbiased and consistent 
estimators. In the present case, 2SLS is used instead of IV due to several different reasons. 
For example, credit ratings are dependent on many different factors including external or 
country-level  factors and each factor is  expected to  have a limited contribution  to  the 
overall model of credit ratings. Any surrogate used as an instrument for credit ratings is 
thus likely to have a weak correlation with credit ratings. This may lead to large standard 
errors resulting in more serious consequences than using OLS instead (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Moreover, if the instrument is even moderately correlated with the error term, it can result 
in bias in the estimates (Wooldridge, 2002, p.470). Given that an appropriate instrument is 
difficult to find, 2SLS is used to obtain an instrumental variable such that it is uncorrelated 
with the error term and highly correlated with the exogenous variable. The use of such an 
instrument is likely to produce unbiased and consistent estimators. Finally, using 2SLS is 
also consistent with previous studies (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Judge and Mateus 
2009;  Mittoo and Zhang, 2010), addressing endogeneity concerns when examining the 
relationship of credit ratings and capital structures.   
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Table 6.14 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Book Debt Ratio  
on Explanatory and Control Variables  
 (Heteroskedasticity Corrected Standard Errors) 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
AAdum 
Adum 
BBBdum 
BBdum 
Bdum 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
    0.535 (5.60)*** 
    0.175 (6.26)*** 
   -0.018 (-3.41)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    -0.039 (-8.40)*** 
     0.085 (1.11) 
     0.110 (4.27)*** 
     0.023 (2.82)*** 
    -0.045 (-6.65)*** 
    -0.007 (-0.12) 
    -0.009 (-0.33) 
    -0.001 (-0.05) 
     0.108 (4.02)*** 
     0.038 (1.01) 
     0.033 (1.13) 
     0.019 (0.69) 
     0.068 (2.42)** 
     0.459 (4.86)*** 
     0.063 (7.57)*** 
    -0.002 (-4.17)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    -0.033 (-7.05)*** 
     0.103 (1.32) 
     0.110 (4.30)*** 
     0.023 (2.87)*** 
    -0.045 (-6.10)*** 
     0.004 (0.08) 
    -0.009 (-0.36) 
     0.004 (0.16) 
     0.124 (4.72)*** 
     0.064 (1.75)* 
     0.044 (1.55) 
     0.026 (0.99) 
     0.082 (2.96)*** 
     0.513 (3.89)*** 
 
 
 
    -0.059 (-2.91)*** 
 
     0.096 (6.33)*** 
     0.159 (5.88)*** 
     0.091 (3.21)*** 
    -0.065 (-5.06)*** 
     0.069 (1.39) 
     0.019 (1.98)** 
     0.014 (2.74)*** 
    -0.033 (-3.42)*** 
    -0.018 (-0.40) 
    -0.048 (-1.37) 
    -0.037 (-1.62) 
     0.106 (2.89)*** 
     0.039 (1.49) 
     0.051 (1.37) 
     0.026 (0.79) 
     0.052 (1.83)*   
   -0.308 (-6.99)*** 
    0.161 (6.99)*** 
   -0.016 (-3.33)*** 
    0.209 (3.91)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
    0.012 (43.28)*** 
   -0.153 (-26.71)*** 
    0.112 (25.38)*** 
   -0.007 (-11.78)*** 
  -0.015 (-25.78)*** 
  -0.096 (-14.40)*** 
  -0.058 (-9.18)*** 
  -0.054 (-8.32)*** 
  -0.056 (-8.69)*** 
  -0.042 (-5.93)*** 
  -0.012 (-1.47) 
  -0.061 (-8.98)*** 
  -0.057 (-7.64)*** 
  -0.259 (-6.84)*** 
   0.059 (9.54)*** 
  -0.003 (-4.86)*** 
   0.185 (4.52)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
   0.012 (43.31)*** 
  -0.153 (-26.67)*** 
   0.112 (25.34)*** 
  -0.007 (-11.78)*** 
  -0.015 (-25.79)*** 
  -0.096 (-14.35)*** 
  -0.058 (-9.14)*** 
  -0.054 (-8.28)*** 
  -0.056 (-8.61)*** 
  -0.042 (-5.84)*** 
  -0.012 (-1.46) 
  -0.061 (-8.93)*** 
  -0.057 (-7.58)*** 
   0.134 (17.11)*** 
 
 
 
  -0.070 (-7.29)*** 
   0.021 (3.11)*** 
   0.121 (11.60)*** 
   0.204 (7.35)*** 
   0.181 (5.23)*** 
   0.012 (43.25)*** 
  -0.153 (-26.70)*** 
   0.112 (25.37)*** 
  -0.007 (-11.81)*** 
  -0.015 (-25.78)*** 
  -0.096 (-14.4)*** 
  -0.058 (-9.18)*** 
  -0.054 (-8.33)*** 
  -0.056 (-8.68)*** 
  -0.042 (-5.94)*** 
  -0.012 (-1.44) 
  -0.058 (-7.66)*** 
  -0.061 (-8.97)*** 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
0.349 
30.700 
.000 
874 
0.362 
32.523 
.000 
874 
0.322 
17.648 
.000 
874 
0.194 
588.427 
.000 
38880 
.195 
573.471 
.000 
38880 
.195 
523.471 
.000 
38880 
Notes: The table displays results for OLS regression results with heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors for Model (1) for both samples. Columns 1 and 4 reports the results for broad rating coding, 
Columns 2 and 5 for individual credit rating coding and Column 3 and 6 for broad rating dummy technique. Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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i.  Estimating the Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) 
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation is used only for the rated firms’ sample and 
not for the whole sample of rated and non-rated firms. If 2SLS is directly applied to the 
whole sample of rated and non-rated firms, the predicted categories will always be very 
close to or equivalent to the last category as a large proportion in the sample consists of the 
non-rated firms (approx. 98% of the total sample). Consequently, the variation in the credit 
ratings will not be observable. Moreover, as stated in Section 6.2.2, the non-linearity in the 
relationship between credit ratings and capital structures should hold with or without the 
inclusion of the non-rated firms. In addition, it is already established from the previous 
studies (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Judge and Mateus 2009; Mittoo and Zhang, 2010) 
and from the empirical evidence provided in Section 6.2.2 that the non-rated firms have 
lower leverage even after controlling for credit ratings. Therefore, the exclusion of non-
rated firms for 2SLS seems an appropriate solution in this case.  Model (1) is restated here 
as: 
t i t i
n
i
i t i t i t i X CR CR TDTA , ,
1
2
, 2 , 1 0 ,           

... (1) 
The two systems of equations estimated by 2SLS are:  


    
n
i
t i t i i t i t i t i X TZS ICR CR
1
, , , 2 , 1 0 ,      ... (1a) 
t i t i PCR CR ,
2
, 1 0
2 ) (      
...(1b) 
t i t i
n
i
i t i t i t i X PCR PCR TDTA , ,
1
2
, 2 , 1 0 ,           

... (1c) 
where TDTA and CR are mutually dependent or endogenous variables in the system and 
Xi,t are assumed to be all exogenous variables in Model (1). The first equation (1a) or stage 
1 of 2SLS, models the credit ratings by incorporating the Interest coverage ratio (ICR) and 
Taffler’s z-score (TZS) along with the exogenous variables from Model (1). As suggested 
by Winship and Mare (1984), the predicted categories of credit ratings (PCR) and their 
squared form (PCR
2) are obtained from Model (1a) by ordinal logistic regressions and are 
used as instruments in the second equation (1c).  
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These  two  additional  variables  may  potentially  be  important  in  determining  the  credit 
ratings of the firms. Prior studies have noted that the interest coverage ratio is one of the 
most pronounced factors in determining the credit rating (see for example, Gray et al., 
2006). Although Standard and Poor’s do not disclose their rating models, Standard and 
Poor’s corporate credit rating criteria mentions ten financial ratios important for the rating 
analysis, out of which five are different measures of the interest coverage ratio (Standard 
and Poor's, 2008). As these ratios measure the firm’s ability to service its debt and other 
financial obligations, credit ratings are likely to be very sensitive to the coverage ratios. 
The ICR here is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (DataStream 
code:  WC18198)  divided  by  the interest  expenses  (DataStream  code:  WC01251). This 
ratio is also one of the measures mentioned in Standard and Poor’s Corporate Credit Rating 
Criteria. 
Another  possible  variable,  which  may  determine  the  financial  health  of  the  firms 
specifically in the UK, is Taffler’s z-score as developed by Taffler (1983). Taffler’s z score 
is a UK version of the Altman (1968) z-score, given as: 
= 3.20 + 12.18 (profit before tax/current liabilities) + 2.50 (current assets/total liabilities) 
- 10.68 (current liabilities/total assets) + 0.029 (no-credit interval)
28 
It has been argued that the score facilitates discrimination between firms close to failure 
and those that are not at risk of failure (Taffler, 1982). Initially the model was developed 
only for the industrial firms, but later it was also tested for other non-financial firms and 
proved to work well (Agarwal and Taffler, 2007). In a recent paper, Agarwal and Taffler 
(2007) retested the original Taffler z-score model to evaluate its predictive ability 25 years 
after it was first developed. They find that the model, even after more than two decades, 
works  well  for  the  prediction  of  the  failure  of  UK  firms.  Taffler’s  z-score  provides  a 
continuous score from below zero to positive values. Firms that have scores towards the 
negative  end,  have  higher  chances  of  failure  than  the  firms  with  a  positive  score. 
Moreover, the lower the score of the firm, the higher the chances of failure and vice versa.  
After  inclusion  of  the  ICR  and  TZS
29  as additional  explanatory variables  for CR, the 
equation is correctly identified which satisfies the  requirements necessary for conducting 
                                                 
28 Where, no-credit interval = (quick assets – current liabilities)/daily operating expenses. Daily operating 
expenses is calculated by subtracting profit before taxes and depreciation divided by 365.  
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2SLS estimations (Brooks, 2008, p. 286). In estimating the first stage (Model 1a), ordinal 
logistic regressions are used to obtain the predicted values of the endogenous variable CR 
and CR
2. The square of the predicted values of CR is used as an explanatory variable for 
the functional form of the endogenous variable, CR
2
 (Model 1b). The quadratic model such 
as in this case, requires that the functional forms of the original term should be treated as 
separate  endogenous  variables  in  the  model  (Wooldridge,  2002).  Therefore,  a  set  of 
predicted values for CR
2 is generated by a separate ordinal logistic regression for CR
2 (for 
a  detailed  discussion  on  the  methodology,  see  Wooldridge,  2002,  p.  230-237).  In  the 
second stage of the 2SLS, model (1c) is estimated by OLS using the predicted values of the 
CR and CR
2 obtained from the first stage.  
Table 6.15 reports the results for 2SLS and confirms the previous findings in the chapter. 
Results of stage I show that the model is significant at explaining variation in credit ratings 
with Cox and Snell R
2 and Nagelkerke R
2 at 46% and 50% respectively. The results of 
stage II shows that CR and CR
2 have similar sign and significance as Table 6.9; CR has a 
positive sign and is significant at the 1% level and CR
2 is also significant and as expected, 
has a negative coefficient. The positive coefficient of the CR and negative coefficient of 
CR
2 implies that the leverage will increase as the CR increases but at a decreasing rate. 
Table  6.12  suggests  that  this  point  or  peak  is  at  BB  rated  firms  in  the  broad  ratings 
category. As the firms fall below the BB rating, the leverage ratios of these firms start 
declining. The results, after eliminating the concerns for endogeneity, are still supportive 
of the alternative hypotheses for an inverted U-shaped relationship of the credit ratings and 
capital structures of the firms.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
29 It may be argued that the Taffler’s z-score (TZS) can be used as a direct instrument for CR by replacing 
CR  with TZS. However, there  are three main reasons for not using TZS either instead of CR or as an 
instrument for CR. First, TZS has a low correlation with CR (2%) and therefore, the measure can be used as 
one of the explanatory variables for credit ratings but not ‘the instrument’ for credit ratings. Second, TZS is 
an accounting measure, which does not incorporate the external factors whereas credit ratings are a relatively 
comprehensive  measure  of  financial  health  taking  into  account  firm  level  as  well  as  external  factors 
(Standard and Poor's, 2008). Hence, an accounting measure cannot be an appropriate surrogate for credit 
ratings. Third, the premise of the study is to evaluate the impact of an external measure of credit worthiness, 
which firms acquire and pay for, and to analyse whether such measures can influence the financial decision 
of the firms. An accounting measure may not serve the same purpose.    
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Table 6.15 
Regression Results of the Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation (2SLS) 
(Models 1a, 1b and 1c) 
Variables  Estimate  Wald  Variables  Coefficients 
 
Panel A: Stage I  Panel B: Stage II 
ICR 
TZS 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
  -.020*** 
   .008*** 
  -.930*** 
  -.734 
  -1.914*** 
  -.150** 
  -.174 
  -1.500** 
   1.762*** 
   1.054*** 
   1.921*** 
   4.376*** 
   2.915*** 
   2.188*** 
   3.230*** 
10.159 
13.873 
158.590 
1.075 
31.844 
4.480 
1.527 
6.632 
30.538 
13.767 
35.716 
71.560 
73.754 
36.935 
49.952 
(Constant) 
PCR 
PCR
2 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
 0.588 (3.16)*** 
 0.157 (5.17)*** 
-0.017 (-3.37)*** 
-0.040 (-5.03)*** 
 0.128 (2.50)** 
 0.111 (3.69)*** 
 0.020 (3.92)*** 
-0.042 (-5.26)*** 
-0.046 (-0.88) 
-0.013 (-0.46) 
-0.002 (-0.06) 
 0.117 (3.99)*** 
 0.031 (0.66) 
 0.020 (0.62) 
 0.013 (0.41) 
 0.068 (1.72)* 
Pseudo R-Square  
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke  
-2 Log Likelihood  
Intercept Only 
Final Model 
N 
 
.458 
.492 
 
2312.20 
1784.78 
874 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
.279 
23.571 
.000 
874 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of the two-stage least estimation. Panel A reports the results of 
the first stage while panel B report the results for the second stage. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as Taffler’s z-score (TZS), interest coverage 
ratio (ICR), predicted values of credit ratings (PCR), predicted values of credit rating squares (PCR
2), log of 
sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, profitability (PROF) is the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes and depreciation to total assets, fixed assets ratio (FAR) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, market 
to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity minus market value of 
equity divided by book value of assets and liquidity ratio (LIQD)is the ratio of current assets to total assets, 
technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods 
dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy (BMdum) and oil and 
gas dummy (OGdum).PCR and PCR
2 are predicted CR and CR
2 from the first stage. 
For correct interpretation of the results, it is necessary to investigate that the instruments 
used for the endogenous variables are valid and are independent of the error terms. To 
testify the instrument validity (Gujarati, 2004), a Sargan test is used, where the Sargan 
statistics (SARG) is defined as: 
SARG= R
2 (n-k) 
= 0.000 (874 -15) 
=0.000 
Here, R
2 is obtained from an auxiliary regression of residuals from the second stage of 
2SLS, which are regressed on the predicted values of CR and CR
2 and control variables. n 
is the number of observations and k is the number of coefficients in the original model. The 
calculated SARG statistics is equal to 0.00. If the test statistics is greater than the critical  
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chi-square value with r degree of freedom, the null hypothesis for instrument validity will 
be  rejected  (Gujarati,  2004).  r  degree  of  freedom  is  s-q,  where  s  is  the  number  of 
instruments in the model and q is the number of endogenous variables in the model. The 
critical chi-square value 
2  is 3.56 and the calculated SARG statistics is less than the 
2 
i.e., 0.00<3.56. Therefore, the null hypothesis of instrument validity cannot be rejected 
suggesting that the instruments selected for the endogenous variables are not correlated 
with the error term in the second stage.  
It should be noted that the instruments used for credit ratings might be problematic because 
they  may  not  be  completely  uncorrelated  with  the  disturbance  term  in  the  dependent 
variable, the debt ratio. For example, interest  coverage ratio may be influenced by the 
proportion  of  debt  firms  have  although  it  not  directly  cause  change  in  the  debt  ratio. 
Similarly, Taffler’s  z-score, a measure of  creditworthiness,  may influence the leverage 
behaviour of the firms and also is influenced by the capital structure and its components 
due  to  the  score  being  composed  of  several  elements  of  the  capital  structure.  It  is 
acknowledged that these two instruments are not the perfect instrumental variables for 
credit ratings as they cannot be completely independent of the error term. The results of 
2SLS should thus be interpreted with caution.  
ii.  Results Based on Lagged Explanatory and Control Variables 
A  less  formal  technique  to  address  reverse  causality  may  be  through  estimating  the 
relationships using lagged explanatory and control variables. Although a lagged structure 
in regression may not practically remove endogeneity in the model, it could theoretically 
help  in  establishing  a  relationship  between  dependent  and  independent  variables.  For 
example, it is not even theoretically possible that the capital structure of a subsequent 
period influences the credit ratings of the previous period. It is also not likely that rating 
agencies will downgrade or upgrade a firm before it has actually issued or reduced debt. 
Model (1) can be rewritten as: 
1 , 1 ,
1
2
1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,  

        t i t i
n
i
i t i t i t i X CR CR TDTA      ... (1d) 
Table  6.16  presents  the  results  only  for  the  rated  firms’  sample  by  using  lagged 
independent and control variables and further confirms the earlier conclusion. Column 1  
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reports the results  for the broad rating  coding  and Column 2 for the individual  rating 
coding. Consistent with Column 2 of Tables 6.9 and 6.11, the coefficients of CR and CR
2 
in Table 6.16 are significantly positive and negative, respectively, providing strong support 
to  the  hypotheses  suggesting  that  previous  years’  credit  ratings  are  also  non-linearly 
associated with the capital structures of firms.     
Table 6.16 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Book Debt Ratio  
on Lagged Explanatory and Control Variables (Model 1d) 
Variables  1  2 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
LOS 
PROF 
FAR 
MBR 
LIQD 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
        0.621 (5.65)*** 
        0.193 (6.94)*** 
       -0.024 (-4.94)*** 
       -0.044 (-7.86)*** 
        0.002 (0.04) 
        0.115 (4.26)*** 
        0.018 (3.46)*** 
       -0.050 (-6.58)*** 
        0.025 (0.56) 
       -0.004 (-0.17) 
        0.011 (0.48) 
        0.114 (4.27)*** 
        0.057 (1.52) 
        0.035 (1.26) 
        0.028 (0.97) 
        0.078 (2.27)** 
        0.585 (5.26)*** 
        0.065 (7.86)*** 
       -0.003 (-5.61)*** 
       -0.039 (-6.79)*** 
        0.020 (0.41) 
        0.108 (4.09)*** 
        0.016 (3.18)*** 
       -0.051 (-6.75)*** 
        0.029 (0.66) 
       -0.010 (-0.38) 
        0.013 (0.55) 
        0.125 (4.60)*** 
        0.078 (2.03)** 
        0.043 (1.54) 
        0.030 (1.04) 
        0.085 (2.48)** 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
.323 
25.453 
.000 
874 
.328 
26.061 
.000 
874 
Notes: The table reports the regression results of model 1d (lagged explanatory and control 
variables) using broad rating (Column 1) and individual rating coding (Column 2). ***, ** 
and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
In sum, the results of the main analysis as well as  the robustness checks provide strong 
support to accept the alternative hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c that credit ratings have a non-
linear inverted U-shaped relationship with capital structure of UK firms. It is found that 
although  rated  firms  have  higher  leverage  than  non-rated  firms,  there  are  systematic 
differences in leverage across rating scale. High rated firms are found to have low debt 
ratios, which appears to be due to the concerns for maintaining their high credit ratings. 
For high rated firms, it appears that the benefits of high credit rating outweigh the benefits 
of  high  debt  ratios.  Similarly,  low  rated  firms,  although  having  better  access  to  debt 
markets due to being rated, are found to have low debt ratios. In contrast to high rated 
firms, which are expected to enjoy several financial and non-financial benefits of high 
ratings, low leverage of low rated firms indicate the possibility that they are concerned 
about the potential costs imposed on them by their low ratings. Mid rated firms, however,  
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are found to have higher debt ratios than high and low rated firms which may suggest that 
such  firms  take  advantage  of  possessing  good  credit  ratings  and  are  also  hopeful  that 
having high leverage will not significantly affect their credit ratings.   
6.4.  Conclusion 
This  chapter  presented  empirical  results  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  credit 
ratings and capital structures of UK firms. A non-linear relationship between credit ratings 
and  capital  structures  was  hypothesised  where  high  rated  and  low  rated  firms  were 
expected to have low levels of leverage and mid rated firms have high levels of leverage in 
their capital structures. The results are presented using different measures of credit ratings 
and various estimation techniques. The results of the present chapter finds strong support 
for  the  hypothesised  relationship  indicating  that  credit  ratings  have  a  non-linear 
relationship with capitals structure of firms. Besides addressing the violations of OLS with 
a specific focus on endogeneity, the chapter has presented several sensitivity checks. The 
results remain robust to alternative estimation techniques and coding procedures.    
Consistent with Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Judge and Mateus (2009) and Mittoo and 
Zhang (2010), the findings of the present chapter support the credit rating – market access 
hypothesis (CR-MA) which implies that rated firms have higher leverage than non-rated 
firms.  However,  unlike  prior  studies,  which  have  failed  to  capture  the  differences  in 
leverage structures across rating levels and assumed that all rated firms have high leverage, 
the results of the present chapter indicate that there are systematic differences in the level 
of leverage across different rating levels. The results, therefore, extend the prior literature, 
which underestimate the differences in leverage across rating levels. These results support 
the underlying credit rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) that concerns for costs 
and benefits of credit ratings would alter firms’ behaviour towards their capital structures. 
Strong empirical evidence shows that there is non-linear relationship between credit ratings 
and capital structures where high and low rated firms have lower levels of gearing than 
mid rated firms. The behaviour of high and low rated firms towards their capital structure 
appears to be consistent with the assumption that these firms may have high concerns for 
credit ratings, which translate into low leverage ratios.     
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Chapter 7  
Credit Rating Changes and Capital Structure 
7.  Introduction  
In the previous chapter, it was established that credit ratings help UK firms in accessing the 
debt markets and the firms at different level of ratings have different level of gearing in 
their capital structures. These differences might be attributable to the implications of the 
credit rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) which suggests that firms take into 
account the discrete costs and benefits of different rating levels when making their capital 
structure  decisions.  In  the  present  chapter,  the  discussion  is  carried  forward  to  more 
specific capital structure decisions by examining the responses of the firms with respect to 
their capital structures when they are faced with credit rating changes. Such changes can be 
potential or actual ratings changes, and if the concerns suggested by the CR-CS hypothesis 
are material for those firms, such changes are likely to affect capital structure activities. 
The chapter, therefore, has two main objectives. First, to examine the impact of potential 
credit  rating  changes  on  capital  structure  decisions  and  second,  to  investigate  the 
significance of actual credit rating changes for those decisions.  
The present chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 7.1 discusses the descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the analysis. It presents the outlier treatment procedures 
and their effects on the sample along with the distribution of the dependent variables used 
in the analyses. Section 7.2 presents the multivariate analysis to examine the impact of 
potential credit rating changes on capital structure and Section 7.3 presents the regression 
results for analyses of the relationship between actual credit rating changes and capital 
structure decisions. Finally, Section 7.4 concludes the chapter.   
7.1.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
This  section  presents  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  the  models  to 
examine the relationship of potential and actual credit rating changes and capital structure 
activities. Specifically, it discusses the descriptive statistics of the sample before and after 
the  outlier  treatments  (Subsection  7.1.1),  distribution  of  net  debt  issuance  (Subsection 
7.1.2) and capital structure activities (Subsection 7.1.3) across rating levels. Moreover, the 
section also presents the distribution of credit rating changes in the sample (Subsection 
7.1.4).  
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7.1.1. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent, Explanatory and Control Variables 
In Chapter 3, it was discussed that if firms have higher chances of being upgraded or 
downgraded,  they  are  more  likely  to  have  leverage  reducing  behaviour  following  the 
implications  of  the  credit  rating  –  capital  structure  hypothesis.  These  potential  credit 
ratings changes are measured as firms having either a ‘+’ or a ‘-’ sign with their credit 
ratings. Firms are also expected to continue with leverage reducing behaviour once they 
have  actually  been  downgraded.  To  analyse  empirically  the  conjectured  behaviour  of 
firms, a sample of 104 rated UK firms over a period of 22 years starting from 1988 to 2009 
(874  firm-years  observations)  is  analysed.  The  definitions  and  justifications  of  the 
dependent, explanatory and control variables are given in Chapter 5. 
Table 7.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent and control variables before and 
after the outlier treatments. Panel A (B) presents the descriptive statistics before (after) the 
outlier treatment. Scattered plots, box plots and visual inspections have been conducted 
and they show that the data are fairly well distributed, with few outlying observations. 
Some  of  the  outlying  observations  theoretically  and  economically  do  not  make  sense, 
while other observations are too far away from other observations for the regressions to 
give precise estimations. Dependent variables, including change in debt ratio (CDR) and 
Kisgen’s debt Ratio (KDR), had 3-5 observations above and below one, which have been 
truncated to ±1. Debt issuance by total assets (DITA) and debt reduction by total assets 
(DRTA) had also a few values greater than one, which do not theoretically make since. For 
example, theoretically it is not possible for the firm to issue or reduce more debt than its 
assets in any given year. Such values therefore, are truncated to one.  
The  control  variables  are  also  fairly  well  distributed,  with  few  numbers  of  outliers. 
Although minimal, these outlying observations appear to be very distant from the rest of 
the data. Unlike data used in the previous chapter, the small size of data do not allow to 
discard such values. Therefore, variables are winsorised at a low percentage of 0.5% where 
required. The lag change in the fixed assets ratio (∆FARt-1) and the market to book ratio 
(∆MBRt-1) do not seem to have any outlying observation whereas lag change in the log of 
sales  (∆LOSt-1),  profitability  (∆PROFt-1)  and  liquidity  (∆LIQDt-1)  had  a  few  extreme 
observations. Therefore, these three variables are winsorised at 0.5% levels on both sides. 
It is to be noted however, that the winsorising process has had no material impact on the 
mean values of the variables while standard deviations have been reduced considerably.   
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Table 7.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables before and after Outlier Treatment 
Panel A: Before Outlier Treatment 
 
N  Range  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Median  S.D 
CDR  770  13.15  -1.00  12.15  0.14  0.00  0.74 
KDR  770  1.78  -0.65  1.13  0.02  0.02  0.13 
DITA  770  1.54  0.00  1.54  0.08  0.03  0.14 
DRTA  770  1.17  -0.09  1.08  0.06  0.02  0.11 
EITA  770  0.65  0.00  0.65  0.01  0.00  0.05 
ERTA  770  0.33  0.00  0.33  0.01  0.00  0.04 
∆LOSt-1  668  16.12  -14.29  1.83  0.03  0.04  0.60 
∆PROFt-1  668  3.76  -1.80  1.95  0.00  0.00  0.14 
∆FARt-1  668  0.76  -0.46  0.30  -0.01  0.00  0.06 
∆MBRt-1  668  8.94  -5.59  3.35  -0.02  0.04  0.59 
∆LIQDt-1  668  96.72  -50.00  46.72  -0.02  0.00  2.69 
Panel B: After Outlier Treatment 
 
N  Range  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Median  S.D 
CDR  668  2.00  -1.00  1.00  0.08  0.01  0.33 
KDR  668  1.65  -0.65  1.00  0.02  0.00  0.12 
DITA  668  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.07  0.02  0.14 
DRTA  668  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.06  0.02  0.11 
EITA  668  0.65  0.00  0.65  0.01  0.00  0.05 
ERTA  668  0.33  0.00  0.33  0.02  0.00  0.04 
∆LOSt-1  668  4.31  -2.48  1.83  0.05  0.04  0.24 
∆PROFt-1  668  2.10  -0.97  1.13  0.00  0.00  0.11 
∆FARt-1  668  0.76  -0.46  0.30  -0.01  0.00  0.06 
∆MBR t-1  668  8.94  -5.59  3.35  -0.02  0.04  0.59 
∆LIQDt-1  668  15.79  -9.40  6.40  -0.02  0.00  0.64 
Notes: The variables are defined as change in debt ratio (CDR), Kisgen’s debt ratio (KDR), debt issuance by 
total  assets  (DITA),  debt  reduction  by  total  assets  (DRTA),equity  issuance  by  total  assets  (EITA),  equity 
reduction  by  total  assets  (ERTA),  lag  change  in  log  of  sales  (∆LOSt-1),  lag  change  in  profitability  ratio 
(∆PROFt-1), lag change in fixed assets ratio (∆FARt-1 ), lag change in market to book value (∆MBRt-1), lag 
change in liquidity ratio(∆LIQDt-1) 
The descriptive statistics of the variables after outlier treatment is given in Panel B of 
Table 7.1. The dependent variable, change in debt ratio (CDR), although  winsorised, 
shows a mean value of 8% suggesting that firms are more active in debt issuance than debt 
reduction. The mean value of 8% indicates that firms issue on average 8% debt of the 
previous years’ total assets. Net debt issuance or Kisgen’s debt ratio (KDR), a cash flow 
measure of change in debt ratio, shows a different mean value but similar trend as the 
CDR. The average value of KDR is 2%, indicating that on average rated firms issue 2% 
more debt than equity of the previous year’s total assets. The averages of the change in 
debt ratios (CDR and KDR) are lying close towards the lower end that indicates that there 
are not many firms, which issue large amounts of debt. However, the standard deviation 
suggests that firms have a lot of variability in their debt issuance and reduction patterns.  
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A comparison of mean values of debt issuance by total assets (DITA) and debt reduction 
by total assets (DRTA) also show that UK rated firms are slightly more active in debt 
issuance compared to debt reduction. The mean value of DITA indicates that firms on 
average issue debt by amounting to 7% of previous year’s total assets, which is slightly 
more than the debt reduction. The equity issuance and reduction ratios, conversely, do not 
indicate that UK firms are very active in the equity market compared to the debt market.  
Nevertheless, some firms have issued up to 65% of equity of their previous years’ total 
assets. Moreover, rated firms, on average, tend to reduce more equity than the amount they 
issue. The debt issuance and equity reduction activity by rated firms provides an additional 
support to the credit rating – market access hypothesis (CR-MA) and to the empirical 
evidence of the previous chapter. The possession of credit ratings offers an alternative 
source of funding to such firms and one can expect that their reliance on equity will be 
relatively less than that of non-rated firms.  
7.1.2. Credit Ratings and Net Debt Issuance 
Figure 7.1 shows the incremental leverage decisions of UK firms with respect to their 
credit ratings. The figure indicates that firms with high credit ratings issue relatively more 
debt than equity compared to low rated firms. Contrary to US firms, which have been 
reported by Kisgen (2006) to show very clear declining trend in the net debt issuance 
behaviour with respect to credit ratings, the decline in the net debt issuance is obvious but 
not very sharp for UK firms. UK firms, having broad credit rating ‘BBB’, continue to issue 
net debt whereas the BBB rated US firms on average issue relatively higher level of equity 
than debt. This might be due to the regulatory use of credit ratings in the US market, where 
a few regulations do not permit institutional investors to invest in speculative grade bonds. 
In such cases, firms near the speculative grade (i.e., BBB- and BB+) in the US market can 
be expected to be more cautious regarding their credit ratings than their counterparts UK 
firms. Kisgen (2006) also empirically finds that firms near the speculative grade tend to 
have leverage reducing behaviour. However, for UK rated firms, this trend is more obvious 
in firms at speculative grade and below; they show a sharp decline in net debt issuance 
where most of the firms seem to issue relatively more equity than debt.  
The rated firms in the UK issue more debt relative to equity compared to their counterpart 
in the US. For example, AA+ rated UK firms issue on average 8% more debt than equity, 
while AA+ rated US firms issue on average 1.4% more debt than equity (Kisgen, 2006).  
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This trend continues at almost all ratings levels, from the investment grade to speculative 
grade firms, which to some extent confirms the findings of Judge and Mateus (2009) who 
find that the effects of possessing credit ratings for UK firms has more pronounced impact 
on levels of leverage with rated UK firms have higher leverage than counterpart rated US 
firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The preliminary evidence suggests that ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs with credit ratings do not have any 
clear link with the leverage related behaviour, except for the low rated firms. The figure 
displaying UK firms’ net debt issuances show that ‘-’ sign with credit ratings, in general, 
have more of a powerful effect in explaining the lower level of leverage. However, this 
effect is limited to only the investment grade firms. For the speculative grade firms, it 
seems that firms with ‘+’ sign with their credit ratings tend to keep leverage at a low level 
to possibly have an upgrade to the next broad category. The figure overall suggests that 
within the rating categories, there are sharp differences in the leverage behaviour of UK 
firms, requiring some control effects in the models to capture these differences.  
 
       Figure 7.1: Net Debt Issuance (KDR) of UK Firms by Credit Ratings 
Speculative Grade  Investment Grade 
Issue more 
debt than 
equity 
Issue less 
debt than 
equity  
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7.1.3. Credit Ratings and Capital Structure Activities 
Figure 7.2 (A and B) show the average debt and equity issuance/ reduction by rating across 
firm-years from 1988-2009. Figure 7.2 (A) shows that the low rated firms, compared to the 
high rated firms, are more active in both issuing and redeeming debt. It also shows that 
rated firms are likely to issue relatively more debt and reduce less debt except for the low 
rated firms that show a tendency to retire higher amounts of debt. Most of the speculative 
grade firms seem to reduce more debt than they issue. On the other hand, high rated firms 
seem to issue more debt and reduce less debt but the average size of debt issuance is 
considerably less than the low rated firms.   
 
 
Figure 7.2 (B) indicates that high rated firms are more geared towards equity reduction 
behaviour. Such behaviour may be an indication of confidence such firms have towards 
their credit quality and superior access to debt markets. Contrary to the high rated firms, 
low  rated  firms  are  more  inclined  towards  equity  issuance  behaviour,  supporting  the 
findings of the prior chapter. Low rated firms either have constrained access to the debt 
markets or they purposely maintain a lower level of leverage in a hope to be upgraded. 
However, neither of the figures indicate any definitive patterns of debt or equity activities 
with respect to potential changes in credit ratings as measured by a ‘+’ or a ‘-’ sign with 
Figure 7.2 (A): Debt Issuance/Reduction by Credit Ratings 
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firms’  credit  ratings.  Nevertheless,  preliminary  evidence  suggests  some  apparent 
differences in the behaviour of firms across the ratings level and such differences may have 
implication for the overall results. A formal analysis will explore further, the behaviour of 
rated firms with respect to such changes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1.4. Distribution of Credit Rating Changes in the Sample  
As discussed in Chapter 5, following Kisgen (2006), potential upgrades and downgrades 
are measured by dummy variables. To measure the proximity of an upgrade, the PLUS 
dummy takes the value of 1 if a firm has a ‘+’ sign with its credit rating, while the MINUS 
dummy representing the proximity of a downgrade takes the value of 1 if a firm has a ‘-’ 
sign with its credit rating. POM is a dummy variable when credit ratings have either a ‘+’ 
or a ‘-’ sign. These variables are lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable, 
to reduce any potential simultaneity bias in the model. The frequency distribution of these 
variables is presented in Table 7.2.  
The table shows that 64% of the firms have a ‘+’ or a ‘-’ sign with their credit ratings and 
can be hypothesised to have a higher chance of an upgrade or a downgrade in the following 
year. The statistics also show that firms with a PLUS are a slightly higher proportion of the 
Figure 7.2 (B): Equity Issuance/ Reduction by Credit Ratings  
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sample firms than firms with a MINUS, yet the overall frequency is fairly well distributed, 
with PLUS being approximately 34%, MINUS being 30% and firms that are not near 
rating changes, i.e., without a modifier, being 36% of the sample.  
 
 
 
 
Table  7.3  displays  the  frequency  distribution  of  the  downgrades  and  upgrades  and  in 
contrast  to  potential  rating  changes  shows  that  the  downgrades  and  upgrades  are  not 
proportionally well distributed. Downgraded firms constitute 18.4% of the total firm-years 
while the firms upgraded make up 5.6% of all firm-years. A large proportion of firm-years 
(76% of all firm years) do not indicate any change in credit ratings. Prior studies (e.g., 
Gonis and Taylor, 2009) have also found that the rate of downgrades for UK rated firms 
exceeds the upgrades. They argue that this is attributable primarily to stringent standards of 
the rating agencies and partially to the declining quality of rated firms (Gonis and Taylor, 
2009;  Blume  et  al.,  2002).  Blume  et  al.  (2002)  also  find  that  US  firms  have  been 
downgraded more often than they are upgraded. The next section formally investigates the 
relationship  between  potential  and  actual  credit  rating  changes  and  firms’  financial 
decisions. 
Table 7.3 
Frequency Distribution of the Downgrades and Upgrades in the Sample 
  Stable  Downgraded  Upgraded 
Value  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
0  185  24.0  628  81.6  727  94.4 
1  585  76.0  142  18.4  43  5.6 
Total  770  100.0  770  100.0  770  100.0 
Notes: Variables are defined as ‘stable’ when firm has either has not upgraded or downgraded in the previous 
year, ‘downgraded’ when a firm has been downgraded in previous year and ‘upgrade’ when a firm has been 
upgraded in previous year.  
7.2.  Analysis of Potential Credit Rating changes and Debt Ratios 
This section investigates the impact of potential credit rating changes on firms’ financial 
decisions. It was hypothesised that concerns for credit ratings, as suggested by the credit 
Table 7.2 
Frequency Distribution of the POM, PLUS and MINUS 
  POM  PLUS  MINUS 
Value  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
0  276  35.8  503  65.3  543  70.5 
1  494  64.2  267  34.7  227  29.5 
Total  770  100  770  100.0  770  100.0 
Notes: Variables are defined as ‘POM’ when firm has either a‘+’ or ‘-’ with its credit rating in the previous 
year, ‘PLUS’ when it has ‘+’ and ‘MINUS’ when firm-year has a ‘-’ sign in the previous year.   
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rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS), will lead firms to reduce leverage when 
they are near to upgrades or downgrades. Models 2a and 2b are set out to test hypotheses 
H2a, H 2b and H2c. Taken from Chapter 3, these hypotheses are restated as follows: 
H2a= Firms with MINUS or PLUS sign with their credit rating are more 
likely to reduce the amount of leverage. 
H2b= Firms with MINUS sign with their credit rating are more likely to 
reduce the amount of leverage. 
H2c= Firms with PLUS sign with their credit rating are more likely to 
reduce the leverage.  
Models 2 and 3 explore the relationship of potential credit rating changes on the leverage 
related behaviour of UK firms. Models restated from Chapter 5 as: 
1 , 1 ,
1
1 , 1 0  

        t i t i i
n
i
t i X POM DR     ... (2a) 
1 , 1 ,
1
1 , 2 1 , 1 0  

          t i t i i
n
i
t i t i X MINUS PLUS DR      ... (2b) 
Where β1 in Model 2a and β1 and β2 in Model 2b are hypothesised to be less than zero. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, two measures are used to estimate ∆D.  All control variables are 
firm-level  factors  from  Model  1,  measured  as  change  variables.  As  a  measure  of 
robustness, models are also estimated using control variables from Kisgen (2006). Two 
dependent variables are used to test the relationship: the first, measuring the change in debt 
ratio (CDR), is the first difference of the total debt by the total assets of the previous year 
and the second measure is the net debt issuance, or Kisgen’s debt ratio (KDR). KDR is 
defined  as  the  net  debt  issuance  minus  net  equity  issuance  by  the  total  assets  of  the 
previous year (for definitions and a more detailed discussion of the variables, see Section 
5.2.2). The following subsections reports the empirical results.  
7.2.1. Testing the Impact of Potential Rating Changes with Models 2a and 2b 
Table 7.4 contains the results of pooled OLS regressions for the sample of 104 rated firms 
over the period of 22 years. Columns 1 to 4 report the results for the change in the simple  
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debt ratio (CDR), while Columns 5 to 8 present the results for net debt issuance, KDR. 
Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 show the results for partial models without control variables and 
Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 present the results for the full model.  
Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the POM and show that neither partial nor the full 
model sufficiently explains the variation in the dependent variable with the F-values of 
both models insignificant. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of POM is negative but the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant. After adding control variables to the model, the 
adjusted-R
2 has slightly improved, but the model remains statistically insignificant and so 
is the coefficient of POM. This suggests that for UK firms, having a PLUS or a MINUS 
sign with their credit ratings is irrelevant and does not have a significant impact on any 
changes in their debt ratio in the subsequent year. Columns 3 and 4 reports results for 
partial  and  full  models  for  individual  PLUS  and  MINUS  dummies  and  show  similar 
results. The coefficients on both dummies are statistically insignificant and do not support 
the rejection of the null hypothesis. However, only the size of the firm is found to be 
significant in the model and has a positive effect on the leverage decisions. The coefficient 
of ∆LOS indicates that firms are more likely to issue debt when there is a positive change 
in the total sales of firms.  
Results  for the models  in  Columns  5-8, with  net  debt  issuance or  Kisgen’s debt ratio 
(KDR) a cash flow measure of dependent variable, are qualitatively similar to the results in 
Columns 1 to 4, with the exception for PLUS, which now has a positive but insignificant 
relation  with  KDR.  All  the  other  dummies  for  potential  credit  rating  changes  remain 
insignificant. The results indicate that firms possessing a PLUS or a MINUS sign with 
their credit ratings do not have any particular leverage related behaviour. This supports the 
rejection of the alternative hypothesis in favour of the null hypothesis of the coefficients of 
variables being jointly equal to zero. The results suggest that any behaviour of UK rated 
firms towards their capital structures is not as though they are very concerned about the 
potential credit ratings changes.   
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Table 7.4 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of CDR and KDR on Potential Credit Rating Changes   
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Variables  CDR  CDR  CDR  CDR  KDR  KDR  KDR  KDR 
(Constant) 
POM t-1 
PLUSt-1 
MINUS t-1  
ΔLOS t-1  
ΔPROF t-1  
ΔFAR t-1  
ΔMBR t-1  
ΔLIQD t-1  
  0.038 (3.92)*** 
-0.009 (-0.75) 
 
 0.030 (3.46)*** 
-0.008 (-0.75) 
 
 
 0.063 (2.79)*** 
-0.035 (-0.73) 
 0.144 (1.53) 
 0.003 (0.31) 
 0.004 (0.51) 
 0.038 (3.91)*** 
 
-0.007 (-0.48) 
-0.012 (-0.83) 
 
 0.030 (3.45)*** 
 
-0.009 (-0.68) 
-0.008 (-0.60) 
 0.064 (2.79)*** 
-0.035 (-0.73) 
 0.144 (1.53) 
 0.003 (0.31) 
 0.004 (0.51) 
  0.022 (2.93)*** 
 -0.008 (-0.85) 
 
  0.021 (2.66)*** 
 -0.006 (-0.66) 
 
 
 0.030 (1.45) 
 0.034 (0.80) 
 0.099 (1.18) 
-0.005 (-0.58) 
 0.004 (0.54) 
  0.022 (2.94)*** 
   
  0.004 (0.36) 
 -0.022 (-1.95)* 
 
 0.021 (2.67)*** 
 
 0.001 (0.09) 
-0.015 (-1.30) 
 0.028 (1.36) 
 0.032 (0.76) 
 0.104 (1.23) 
-0.005 (-0.57) 
 0.003 (0.46) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
-.001 
.560 
.454 
668 
.007 
1.740 
.109 
668 
-.002 
.348 
.706 
668 
.005 
1.489 
.168 
668 
.000 
.715 
.398 
668 
-.001 
.848 
.533 
668 
.005 
2.956 
.053 
668 
.000 
.994 
.434 
668 
Notes: This table displays the OLS regression results for estimating the impact of potential change in credit rating on the change in the debt ratio. Columns 1-4 report the results for change in debt ratio (CDR) and Columns 
5-8 report the results for net debt issuance (KDR). Variables are defined as fist difference in total debt by total assets of previous year (CDR),  net debt issuance  measured as (debt issuance - debt reduction +any change in 
short term debt) - (equity issuance - equity reduction) by total assets of the previous year (KDR), dummy variable taking value of 1 if a firm as a ‘+’ or a ‘– ’sign with its credit rating in the previous year or zero otherwise 
(POM t-1), dummy variable taking value of 1 if a firm has a ‘+’ sign with its credit rating  in the previous year (PLUS t-1), dummy variable taking value of 1 if a firm has a ‘–’ sign with its credit rating  in the previous year 
(MINUS  t-1), lag change in log of sales (∆LOSt-1), lag change in profitability ratio (∆PROF  t-1), lag change in fixed assets ratio (∆FAR  t-1), lag change in market to book value (∆MBR  t-1) and lag change in liquidity 
ratio(∆LIQD t-1). ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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The models in Table 7.4 have limited power as measured by the adjusted-R
2, in explaining 
any  variation  in  the  dependent  variables,  whether  dependent  variable  is  measured  as 
change in the simple debt ratio (CDR) or net debt issuance (KDR). The limited power of 
the  adjusted-R
2  can,  however,  be  attributed  to  the  nature  of  dependent  and  control 
variables. It may be possible that the factors affecting the capital structures of the firms 
will not respond very well in the short-run, possibly because the leverage decisions are 
implicitly  long-term  decisions.  Low  adjusted-R
2  is  common  among  the  studies  using 
explanatory and control variables measured as  change variables. For example, Graham 
(1996) also reports lower adjusted-R
2 in all the specification with control variables and 
dependent variable measured as change variables. Kisgen’s 2006 and 2009 studies, both 
report very low adjusted-R
2. Also it should be noted that the Models 2a and 2b also differ 
from Kisgen (2006) as the control variables are those which are empirically tested by the 
present study as well as by prior studies to determine UK firms’ capital structures. This can 
also influence the results. To be consistent with Kisgen (2006), the next section reports the 
results of model with specifications similar to Kisgen (2006). 
7.2.2.  Testing the Impact of Potential Rating Changes with Kisgen’s (2006) 
Model 
Table  7.5  reports  the  results  for  models  with  specifications  similar  to  Kisgen  (2006). 
Columns 1 and 3 present the results for POM, while Columns 2 and 4 presents the results 
for individual dummy variables for PLUS and MINUS. In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent 
variable is defined as net debt issuance (KDR) without any large debt offerings. Large debt 
offerings is defined as a firm-year in which the debt issuance is >= 10% of the total assets 
of the previous year. In Columns 3 and 4, the reported results are for the net debt issuance 
(KDR), excluding large debt offerings and equity offerings, where large debt and equity 
offerings are defined as debt or equity offerings >= 10% of the previous year total assets.  
It can be argued that the implications of the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis 
(CR-CS), which suggests that potential credit rating changes are important for the firms’ 
capital structure, should be more relevant for the small size and medium sized offerings 
only. The rationale is that the small and medium sized offerings can lead in rating change 
when  the  firm  is  near  an  upgrade  or  a  downgrade.  Conversely,  large  offerings  will 
eventually  lead  to  a  rating  change,  whether  the  firm  is  near  or  not  a  rating  change. 
Moreover, in some cases, the credit rating changes may not be relevant and the firm might  
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have large debt or equity offerings without considering the impact on the credit ratings. For 
example, in the acquisition of another firm or reorganisation, the benefit of large offerings 
may outweigh the  costs and benefits  associated with  rating changes.  This  implies  that 
concerns  over  rating  change  would  not  be  material  when  firms  intend  to  issue  large 
amounts of debt and equity. To be consistent with Kisgen (2006), large debt and equity 
offerings (using a 10% cut-off) are excluded from the sample. 
Table 7.5 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of CDR and KDR on Potential Credit Rating 
Changes  (Kisgen’s 2006 Model)  
  1  2  3  4 
Variables 
Excluding  
large Debt  
Issuance 
UK 
Excluding  
large Debt  
 Issuance 
UK 
Excluding  
Large Debt  
and Equity  
Issuance 
UK 
Excluding 
Large Debt 
 and Equity 
Issuance  
UK 
(Constant) 
POM t-1 
PLUSt-1 
MINUS t-1  
D/D+E 
LOS t-1 
PROF t-1 
  -0.146 (-3.06)*** 
  -0.008 (-1.10) 
 
 
  -0.007 (-1.21) 
   0.009 (3.05)*** 
   0.047 (1.54) 
  -0.134 (-2.74)*** 
 
  -0.003 (-0.32) 
  -0.014 (-1.62) 
  -0.008 (-1.28) 
   0.009 (2.75)*** 
   0.043 (1.39) 
  -0.083 (-2.00)** 
  -0.004 (-0.71) 
 
 
  -0.007 (-1.34) 
   0.006 (2.09)** 
   0.038 (1.45) 
  -0.071 (-1.69)* 
 
   0.000 (0.06) 
  -0.010 (-1.33) 
  -0.007 (-1.41) 
   0.005 (1.80)* 
   0.034 (1.29) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.017 
3.981 
.003 
705 
.018 
3.514 
.004 
705 
.008 
2.453 
.045 
689 
.010 
2.334 
.041 
689 
Notes: This table displays the OLS regression results for estimating the impact of potential change in credit rating on the 
change in the debt ratio using similar models as Kisgen (2006). Variables are defined as:  net debt issuance  measured as 
(debt issuance - debt reduction + any change in short term debt) - (equity issuance - equity reduction) by total assets of the 
previous year (KDR),dummy variable taking value of 1 if a firm as a ‘+’ or a ‘– ’sign with its credit rating in the previous 
year or zero otherwise (POM t-1), dummy variable taking value of 1 if a firm has a ‘+’ sign with its credit rating  in the 
previous year (PLUS t-1), dummy variable taking value of 1 if a firm has a ‘–’ sign with its credit rating  in the previous year 
(MINUS t-1),  lag total debt by total debt plus equity (D/(D+E), lag log of sales (LOSt-1), lag profitability ratio (PROF t-1). 
Large debt or equity offerings is any debt or equity offering greater than 10% of the total assets of previous year.  
***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.5 indicate that there are 8.4% cases (65 firm-years) where the 
firms have issued 10% or more debt of the previous years’ total assets, while Columns 3 
and 4 show that in 10.5% cases, firms have both large debt and equity issuances. These 
figures are smaller than what Kisgen (2006) report for the US, with 14% of the firms 
having  had  large  debt  issuances.  This  can  indicate  that  although  UK  rated  firms  have 
higher leverage compared to the US rated firms, offerings of large size by UK firms are 
still limited to few firms. From Figure 7.1, it can be noted that the debt issuance in the UK 
is more common in the high rated firms, but on average their issues are smaller compared 
to low rated firms that tend to issue less debt than equity.    
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Column 1 indicates that, similar to Column 2 of Table 7.4, the coefficient of POM is 
negative but the coefficient remains insignificant. In Column 2, the individual proxies for 
potential rating change, PLUS and MINUS, show similar results. The coefficients of both 
proxies  are  negative  but  insignificant,  suggesting  irrelevance  of  the  potential  rating 
changes for capital structure decisions, even after taking out the large debt offerings. This 
indicates that whether the offering size of debt is small, medium or large, the UK firms do 
not on average take into considerations the sign of their credit ratings when they make any 
adjustments to their capital structures.  
Columns 3 and 4 present regression output for net debt issuance excluding large debt and 
equity and offer qualitatively similar results to Columns 1 and 2. Despite excluding large 
debt and equity offerings, the coefficients of POM remain insignificant. Individual proxies 
in Column 4 also show a similar trend. The coefficient of MINUS remains negative but 
PLUS has become positive with this specification. Nevertheless, both coefficients remain 
insignificant.  These  results  are  unlike  the  US  firms  reported  by  Kisgen  (2006),  which 
consistently indicate a negative relationship of potential rating changes with the net debt 
issuance without the large debt or large debt and equity offerings.   
A comparison of Table 7.4 and 7.5 indicates that the results are not dependent on the 
definitions of control variables. The results of Table 7.5 and 7.4 are qualitatively similar 
where the coefficients of potential rating changes are mostly of expected sign but remain 
insignificant despite of the specification. Nevertheless, the specifications in Table 7.5 have 
certainly improved the overall fit of the models.   
The results in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 do not provide enough support to accept H2a, H 2b, 
and H 2c in favour of null hypotheses that there is no relationship between potential rating 
changes and firms’ leverage decisions. The behaviour of UK firms towards their leverage 
suggests that, unlike US firms, the costs of being downgraded and the benefits of being 
upgraded do not seem to be material for UK firms. These insignificant results may have 
various reasons. They may indicate that UK firms are generally already at their target 
credit ratings. For example, Hovakimian et al. (2009) find that firms above their target 
credit  ratings  have  leverage  issuance  behaviour,  while  firms  below  their  targets  have 
leverage reduction behaviour. If most UK firms are at their target credit ratings, then they 
may not make any adjustments to their leverage structures.  
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As already discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the sensitivities of firms towards rating changes 
can be expected to vary across different markets depending upon the level of development 
of the bond markets they use, and their local credit rating industry, and so the perceived 
benefits and costs of rating changes will also vary. A market with a developed credit rating 
industry (e.g., the US market), is likely to have a different distribution of credit ratings 
from a market with a relatively less developed rating industry. For example, US firms are 
characterised  by  a  developed  bond  market  and  their  credit  rating  industry  has  30% 
speculative firms (Kisgen, 2006) while the sample of UK rated firms shows that 13% of 
rated firms are at a speculative grade. A market characterised by highly rated firms, which 
are already highly creditworthy and financially too sound to be downgraded any time soon, 
may not have similar sensitivities for credit ratings changes as a market with a significant 
proportion of low rated firms. 
The  differences  in  results  between  the  present  study  and  prior  US  studies  could  be 
attributable to the difference in regulatory dependence on credit ratings in the markets. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the development of the credit ratings industry in the US market can 
be  attributable  to  the  regulatory  use  of  credit  ratings.  These  regulations  include  the 
prohibition of institutional investors from investing in speculative grade issues, less strict 
disclosure requirements  for investment  grade bonds,  and restrictions on market  mutual 
funds’  investment  in  low-grade  bonds  etc.  Such  dependencies  of  regulatory  bodies  on 
credit ratings can affect capital structures in two ways. First, regulatory reliance will create 
an environment of high acceptance for credit ratings in the market, such that credit ratings 
become an essential part of investors and managements’ decision-making processes. This 
may increase the use of credit ratings in general. Second, the widespread use of credit 
ratings in regulations can result in firms being more careful about their credit ratings, and 
their capital structure decisions will be more inclined towards achieving ratings that meet 
the threshold of the regulatory clauses. Moreover, explicitly defined regulatory thresholds 
lead to forced selling, resulting in a predictable market reaction on rating changes. The 
underlying risk of the upgraded or downgraded firms may not have changed significantly, 
but due to the regulatory dependence, the cost of borrowing may increase. In a market 
where laws and regulations are not tied up with credit ratings (e.g., the UK), firms can be 
less sensitive towards potential rating changes.  
It should also be acknowledged that the proxies for potential rating changes can be noisy, 
and they might not capture what they are intended to measure. For example, a strong BBB-  
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may have a higher chance of upgrade than a weak BBB+. Moreover, the proxies are only 
able to measure potential rating changes from one broad rating category to another, but 
they do not represent the potential rating changes within the broad rating category. This 
may underestimate the predictive ability of the model and bias the results towards only the 
broad rating category. The results have therefore to be interpreted with caution.  
7.2.3. Potential Rating Changes and Individual Capital Structure Activities  
To provide an in-depth examination of the capital structure choices firms make, logistic 
regression analysis is also carried out for the components of net debt issuance (KDR). 
Binary variables are constructed by using a cut-off level at 5% (and a robustness check at 
2.5%),  where  the  dummy  variable  takes  a  value  of  1  if  the  total  debt  issuance,  debt 
reduction, equity issuance and equity reduction are greater than or equal to 5% of the total 
assets. Here, debt issuance, debt reduction, equity issuance and equity reduction are tested 
separately to explore whether PLUS and MINUS have some predictive ability with regard 
to each one of them. The general model from Chapter 5 is restated below: 
  


 


 

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Log Logit  1 ,
1
1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ) ( 

       t i
n
i
i t i t i X MINUS PLUS       ...(3) 
Here, β shows the direction of the relationship and a Wald test shows the significance of 
each predictor (Pallant, 2005).  e
β
 shows the odd ratio for each variable in the model, where 
the odds ratio is ‘the increase (or decrease if the ratio is less than one) in odds of being in 
one outcome category when the value of the predictor increases by one unit’ (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2001, p. 548). If firms were concerned about the costs and benefits offered by 
credit ratings, the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis would imply that firms would 
be reluctant to issue debt and reduce equity when they are near to credit ratings changes. 
Moreover, it can also be expected that firms are more reluctant to reduce debt and issue 
more equity instead. The results are reported in Table 7.6.   
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Table 7.6 
Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of the Components of Net Debt Issuance (KDR) on Potential Credit Rating Change 
  >=2.5%  >=5%  >=2.5%  >=5% 
  Panel A: Debt Issuance  Panel B: Debt Reduction 
  1  2  3  4 
Variables  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β 
(Constant)  
PLUSt-1 
MINUS t-1  
ΔLOS t-1  
ΔPROF t-1  
ΔFAR t-1  
ΔMBR t-1  
ΔLIQD t-1  
-0.10 
-0.01 
0.06 
0.26 
-0.46 
-1.17 
-0.06 
-0.04 
0.18 
0.00 
0.11 
0.56 
0.41 
0.67 
0.17 
0.10 
0.90 
0.99 
1.07 
1.30 
0.63 
0.31 
0.94 
0.96 
-0.56 
0.11 
-0.02 
0.10 
0.31 
-0.87 
-0.15 
-0.07 
5.37** 
0.31 
0.01 
0.07 
0.18 
0.37 
1.09 
0.30 
0.57 
1.11 
0.98 
1.10 
1.36 
0.42 
0.86 
0.93 
0.05 
-0.29 
-0.06 
-0.50 
-0.20 
-3.39 
0.22 
-0.28 
0.04 
2.38 
0.10 
2.01 
0.07 
5.03** 
2.39 
2.97* 
1.05 
0.75 
0.94 
0.60 
0.82 
0.03 
1.25 
0.76 
-0.74 
-0.09 
0.03 
-0.31 
-1.05 
-2.30 
0.03 
-0.25 
8.52*** 
0.22 
0.02 
0.72 
1.66 
2.31 
0.05 
2.49 
0.48 
0.91 
1.03 
0.73 
0.35 
0.10 
1.03 
0.78 
Cox & Snell R Square  .004  .012  .020  .012 
Nagelkerke R Square  .006  .017  .027  .017 
N  668  668  668  668 
  Panel C: Equity Issuance  Panel D: Equity Reduction 
  5  6  7  8 
Variables  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β 
(Constant)  
PLUSt-1 
MINUS t-1  
ΔLOS t-1  
ΔPROF t-1  
ΔFAR t-1  
ΔMBR t-1  
ΔLIQD t-1 
-2.77 
0.17 
-0.13 
0.98 
-1.72 
0.57 
0.35 
-0.10 
33.22*** 
0.20 
0.13 
2.33 
1.85 
0.05 
1.72 
0.21 
0.06 
1.19 
0.87 
2.67 
0.18 
1.78 
1.42 
0.91 
-3.45 
0.33 
0.16 
0.78 
-1.65 
1.44 
0.35 
-0.40 
36.35*** 
0.55 
0.13 
1.13 
1.38 
0.22 
1.27 
4.00** 
0.03 
1.40 
1.18 
2.18 
0.19 
4.21 
1.42 
0.67 
-1.66 
-0.71 
0.57 
-0.86 
1.95 
-1.22 
0.08 
-0.09 
21.96*** 
8.55*** 
3.27* 
3.18* 
4.00** 
0.36 
0.14 
0.23 
0.19 
0.49 
1.77 
0.42 
7.01 
0.30 
1.08 
0.92 
-1.91 
-0.53 
0.20 
-0.98 
2.11 
-1.74 
0.15 
-0.09 
23.64*** 
3.40* 
0.33 
3.24* 
4.14** 
0.58 
0.40 
0.23 
0.15 
0.59 
1.22 
0.38 
8.28 
0.17 
1.17 
0.91 
Cox & Snell R Square  .009  .013  .043  .022 
Nagelkerke R Square  .025  .040  .074  .044 
N  668  668  668  668 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The table displays the results of logistic regression for analysing the impact of potential credit rating changes on the components of KDR, i.e., debt issuance, debt reduction, equity issuance and equity reduction. Cut-off of 2.5% and 5% is 
used where the binary variable for debt issuance, debt reduction, equity issuance and equity reduction takes the value of 1 if there the components are 2.5% or 5% of the previous year’s total assets and zero otherwise.  
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Similar to the earlier results of the chapter, capital structure decisions do not seem to be 
influenced  by  potential  ratings  changes.  The  dummies  for  potential  rating  changes  are 
mostly insignificant for debt issuance and reduction and equity issuances, irrespective of 
the  cut-off  level.  The  insignificance  of  the  dummies  does  not  suggest  any  particular 
behaviour related to debt and equity issuances. However, Column 7 of Panel D indicates 
that when firms have a PLUS sign they are more likely not to reduce equity (marginally 
significant at the 10% level) while firms having MINUS sign show that they reduce equity. 
The coefficients indicate that firms with a PLUS sign have 51% less odds of not reducing 
equity compared with firms which do not have a PLUS sign. Conversely, firms with a 
MINUS sign have 1.77 higher odds of reducing equity compared with firms which do not 
have a MINUS sign (Column 7 of Panel D).  
The above results  have to  be interpreted with  caution  as  the components  are analysed 
independently. They may not provide a meaningful picture individually but does show the 
channels which firms choose to adjust their capital structures. For example, a firm that 
issues debt and equity of equal amounts may not have any real capital structure change 
(i.e., would show zero net debt issuance). However, a separate analysis of the components 
may indicate the alternatives firms choose to adjust their overall capital structures. Overall 
results from Tables 7.4, 7.5 and Table 7.6 do not indicate any specific patterns of the UK 
firms’  decisions  about  their  capital  structures  when  they  are  near  to  possible  rating 
changes. 
7.2.4. Testing the impact of Potential Rating Changes across Rating Levels 
Referring to Kisgen’s (2006) study, there are minor differences in high rated US firms and 
low rated firms in terms of their leverage related behaviour (pp. 1051-1053). For most of 
the broad rating categories in Kisgen’s results, the dummies for potential rating change 
show  a  negative  and  significant  relationship  while  a  few  coefficients  of  some  rating 
categories are insignificant and are of opposite sign.
30 This suggests that US firms, despite 
their levels of rating, tend to decrease their amounts of leverage, suggesting that concerns 
about rating levels are shared almost equally among different rating levels.  
Although the implications of the  credit rating – capital structure hypothesis suggest that 
concerns for the costs and benefits offered by credit ratings are likely to be present at every 
                                                 
30 For the individual broad rating regression, POM, PLUS and MINUS are occasionally insignificant which 
Kisgen (2006) attributes to the small sample size for that particular broad rating category.  
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rating  level,  it  can  be  argued  that  firms  at  different  rating  levels  may  have  different 
sensitivities towards potential rating changes, which may influence their capital structures 
differently. For example, high rated firms, which have limited amounts of debt and lower 
risks of bankruptcy, may behave differently from low rated firms. Shivdasani and Zenner 
(2005) also argue that debt issuance by high rated firms with limited debt on their balance 
sheets may not have as significant an economic impact on their ratings and cost of debt as 
it would have for low rated firms. The level of financial flexibility and the superior market 
position, therefore, may lessen the sensitivities of high rated firms towards minor changes 
in their credit ratings.  
Moreover, the distribution of credit ratings in the UK market is different from the US 
market, which may also potentially result in different behaviours of firms across rating 
levels.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  present  sample  indicates  that  87%  of  UK  firms  are 
investment grade firms while 13% are speculative grade. This is comparable to Kisgen 
(2006)  reporting  70%  investment  grade  and  30%  speculative  grade  firms.  Speculative 
grade firms should arguably be more concerned about maintaining and improving their 
current rating levels, as they may be more susceptible to rating downgrades due to their 
relatively poorer quality. Rating changes can be expected to have relatively more serious 
repercussions for low rated than for high rated firms. Therefore, it can be expected that 
when speculative grade firms are faced with potential rating changes, their concerns for 
downgrades  are  likely to  result in leverage reducing behaviour. Finally, it can also  be 
observed  in  Figures  7.1  and  7.2  (A  &  B)  that  there  are  wide  differences  in  net  debt 
issuance  behaviour  among  high  and  low  rated  UK  firms.  These  expected  differences 
require the inclusion of variables which might capture these differences in the model. 
To control for such differences, firms’ individual credit rating (CR), and the interaction 
terms  (CR*PLUS  and  CR*MINUS)  are  introduced  in  the  model.  Interaction  terms, 
CR*PLUS and CR*MINUS, are constructed by multiplying individual credit ratings with 
the dummy variables, PLUS and MINUS, respectively. Firms’ individual credit ratings will 
capture any differences in the capital market activity at different rating levels while the 
interactions terms may capture the leverage related behaviour at a particular rating level 
and  when  the  firms  also  have  a  potential  to  be  upgraded  or  downgraded.  Analysis  is 
conducted for changes in subsequent debt ratios and individual capital structure activities. 
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7.2.4.1.  Potential  Rating  Changes  and  Changes  in  Debt  Ratios  across 
Rating Levels  
Table 7.7 presents the results after the inclusion of the CR and interaction variables in the 
model. Column 1 displays results for the change in simple debt ratio (CDR) and Columns 2 
and 5 report the results for net debt issuance (KDR). Columns 3 and 6 present the results 
for KDR excluding large debt issuance and Columns 3 and 6 for KDR excluding large debt 
and equity issuance. Columns 5 to 7 display the results for the models similar to Kisgen 
(2006). 
The  table  indicates  that  introducing  interaction  terms  in  the  model  has  considerably 
improved the fit of the model in all the cases. R
2-change, which tests the incremental effect 
of additional variables by comparing the hierarchical F-test, supports the rejection of the 
null hypothesis that the additional predictors are zero. This suggests that the alternative 
models are significantly better in explaining the variations in dependent variables.  The 
results for the interaction term CR*PLUS in Column 1 of Table 7.7 indicate that low rated 
firms that have a PLUS sign with their credit ratings are, as expected, more likely to reduce 
the amount of leverage in the subsequent period. The results in Column 2 show that the 
relationship of PLUS is positive while the interaction term CR*PLUS has a negative and 
significant relationship with KDR. The positive coefficient of PLUS suggests that high 
rated firms with a PLUS sign with their credit rating, tend to issue annually 5.6% more 
debt than equity compared to the firms that do not have a PLUS sign. However, when 
firms are low rated, and have a PLUS sign, they are more likely to reduce the amount of 
leverage. The coefficient shows that these firms reduce 1% more debt than equity with 
each level decrease in the credit rating. Overall, the results show that low rated firms are 
keen towards getting an upgrade, while the behaviour of high rated firms do not show any 
concern towards rating changes.  
When large debt issuances are excluded, low rated firms, irrespective of the sign, reduce 
the amount of leverage. The coefficient of CR, although marginally significant, shows that 
as the rating falls, firms have a tendency for reducing than issuing more debt. However, the 
firms that have a PLUS sign in particular, on average issue less debt than equity. The 
specifications without large debt and equity also offer similar results. Nevertheless, PLUS 
is no longer significant, which indicates that high rated firms with PLUS sign generally 
issued large amounts of debt and equity.   
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Table 7.7 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of CDR and KDR on Potential Credit Rating Changes, CR and Interaction Effects 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Variables  CDR  KDR 
Excluding  
large Debt  
Excluding Large 
 Debt and Equity  KDR 
Excluding  
large Debt  
Excluding Large 
Debt and Equity 
(Constant) 
PLUSt-1 
MINUS t-1 
CR  t-1 
CR*PLUS t-1 
CR*MINUS t-1 
ΔLOS t-1 
ΔPROF t-1 
ΔFAR t-1 
ΔMBR t-1 
ΔLIQD t-1 
D/D+E 
LOS t-1 
PROF t-1 
  0.033 (1.37) 
  0.037 (1.19) 
 -0.020 (-0.61) 
  0.000 (-0.11) 
 -0.008 (-1.76)* 
  0.002 (0.41) 
  0.061 (2.69)*** 
 -0.031 (-0.65) 
  0.147 (1.56) 
  0.002 (0.25) 
  0.004 (0.42) 
  0.043 (2.06)** 
  0.056 (2.03)** 
 -0.020 (-0.69) 
 -0.003 (-1.15) 
 -0.010 (-2.53)** 
  0.001 (0.19) 
  0.023 (1.17) 
  0.041 (0.98) 
  0.103 (1.25) 
 -0.006 (-0.74) 
  0.002 (0.23) 
  0.024 (1.59) 
  0.047 (2.38)** 
  0.000 (0.01) 
 -0.004 (-1.86)* 
 -0.009 (-3.05)*** 
 -0.002 (-0.60) 
  0.009 (0.61) 
  0.065 (2.09)** 
 -0.022 (-0.36) 
 -0.007 (-1.18) 
  0.002 (0.46) 
  0.030 (2.35)** 
  0.024 (1.42) 
 -0.013 (-0.70) 
 -0.004 (-2.39)** 
 -0.004 (-1.74)* 
  0.001 (0.31) 
  0.013 (1.05) 
  0.063 (2.44)** 
 -0.015 (-0.29) 
 -0.002 (-0.35) 
  0.003 (0.63) 
  0.061 (0.80) 
  0.065 (2.49)** 
  0.000 (0.01) 
  0.000 (0.05) 
 -0.011 (-2.76)*** 
 -0.002 (-0.58) 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.009 (1.61) 
 -0.005 (-1.24) 
  0.262 (6.42)*** 
 -0.007 (-0.11) 
  0.048 (2.38)** 
  0.008 (0.36) 
  0.000 (-0.20) 
 -0.009 (-2.92)*** 
 -0.003 (-1.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.011 (-2.15)** 
  0.000 (-0.07) 
  0.145 (4.28)*** 
  0.012 (0.24) 
  0.037 (2.09)** 
  0.008 (0.44) 
  0.000 (0.20) 
 -0.006 (-2.42)** 
 -0.003 (-1.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.009 (-2.16)** 
 -0.002 (-0.52) 
  0.139 (4.72)*** 
Adj R
2 
F-Value 
Sig 
N
 
.011 
1.749 
.067 
668 
.031 
3.041 
.001 
668 
.073 
5.860 
.000 
615 
.053 
4.378 
.000 
605 
.083 
9.648 
.000 
770 
.073 
7.882 
.000 
705 
.056 
6.120 
.000 
689 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results of CDR (Column 1), KDR (Columns 2 and 5) and KDR without large debt issuances (Columns 3 and 6) and KDR 
excluding both large debt and large equity issuance (Columns 4 and 7) on potential rating change variables, CR and interaction variables. ***, ** and * denotes that 
the p-value is significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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For robustness purpose, Columns 5 to 7 present the results on the models similar to Kisgen 
(2006). It can be observed that results remain similar to Columns 2 to 5 with high rated 
firms with PLUS sign issue more debt than equity while low rated firms with a PLUS sign 
are more likely to issue less debt than equity. The coefficients remain significant in all the 
cases.   
Overall, these results are different when compared to the US counterpart firms. Kisgen’s 
(2006) study shows that firms with a PLUS or a MINUS with their credit ratings are more 
likely  to  reduce  the  amount  of  leverage  where  almost  all  rating  levels  indicate  this 
tendency. Unlike the US firms, the present sample of UK firms suggests that high rated 
firms possibly take advantage of their PLUS sign and issue more debt relative to equity, 
while the low rated firms with a PLUS sign are more likely to reduce the amount of debt. 
The results seem to suggest that UK firms are more confident about their credit ratings yet 
this confidence is not shared among all levels of ratings. For the low rated firms, the ‘sign’ 
matters relatively more than the rest of the sample. Moreover, since high rated firms have 
lower  levels  of  leverage  (concluded  from  the  previous  chapter),  they  have  greater 
flexibility to issue debt, when they require. Such firms might be relatively safer from minor 
changes to credit ratings or such changes may not have very serious consequences for 
firms. Nevertheless, they keep the total amount of leverage lower than other rated firms.  
Compared to low rated firms with a MINUS sign, low rated firms with a PLUS sign seems 
to be more hopeful of getting credit ratings upgrade. In all the specifications in Table 7.7, 
the negative relationship of CR*PLUS indicates that such firms will issue less debt than 
equity. Following from the previous chapter it is also likely that low rated firms generally 
have constrained access to debt markets that leads such firms to issue more equity instead. 
However, the significance of  CR*PLUS particularly suggests  that the  low rated  firms, 
which reduce the amount of leverage when they have a PLUS sign, is most likely due to 
the concerns for costs of low credit ratings as suggested by the CR-CS hypothesis.  
7.2.4.2.  Potential  Rating  Changes  and  Capital  Structure  Activities  across 
Rating Levels  
An in-depth analysis of the components of KDR with a cut-off at 5% is also presented in 
Table 7.8. This will facilitate the understanding of the alternatives firms choose when they 
attempt to bring any change in their capital structures in consideration of potential ratings  
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changes. Although the fits of the models have generally improved, the coefficients of the 
PLUS, MINUS and interaction terms are insignificant in some cases. Column 2 indicates 
that low rated firms have higher odds of reducing the amount of leverage. The Wald test is 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient indicates that with decrease in each broad rating 
category, the odds of reducing 5% or more leverage increases by 23% (Column 2). This is 
in line with the results of the previous chapter that finds the low rated firms have low 
levels of gearing. It appears that low rated firms not only keep the total amount of leverage 
low, but also their capital structure activities are diverted towards reducing leverage in the 
subsequent  periods.  This  can  either  be  attributable  to  their  constrained  access  to  debt 
markets or their deliberate efforts towards improving their current credit ratings.  
It can be noted that the change in net issuance behaviour (KDR) of firms with a PLUS 
sign, whether they are high or low rated, can be attributed to equity issuance/reduction 
behaviour. High rated firms with a PLUS sign are more likely not to issue equity where an 
odd ratio of 0.07 in Column 3 indicates that these firms have 0.07 lesser odds of not 
reducing equity than other high rated firms without a PLUS sign. On the contrary, low 
rated firms with a PLUS sign are more likely to issue equity than other low rated firms. 
The odd ratio of 1.37 in Column 3 indicates that such firms have 37% higher odds of 
issuing  5%  or  more  equity  than  the  rest  of  the  firms,  thus  suggesting  that  to  achieve 
possible higher ratings, low rated firms tend to issue more equity. The equity issuances of 
low rated firms tend to support the CR-CS hypothesis which suggests that if the concerns 
for credit ratings are material, firms may not follow the hierarchy in financing as suggested 
by the pecking-order theory. Firms may issue equity instead of debt to achieve higher 
ratings.  Low rated firms with a MINUS sign are, surprisingly, found to have higher odds 
of reducing equity.   
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Table 7.8 
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Components of Net Debt Issuance (KDR) 
on Potential Credit Rating Change, CR and Interaction Effect at 5% Cut-off 
  1  2  3  4 
Variables  Debt Issuance  Debt Reduction  Equity Issuance  Equity Reduction 
  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β 
(Constant) 
PLUSt-1 
MINUS t-1 
CR  t-1 
CR*PLUS t-1 
CR*MINUS t-1 
ΔLOS t-1 
ΔPROF t-1 
ΔFAR t-1 
ΔMBR t-1 
ΔLIQD t-1 
-0.65 
-0.62 
-0.53 
0.03 
0.09 
0.08 
0.12 
0.21 
-0.81 
-0.13 
-0.05 
3.18* 
1.60 
1.04 
0.27 
1.71 
1.34 
0.11 
0.08 
0.32 
0.83 
0.16 
0.52 
0.54 
0.59 
1.03 
1.10 
1.09 
1.12 
1.23 
0.45 
0.88 
0.95 
-2.26 
0.20 
-0.79 
0.21 
0.02 
0.10 
-0.24 
-1.43 
-2.46 
0.10 
-0.21 
26.84*** 
0.13 
1.48 
13.11*** 
0.05 
1.52 
0.41 
3.06* 
2.4 
0.38 
1.84 
0.10 
1.22 
0.46 
1.23 
1.02 
1.11 
0.79 
0.24 
0.09 
1.10 
0.81 
-3.44 
-2.61 
-1.33 
0.07 
0.32 
0.15 
0.66 
-1.42 
0.86 
0.32 
-0.38 
19.14*** 
3.84** 
1.15 
0.50 
4.07** 
1.04 
0.94 
1.21 
0.09 
1.1 
3.86** 
0.03 
0.07 
0.27 
1.07 
1.37 
1.16 
1.94 
0.24 
2.37 
1.38 
0.68 
-0.04 
0.28 
-2.94 
-0.37 
-0.02 
0.44 
-1.51 
4.01 
-2.00 
0.14 
-0.14 
0.00 
0.14 
10.57*** 
12.81*** 
0.030 
10.98*** 
6.38** 
9.34*** 
0.62 
0.27 
0.56 
0.96 
1.32 
0.05 
0.69 
0.98 
1.56 
0.22 
55.42 
0.14 
1.15 
0.87 
Cox & Snell R Square 
Nagelkerke R Square 
N 
.020 
.027 
668 
.102 
.143 
668 
.037 
.115 
668 
.075 
.149 
668 
Notes: This table show the results of the logistic regression model for the components of KDR with cut-off of 5%. Components are regressed upon dummies of potential rating change, CR and interaction variables. ***, 
** and * denotes the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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7.3.  Analysis of Actual Credit Rating changes and Debt Ratio 
As argued in Chapter 3, the implications of the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis 
(CR-CS) would imply that concerns for credit ratings would induce firms to reduce their 
amount of leverage once they  have been downgraded. However,  given the benefits  of 
rating upgrades, they are more likely not to have any significant change in their capital 
structures. The hypotheses from Chapter 3 are restated below: 
 
H3a = Other things being equal, downgraded firms will decrease the amount 
of leverage in their capital structure. 
H3b  =  Other  things  being  equal,  upgraded  firms  are  likely  to  have  a 
significant change in their capital structure.  
The model to test the above hypotheses is: 
1 , 1 ,
1
1 , 2 1 , 1 0  

          t i t i i
n
i
t i t i X DG UG DR      ... (4) 
It is expected that β2 will be less than 0 while β1 will not be significantly different from 
zero, to support the CR-CS hypothesis.  
7.3.1. Testing the Impact of Actual Credit Rating Changes on Debt Ratio 
Table 7.9 presents the OLS regression results for the change in debt ratio (CDR) and net 
debt issuance (KDR) regressed upon the dummies for actual downgrade and upgrade of the 
firms and other control variables. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for CDR based on 
rating change dummies  only and the  full  model with  controls  for changes in  the  firm 
characteristics,  respectively,  while  Columns  3  and  4  report  the  results  for  the  KDR. 
Columns 5 and 6 report the results for UK rated firms based on the model close to Kisgen 
(2009)  using  CDR  and  KDR,  respectively,  as  dependent  variables.  Kisgen  (2009) 
controlled for firm-level characteristics, both at levels and changes in his models.  
As  can  be  noted  from  Columns  1  and  2,  the  F-values  of  the  models  are  statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the joint effect of the coefficients of rating  
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change and control variables are significantly different from zero. UG, the dummy for  
upgrades, shows a negative relationship significant at the 10% level while DG, the dummy 
for a downgrade in the previous year shows a positive relationship with the change in 
simple debt ratio (CDR) (significant at the 1% level). Adding firm-level control variables 
in  the  model  does  not  change  the  signs  and  significance  of  upgrade  and  downgrade 
dummies. Similar to Column 1, Column 2 shows a negative relationship of UG and a 
positive relationship of DG with the CDR. Although marginally significant, the coefficient 
of UG suggests that firms with upgrades in ratings in the previous year are more likely to 
reduce debt, on average, amounting 4.2% of the total assets of last years. On the other 
hand, a downgrade in the previous year yields a positive relationship, significant at the 1% 
level indicating that these firms issue debt amounting to 5.6% of last years’ total assets. 
This may imply that downgrades in the previous years are not as important for the firms as 
an upgrade and the firms continue to issue debt after they have been downgraded. 
Columns  3  and  4  for  KDR  also  show  similar  results.  The  results  for  KDR  for  the 
coefficients of upgrade and downgrade are significant and have similar sign as in Columns 
1 and 2, respectively. However, the significance is slightly reduced for the DG in Column 
3. The results indicate that the UK firms reduce the amount of leverage after an upgrade in 
the  previous  year  and  continue  to  increase  the  amount  of  leverage  after  they  have  a 
downgrade. The coefficient of UG shows that firms issue on average 4% less debt than 
equity after they have been upgraded, while they increase 3% more debt relative to equity 
after  downgrades.  For  the  purpose  of  robustness  checks,  model  specifications  close  to 
Kisgen (2009) are also tested. The results are reported in Columns 5 and 6. It can be 
observed that, consistent with the CR-CS hypothesis, upgraded firms show an insignificant 
relationship  with  CDR  and  KDR.  However,  the  downgrade  dummy  in  both  the 
specifications remains positive and significant, indicating that such firms continue to issue 
debt  when  they  are  downgraded.  These  results  indicate  the  possibility  of  the  model 
specifications influencing the results.  
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Table 7.9 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of CDR and KDR on Actual Credit Rating Changes   
  CDR  KDR  CDR  KDR 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6 
(Constant) 
UG t-1  
DG t-1  
ΔLOS t-1  
ΔPROF t-1  
ΔFAR t-1  
ΔMBR t-1  
ΔLIQD t-1  
LOS t-1  
PROF t-1  
FAR t-1  
MBR t-1  
LIQD t-1  
   0.019 (3.18)*** 
  -0.040 (-1.80)* 
   0.051 (3.91)*** 
 
   0.016 (2.62)*** 
  -0.042 (-1.89)* 
   0.056 (4.22)*** 
   0.074 (3.30)*** 
  -0.003 (-0.05) 
   0.146 (1.58) 
   0.004 (0.49) 
   0.002 (0.27) 
   0.014 (2.60)*** 
  -0.038 (-1.89)* 
   0.027 (2.32)** 
 
   0.013 (2.29)** 
  -0.040 (-2.02)** 
   0.031 (2.61)*** 
   0.036 (1.77)* 
   0.055 (1.28) 
   0.101 (1.21) 
  -0.004 (-0.47) 
   0.003 (0.39) 
   0.080 (1.04) 
  -0.033 (-1.53) 
   0.065 (5.09)*** 
   0.068 (3.10)*** 
  -0.117 (-2.16)** 
   0.076 (0.84) 
   0.005 (0.53) 
   0.008 (0.88) 
  -0.008 (-1.78)* 
   0.236 (4.19)*** 
   0.033 (1.53) 
   0.017 (3.64)*** 
  -0.015 (-1.75)* 
  -0.075 (-1.11) 
  -0.029 (-1.54) 
   0.043 (3.77)*** 
   0.026 (1.34) 
  -0.107 (-2.24)** 
   0.025 (0.32) 
  -0.002 (-0.30) 
   0.002 (0.28) 
   0.000 (0.02) 
   0.325 (6.55)*** 
   0.037 (1.91)* 
   0.016 (3.76)*** 
  -0.004 (-0.53) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.027 
10.265 
.000 
668 
.038 
4.809 
.000 
668 
.012 
5.094 
.006 
668 
.015 
2.420 
.019 
668 
.105 
7.536 
.000 
668 
.126 
9.025 
.000 
668 
Notes: This table displays the OLS regression results for CDR and KDR regression upon the actual rating change dummies for Model (6). Variables are defined as upgrade dummy 
(UG), downgrade dummy (DG), lag change in log of sales (∆LOSt-1), lag change in profitability ratio (∆PROF t-1), lag change in fixed assets ratio (∆FAR t-1, )lag change in market 
to book value (∆MBR t-1,)and lag change in liquidity ratio(∆LIQD t-1), lag log of sales (LOSt-1), lag profitability ratio (PROF t-1), lag fixed assets ratio (FAR t-1, ), lag market to book 
value (MBR t-1,) and lag liquidity ratio(LIQD t-1) 
 ***, ** and * denotes that the p-value is significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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These results are inconsistent with the CR-CS hypothesis as well as with previous reported 
results for US firms by Kisgen (2009). Kisgen find that US firms tend to reduce their 
amounts of leverage after a downgrade while with some specifications he also documents 
that,  contrary  to  the  CR-CS  hypothesis’s  expectations,  upgraded  firms  reduce  their 
amounts of leverage. The upgrade dummy’s significance is reduced either when a fixed-
effects model is used or it becomes insignificant when time-varying effects by industries 
are controlled for.  
However, in the case of UK firms, the negative relationship of the upgrade dummy with 
net  debt  issuance  may  be  for  many  reasons.  There  is  a  possibility  of  a  simultaneous 
relationship between the two variables. For example, firms that have reduced their amounts 
of leverage are more likely to be upgraded, whereas firms that have issuance debt are more 
likely to be downgraded. However, this possibility could be ruled out due to the variables 
being  measured  as  first  difference  while  all  the  explanatory  and  control  variables  are 
lagged  by  one  period.  It  is  not  theoretically  possible  for  firms  to  be  upgraded  or 
downgraded before they have actually reduced or issued debt respectively.  
These results may also indicate that, in general, the benefits of upgrades perceived by UK 
firms are higher than the costs of reducing their debt, i.e., losing debt tax shields. The firms 
may continue to reduce debt to a point where the net benefits of upgrades are higher than 
the costs of reducing debt. It can be argued that firms might have target credit ratings and 
therefore they continue to adopt leverage reduction behaviour, even following an upgrade, 
to  achieve  those  targets.  Similarly,  it  seems  that  the  benefits  of  issuing  debt  for 
downgraded firms are perceived to be higher than the costs of downgrades. Given this, 
firms may continue to issue debt, irrespective whether the issuance jeopardises their credit 
rating. The empirical evidence thus provides support to reject H3a and accept H3b; firms do 
not reduce their amount of debt when they are downgraded and they issue more leverage 
when they are upgraded.  
7.3.2. Actual Rating Changes and Individual Capital Structure Activities 
To analyse leverage related behaviour in more detail, analysis of the components of net 
debt issuance (KDR) is also presented in Table 7.10. The table shows that the upgrade and 
downgrade dummies are insignificant in most of the specifications, specifically for debt 
issuance and debt reduction. Alternatively, for equity issuance and reduction, it can be  
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noted that firms bring changes in their levels of equity following upgrades. The odds ratios 
of UG reported in Column 5 and 6 of Panel C show that upgraded firms have 2.70 and 2.85 
times higher odds of reducing 2.5% and 5% or more equity, respectively, than the firms 
which are not upgraded. These results also indicate that firms tend not to reduce equity 
when they are upgraded. Similarly, downgraded firms issue equity and are not likely to 
reduce equity, indicating that UK firms do not make any significant changes to their levels 
of debt, either by issuing or reducing debt, following rating changes. However, unlike US 
firms that tend to reduce debt and are not likely to issue debt or reduce equity, UK firms 
prefer to issue equity following rating changes. 
7.3.3. Testing the Impact of Actual Rating Changes across Rating Levels 
As is already evident from Chapter 6 and Section 7.2.4, firms at different levels of ratings 
have a tendency to behave differently towards their capital structures. To test whether there 
are differences in their leverage related behaviour when faced with actual rating changes, 
similar procedures to Section 7.2.4.1 are followed, by adding credit ratings and interaction 
terms to the models. Table 7.11 provides the results when CR and interaction effects are 
introduced into the model. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for CDR, Columns 3 and 4 
report the results for KDR, while Columns 5 and 6 display the results for CDR and KDR, 
respectively, for specifications close to Kisgen (2009).  
The results for CDR indicate that the introduction of the CR and the interaction effects 
have  slightly  improved  the  fit  of  the  model.  The  adjusted-R
2  in  Columns  2  to  4  is 
comparable to Kisgen (2009) reporting 3.7% adjusted-R
2 for the full model. The adjusted-
R
2  of  the  model  close  to  Kisgen’s  (2009)  specifications,  however,  yields  higher 
adjusted-R
2 of 11.3% and 13.4% for the CDR and KDR as reported in Columns 5 and 6, 
respectively. As expected, Columns 1 and 2 show differences in the behaviour of high 
rated  and  low  rated  UK  firms,  when  they  are  faced  with  actual  rating  changes.  The 
coefficient of UG in Column 1 shows that high rated firms tend to issue debt by 9.5% of 
previous  year’s  total  assets,  when  they  are  upgraded  but  when  low  rated  firms  are 
upgraded, they tend to reduce debt. Similarly, downgraded firms tend also to increase the 
amount  of  leverage.  The  coefficient  of  CR*DG  shows  an  insignificant  negative 
relationship with the CDR and does not give support to establish any relationship between 
the two variables.     
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Table 7.10 
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Components of Net Debt Issuance on Actual Credit Rating Change 
  >=2.5%  >=5%  >=2.5%  >=5% 
  Panel A: Debt Issuance  Panel B: Debt Reduction 
  1  2  3  4 
Variables  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β 
(Constant)  
UG t-1  
DG t-1  
ΔLOS t-1  
ΔPROF t-1  
ΔFAR t-1  
ΔMBR t-1  
ΔLIQD t-1  
-0.06 
-0.43 
0.12 
0.30 
-0.34 
-1.17 
-0.05 
-0.04 
0.46 
1.53 
0.33 
0.74 
0.21 
0.67 
0.14 
0.11 
0.94 
0.65 
1.12 
1.35 
0.71 
0.31 
0.95 
0.96 
-0.50 
-0.34 
0.08 
0.10 
0.39 
-0.83 
-0.15 
-0.08 
27.49*** 
0.87 
0.14 
0.08 
0.28 
0.33 
1.04 
0.36 
0.61 
0.71 
1.08 
1.11 
1.48 
0.44 
0.86 
0.92 
-0.19 
-0.06 
0.02 
-0.45 
-0.15 
-3.48 
0.23 
-0.27 
4.01** 
0.03 
0.01 
1.58 
0.04 
5.23** 
2.48 
2.88* 
0.83 
0.94 
1.02 
0.64 
0.86 
0.03 
1.26 
0.76 
-0.73 
-0.17 
-0.24 
-0.33 
-1.14 
-2.33 
0.03 
-0.24 
54.2*** 
0.21 
1.17 
0.80 
1.88 
2.35 
0.04 
2.24 
0.48 
0.84 
0.79 
0.72 
0.32 
0.10 
1.03 
0.79 
Cox & Snell R Square  .007  .005  .017  .014 
Nagelkerke R Square  .010  .007  .022  .019 
N  668  668  668  668 
  Panel C: Equity Issuance  Panel D: Equity Reduction 
  5  6  7  8 
Variables  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β 
(Constant)  
UG t-1  
DG t-1  
ΔLOS t-1  
ΔPROF t-1  
ΔFAR t-1  
ΔMBR t-1  
ΔLIQD t-1 
-3.02 
0.99 
0.77 
1.07 
-1.50 
0.32 
0.39 
-0.14 
190.5*** 
3.58* 
4.49** 
2.78* 
1.40 
0.02 
2.16 
0.39 
0.05 
2.70 
2.16 
2.92 
0.22 
1.38 
1.47 
0.87 
-3.31 
1.05 
0.52 
0.78 
-1.54 
0.97 
0.36 
-0.42 
176.59*** 
3.23* 
1.4 
1.12 
1.25 
0.10 
1.36 
4.52** 
0.04 
2.85 
1.69 
2.18 
0.21 
2.65 
1.43 
0.66 
-1.50 
-1.16 
-0.58 
-0.75 
2.03 
-1.22 
0.08 
-0.01 
152.31*** 
3.23* 
3.48* 
2.43 
4.17** 
0.39 
0.16 
0.00 
0.22 
0.31 
0.56 
0.47 
7.59 
0.29 
1.08 
0.99 
-1.94 
-1.22 
-0.63 
-0.93 
2.27 
-1.68 
0.16 
-0.05 
187.59*** 
2.40 
2.75* 
2.84* 
4.27** 
0.56 
0.43 
0.06 
0.14 
0.29 
0.53 
0.39 
9.67 
0.19 
1.17 
0.96 
Cox & Snell R Square 
Nagelkerke R Square 
N 
.018 
.046 
668 
.017 
.053 
668 
.022 
.038 
668 
.022 
.044 
668 
Notes: This table displays the logistic regression results of for the components of KDR i.e., debt issuance, debt reduction, equity issuance and equity reduction regressed upon the actual credit rating change 
dummies, upgrade and downgrade for Model (5). ***, ** and * denotes the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7.11 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of CDR and KDR on Actual Credit Rating Changes, Credit ratings and Interaction Terms   
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Variables  CDR  CDR  KDR  KDR  CDR  KDR 
(Constant)  
UG t-1  
DG t-1  
CR t-1 
CR*UG t-1 
CR*DG t-1 
ΔLOS t-1  
ΔPROF t-1  
ΔFAR t-1  
ΔMBR t-1  
ΔLIQD t-1  
LOS t-1  
PROF t-1  
FAR t-1  
MBR t-1  
LIQD t-1 
  0.014 (0.98) 
  0.095 (1.74)* 
  0.093 (2.70)*** 
  0.001 (0.35) 
 -0.017 (-2.65)*** 
 -0.007 (-1.31) 
 
  0.008 (0.56) 
  0.096 (1.75)* 
  0.100 (2.90)*** 
  0.001 (0.58) 
 -0.017 (-2.72)*** 
 -0.007 (-1.36) 
  0.074 (3.29)*** 
  0.016 (0.34) 
  0.142 (1.54) 
  0.004 (0.44) 
  0.001 (0.13) 
  0.037 (2.85)*** 
  0.084 (1.72)* 
  0.067 (2.18)** 
 -0.004 (-1.95)* 
 -0.014 (-2.49)** 
 -0.006 (-1.38) 
 
  0.035 (2.62)*** 
  0.093 (1.89)* 
  0.072 (2.34)** 
 -0.004 (-1.83)* 
 -0.015 (-2.74)*** 
 -0.006 (-1.41) 
  0.031 (1.57) 
  0.075 (1.77)* 
  0.094 (1.14) 
 -0.005 (-0.65) 
  0.001 (0.08) 
  0.001 (0.01) 
  0.086 (1.62) 
  0.110 (3.30)*** 
  0.005 (1.89)* 
 -0.015 (-2.55)** 
 -0.007 (-1.42) 
  0.069 (3.15)*** 
 -0.109 (-1.98)** 
  0.073 (0.81) 
  0.005 (0.54) 
  0.007 (0.74) 
 -0.006 (-1.03) 
  0.247 (4.25)*** 
  0.039 (1.73)* 
  0.018 (3.74)*** 
 -0.013 (-1.53) 
 -0.058 (-0.68) 
  0.083 (1.78)* 
  0.086 (2.91)*** 
  0.001 (0.47) 
 -0.014 (-2.61)*** 
 -0.007 (-1.57) 
  0.027 (1.38) 
 -0.086 (-1.76)* 
  0.025 (0.32) 
 -0.003 (-0.35) 
  0.001 (0.15) 
 -0.001 (-0.26) 
  0.313 (6.13)*** 
  0.033 (1.68)* 
  0.015 (3.63)*** 
 -0.003 (-0.45) 
Adj R
2 
F 
sig 
N
 
.036 
5.955 
.000 
668 
.047 
4.305 
.000 
668 
.038 
6.285 
.000 
668 
.042 
3.926 
.000 
668 
.113 
6.640 
.000 
668 
.134 
7.879 
.000 
668 
Notes: This table displays the OLS regression results for ratings change dummies and interaction effects on the CDR and KDR. Column 1 and 2 reports the results for CDR and Columns 3 
and 4 report the results for KDR. Columns 5 and 6 display the results for CDR and KDR, respectively, for model close to Kisgen (2009). Variables are defined as upgrade dummy (UG), 
downgrade dummy (DG), lag credit ratings(CRt-1), interaction term credit rating*upgrade (CR*UG), interaction term credit rating*downgrade (CR*DG), lag change in log of sales (∆LOSt-
1), lag change in profitability ratio (∆PROF t-1), lag change in fixed assets ratio (∆FAR t-1, )lag change in market to book value (∆MBR t-1)and lag change in liquidity ratio(∆LIQDt-1), lag log 
of sales (LOSt-1), lag profitability ratio (PROFt-1), lag fixed assets ratio (FAR t-1), lag market to book value (MBR t-1) and lag liquidity ratio(LIQD t-1) 
***, ** and * denotes the  significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
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The results for full model in Columns 2 and 4 are similar except for the CR, which is 
positive but insignificant when the dependent variable is measured as CDR. The results in 
Column 4 show significant relationship of the credit ratings with KDR suggesting that the 
leverage related behaviour of rated firms is not similar across all the rating categories. 
Marginally significant at the 10% level, the negative relationship of CR indicates that firms 
issue  0.4%  less  debt  than  equity  as  the  ratings  decreases  from  one  level  to  another. 
Columns 1 to 4 show that the dummies for rating change, i.e., UG and DG as main effects, 
are both positive and significant in all the models whereas only CR*UG shows a negative 
relationship with the dependent variable in all the columns.  
The positive sign of UG and DG, as main effects, suggests that for high rated firms the 
impact of a rating change is not material and they continue to issue more leverage. In 
Column 4, the coefficients of UG and DG suggest that firms will issue 9.3% more debt 
relative  to  equity  once  they  have  been  upgraded  and  around  7.2%,  when  they  are 
downgraded, respectively. On the other hand, when low rated firms are upgraded they 
undertake leverage reducing behaviour. Significant at the 1% level, the results show that 
low rated firms, when upgraded, will issue 1.5% less debt relative to equity. It seems that 
the earlier results for upgraded firms, as reported in Table 7.9, were dominated by low 
rated firms. Once such effects are controlled for in the model, there apparent differences 
are noted in the behaviour of high and low rated firms. The reported results in Columns 5 
and 6 for models close to Kisgen (2009) also show similar predictions.  
Similarly to Table 7.8, the results of Table 7.11 indicate that high rated firms in particular 
are not very concerned about marginal rating changes. High rated firms, whether upgraded 
or downgraded, continue to issue debt. It seems that rating changes do not impose any 
material  costs  on  high  rated  firms.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  argument  by 
Shivdasani and Zenner (2005), that debt issuance by high rated firms may not have serious 
implications on the cost of borrowing of these firms in the way that it does for low rated 
firms. It also indicates managements’ confidence about the credit quality of their firms. 
The results suggest that high rated UK firms may be sufficiently financially sound to issue 
debt and that the benefits of debt issuance outweigh any costs of rating changes. However, 
low rated firms continue to reduce debt, possibly in the hope of achieving upgrades.  
Table 7.12 also reports the results of logistic regression models, showing which channel 
rated firms choose to bring changes in their capital structures when they are faced with  
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actual change in their credit ratings. The odds ratio of the interaction effect for upgrades 
UG*CR in Column 4 shows that low rated firms have 2.11 times higher odds of issuing 
equity compared to other low rated firms that are not upgraded. Unlike the reported results 
for the US firms in Kisgen (2009), neither the downgrade dummy on its own nor the 
interaction effect for downgrades show any relevance for debt and equity issuance and 
reduction behaviour. Nevertheless, similar to results in Chapter 6 and in Table 7.8, low 
rated firms seem to reduce debt in the subsequent period. The odd ratios for CR in Column 
2 indicate that low rated firms have 1.28 times higher odds of reducing debt compared to 
issuing debt (odd ratio of 1.12 in Column 1). Moreover, low rated firms have also higher 
odds of issuing equity and not reducing equity implying that low rated firms become more 
active in equity market with raising concerns for the high costs associated with low credit 
ratings.  
Overall, the results indicate that actual credit rating changes are not material for firms’ 
capital structure decisions in the way suggested by the CR-CS hypothesis. Nevertheless, 
high and low rated firms tend to have different considerations over the costs and benefits 
of credit ratings where high rated firms seem to be less concerned about the rating changes 
than low rated firms. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 7.13.  
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Table 7.12 
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Components of Net Debt Issuance  
on Actual Credit Rating Change, CR and Interaction Effect at 5% Cut-off 
  1  2  3  4 
  Debt Issuance  Debt Reduction  Equity Issuance  Equity Reduction 
  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β  β  Wald  e
β 
(Constant)  
UG t-1  
DG t-1  
CR t-1 
CR*UG t-1 
CR*DG t-1 
ΔLOS t-1  
ΔPROF t-1  
ΔFAR t-1  
ΔMBR t-1  
ΔLIQD t-1  
-1.24 
-0.18 
0.83 
0.12 
-0.05 
-0.12 
0.17 
0.33 
-0.71 
-0.13 
-0.06 
26.97*** 
0.03 
2.35 
11.72*** 
0.22 
2.24 
0.24 
0.20 
0.24 
0.78 
0.20 
0.29 
0.84 
2.29 
1.12 
0.95 
0.89 
1.19 
1.40 
0.49 
0.88 
0.94 
-2.34 
-2.04 
0.03 
0.25 
0.14 
-0.04 
-0.15 
-1.62 
-2.57 
0.10 
-0.18 
70.35*** 
2.09 
0.00 
40.82*** 
0.94 
0.25 
0.15 
3.75* 
2.57 
0.37 
1.39 
0.10 
0.13 
1.03 
1.28 
1.15 
0.96 
0.86 
0.20 
0.08 
1.10 
0.84 
-4.19 
-7.88 
-0.16 
0.13 
0.75 
0.09 
0.83 
-1.77 
1.50 
0.34 
-0.37 
49.13*** 
2.00 
0.01 
3.01* 
2.86* 
0.32 
1.27 
2.03 
0.24 
0.97 
3.81* 
0.02 
0.00 
0.85 
1.14 
2.11 
1.10 
2.30 
0.17 
4.47 
1.40 
0.69 
-0.73 
-0.84 
0.77 
-0.21 
-0.01 
-0.29 
-1.38 
3.43 
-2.32 
0.09 
-0.09 
4.46** 
0.25 
0.70 
12.71*** 
0.00 
2.30 
5.17** 
5.90** 
0.84 
0.12 
0.22 
0.48 
0.43 
2.17 
0.81 
0.99 
0.75 
0.25 
30.84 
0.10 
1.09 
0.92 
Cox & Snell R Square 
Nagelkerke R Square 
N 
.024 
.032 
668 
.103 
.144 
668 
.042 
.132 
668 
.057 
.114 
668 
Notes:  This table displays the logistic regression results of for the components of KDR i.e., debt issuance, debt reduction, equity issuance and equity reduction regressed upon the actual 
credit rating change dummies, upgrade and downgrade, credit ratings and interaction variables ***, ** and * denotes the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7.13 
Summary of the Findings 
Firms with a ‘+’ or a ‘-’sign, do not show significant variation in their capital structure 
Firms with a ‘+’or ‘-’ sign, are more likely to reduce the amount of equity 
High rated firms with a ‘+’ sign, increase the amount of leverage in subsequent years 
Low rated firms with a ‘+’ sign, tend to reduce the amount of leverage in subsequent years 
High rated firms with a ‘+’ sign are more likely not to issue equity but high rated firms with a ‘-’ sign are 
not likely to reduce equity 
Low rated firms with a ‘+’ sign are more likely to issue equity but low rated firms with a ‘-’ sign are 
more likely to reduce equity 
Upgraded firms tend to reduce the amount of leverage in subsequent years 
Downgraded firms tend to increase the amount of leverage in subsequent years 
Upgraded and downgraded firms are more likely to issue equity and do not reduce equity  
High rated firms when upgraded or downgraded tend to issue more debt  
Low rated firms, when upgraded, tend to reduce the amount of leverage. They are more likely to issue 
equity after an upgrade. 
7.4.  Conclusion 
This  chapter  presented  empirical  results  for  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
potential  and  actual  rating  changes  and  firms’  leverage  related  decisions.  It  also 
presented  several  robustness  checks,  including  different  measures  of  dependent 
variables,  different  model  specifications,  in-depth  analyses  of  individual  capital 
structure activities, and tests of the variations of results across rating levels.  
Unlike prior US study by Kisgen (2006), the results from the main models reported in 
Table  7.4  do  not  support  the  hypotheses  that  UK  firms  have  leverage  reducing 
behaviour when they are near rating changes. This suggests that the costs and benefits 
associated with rating changes are not material for firms’ capital structure decisions. 
However, analysis testing the impact of potential rating changes across rating levels 
suggests some differences between high rated and low rated firms towards their capital 
structures.  It  is  noted  that  high  rated  UK  firms  are  not  very  concerned  about  the 
modifiers alongside their credit ratings, and they continue to issue more debt when they 
have a ‘+’ sign. However, the firms which are at the lower end of the rating scale are 
more likely to reduce their amounts of leverage when they have a ‘+’ sign with their 
ratings possibly in a hope to achieve upgrades.  
Similarly, the results do not also support the hypothesised relationship between actual 
credit ratings and capital structure decisions. Upgraded firms tend to reduce debt, while 
downgraded firms tend to issue debt. This behaviour indicates that upgraded firms, in 
general, may have target credit ratings and they continue to reduce debt once they have  
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been upgraded. However, when analysis is carried out to test the impact of this across 
the rating scale, only high rated firms tend to issue debt when they are upgraded or 
downgraded. Firms towards low ratings are inclined to reduce debt following upgrades 
with each notch decrease in credit rating. 
Overall, the results  suggest  that UK firms  are  not  particularly concerned about  the 
marginal changes in their credit ratings, whether they are potential or actual changes. 
This indicates that the costs and benefits associated with rating changes, as suggested 
by the CR-CS hypothesis, are not material for firms’ capital structure decisions. It is 
only the low rated firms, which appear to be concerned about their credit ratings and 
strive to achieve higher ratings by reducing debt. High rated firms continue to issue 
debt, irrespective of the potential and actual change in their credit ratings. 
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Chapter 8 
Credit Ratings and Debt Maturity Structure 
8.  Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results to analyse the relationship between credit 
ratings and debt maturity structures of non-financial UK firms. As discussed in Chapter 
4, several survey studies highlight that refinancing risk is an important concern for debt 
maturity  structure  decisions.  However,  prior  empirical  studies,  examining  the 
determinants  of  debt  maturity  structure  of  UK  firms,  tend  to  underestimate  the 
importance of refinancing risk in their models and therefore may have a limited ability 
to explain the actual behaviour of firms. This chapter, therefore, examines empirically 
the significance of refinancing risk for debt maturity structure. Specifically, it tests 
Diamond’s 1991 liquidity theory which theorises that refinancing risk faced by firms 
induces a non-linear relationship between the between credit ratings and debt maturity 
structure. Firms exposed to low liquidity risk are expected to have shorter maturity 
structure, while firms faced with high liquidity risk may prefer longer maturity in their 
capital structure. However, there may be some firms with high liquidity risk that do not 
have access to long-term debt markets. Therefore, such firms may rely more on short-
term  debt.  This  chapter  tests  these  predictions  by  providing  a  detailed  empirical 
analysis.   
The remainder of the chapter organised  as follows. Section 8.1 provides a detailed 
description of the data for the analysis. Section 8.2 presents the empirical results and 
discusses the findings of the multivariate regression analysis for the credit rating – 
maturity structure hypothesis. Section 8.3 reports the results of some robustness and 
sensitivity checks and Section 8.4 concludes the chapter.  
8.1.  Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Before formally analysing the relationship between credit ratings and debt maturity 
structure, a detailed description of the variables is presented in order to summarise the 
data and describe the trend and distribution of the sample. It reports the statistics of the 
data without the outliers’ treatment and the effects of this treatment on the sample 
statistics. The subsections also present the comparative statistics of the rated and non-
rated UK firms  and the trends of the maturity structure over the sample  years and  
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industries. Finally, the section also briefly discusses about assumptions of OLS, as they 
have already been covered in more detail in the Subsection 6.1.4 of Chapter 6.  
8.1.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent, Independent and Control 
Variables 
The sample selected for the analysis is composed of a large number of non-rated and 
rated UK firms. The distribution of the data in the sample is however not suitable to 
provide reliable and precise estimations as there are several values which are far away 
from  rest  of  the  data.  Such  values  may  distort  the  analysis  as  their  inclusion  may 
influence the data by driving the results towards those values. To obtain more reliable 
inferences from the data, outlying observations need to be treated carefully such that 
the impact of these values on results are minimised but the integrity of data is still 
maintained. Section 5.3 of Chapter 5 discusses the procedures followed to treat such 
observations. Table 8.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. Panel A displays 
the descriptive statistics for the whole sample of the rated and non-rated firms before 
any outlier treatment and Panel B after the treatment. Finally, Panel C displays the 
descriptive statistics of the final sample for the multivariate analysis.  
Panel A indicates several extreme observations. For example, quality of firms (QUAL), 
defined as the difference between earnings before interest and taxation (EBITt+1) and 
EBITt  scaled  by  SPt,  ranges  from  -1135.20  to  5971.58,  with  a  mean  of  0.02  and 
standard deviation of 70.54. Asset maturity structure (AMAT), market to book ratio 
(MBR) and effective tax rate (ETR) also show the presence of extreme observations 
either  at  one  end  or  at  both  ends.  However,  debt  maturity  structure  (DMR),  the 
dependent variable, and log of sales (LOS), seem fairly well distributed, with mean 
values appearing to be close to the median values. Visual inspection and graphical 
presentations such as box plots show that the outlying observations of the rest of the 
variables are likely to be an error in recording, as they are extremely distant from the 
rest of the observations.  
Notice that, not all of the variables require outlier treatment. Therefore, only the ones 
that show extreme observations are trimmed or winsorised depending on the nature of 
the extreme observations. For example, debt maturity ratios (DMR) do not have any 
value above 1 or below 0; therefore the variables do not require any treatment. Quality  
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of firm (QUAL) and market to book ratio (MBR) have several outliers at both ends 
while assets maturity structure (AMAT) displays extreme observations only at one end. 
To be consistent with the outlier treatment followed in Chapter 6 and to maintain the 
integrity of the data, the variables are trimmed at 0.5% at one or both ends where 
required. Following this, quality of firm  (QUAL) and market to book ratio (MBR) 
values are trimmed at 0.5% at both ends, while assets maturity structure (AMAT) is 
trimmed only at the top end. Effective tax rate (ETR) had almost 4% of the values that 
lay above one or below zero, which, although might be valid cases, they may not be a 
suitable indicator for measuring the effective tax rate of firms. The 0.5% threshold used 
earlier would not deal effectively with these observations. Therefore, contrary to the 
procedure followed for the rest of the control variables, the effective tax rate (ETR) is 
winsorised at zero and one with any value that lies above (below) one (zero) is set 
equal to one (zero).  
Table 8.1 
Descriptive Statistics Before and After Outlier Treatment 
Variables  N  Range  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Median  S.D 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics before outlier treatment 
DMR  37,405  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.56  0.62  0.34 
LOS  40,989  25.23  0.00  25.23  12.06  11.61  3.41 
QUAL  38,024  17107.08  -11135.50  5971.58  0.02  0.19  70.54 
AMAT  30,244  18912.00  0.00  18912.00  26.58  6.85  249.79 
MBR  42,872  13937.00  -960.47  12976.53  2.48  1.37  65.73 
ETR  42,345  3142.42  -3072.67  69.75  0.10  0.26  15.23 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics after outlier treatment 
DMS  37,405  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.56  0.62  0.34 
LOS  40,989  25.23  0.00  25.23  12.06  11.61  3.41 
QUAL  37,644  51.40  -25.31  26.09  0.22  0.17  2.54 
AMAT  30,093  804.58  0.00  804.58  14.03  6.88  40.37 
MBR  42,444  22.22  0.09  22.32  1.92  1.37  1.88 
ETR  42,345  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.23  0.26  0.20 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for the final sample 
DMS  23,974  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.56  0.64  0.34 
LOS  23,974  25.23  0.00  25.23  12.13  11.81  2.95 
QUAL  23,974  51.22  -25.21  26.01  0.27  0.18  2.59 
AMAT  23,974  798.17  0.00  798.17  12.42  7.17  30.24 
MBR  23,974  22.22  0.09  22.32  1.84  1.37  1.65 
ETR  23,974  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.24  0.26  0.20 
Notes: This table displays the descriptive statistics of the variables before and after outlier treatment and of the 
final sample for the multivariate analyses. N refers to number of observations (firm-years) and S.D refers to 
standard deviation. Variables are defined as total long-term debt (payable in more than one year) to total debt 
(DMR) as dependent variable, log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, quality of the firm 
(QUAL) is the difference between earnings before interest and taxation EBITt+1 and EBITt scaled by share 
price at time t, assets maturity ratio (AMAT) is the ratio of total property, plant and equipment to total annual 
depreciation, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity plus 
market value of equity divided by book value of assets while and effective tax rate (ETR) is the ratio of total 
amount of tax charged by total taxable income.  
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Panel B of Table 8.1 shows that after the trimming procedures, the treated variables 
have  improved  in  term  of  their  distribution  with  the  standard  deviations  reduced 
considerably  and  with  noticeable  shifts  in  the  mean  values.  However,  it  can  be 
observed  from  the  table  that  the  outlier  treatment  has  not  resulted  in  a  complete 
removal of extreme observations for some cases. For example, QUAL, after trimming 
at both ends of the distributions by 0.5%, still shows minimum and maximum values of 
-25.31 and 26.09, respectively, which suggests that firms’ abnormal earnings decreased 
by a maximum of 2,531% and increased by a maximum of 2,609% during the sample 
period. The first quartile and the third quartile for QUAL indicate that 50% of the 
observations lie above -0.05 and below 0.57 thus indicating the presence of extreme 
observations at both ends. Similar results are observed for other variables such as assets 
maturity structure (AMAT) and market to book ratio (AMAT). Although the standard 
deviations  of  these  variables  have  been  reduced  in  comparison  with  before,  it  still 
shows that the distribution has several observations lying distant from the mean. For 
example, the third quartile for AMAT suggests that 75% of the firm-years have an 
assets maturity of 11.25 years or below, while 25% have maturity above 11.25 years.
31 
It should be noted that the trimming and the winsorising criterion fol lowed is purely 
arbitrary and the mean and standard deviations are not seriously affected if other 
thresholds (such as 1% for control variables and ±1 criteria for ETR) are used instead.  
Panel C of Table 8.1 displays the final sample for the multivariate analyses and shows 
that the average debt maturity in the UK firms’ capital structure is 0.56 (median of 
0.64). This indicates that, on average, the firms have a slightly higher proportion of 
long-term debt in comparison to their short-term debt. However, the standard deviation 
of  0.34  suggests  considerable  variation  within  the  sample.  The  first  and  the  third 
quartile show that 50% of the firms have a debt maturity ratio between 0.28 and 0.85 
and only 25% of the firms have long-term debt ratio higher than 0.85 in their capital 
structure. This ratio is comparable to that of Fan et al. (2011) reporting 0.62 (median) 
for the long-term debt ratio of the UK firms using 21,785 firm-years over a sample 
period  of  16  years  (1991-2006).  However,  Antoniou  et  al.  (2006)  report  a  slightly 
                                                 
31 The asset maturity ratio (AMAT) has several large observations for example, the maximum value is 
798 years. A plausible explanation could be that the Datastream’s definition for  Property, plant and 
equipment (W02301) includes land, which is not a depreciable asset. A firm which held a large amount 
of non-depreciable assets compared to depreciable assets such as plant and machinery, would have a 
higher assets maturity ratio.    
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lower debt maturity ratio of 0.46 for the UK firms. Although this difference is not 
large,  it  may  arise  due  to  the  sample  period  and/or  the  number  of  observations. 
Antoniou et al. (2006) use 35,266 firm-years over a sample period of 38 year (1969-
2006). When compared with earlier studies (Antoniou et al. 2006; Ozkan, 2000 and 
2002), the average value of the DMR in the present study is higher, which may indicate 
that the UK firms have switched to longer maturity ratios than they had previously 
chosen. This can also be observed in  Figure 8.2. This gradual increase in the debt 
maturity ratio in recent years could be due to the major changes experienced by British 
capital markets after the Financial Services Act 1986 which was followed by increased 
transparency and low issuance costs (Antoniou et al., 2006). The average debt maturity 
ratio  of  the  present  sample  is  much  higher  than  the  reported  maturity  ratios  of 
approximately 0.10 in Ozkan (2000 and 2002).
32 
In terms of the maturity structure, UK   firms lie in the middle of two extremes as 
reported by Fan et al. (2011). For example, Chinese and Greek firms have the lowest 
maturity  of  approximately  0.08  and  0.22  respectively,  while  New  Zealand  and 
Norwegian firms have the highest maturity proportion of 0.88 and 0.87 respectively.
33 
However, this is notably lower than US firms’ average long-term debt ratio of 0.79. 
This could possibly be due to the developed domestic bond market in the US when 
compared to the UK market where the reliance of firms, specifically mid and small size 
firms, is mostly on bank loans (Blake, 2000), which arguably have shorter maturity.   
The control variables, when compared to previous studies on the maturity structure of 
the UK firms, also show some differences. Log of sales (LOS) shows a minimum value 
of 0.00 and a maximum value of 25.23 with an average size of 12.13. This is much 
higher than that reported by Ozkan (2000 and 2002) at 10.79 and 10.87, respectively, 
and Antoniou et al. (2006) at 9.03 as log of sales for the UK firms. Quality of firms 
(QUAL), after trimming,  ranges  from  -25.21 to 26.01 with  a mean of  0.30, which 
indicates that several firms had abnormal losses in the subsequent years. This is likely 
                                                 
32 Ozkan classified debt maturing in more than 5 years as long-term debt. This means that his sample is 
limited to only those firms, which provide details on classification of long-term debt, thus resulting in a 
small sample. Ozkan (2000) used dataset of 429 firms with 4,624 observations during 1984-1996 while 
Ozkan (2002) employed data for 321 firms for the same period. It also seems that Ozkan (2000 and 
2002) have used a sample of small firms which are likely to have had lower debt ratios. Moreover, low 
average debt maturity ratio reported by Ozkan (2000 and 2002) can be also attributable to the definition 
used for classifying long-term debt.  
33  Average debt maturity ratios are approximately determined from the figure of the debt maturity 
structures across the different countries reported by Fan et al. (2011).   
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because of the inclusion of dead firms in the sample, some of which presumably would 
have negative profitability in many years within the sample period.  
A mean of asset maturity ratio (AMAT) of 12.42 indicates that the average maturity of 
the assets for UK firms is just over 12 years. However, as already stated above, the 
considerable variation within the sample, which ranges from 0 to 798 years with a 
standard  deviation  of  30  years,  could  be  due  to  the  assets  structures  being  largely 
composed  of  non-depreciable  assets.  Nevertheless,  the  mean  AMAT  is  generally 
consistent with prior UK studies such as Antoniou et al. (2006) reporting 13.58 and 
Ozkan (2000 and 2002) with 10.24 and 9.732 respectively. The market to book ratio 
(MBR), with a mean of 1.85 and a standard deviation of 1.66 and the effective tax rate 
(ETR),  with  mean  value  of  0.24  and  standard  deviation  of  0.21,  also  indicates 
substantial variation within the sample. Nevertheless, both ratios are consistent with the 
prior reported results of Ozkan (2000 and 2002) and Antoniou et al. (2006).  
8.1.2.  Average Debt Maturity Ratio over the Sample Period and Industries 
Figure 8.1 displays the average debt ratios and debt maturity structure ratios of the 
whole sample over the sample period. Contrary to  Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6, and as 
depicted in Figure 8.1, which shows that the average debt of the UK firms remains the 
same  over  the  sample  period,  this  figure  indicates  that  UK  firms  have  been  are 
gradually shifting the type of debt held, from short-term debt towards long-term debt. 
After  an  initial  decrease  in  the  debt  maturity  ratio
34, the average maturity ratio is 
consistently increasing, from approximately 0.50 in 1992 to 0.62 in 2009. The wide 
range of available sources of debt financing, such as domestic and international bond 
markets for the large and medium sized firms in particular, may be one of the reasons 
for the increase in the relative proportion of long -term debt. Moreover, the shift to 
long-term debt may indicate firms’ preferences in lenghtening the payback period of 
their debt.  
 
                                                 
34 The sample firms in the first three years, i.e., 1989-1991 are 11, 24 and 56 respectively, which is likely 
to be the reason for the inflated debt and debt maturity ratios.  
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Figure 8.1: Average Book Debt Ratio and Debt Maturity Structure of the UK Firms  
over the Sample period 
 
Table 8.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables with respect to the industry 
classification. Notable differences exist between the characteristics of the firms across 
the industries. The debt maturity ratio (DMR) ranges from the utility sector having the 
highest maturity ratio of 0.76, to firms in the consumer goods sector having the lowest 
maturity of 0.49. The standard deviation of DMR of the utility sector is low, indicating 
that within the sector, firms do not vary greatly which in turn suggests the possibility 
that regulations have influenced the debt maturity structure of such firms. As some 
prior studies on debt maturity structure exclude utility firms, to be consistent with these 
studies, analysis will also be conducted excluding utility sector firms from the sample. 
Other control variables also show significant differences between the industries. The 
standard  deviation  of  the  variables  suggests  that  within  industries,  firms  vary 
considerably in term of their size, profitability, maturity of assets, potential growth 
opportunities and effective taxation. To reiterate here, industry dummies are included in 
the model to capture the variation across the industries.  
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Table 8.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Control Variables Based on Industries 
 
Variable  N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  S.D 
Basic Materials 
DMR  1,644  0.00  1.00  0.61  0.30 
LOS  1,644  1.61  18.51  12.88  3.12 
QUAL  1,644  -24.30  25.62  0.22  2.69 
AMR  1,644  0.00  508.58  15.41  28.61 
MBR  1,644  0.19  21.88  1.58  1.26 
ETR  1644  0.00  1.00  0.25  0.21 
Consumer 
Goods 
DMR  3,352  0.00  1.00  0.49  0.33 
LOS  3,352  0.00  22.93  12.57  2.76 
QUAL  3,352  -23.21  24.60  0.26  2.24 
AMR  3,352  0.00  798.17  11.62  25.31 
MBR  3,352  0.13  15.55  1.49  0.96 
ETR  3,352  0.00  1.00  0.26  0.18 
Consumer 
Services 
DMR  5,173  0.00  1.00  0.59  0.35 
LOS  5,173  0.00  21.01  11.81  2.63 
QUAL  5,173  -25.00  25.52  0.27  2.63 
AMR  5,173  0.00  797.00  18.56  42.56 
MBR  5,173  0.13  22.32  1.83  1.61 
ETR  5,173  0.00  1.00  0.23  0.20 
Health Care 
DMR  1,579  0.00  1.00  0.58  0.33 
LOS  1,579  0.69  17.97  11.11  3.55 
QUAL  1,579  -23.56  23.69  0.26  2.52 
AMR  1,579  0.00  758.75  9.80  30.64 
MBR  1,579  0.14  22.17  2.84  2.56 
ETR  1,579  0.00  1.00  0.18  0.20 
Industrials 
DMR  7,525  0.00  1.00  0.54  0.33 
LOS  7,525  1.10  25.23  12.09  2.72 
QUAL  7,525  -25.17  26.01  0.30  2.62 
AMR  7,525  0.00  459.75  9.62  17.68 
MBR  7,525  0.12  19.96  1.63  1.24 
ETR  7,525  0.00  1.00  0.26  0.20 
Oil & Gas 
DMR  776  0.00  1.00  0.64  0.33 
LOS  776  3.26  21.80  12.11  3.66 
QUAL  776  -25.21  21.62  0.23  2.30 
AMR  776  0.00  764.14  23.18  74.02 
MBR  776  0.09  14.22  1.71  1.35 
ETR  776  0.00  1.00  0.25  0.24 
Technology 
DMR  2,621  0.00  1.00  0.51  0.36 
LOS  2,621  2.20  22.41  11.49  3.00 
QUAL  2,621  -23.17  25.54  0.35  3.12 
AMR  2,621  0.00  145.25  4.80  6.56 
MBR  2,621  0.12  20.74  2.57  2.49 
ETR  2,621  0.00  1.00  0.20  0.21 
Tele-
communications 
DMR  614  0.00  1.00  0.71  0.28 
LOS  614  2.89  19.95  14.03  3.23 
QUAL  614  -19.74  23.00  0.20  2.80 
AMR  614  0.00  74.00  6.41  5.59 
MBR  614  0.17  20.15  2.06  1.90 
ETR  614  0.00  1.00  0.23  0.23 
Utilities 
DMR  690  0.00  1.00  0.76  0.22 
LOS  690  3.22  22.28  14.23  2.64 
QUAL  690  -10.26  15.99  0.08  1.13 
AMR  690  2.52  328.17  22.01  18.61 
MBR  690  0.23  8.15  1.31  0.52 
ETR  690  0.00  1.00  0.25  0.18 
This table displays the descriptive statistics of the dependent and control variables based on the industries. 
Variables are debt maturity ratio (DMR), log of sales (LOS), quality of the firm (QUAL), assets maturity 
ratio (AMAT), market to book ratio (MBR) and effective tax rate (ETR).  
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8.1.3. Comparative Statistics of the Rated and Non-Rated Firms 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 8.1 are for the sample composed of rated 
and non-rated firms. After the outlier treatment, the final sample includes 564 rated 
firm-years  and  23,410  non-rated  firm-years.  It  was  argued  in  Subsection  5.1.4  of 
Chapter 5 that non-rated firms are likely to have less access to public debt markets as 
they  have  relatively  inferior  credit  quality  compared  with  the  rated  firms.  To 
empirically analyse whether non-rated firms possibly experience restricted access to 
debt markets and specifically to long-term debt, it should be determined whether the 
groups have different firm-level characteristics which may explain the differences in 
the levels of long-term debt in their capital structures. Table 8.3, therefore, displays the 
mean values of the dependent and control variables for rated and non-rated firms as 
well as the differences between the two groups. 
Table 8.3 
Test for the Difference of Means in Rated and Non-rated Samples 
  
 
N  Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
DMR 
Rated   564  0.77 
0.22*** 
Non-rated  23410  0.56 
LOS 
Rated   564  15.24 
3.19*** 
Non-rated  23410  12.06 
QUAL 
Rated   564  0.15 
-0.13 
Non-rated  23410  0.28 
AMAT 
Rated   564  13.17 
0.76 
Non-rated  23410  12.41 
MBR 
Rated   564  1.87 
0.04 
Non-rated  23410  1.84 
ETR 
Rated   564  0.30 
0.06*** 
Non-rated  23410  0.24 
This table displays the independent sample t-test for the differences in mean values of the 
dependent and control variables of rated and non-rated UK firms. *** denotes significance 
at the 1% level of confidence. Variables are defined debt maturity ratio (DMR), log of sales 
(LOS), quality of the firm (QUAL), assets maturity ratio (AMAT), market to book ratio (MBR) 
and effective tax rate (ETR). 
Consistent with Faulkender and Petersen (2006), there are significant differences in the 
maturity structure of the rated an d non-rated firms. Rated firms  have  on average  a 
proportion of approximately 0.77 of long-term debt in their capital structure, while non-
rated firms have a proportion of 0.56 of long -term debt. The difference of 0.22 
percentage points is statistically significant at the 1% level, which provides some  
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preliminary evidence suggesting that rated firms have better access to the long-term 
debt markets than non-rated firms. 
Such differences in the proportion of long-term debt can be attributed not only to the 
rated firms’ ability to access domestic debt markets but also to the international debt 
markets, as firms with better access to international debt markets are argued to have a 
higher proportion of long-term debt (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006). Moreover, it is 
also argued that maturities in the debt markets or bond markets are greater than private 
placements such as bank loans (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Barclay and Smith, 
1995). Therefore, firms with better access to the debt markets are expected to have 
longer maturities in their debt structure. 
The results in Table 8.3 also show that rated firms are significantly different from non-
rated firms in other characteristics e.g., they have larger sizes and higher effective tax 
rates compared with non-rated firms. The differences in the size of the non-rated and 
rated  firms  indicate  that  rated  firms  are  significantly  larger  than  their  non-rated 
counterparts.  Moreover,  the  high  effective  tax  rate  indicates  that  rated  firms  have 
higher before tax profits, resulting in high corporate taxes. These results are consistent 
with the prior US study by Faulkender and Petersen (2006), which reported significant 
differences in the relative sizes of rated and non-rated firms, while reporting higher 
marginal tax rates for the rated firms’ sample. Interestingly, the quality of the rated 
firms, as measured by abnormal earnings, is unexpectedly lower than the quality of the 
non-rated firms. This difference, however, is statistically insignificant. It may be due to 
a high variation within the sample of the non-rated firms that possibly results in higher 
quality  ratio,  but  does  not  necessarily  result  in  a  difference  being  statistically 
significantly when compared to the rated firms.  
Other firm level characteristics of the rated firms, such as  the assets maturity ratio 
(AMAT)  and  market  to  book  ratio  (MBR)  also  have  higher  mean  values,  but  the 
differences between the two groups are not statistically significant. The insignificance 
of AMAT indicates that both the groups have a somewhat similar maturity term in their 
assets  structure.  The  insignificance  of  MBR  contradicts  previous  US  and  Canadian 
studies by Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Mittoo and Zhang (2010) respectively, 
who reported significant differences in the market to book ratios of the firms. These 
studies also report contradictory results from each other with Faulkender and Petersen  
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(2006)  finding  that  the  US  rated  firms  are  more  stable  and  have  fewer  investment 
opportunities  as  measured by  the  market  to  book ratio, whereas  Mittoo and Zhang 
(2010)  find  the  inverse.  The  present  study  does  not  support  that  there  are  any 
significant differences between the investment opportunities between the two groups.   
8.1.4. Debt Maturity Structure of Rated and Non-rated Firms over the 
Sample Period 
Table 8.4 shows the mean debt maturity ratios of the rated and non-rated firms over the 
sample period.
35 It also shows independent t -test results for the differences in mean 
values between the groups.  
Table 8.4 
Test of the Difference in the Mean Debt Maturity Ratios of Rated and 
Non–Rated Firms over the Sample Period 
Years  N  Mean 
Mean 
Difference  Years  N  Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
1992 
3  0.83 
   0.33**  2001 
45  0.75 
0.22*** 
627  0.50  1456  0.54 
1993 
9  0.76 
0.25***  2002 
41  0.79 
0.24*** 
1178  0.51  1496  0.56 
1994 
17  0.71 
0.18***  2003 
52  0.79 
0.22*** 
1217  0.52  1508  0.57 
1995 
23  0.74 
0.22***  2004 
48  0.81 
0.22*** 
1272  0.52  1537  0.59 
1996 
19  0.73 
0.19***  2005 
55  0.83 
0.26*** 
1282  0.54  1523  0.57 
1997 
23  0.74 
0.19***  2006 
45  0.75 
0.17*** 
1315  0.55  1506  0.58 
1998 
32  0.73 
0.19***  2007 
44  0.80 
0.20*** 
1434  0.54  1427  0.60 
1999 
22  0.73 
0.19***  2008 
39  0.75 
0.16*** 
1355  0.55  1321  0.59 
2000 
29  0.72 
0.18***  2009 
18  0.82 
0.21*** 
1385  0.54  480  0.61 
Notes: This table displays the average debt maturity ratio (DMR) for rated and non-rated UK firms 
over the sample period and the results for the differences in mean values of both the groups. *** 
and ** denotes significance at 1% and 5% level of confidence 
Even taking into account that the sample size of rated firms is very small compared to 
the non-rated firms, the differences between the respective average matur ity ratios is 
significant at least at 1% or the 5% level of confidence for all the sample years. The 
significance of Levene’s test, which tests the homogeneity of variances between two 
                                                 
35 Due to the outlier treatment, results from 1989-1991 do not contain any data for the rated firms.    
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samples  (Field,  2005),  gives  support  to  rejecting  the  null  hypothesis  for  the 
homogeneity of the variances for all the sample years.  
The results imply that there are significant differences in the maturity ratios of the rated 
and non-rated firms, where rated firms have a significantly higher level of long-term 
debt in their capital structure. Standard deviation statistics indicate that the rated firms 
have lower variations within the sample, which means that these firms tend not to have 
a lot of variation in the maturity ratios among themselves, compared with the non-rated 
group. These results, however, have to be interpreted with caution, as the degree of 
freedom of the rated firms is considerably lower than that of the non-rated firms. 
8.1.5. Credit Ratings and Average Debt Maturity Ratios 
Figure 8.2 (A) displays the mean debt maturity ratios of the sample with respect to 
broad credit ratings. The rated firms, despite being  high or low rated, have longer 
average maturity ratios compared to their counterpart non-rated firms. The average debt 
maturity of AA and A rated firms is the lowest, followed by B rated firms, while BB 
rated firms have the highest average debt maturity ratio. The distribution of average 
debt maturity ratio provides preliminary evidence consistent with Diamond’s (1991) 
theory and the proposed hypotheses based on it, suggesting a non-linear trend between 
the broad credit ratings and the debt maturity ratios.  
Figure 8.2 (B) displays the debt and debt maturity ratios of the UK firms with respect to 
the individual credit ratings. Consistent with Figure 8.2 (A), maturity ratios also show a 
non-linear trend with respect to the individual rating categories. The figure indicates 
that firms below BB- ratings have shorter maturities in their debt structure. Figure 8.2 
(B) also shows that the average debt maturity ratios at each individual rating level also 
vary with the overall capital structure. Firms with higher debt in their capital structure 
seem to have higher level of long-term debt as well supporting the argument by Leland 
and Toft (1996) and Morris (1992) that firms opting for higher leverage also select 
longer maturities to delay the exposure to bankruptcy and potential cost of financial 
distress. Moreover, a prior empirical study by Antoniou et al. (2006) empirically also 
find that leverage and the maturity structure of debt have a positive relationship for the 
UK firms. This preliminary evidence suggests the need for controlling for the level of 
leverage of firms in the model. However, leverage of firms is not incorporated in the  
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main  model  due  to  the  concerns  for  endogeneity  in  the  model,  as  it  is  already 
established  in  Chapter  6  that  credit  ratings  are  an  important  determinant  of  capital 
structure. Nevertheless, following theoretical debate and prior empirical studies, as a 
measure of robustness check, leverage is incorporated in the model later (See Section 
8.3.2). 
 
 
Figure 8.2 (A) Credit Ratings and Average Debt Maturity Structure (DMR) 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 (B) Credit Rating and Average Debt (DR) and Debt Maturity Ratios (DMR)   
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Section 8.2 will formally test whether this observed non-linearity could be attributable 
to the credit ratings, controlling other factors important for the determination of the 
maturity structure of firms’ debt. 
8.1.6. Tests for the OLS Assumptions 
Before estimating the relationship of the credit rating on the maturity structure of the 
firms, it is important to test the validity and suitability of the estimation technique. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used as the main estimation 
technique  for  the  debt  maturity  structure.  Following  the  diagnostics  for  the  OLS 
assumptions in Chapter 6, data for analysis of the debt maturity structure are also tested 
for the suitability of the estimation technique. Similar to the capital structure analysis, 
the diagnostics for OLS assumptions indicate three main concerns. The first relates to 
the multicollinearity of explanatory variables, credit ratings and its functional form. 
The second main concern is the non-constant variance or heteroskedasticity, while the 
third  relates  to  the  expected  non-independence  of  the  error  term  resulting  in  an 
endogenous relationship between the credit ratings and the dependent variable, the debt 
maturity ratio. Appendices 8A-8G presents the results of the diagnostics tests. 
Multicollinearity  is  diagnosed  by  VIF,  Eigenvalues  and  a  correlation  matrix  of  the 
dependent, independent and control variables. The results indicate a high correlation 
between credit ratings and the squared values of credit ratings. A detailed discussion in 
Chapter  6  suggests  that  the  multicollinearity  between  the  actual  variable  and  its 
functional form cannot be classified as a pure multicollinearity case. This problem does 
not therefore require any remedial measure (for a detailed discussion, see Chapter 6 
Subsection 6.1.2). For addressing the concern of heteroskedasticity, White Standard 
Errors are also used.     
The concern about  endogeneity is likely to arise because of the theoretical  reverse 
relationship between credit ratings and maturity structure of debt. The direction of the 
relationship between the maturity structure and the credit ratings is not clear, as no 
theoretical and empirical study has directly looked at the relevance of the maturity 
structure  of  debt  in  the  determination  of  credit  ratings.  However,  since  the  capital 
structure and its components are closely associated with the credit ratings, it should be 
ensured that endogeneity does not affect the estimates of the model. To address any  
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such  concerns,  different  estimation  techniques  and  models  are  also  estimated.  A 
detailed discussion of procedures can be found in Section 8.3.3.  
8.2.  Testing the Impact of Credit Rating on the Debt Maturity Structure 
This section presents the main regression results of the analysis of the impact of credit 
ratings on the maturity structure of the debt. The hypothesis H4a, which postulates a 
non-monotonous or an inverted U-shaped relationship between credit rating and debt 
maturity structure, are tested using Model 6. The hypothesis restated from Chapter 4 is 
as follows: 
H4a: If other things remain constant, there is a non-linear, inverted U-
shaped relationship  between credit ratings  and the debt maturity 
structures of the firms. 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  5  Subsection  5.2.3.4,  Model  6  explores  the  relationship 
between credit rating and debt maturity structure of the firms. The model is re-stated 
below: 
t i
n
i
t i i t i t i t i X CR CR DMR ,
1
,
2
, 2 , 1 0 ,           

... (6) 
Where:   
t i DMR,  
is the debt maturity ratio of a firm 
0   
is a constant term 
t i CR ,  
is the credit rating of the firm with cardinalzed values of 1,2,…5, where 
AA=1 to B=5 or with cardinalzed values of 1,2,…6 where NR=6  
2
,t i CR
  is the square of credit rating CRi,t 
t i X ,   are  control  variables  including  Rating  dummy  (RATdum),  size  (LOS), 
firms  quality  (QUAL),  assets  maturity  (AMAT),  growth  opportunities 
(MBR),  effective  tax  rate  (ETR)  and  industry  dummies  (technology 
(TECHdum),  Industrial  (INDdum),  consumer  service  (CSdum),  consumer 
goods  (CGdum),  health  care  (HCdum),  utility  (UTLdum),  basic  material 
(BMdum), oil & gas (OGdum)  
t i,    Error term 
The section is further divided into two subsections. Section 8.2.1 presents the results 
for the whole sample of rated and non-rated firms, while Section 8.2.2 presents the 
results for rated firms only.   
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8.2.1. Results Based on Whole Sample of Rated and Non-Rated firms. 
Table 8.5 displays the results of the pooled OLS regression for Model (6) for the whole 
sample of rated and non-rated firms. Specifically, Columns 1 to 3 present the results for 
the entire sample including utility firms, while Column 4 displays the results for the 
sample  excluding  the  utility  sector.  The  utility  sector  is  excluded  to  maintain 
consistency with previous studies examining the debt maturity structure of the firms. 
Column  1 presents  the results  only  for the credit rating (CR) and its squared term 
(CR
2). Column 2 reports the results for the full model without the rating dummy, while 
Column 3 contains the results for the full model including the rating dummy.  
Table 8.5 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Long-term Debt Ratio 
on Credit Ratings and Control Variables for the Whole Sample 
Variables  1  2  3  4 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
  0.461 (6.85)*** 
  0.219 (5.28)*** 
 -0.034 (-6.60)*** 
 
   0.014 (0.21) 
   0.249 (6.26)*** 
  -0.034 (-6.84)*** 
 
   0.029 (37.72)*** 
  -0.001 (-1.01) 
   0.001 (12.79)*** 
  -0.003 (-2.23)** 
   0.003 (0.29) 
  -0.116 (-8.06)*** 
  -0.109 (-8.10)*** 
  -0.066 (-4.79)*** 
  -0.175 (-12.42)*** 
  -0.034 (-2.24)** 
   0.033 (1.84)* 
  -0.072 (-4.76)*** 
  -0.021 (-1.20) 
  -0.084 (-0.88) 
   0.181 (2.94)*** 
  -0.020 (-1.80)* 
   0.170 (1.44) 
   0.029 (37.71)*** 
  -0.001 (-1.02) 
   0.001 (12.77)*** 
  -0.003 (-2.21)** 
   0.003 (0.31) 
  -0.115 (-8.00)*** 
  -0.108 (-8.01)*** 
  -0.064 (-4.69)*** 
  -0.173 (-12.31)*** 
  -0.033 (-2.18)** 
   0.034 (1.90)* 
  -0.071 (-4.68)*** 
  -0.020 (-1.15) 
  -0.139 (-1.35) 
   0.219 (3.34)*** 
  -0.025 (-2.14)** 
   0.159 (1.28) 
   0.029 (37.54)*** 
  -0.001 (-0.99) 
   0.001 (12.29)*** 
  -0.003 (-2.17)** 
   0.006 (0.53) 
  -0.114 (-7.84)*** 
  -0.107 (-7.86)*** 
  -0.063 (-4.55)*** 
  -0.172 (-12.15)*** 
  -0.031 (-2.02)** 
 
  -0.070 (-4.56)*** 
  -0.018 (-1.03) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.010 
117.044 
.000 
23974 
.100 
177.670 
.000 
23974 
.100 
166.703 
.000 
23974 
.092 
157.547 
.000 
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Notes: This table displays the OLS regression results of Model 6 for the whole sample (Columns 1-3) and without utility firm 
(Column 4). Variables are defined as total long-term debt to total assets (DMR) as dependent variable, numerical code 1-6 for 
credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2),rating dummy (RATdum), log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, 
Quality of the firm (QUAL) is the difference between earnings before interest and taxation (EBITt+1) and  EBITt scaled by share 
price SPt, assets maturity ratio (AMAT) is the ratio of total property, plant and equipment to total annual depreciation, market to 
book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity plus market value of equity divided by book 
value of assets while and effective tax rate (ETR) is the ratio of total amount of tax charged by total taxable income,  technology 
dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care 
dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy (BMdum) and  oil and gas dummy (OGdum). 
Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Column 1 shows the model with the explanatory variables, credit rating and its squared 
term only. The F-value of 117.04 is significant at the 1% level with an adjusted-R
2 of 
1.0%, which gives sufficient support to reject the null hypothesis that the slopes of the  
227 
 
explanatory variables are simultaneously zero. In terms of the relevance of the credit 
ratings  for  the  maturity  structure  of  the  firms,  the  adjusted-R
2  is  very  low.  As 
previously stated in Chapter 6 Subsection 6.1.2.1, the sample consists of rated and non-
rated firms where the rated firms constitute 2.3% of the total sample. This may lower 
the contribution of the credit rating in the model. Moreover, due to significant variation 
in the maturity structure of non-rated firms, one can expect that assigning a single code 
may limit the power of the CR and CR
2 as a whole. Despite these limitations of the 
variable, both CR and CR
2 explain significantly the maturity structure of the firms as 
depicted in Column 1. 
Column  1  shows  that  the  CR  has  a  positive  relationship  and  CR
2  has  a  negative 
relationship with the debt maturity ratio (DMR). The coefficients of CR and CR
2 are 
both  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  Since  both  variables  are  functionally 
related with each other, the coefficients have to be jointly explained. The positive and 
negative coefficients  of CR and CR
2 respectively, indicate that with  an increase in 
credit rating, debt maturity first increases and then gradually decreases. The negative 
sign of CR
2 indicates that the maturity of the debt increases at a diminishing rate. The 
significance of CR and CR
2 with the predicted signs gives strong support for the non-
linearity  hypothesised  in  the  relationship  between  credit  rating  and  debt  maturity 
structure.  
After adding the firm-level control variables as restrictions in the model, the fit of the 
model  improves  considerably,  increasing  the  adjusted-R
2  to  10%,  with  F-value 
significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the earlier results in Column 1, CR and CR
2 
maintain  the  predicted  signs  and  remain  significant  at  the  1%  level  of  confidence. 
However, it may be argued that the non-linear relationship between credit rating and 
debt maturity structure is due to the inclusion of non-rated firms, as they tend to have a 
lower  debt  maturity  ratio,  which  is  also  evident  from  Tables  8.2  (A  and  B).  To 
minimise such concerns, RATdum is added to the model. This restriction is likely to 
address any possible issues that may arise from the inclusion of large number of non-
rated  firms  to  construct  the  credit  rating  variables.  As  stated  in  Chapter  5,  this 
procedure  is  also  consistent  with  Stohs  and  Mauer  (1996)  and  Barclay  and  Smith 
(1995), who explore the determinants of the debt maturity structure of US firms.  
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Column 3 reports the regression results after the addition of RATdum to the model. After 
adding the restriction of the rating dummy, the adjusted-R
2 of the full model does not 
change and remains at 10%. This is comparable to previous UK studies such as Ozkan 
(2002)  and  Fan  et  al.  (2011)  which  reported  adjusted-R
2  of  13.9%  and  8.9% 
respectively. It can also be compared to previous US studies which generally reported 
adjusted-R
2 in the same range (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996). 
The  adjusted-R
2  may  be  low  but  it  is  consistent  those  found  in  prior  literature, 
specifically  Fan  et al. (2011) who study the maturity structure of 40 countries and 
report similar statistics for most of the sample countries including the UK. Moreover, 
the constant term is not significant in the model suggesting that the independent and 
control variables are appropriately selected. 
In the full model, CR and CR
2 still posses the expected sign and are significant even 
after  the  inclusion  of  all  restrictions.  As  expected,  CR  has  a  positive  sign  and  is 
significant at the 1% level; CR
2 also maintains its direction but it is now significant at 
the 10% level. The coefficients of CR and CR
2 suggest that credit ratings and debt 
maturity structures have a non-linear relationship, thus providing strong support for 
H3a, H3b, and H3c. The coefficients indicate that when firms have high ratings, they tend 
to have a shorter maturity in their capital structure. However, this trend diminishes as 
the  credit  rating  deteriorates.  Specifically,  the  coefficients  suggest  that  with  the 
deterioration of each rating category, the level of maturity increases by 18 percentage 
points, but the rate of increase simultaneously decreases by 2 percentage points with 
each consecutive squared rating. The significance of the CR
2 is low but it remains 
within an acceptable limit. The rating dummy (RATdum) is unexpectedly insignificant in 
the model, but its inclusion has altered the significance of the CR
2. The significance of 
CR and CR
2 and the insignificance of RATdum suggest that despite non-rated firms 
having shorter maturity in their capital structure, they are not significantly different in 
their debt maturity level when the credit ratings are controlled for in the model.  It may 
be possible that the size of the firms (LOS) also captures some of the effects of credit 
ratings leading to the statistical insignificance of the rating dummy.  
The relationship  of CR and CR
2 with  the maturity structure is  consistent  with  that 
found by Stohs and Mauer (1996). They documented a positive relationship of CR and 
a negative relationship of CR
2 with the maturity structure, both significant at the 1% 
level of confidence. Moreover, they noted that the rating dummy is also significant in  
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the model. The findings of the present study are slightly contradictory to Stohs and 
Mauer (1996), as the t-statistics for CR and CR
2 is relatively lower than those of the 
control variables. However, this can be attributed to the differences in the composition 
of the sample. The proportion of non-rated firms in their sample is 44% and the rest of 
the sample is composed of rated firms whereas the present sample consists of 2.3% 
rated firms and 97.7% non-rated firms. It is expected that this difference should result 
in substantial dissimilarities in the results for both the studies in terms of the validity 
and strength of credit ratings as an explanatory variable. Nevertheless, the relationship 
of  CR  and  CR
2  is  as  predicted  and  remains  evident  when  all  the  restrictions  are 
introduced into the model. A separate regression analysis for testing the model solely 
for the rated firms is carried out in the next section to further analyse the contribution 
and significance of the credit ratings for the maturity structure of the rated firms alone.  
Although these results confirm the assumption made about the non-rated firms, the 
evident shorter debt maturity structure may be due to reasons other than liquidity risk. 
For  example,  being  rated  reduces  information  asymmetry  between  lenders  and 
borrowers  (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006) suggesting that the quality of non-rated 
firms may be more difficult to assess. Therefore, the lenders, specifically banks, may 
reduce  the  maturity  of  debt  to  possibly  gain  a  superior  bargaining  position  and  to 
maximise the effectiveness of their monitoring activities (Barclay and Smith, 1995).  
The control variables also possess the expected signs but only the log of sales (LOS), 
assets maturity ratio (AMAT) and market to book value (MBR) are significant in the 
model whereas the quality of firm (QUAL) and the effective tax rate (ETR)
36 possess 
the expected relationship but are insignificant. The size of the firm, measured by log of 
sales (LOS), is significantly positively associated with  the DMR. Such a relationship 
between size and the debt maturity structure is in line with that found in Barclay and 
Smith (1995 and 1996), Stoh and Mauer (1996), Cai  et al. (2008), Deesomsak et al. 
(2009) and specifically with Ozkan (2000 and 2002), Antoniou et al. (2006) and Fan et 
al. (2011) for UK firms. The positive association between the LOS and DMR indicates 
that large UK firms have a longer maturity in their capital structure, possibly due to 
lower information asymmetry, better ability to borrow from the public debt markets, 
fewer potential conflicts of interests and a higher proportion of collateralisable debt.    
                                                 
36 The truncation process of ETR, as discussed in Section 8.1.1, does not have any effect on the direction 
or the significance of the variable in any of the models.    
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The  evidence  indicates  that  the  quality  of  the  firms  (QUAL)  is  not  an  important 
predictor of  UK firms’  maturity structure. The  coefficient of QUAL is  negative as 
expected, but is insignificant, thus contradicting Flannery’s (1986) and Kale and Noe’s 
(1990) theory that firms signal their quality to the outsiders through the choice of the 
maturity  structure  of  their  debt.  The  results  are  consistent  with  prior  UK  studies 
(Ozkan, 2000 and 2002; Antoniou et al. 2006) but inconsistent with most of the US 
studies (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stoh and Mauer, 1996). 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed later in this section, the empirical results for the 
sample for the rated firms indicate negative and significant results for the QUAL and 
DMR.  
Consistent  with  the  theoretical  argument  of  Myers  (1977),  the  results  for  AMAT 
indicate that UK firms tend to match the maturity structure of their assets with the 
maturity structure of their debt to circumvent any circumstances where they do not 
have  sufficient  cash  flows  to  meet  their  obligations  when  these  become  due.  By 
matching  the  maturity  of  the  assets  structure  with  the  debt  structure,  they  can 
streamline their cash flows so that they both mature at the same time. These results are 
in line with most of the previous studies on the debt maturity structure of the UK, US 
and other international markets (see, Ozkan, 2000 and 2002; Antoniou  et al. 2006; 
Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Cai et al. 
2008; Deesomsak et al. 2009; Fan et al. 2011). 
The market to book ratio (MBR) shows a negative and significant relationship with the 
debt maturity structure of the UK firms. The results support the theoretical predictions 
of Myers (1977), who argues that when firms have risky debt in their capital structure, 
the  benefits  from  undertaking  positive  NPV  projects  are  shared  between  the 
bondholders and the shareholders, resulting in a disincentive to invest in such projects. 
Myers (1977) and Bodie and Taggart (1978) propose that reducing the maturity of debt 
is likely to solve such problems. Consistent with the suggestions of Myers (1977) and 
Bodie and Taggart (1978), the negative relationship of MBR with DMR indicates that 
UK firms are particularly concerned about sub-optimal investment and they use the 
maturity structure of their debt to minimise such concerns. The results are inconsistent 
with most of the previous UK studies (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Antoniou et al. 2006; 
Fan et al. 2011) and literature from other markets (Esho et al. 2002; Cai et al. 2008; 
Fan  et  al.  2011)  who  report  either  a  positive  and/or  an  insignificant  relationship  
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between the two variables. The effective tax rate also shows a negative sign, but it is 
insignificant in the model. These findings are similar to Ozkan (2000 and 2002), in 
suggesting  that  tax  concerns  are  not  important  for  the  UK  firms  in  making  their 
maturity structure decision. 
Industry dummies are mostly negative and are significantly associated with the debt 
maturity structure indicating that most of these industries have significantly  shorter 
maturity  in  their  capital  structure  when  compared  to  the  base  industry, 
telecommunication. The positive coefficient of the utility dummy (UTLdum), however, 
suggests that, contrary to most of the industries, firms in the utility sector have on 
average higher long-term debt as a proportion of their total debt when compared with 
the base industry. A detailed discussion of reasons why of UK utility firms have higher 
leverage can be found in BIS (2004). 
The inclusion of utility firms in the sample, however, can be subject to criticism. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, utility firms, being highly regulated, are expected to 
follow a different  capital  structure than other non-financial firms  and possibly  also 
different determinants as well. It may also be likely that their choice of the maturity 
structure is also influenced by such factors. A few of the previous studies, which have 
examined the debt maturity structure, have also included the regulated firms in their 
sample (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996). However, they have used 
a regulated firm dummy to capture any differences in the results due to such inclusion. 
The use of a utility dummy in the analysis above (Columns 2 and 3) effectively address 
such concerns but to be consistent with most of the previous UK studies on the debt 
maturity structure (Ozkan, 2000 and 2002; Antoniou et al. 2006), Column 4 of Table 
8.5 also provides the multivariate regression results for the sample when excluding the 
utility sector.  
The results are similar to  Column 3, where the coefficients of the explanatory and 
control variables maintain similar signs and are significant in the reduced sample. The 
coefficients of CR and CR
2 still show a positive and negative sign, respectively, but the 
statistically significance for CR
2 has improved from 10% to 5%. A separate regression 
for the utility firms’ does not show any relevance of the credit ratings as a determinant 
of  their  debt  maturity  structure,  which  possibly  attenuates  the  significance  of  CR
2. 
Moreover, as will be discussed in  Subsection 8.3.1.1, it is possible that the coding  
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scheme of credit ratings limits the non-linear effect of credit ratings, in relation to the 
debt maturity structure. 
Results reported in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 8.5 provide strong evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis that credit ratings do in fact have 
a non-linear relationship with the debt maturity structure of the firms. Moreover, the 
results  suggest  that  non-rated  firms,  similar  to  other  low  rated  firms,  have  shorter 
maturity in their capital structure. These results are in line with Diamond’s prediction 
that a shorter debt maturity structure moderated by the refinancing risk faced by firms 
leads to a non-monotonic relationship between their credit ratings and the debt maturity 
structure. A further discussion is postponed until the next subsection. 
8.2.2. Results Based on the Rated Firms  
The main dataset used in Table 8.4 is composed of the rated and non-rated firms, where 
non-rated firms, having a proportion of 97.6% in the total sample, dominate the whole 
sample. As stated earlier, this method of sample selection is in line with previous US 
studies by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) which examined the 
debt maturity structure of the US firms. The inclusion of a large number of non-rated 
firms is based on the assumption that these firms which may be similar to low rated 
firms,  have  inferior  quality  and/or  constrained  access  to  the  debt  markets.  The 
assumption, although valid, might pose some concerns. For example, non-rated firms 
may not be strictly classified as firms with less access to debt markets and as having 
poor credit quality leading such firms to rely on short-term debt. Given that several 
firms in the UK do not acquire credit ratings, it is acknowledged that the assumption 
may not suffice in many circumstances. Moreover, the number of non-rated firms is 
proportionally  large,  which  might  undermine  the  effect  of  credit  ratings  and  other 
control variables on the maturity structures and may alter the actual relationship among 
the variables. It can also be noted in Table 8.4 that the marginal contribution of the 
credit rating is less than expected, with t-statistics of the credit rating and its functional 
form being smaller than several other control variables in the model.  
This assumption made about the non-rated firms would only suffice when the sample 
without the non-rated firms produces  similar estimates  for the rated firms’ sample. 
Therefore, Model 3 is also tested for rated firms only and the results are displayed in  
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Table 8.6.
37 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8.7 show the model estimates for the whole 
sample of rated firms, while Columns 3 and 4 display the results for rated firms without 
the inclusion of utility firms in the sample.  
Column 1 reports the estimates for the coefficients of CR and CR
2 only. The adjusted-
R
2 of 6.6% is notably higher when compared to Column 1 of Table 8.5, indicating the 
relevance  of  credit  ratings  for  the  rated  firms  in  particular.  This  might  provide 
sufficient support that the hypothesis that debt maturity structure of the rated firms in 
the UK varies with their credit ratings, despite the fact that the coefficient of CR
2 is 
unexpectedly insignificant. A closer inspection suggests that the insignificance of the 
CR
2 can be attributed to the inclusion of utility sector in the sample and the coding 
procedures (further details discussed later in the section). 
Table 8.6 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Long-term Debt Ratio 
on Credit Ratings and Control Variables for the Rated Firms 
Variables  1  2  3  4 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
    0.599 (12.96)*** 
    0.089 (2.54)** 
   -0.007 (-1.07) 
    0.885 (6.02)*** 
    0.166 (3.89)*** 
   -0.022 (-3.00)*** 
   -0.023 (-2.97)*** 
   -0.012 (-2.03)** 
    0.003 (2.67)*** 
   -0.003 (-0.43) 
    0.008 (0.30) 
    0.020 (0.28) 
   -0.020 (-0.51) 
   -0.044 (-1.20) 
   -0.135 (-3.46)*** 
    0.011 (0.20) 
   -0.023 (-0.55) 
   -0.136 (-3.18)*** 
    0.014 (0.29) 
 0.506 (11.88)*** 
 0.134 (4.31)*** 
-0.011 (-2.15)** 
 0.706 (4.29)*** 
 0.209 (4.55)*** 
-0.028 (-3.48)*** 
-0.016 (-1.87)* 
-0.011 (-1.75)* 
 0.002 (2.54)** 
-0.001 (-0.19) 
 0.005 (0.11) 
 0.025 (0.34) 
-0.009 (-0.22) 
-0.042 (-1.12) 
-0.128 (-3.24)*** 
 0.034 (0.62) 
 
-0.12 (-2.76)*** 
 0.033 (0.65) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.066 
21.234 
.000 
571 
.164 
11.571 
.000 
571 
.114 
49.174 
.000 
495 
.181 
8.772 
.000 
495 
Notes: This table displays the OLS regression results of Model 3 for the Rated firms’ sample with utility firms (Columns 1and 
2) and without utility firm (Columns 3 and 4). Variables are defined as total long-term debt to total assets (DMR) as 
dependent variable, numerical code 1-5 for credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2), log of sales (LOS) refers to 
natural logarithm of sales,  quality of the firm (QUAL) is the difference between earnings before interest and taxation 
(EBITt+1) and  EBITt scaled by share price SPt, assets maturity ratio (AMAT) is the ratio of total property, plant and 
equipment to total annual depreciation, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of 
the equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of assets while and effective tax rate (ETR) is the ratio of total 
amount  of  tax  charged  by  total  taxable  income,  technology  dummy  (TECHdum),  industrial  dummy  (INDdum),  consumer 
services  dummy  (CSdum),  consumer  goods  dummy  (CGdum),  heath  care  dummy  (HCdum),  utility  dummy  (UTLdum),  basic 
material dummy (BMdum) and  oil and gas dummy (OGdum). 
Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
                                                 
37 The data for the rated firms is winsorized due to the small sample size. QUAL is winsorized at the top 
and bottom 0.5%, AMAT and MBR at the top 0.5% and ETR at 0-1 criteria as before.    
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After  adding  the  control  variables  into  the  model,  the  coefficients  of  CR  and  CR
2 
maintain their direction. However, the relationship of CR
2 with DMR is now significant 
at  the  1%  level.  The  coefficients  suggest  that  the  level  of  debt  maturity  structure 
increases by 16.6 percentage points with the deterioration of the broad rating category, 
but this increase has a diminishing rate of 2.2 percentage points with every squared 
broad rating. As stated above, one possible reason for the non-significance of CR
2 in 
Column 1 can be the inclusion of utility firms in the sample. When other firm-level 
characteristics together with the effect of the inclusion of utility sector are controlled 
for, Column 2 shows significant coefficient of CR
2. Moreover, results for Model 3 in 
Columns 3 and 4 without the utility sector indicate a strong non-linear relationship. The 
exclusion of utility section has not only improved the t-values for credit ratings but has 
reduced  the  significance  of  other  firm  level  factors  in  determining  the  maturity 
structure of UK firms. This may mean that the debt maturity structures of rated utility 
firms is either not related to the credit ratings or that they do not have a non-linear 
relationship, which possibly attenuates the significance of credit ratings for the rest of 
the sample, as displayed in Column 1. An individual regression for the rated utility 
firms suggests that credit ratings are irrelevant for the maturity structures of such firms. 
Presumably  the  sample  size  is  also  small,  which  may  contribute  to  the  lack  of 
significance of credit ratings in the model.   
The consistency in the relationship of CR and CR
2 with DMR, and its significance in 
both tables, i.e., Tables 8.5 and 8.6, suggests that firms with high and low credit ratings, 
despite the inclusion of non-rated firms in the sample, have shorter maturity in their 
capital structure while mid rated firms have longer debt maturity. These results thus 
support Diamond’s (1991) theory, which predicts that the maturity structure of debt is 
dependent on refinancing risk and this refinancing risk is different at each level of 
creditworthiness. The refinancing risk induces a non-monotonic relationship between 
the credit ratings,  which are  explicitly considered a measure of creditworthiness  in 
Diamond (1991).  
The results suggest that high rated UK firms have a preference for a high proportion of 
short-term debt and following Diamond (1991), one can expect that this debt consists 
mostly of commercial papers  and unsecured debt.
38  It is also documented by prior 
                                                 
38 The availability of data does not permit to investigate further the type of instruments used by firms at 
each level of ratings.  
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literature  that  high  rated  firms  prefer  directly  placed  debt  with  short  maturity.  For 
example,  as  in  1992-93,  70%  of  the  issues  of  commercial  paper  and  90%  of  the 
outstanding amount in the UK market were rated by top three rating agencies (Alworth 
and Borio, 1993). Evidence also suggests that only top rated firms issue commercial 
papers  (Stojanovic  and  Vaughan,  1998;  Financial  Times,  2011,  A.M  Best,  2012). 
Stojanovic and Vaughan (1998) report that 90.4% of the issues rated by Moody's have 
high prime ratings (highest Moody's rating P1) and the remaining 9% have low prime 
ratings (second highest Moody's P2). As the high rated firms have low refinancing risk, 
they are able to  rollover the debt  to the next  period.  Choosing short debt maturity 
enables high rated firms to take advantage of the favourable information which may 
reveal at the time of maturity of existing debt, lowering its cost of borrowing in the next 
period.  
Due to the high costs associated with refinancing short-term debt at maturity, it can be 
argued that low rated firms would also prefer more long-term debt. However, due to the 
high credit risk they are exposed to, they might be screened out from the long-term debt 
markets.  Low  rated  firms  might  be  restricted  to  either  issue  public  debt  of  shorter 
maturity or would be limited to bank loans or private placements, which arguably are of 
shorter maturity than public debt. The results of Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show that similar to 
non-rated  firms,  low  rated  firms  have  short  maturity  in  their  debt  structure.  This 
behaviour  provide  support  for  the  argument  by  Diamond  (1991)  indicating  that 
possibility that low-rated and non-rated firms have difficulty in accessing long-term 
debt markets.   
Consistent  with  Diamond  (1991),  intermediate  rated  UK  firms  seem  to  be  more 
inclined towards a longer maturity in their capital structure. This is likely because, 
unlike low quality firms, which have constrained access to the long-term debt markets, 
mid rated firms can have better access to such financing options. While short-term debt 
may be cheaper for these firms, evidence suggests that mid rated firms may lack the 
confidence of being able to easily rollover the debt when it matures. Therefore, these 
firms take the advantage of being able to access long-term debt markets.  
Regarding the other control variables, LOS has a negative relationship with the DMR, 
which  contradicts  with  earlier  reported  results  in  Tables  8.5  and  those  of  previous 
studies.  The  negative  sign  not  only  indicates  that  large  firms  prefer  to  use  shorter  
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maturity in their capital structure, but also suggests a possible interaction between the 
level of credit ratings and the size of firms. For example, large firms are more likely to 
have  better  ratings  and  thus  can  easily  access  short-term  instruments  including 
commercial papers. However, it is not feasible to isolate the effect of both the variables 
on the debt maturity ratios.   
The importance of signaling quality through the choice of maturity structure seems to 
show up more clearly when the analysis is restricted to the rated firms only. Contrary to 
the  prior  UK  studies,  the  quality  of  a  firm  (QUAL)  is  found  to  have  a  negative 
relationship  with  DMR  where  the  coefficient  is  significant  at  the  5%  level.  This 
supports the signaling theory by Flannery (1986) and Kale and Noe (1990) and the 
empirical results reported by previous US studies (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes 
and Opler, 1996; Stoh and Mauer, 1996). This suggests that, similar to US firms where 
firms choose debt maturity structures which differentiate them from inferior quality 
firms,  the  UK  rated  firms  signal  their  quality  to  outsiders  through  the  maturity 
structure.
39 The assets maturity structure (AMAT) has a positive association with the 
DMR  supporting  the  m aturity  –  matching  hypothesis.  Investment  opportunities 
measures by market to book ratio (MBR) and effective tax rate (ETR) do not seem to 
be an important determinant of the debt maturity structure of UK rated firms.   
To  conclude,  the  two  subsections  provide  strong  support  for  rejecting  the  null 
hypotheses in favour of alternative hypothesis, H4a, that credit ratings are non-linearly 
associated with the debt maturity structure of the UK firms. The next section presents 
some of the robustness checks to analyse the stability and consistency of the results 
when alternate coding procedures and estimation techniques are used. 
8.3.  Robustness and Sensitivity Checks 
This section presents the results of a series of robustness and sensitivity checks. The 
objective is to examine whether the results reported above are robust to alternative 
estimation techniques and coding procedures. Specifically, Subsection 8.3.1 discusses 
the results for alternative coding procedures based on individual credit ratings and a 
dummy method. Subsection 8.3.2 reports the results after controlling for the leverage of 
                                                 
39 It should be reiterated here that the proxy for quality of firms might not truly capture what it is 
intended to measure. Abnormal earnings of firms may have restricted ability to measure the true quality 
of firm, which may arguably be a long-term attribute of a firm.    
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the firms, while Subsection 8.3.3 reports the results based on alternative estimation 
technique namely the two-stage least squares model (2SLS) and on lagged explanatory 
and control variables. 
8.3.1. Results based on Alternative Coding for the Credit Ratings 
The main results presented in Tables 8.5 and 8.6 were based on coding assigned to each 
broad rating category from AA to B while the last numeric code of 6 was assigned to 
the  non-rated  category  when  non-rated  firms  are  part  of  the  sample.  As  argued  in 
Subsection 6.2.2.1, the ordinal scale assigned to the rated categories has a clear ranking 
from 1 assigned to highest ratings through to 6 for the lowest quality but the distance 
between  the  rating  categories  may  not  be  similar.  This  may  pose  a  problem  in 
interpreting  the  results.  For  example,  the  debt  maturity  structure  increases  with  a 
diminishing rate with the deterioration of every broad rating category but cast doubt on 
whether the decline in the broad rating category is similar across the whole level of 
ratings. To address such concerns, similar to Chapter 6, two alternative coding schemes 
are used for credit ratings, namely the individual rating category coding and the broad 
rating  dummy  technique.  Subsection  8.3.1.1  presents  the  empirical  results  for 
individually rating categories and Subsection 8.3.1.2 presents the results for the broad 
rating dummy technique.  
8.3.1.1. Results Based on Individual Rating Categories Coding 
Table 8.7 reports the results for CR and CR
2 measured by assigning a numeric code to 
each individual rating level. For example, AA+, AA, AA- are assigned 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively, and B-, being the last rating level, is assigned 15. The non-rated firms are 
assigned  the  numeric  code  of  16.  Using  a  different  coding  scheme  will  ensure  to 
minimise any potential noise arising from the unequal distances between each rating 
level. Moreover, this system of coding will also test the hypotheses for each individual 
rating level to analyse whether individual rating levels also have similar relationships 
with  the  debt  maturity  structure  of  the  UK  firms  as  seen  with  the  broad  rating 
categories. Columns 1 to 3 display the results for the whole sample of rated and non-
rated firms and Columns 4 to 6 report the results for the rated firms only. Columns 3 
and 6 show the results of Model 3 tested for sample firms without including the utility 
sector.   
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Table 8.7 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Book Long-term Debt Ratio on Credit Ratings based on Individual Rating Coding 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
0.460 (8.13)*** 
0.086 (6.27)*** 
-0.005 (-7.70)*** 
 
-0.059 (-0.71) 
0.078 (4.36)*** 
-0.003 (-3.00)*** 
0.127 (1.41) 
0.029 (37.76)*** 
-0.001 (-1.01) 
0.001 (12.78)*** 
-0.003 (-2.19)** 
0.003 (0.31) 
-0.115 (-7.98)*** 
-0.108 (-8.00)*** 
-0.064 (-4.69)*** 
-0.173 (-12.27)*** 
-0.033 (-2.12)** 
0.034 (1.89)* 
-0.071 (-4.66)*** 
-0.019 (-1.10) 
-0.104 (-1.17) 
0.084 (4.49)*** 
-0.004 (-3.05)*** 
0.137 (1.43) 
0.029 (37.58)*** 
-0.001 (-0.99) 
0.001 (12.29)*** 
-0.003 (-2.16)** 
0.006 (0.53) 
-0.114 (-7.81)*** 
-0.107 (-7.85)*** 
-0.063 (-4.54)*** 
-0.172 (-12.10)*** 
-0.030 (-1.96)** 
 
-0.069 (-4.54)*** 
-0.017 (-0.98) 
0.554 (15.99)*** 
0.049 (4.98)*** 
-0.002 (-3.06)*** 
0.733 (4.93)*** 
0.072 (5.92)*** 
-0.004 (-4.71)*** 
 
-0.015 (-1.92)* 
-0.012 (-2.07)** 
0.003 (2.93)*** 
-0.003 (-0.40) 
0.007 (0.26) 
0.025 (0.37) 
-0.028 (-0.72) 
-0.047 (-1.29) 
-0.125 (-3.19)*** 
0.052 (0.95) 
-0.015 (-0.35) 
-0.127 (-2.97)*** 
0.039 (0.80) 
0.541 (3.20)*** 
0.081 (6.29)*** 
-0.004 (-4.85)*** 
 
-0.006 (-0.67) 
-0.012 (-1.87)* 
0.002 (2.60)*** 
-0.002 (-0.21) 
-0.002 (-0.04) 
0.028 (0.41) 
-0.011 (-0.28) 
-0.037 (-0.99) 
-0.108 (-2.71)*** 
0.080 (1.43) 
 
-0.105 (-2.39)** 
0.062 (1.23) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
.010 
119.717 
.000 
23974 
.100 
177.670 
.000 
23974 
0.092 
158.486 
.000 
23284 
.104 
33.927 
.000 
571 
.193 
13.363 
.000 
571 
.209 
10.348 
.000 
495 
Notes: This table displays results for OLS regression for Model 3, using 1-16 code for credit ratings. Columns 1 to 3 reports the results for the whole sample and Columns 4 to 6 reports the results 
for the rated firms’ only. Column 3 and 6 reports the results for firms without the inclusion of utility firms.. Variables are defined as total long-term debt to total assets (DMR) as dependent variable, 
numerical code 1-6 or 1-5 for credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2),rating dummy (RATdum), log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, quality of the firm (QUAL) is the 
difference between earnings before interest and taxation (EBITt+1) and  EBITt scaled by share price SPt, assets maturity ratio (AMAT) is the ratio of total property, plant and equipment to total 
annual depreciation, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of assets while and Effective tax 
rate (ETR) is the ratio of total amount of tax charged by total taxable income, technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy 
(CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy (BMdum) and  oil and gas dummy (OGdum). 
Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively  
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Column 1 of Table 8.7, similar to Column 1 of Table 8.5, suggests that the partial 
model explains a significant proportion of variation in the maturity structure of the 
firms where the CR and CR
2 have expected signs and are significant at the 1% level. 
The inclusion of control variables does not result in any change in the direction and 
significance of CR and CR
2, although the t-statistics have slightly reduced. Compared 
to the results of Column 3 in Table 8.5, however, the significance level of CR
2 has 
improved  from  10%  to  a  1%  level  of  significance.  This  indicates  that  CR
2,  which 
effectively captures the non-linearity, has a stronger relationship with the debt maturity 
structure when CR and CR
2 are coded according to individual rating categories rather 
than  broad  rating  categories.  Measuring  credit  rating  through  broad  rating  scheme 
attenuated the effects of the individual rating levels on the debt maturity structure of the 
firms. Nevertheless, both the coding procedures confirm the non-linear relationship of 
credit ratings with the debt maturity structure, where the non-rated firms have shorter 
maturity in their capital structures similar to other rated firms.   
The coefficients of the CR and CR
2 are lower than those of the reported coefficients in 
Table 8.5, using a broad rating category as the number of coding points has decreased 
from 6 to 16. When credit ratings are coded individually, there will be less marginal 
change from one rating to another than the case where credit ratings were coded with 
respect to broad rating category. Overall, the significance of both the CR and CR
2 
suggests that the coding procedure is not likely to suffer from any serious measurement 
error  although  the  results  are  slightly  sensitive  to  the  coding  procedure.  Moreover, 
credit  ratings,  measured  by  individual  rating  categories,  also  suggest  a  non-linear 
relationship with the debt maturity structure of the firms. This indicates, for example, 
that not only do the firms with the highest and lowest broad rating categories (e.g., AA, 
B) have shorter maturity in their leverage structure, but the firms within these broad 
rating categories such as AA+, AA, AA-, B+, B and B-, also exhibit a shorter debt 
maturity.  
These results are consistent with those of Barclay and Smith (1995), who use individual 
rating categories to test Diamond’s non-linearity hypothesis. However, the results of 
the  present  study  are  an  improvement  to  Barclay  and  Smith’s  study.  They  use 
individual rating levels and a rating dummy to capture the non-linearity of the credit 
ratings. Their study suggests that the credit ratings on their own have a monotonic 
relationship  with  the  debt  maturity  structure  while  the  non-monotonicity  is  solely  
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driven  by  the  inclusion  of  non-rated  firms.  The  present  study,  on  the  other  hand, 
suggests that the credit ratings on their own have a non-monotonous relationship with 
the debt maturity structure and, consistent with Stoh and Mauer (1996), the non-rated 
firms in the sample do not drive such results. The results reported in Columns 4 to 6 for 
rated firms also show similar patterns, although the results are more pronounced than 
for the sample with the inclusion of non-rated firms reported in Columns 1 to 3. The 
CR and CR
2 have significant relationships with the debt maturity structure of the UK 
firms, where the t-statistics of the coefficients are sufficiently large to conclude that 
credit ratings are in fact the most important factor in the determination of the debt 
maturity structure of rated UK firms. 
In sum, the significance of the models’ estimates for CR and CR
2 have improved when 
credit ratings have been measured by individual rating levels. The results based on 
individual rating levels  confirm previous findings  and refute the null hypothesis  in 
favour of the alternative hypotheses, suggesting that  the credit ratings have a non-
monotonous  or  an  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  with  the  debt  maturity  structure, 
irrespective of the inclusion of non-rated firms and the utility sector in the sample.     
8.3.1.2.  Broad Rating Dummy Technique 
Similarly  to  Subsection  6.3.1.2  of  Chapter  6,  an  alternative  measure  for  the  credit 
ratings is constructed by assigning a dummy variable to each broad rating category. For 
example, for the dummy variable AAdum, the firm-year will take the value of 1 if they 
have AA+, AA or AA- ratings, otherwise it will be zero. Non-rated firms are kept as 
the base/ reference category when the model is tested for the whole sample, given that 
this category has the highest number of observations to make precise estimates about 
the  other  categories  in  the  model.  For  the  rated  firms’  sample,  BBB  is  kept  as  a 
reference category. Table 8.8 reports the results for the broad rating dummy technique 
for the whole sample as well as for rated firms only. Columns 1 to 3 report the results 
for the whole sample of rated and non-rated firms and Columns 4 to 6 show the results 
for the rated firms’ sample. 
Column 1 reports the results for the broad rating category dummies without the control 
variables. Consistent with Figure 8.2 (A), non-rated firms have the lowest proportion of 
long-term debt of 0.55, while all other rating categories have, on average, more long- 
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term debt in their capital structure. The result shows that the BB rated firms have the 
longest maturity in their debt structure, while the AA rated firms have the shortest debt 
maturity. All the dummies are significant at the 1% level.  
After adding the control variables, the results show similar pattern although the AAdum 
becomes insignificant in the model. The coefficients of Adum, BBBdum, BBdum and Bdum 
indicate that after controlling for the firm level characteristics, A, BBB, BB and B rated 
firms have respectively 4, 18.8, 17.9 and 16.9 percentage points higher maturity than 
that  of  the  non-rated  firms.  It  can  be  noted  that  when  effects  of  firm-level 
characteristics are controlled for in the model, the coefficients have reduced their size 
considerably.  This  possibly  could  be  attributed  to  some  firm-level  characteristics, 
which can be strongly associated with the credit ratings of the firms. For example, as 
discussed in Section 8.2.1, the size of the firm may take some of the effects of credit 
ratings,  resulting  in  lowering  of  size  of  the  coefficients  and  their  significance. 
Nevertheless,  the  credit  ratings,  whether  measured  as  ordinal  variables  or  dummy 
variables, retain their significance despite the specifications of the model.   
The  curvature  relationship  between  credit  ratings  and  debt  maturity  structure  is 
relatively more apparent when utility firms are excluded from the sample (Column 3). 
These results are consistent with the reported results in Column 4 of Table 8.5. The 
coefficient of BB rated firms show that firms within the broad rating of BB have 22 
percentage points more long-term debt while B rated firms have 18 percentage points 
more long-term debt in their capital structure compared to the base category of non-
rated firms. The results are different from Column 2 because the debt maturity structure 
of the utility firms is significantly different as a whole and at each rating level, from 
other firms in the sample. In unreported statistics, utility firms at each level, from AA 
category through non-rated firms NR, show significantly different mean maturity ratios 
than the rest of the sample firms. Moreover, the mean debt maturity ratios show that the 
point of curvature for the utility firms is much earlier than for firms making up the rest 
of the sample. These differences are more pronounced for the broad rating categories 
than for the individual rating levels.   
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  Table 8.8 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Long-term Debt Ratio (DMR) on Explanatory Using Broad Rating Dummy Technique 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6 
(Constant) 
AAdum 
Adum 
BBBdum 
BBdum 
Bdum 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
    0.555 (254.66)*** 
    0.163 (4.02)*** 
    0.168 (7.81)*** 
    0.270 (11.16)*** 
    0.317 (6.00)*** 
    0.237 (3.26)*** 
 
    0.296 (17.57)*** 
   -0.010 (-0.27) 
    0.044 (2.11)** 
    0.188 (8.09)*** 
    0.179 (3.54)*** 
    0.169 (2.53)** 
    0.029 (37.67)*** 
   -0.001 (-1.03) 
    0.001 (12.79)*** 
   -0.003 (-2.24)** 
    0.003 (0.31) 
   -0.116 (-8.06)*** 
   -0.109 (-8.09)*** 
   -0.066 (-4.79)*** 
   -0.174 (-12.37)*** 
   -0.035 (-2.27)** 
    0.035 (1.95)* 
   -0.072 (-4.73)*** 
   -0.022 (-1.26) 
    0.289 (16.90)*** 
   -0.042 (-0.98) 
    0.047 (1.98)** 
    0.186 (7.95)*** 
    0.219 (3.64)*** 
    0.179 (2.55)** 
    0.029 (37.52)*** 
   -0.001 (-1.01) 
    0.001 (12.29)*** 
   -0.003 (-2.19)** 
    0.006 (0.52) 
   -0.115 (-7.88)*** 
   -0.108 (-7.91)*** 
   -0.064 (-4.62)*** 
   -0.173 (-12.18)*** 
   -0.032 (-2.09)** 
 
   -0.070 (-4.60)*** 
   -0.019 (-1.11) 
   0.823 (64.10)*** 
  -0.104 (-4.15)*** 
  -0.099 (-5.76)*** 
    
   0.062 (2.09)** 
  -0.013 (-0.33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   1.229 (9.91)*** 
  -0.129 (-3.97)*** 
  -0.104 (-5.45)*** 
    
  -0.010 (-0.33) 
  -0.118 (-2.36)** 
  -0.022 (-2.95)*** 
  -0.014 (-2.35)** 
   0.002 (2.53)** 
  -0.006 (-0.75) 
  -0.006 (-0.14) 
   0.066 (0.89) 
  -0.036 (-0.92) 
  -0.065 (-1.74)* 
  -0.141 (-3.59)*** 
  -0.030 (-0.54) 
  -0.021 (-0.50) 
  -0.143 (-3.35)*** 
  -0.026 (-0.52) 
  1.153 (8.32)*** 
 -0.159 (-4.28)*** 
 -0.107 (-5.48)*** 
  
  0.017 (0.49) 
 -0.107 (-2.02)** 
 -0.018 (-2.15)** 
 -0.012 (-1.85)* 
  0.002 (2.31)** 
 -0.004 (-0.53) 
  0.009 (0.19) 
  0.064 (0.85) 
 -0.028 (-0.68) 
 -0.060 (-1.59) 
 -0.135 (-3.36)*** 
 -0.008 (-0.14) 
  
-0.132 (-3.01)*** 
 -0.010 (-0.18) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
.010 
47.023 
.000 
23974 
.100 
146.866 
.000 
23974 
.092 
139.349 
.000 
23284 
.087 
14.587 
.000 
571 
.182 
8.483 
.000 
571 
.193 
8.402 
.000 
495 
Notes: The table displays OLS regression results for dummy variable technique for Model 3. Columns 1 to 3 reports the results for the whole sample and Columns 4 to 6 reports the results for the rated firms’ only. 
Column 3 and 6 reports the results for firms without the inclusion of utility firms. AAdum, Adum, BBBdum BBdum, and Bdum  takes the value of 1, if firm has a rating within broad rating category AA, A, BBB, BB or B, 
respectively, or 0 otherwise whereas base category for the whole sample is non-rated firms (NR) and for rated firm is BBB. Variables are defined as total long-term debt to total assets (DMR) as dependent variable, 
log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, quality of the firm (QUAL) is the difference between earnings before interest and taxation (EBITt+1) and  EBITt scaled by share price SPt, assets maturity ratio 
(AMAT) is the ratio of total property, plant and equipment to total annual depreciation, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity plus market value of equity 
divided by book value of assets , effective tax rate (ETR) is the ratio of total amount of tax charged by total taxable income technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy 
(CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy (BMdum) and  oil and gas dummy (OGdum).Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-
values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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The results for the rated firms’ sample (Columns 4 to 6) show similar trends as to Table 
8.6. When firm-level characteristics are not controlled for in the model, the Bdum is 
insignificant, thus not suggesting a non-linear relationship. However, after controlling 
for the firm-level characteristics, including industry dummy for the utility sector, the 
broad rating dummies show a non-linear trend. Column 5 indicates that, compared to 
the base category, i.e., BBB rated firms, AA rated firms have 12 percentage points, A-
rated firms have 10 percentage points and B rated firms have 12 percentage points less 
long-term to total debt in their capital structures. The results in Column 6 show similar 
results to Column 5 although the coefficient for AA rated firms has decreased which 
indicates that AA rated non-utility sector firms have 16 percentage points less long-
term debt than the BBB rated firms.  
Overall, the results from this section support the earlier conclusion that credit ratings 
are non-linearly associated with the debt maturity structure of the UK firms, where the 
non-rated firms have shorter debt maturity compared to the rated firms. Despite the fact 
that results are generally consistent with different coding schemes, they indicate that 
categorising credit ratings according to the broad rating categories is not capturing the 
effects  of  credit  ratings  as  efficiently  as  when  they  are  measured  according  to  the 
individual rating classes. Moreover, the improvement in the results with more definitive 
non-linear pattern with the exclusion or controlling for the utility sector shows that the 
utility sector firms do not have similar concerns for refinancing risk as firms in other 
sectors. These differences can be attributable to the regulations that govern the capital 
structure decision making of such firms.   
8.3.2. Results after Controlling for the Leverage of the Firms 
It is argued that leverage has a direct relationship with the debt maturity structure of the 
firms. Firms that have high leverage also have long maturity in their capital structures 
compared to firms which have low levels of debt. Leland and Toft (1996) and Morris 
(1992) argue that this is due to the firms’ attitude towards risk, as highly geared firms 
in a hope to minimise or delay exposure to bankruptcy and avoid the cost of financial 
distress select to issue more long-term debt. Empirically, Antoniou et al. (2006) for the 
UK firms also find that leverage and the maturity structure of debt have a positive 
relationship. Furthermore, this relationship is also observable in Figure 8.2 (B). The  
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leverage of firms can therefore potentially be an important determinant of the debt 
maturity  structure  which  in  turn  can  possibly  alter  the  relationship  between  credit 
ratings and debt maturity structure.  
It can be noted that leverage of the firms is not controlled for in the main model, as 
doing so would introduce complex interactions among the explanatory variables. For 
example, the leverage of a firm is directly related to the size of the firm, as large firms 
have more access to the capital markets and thus have more debt. Similarly, credit 
ratings also influence capital structure, as discussed in Chapter 6, while the reverse 
causality of credit ratings and capital structure is always inevitable. These complex 
interactions among the variables may cause non-independence of error terms, which 
may result in producing biased or/and inconsistent estimators.  
However, to ensure that credit ratings are reliably associated with the debt maturity 
structure of the firms, the leverage of the firms is included as a control variable. Table 
8.9 presents the results for the whole sample (Columns 1 to 3) and for the rated firms 
(Columns 4 to 6). Column 1 (4) presents the results for credit rating coding 1-6 (1-5), 
Column 2 (5) presents the results for credit rating coding 1-16 (1-15) while Columns 3 
and 6 display the results for the broad rating dummy technique for the whole sample 
and the rated firms’ sample, respectively.  
It can be noted in the table that the leverage of the firms is directly related to the debt 
maturity structure of the UK firms. This suggests that if the firms have higher leverage 
they are also likely to have longer maturity in their capital structure supporting the 
argument by Leland and Toft (1996) and Morris (1992). Nevertheless, the results for 
the relevance of credit ratings display consistent results with what has been reported 
earlier  in  the  chapter.  Some  differences  in  the  level  of  significance,  however,  are 
observable in few cases for the whole sample.   
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Table 8.9 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Long-term Debt Ratio (DMR) on Explanatory Controlling for the Leverage of the Firms 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
AAdum 
Adum 
BBBdum 
BBdum 
Bdum 
DR 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
-0.014 (-0.15) 
 0.133 (2.20)** 
-0.016 (-1.48) 
 0.090 (0.78) 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.345 (32.26)*** 
 0.027 (36.06)*** 
-0.001 (-1.23) 
 0.000 (1.67)* 
-0.006 (-4.43)*** 
 0.032 (2.98)*** 
-0.068 (-4.77)*** 
-0.076 (-5.78)*** 
-0.043 (-3.18)*** 
-0.146 (-10.56)*** 
-0.002 (-0.11) 
 0.042 (2.40)** 
-0.044 (-2.95)*** 
 0.010 (0.59) 
-0.008 (-0.09) 
 0.059 (3.36)*** 
-0.003 (-2.46)** 
 0.063 (0.72) 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.345 (32.19)*** 
 0.027 (36.10)*** 
-0.001 (-1.22) 
 0.000 (1.69)* 
-0.006 (-4.41)*** 
 0.032 (2.97)*** 
-0.068 (-4.77)*** 
-0.077 (-5.78)*** 
-0.043 (-3.19)*** 
-0.146 (-10.54)*** 
-0.001 (-0.07) 
 0.042 (2.39)** 
-0.044 (-2.94)*** 
 0.011 (0.62) 
 0.216 (12.9)*** 
 
 
 
 0.012 (0.31) 
 0.038 (1.85)* 
 0.144 (6.32)*** 
 0.127 (2.57)*** 
 0.102 (1.50) 
 0.345 (32.24)*** 
 0.027 (36.02)*** 
-0.001 (-1.24) 
 0.000 (1.69)* 
-0.006 (-4.45)*** 
 0.032 (2.97)*** 
-0.069 (-4.83)*** 
-0.078 (-5.85)*** 
-0.044 (-3.27)*** 
-0.147 (-10.61)*** 
-0.003 (-0.19) 
 0.042 (2.44)** 
-0.045 (-3.00)*** 
 0.008 (0.49) 
 0.761 (5.20)*** 
 0.143 (3.41)*** 
-0.021 (-2.95)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.226 (4.48)*** 
-0.014 (-1.76)* 
-0.012 (-2.04)** 
 0.002 (2.01)** 
-0.013 (-1.62) 
-0.014 (-0.33) 
 0.063 (0.87) 
-0.010 (-0.26) 
-0.038 (-1.06) 
-0.150 (-3.88)*** 
 0.027 (0.51) 
-0.024 (-0.6) 
-0.131 (-3.12)*** 
 0.005 (0.10) 
 0.656 (4.45)*** 
 0.061 (5.06)*** 
-0.003 (-4.36)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.191 (3.80)*** 
-0.008 (-1.07) 
-0.013 (-2.15)** 
 0.002 (2.24)** 
-0.011 (-1.45) 
-0.021 (-0.51) 
 0.055 (0.80) 
-0.016 (-0.42) 
-0.041 (-1.13) 
-0.139 (-3.54)*** 
 0.061 (1.12) 
-0.014 (-0.35) 
-0.123 (-2.90)*** 
 0.029 (0.60) 
 1.047 (8.11)*** 
 
 
 
-0.097 (-2.92)*** 
-0.085 (-4.39)*** 
 
-0.026 (-0.85) 
-0.143 (-2.89)*** 
 0.217 (4.34)*** 
-0.014 (-1.82)* 
-0.013 (-2.12)** 
 0.002 (1.98)** 
-0.014 (-1.79)* 
-0.008 (-0.19) 
 0.098 (1.34) 
-0.033 (-0.84) 
-0.064 (-1.75)* 
-0.162 (-4.18)*** 
-0.016 (-0.29) 
-0.032 (-0.78) 
-0.144 (-3.44)*** 
-0.039 (-0.78) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
.137 
224.907 
.000 
23974 
.137 
225.390 
.000 
23974 
.137 
201.465 
.000 
23974 
.193 
9.510 
.000 
571 
.213 
10.620 
.000 
571 
.209 
9.360 
.000 
571 
Notes: The table displays OLS regression results Model 3 with the inclusion of leverage as a control variable. Columns 1 to 3 reports the results for the whole sample and Columns 4 to 6 reports the results for the rated 
firms’ only. Column 1 (4) reports the results for credit rating coding 1-6 (1-5), Column  2 (5) reports the reports the results for credit rating coding 1-16 (1-15) and Columns 3 and 6 reports the results for broad rating 
dummy technique. AAdum, Adum, BBBdum BBdum, and Bdum  takes the value of 1, if firm has a rating within broad rating category AA, A, BBB, BB or B, respectively, or 0 otherwise where base category for the whole sample 
is non-rated firms (NR) and for rated firm is BBB. Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Column  1,  based  on  broad  rating  coding  scheme,  suggests  a  positive  relationship 
between credit ratings and debt maturity structure when the effects of leverage are 
controlled for. The inclusion of firms’ leverage has resulted in non-significance of CR
2 
which was earlier significant at the 10% level in Column 3 of Table 8.5. One possible 
reason for the non-significance may be the strong association between the leverage and 
credit  ratings  of  firms.  However,  when  credit  ratings  are  measured  according  to 
individual  rating  levels  (Column  2),  the  results  seem  consistent  with  the  previous 
findings. The coefficients of credit ratings, CR and CR
2, are significant at the 1% level 
although  the  size  of  the  coefficients  have  been  slightly  reduced  from  the  earlier 
reported results in Column 2 of Table 8.7.  
Column 3 also indicates a non-linear trend, where the BBB rated firms have a longer 
maturity than non-rated firms while other rating categories have a shorter debt maturity 
than  BBB  rated  firms.  The  inclusion  of  firms’  leverage,  however,  has  altered  the 
significance of B rated firms. The model does  not suggest that B rated firms have 
significantly longer maturity than non-rated firms. The results for the rated firms are 
qualitatively  similar  to  the  previous  reported  results,  despite  the  different  coding 
techniques. The overall results suggest that irrespective of the level of gearing in firms’ 
capital  structure,  the  concerns  for  the  refinancing  risk  vary  with  the  level  of 
creditworthiness of the firms. Therefore, firms at different levels of credit ratings have 
different  debt  maturity  structure.  Consistent  with  the  previous  reported  results,  the 
results in Table 8.9 provide strong support for the rejection of the null hypothesis in 
favour  of  the  non-linear  relationship  between  credit  ratings  and  the  debt  maturity 
structure of the firms.   
8.3.3. Addressing the Violations of OLS 
As  discussed  in  Subsection  8.1.6  above,  all  OLS  assumptions  are  tested  before 
estimating the models. The diagnostics show that data do not meet the assumptions of 
homogeneity of variances and independence of error terms. This section, thus, presents 
the results of the remedial measures taken to address the possibly violations of OLS.     
8.3.3.1. Addressing Heteroskedasticity 
White  Heteroskedasticity  test  and  graphical  presentations  indicate  the  presence  of 
heteroskedasticity in both the samples, i.e., combined sample of rated and non-rated  
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firms  and rated firms  sample. Therefore,  the models  are tested by obtaining  White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors  to  ensure  reliable  and  efficient 
estimators from OLS in the presence of Heteroskedasticity. Table 8.10 displays the 
OLS results after correcting any Heteroskedasticity present in the models. 
Columns 1-3 report the results for the combined sample and Column 4-6 shows the 
results for rated firms only. The results, in general, remain robust after correcting the 
heteroskedasticity  issue  in  both  samples.  However,  in  Column  6,  which  shows  the 
results using broad rating dummy technique for rated sample, the coefficients of AA 
dummy and B dummy become insignificant after correcting for heteroskedasticity.  
8.3.3.2. Addressing Endogeneity   
Credit ratings, theoretically and empirically, are perceived to be an important factor in 
determining  the maturity  structure of firms’ debt.  As highlighted in  Chapter 4 and 
earlier in the chapter, most US studies (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stoh and Mauer, 
1996)  find  that  credit  ratings  are  an  important  determinant  of  maturity  structure 
decisions.  However,  these  studies  ignore  the  potential  impact  of  the  debt  maturity 
structure on the credit ratings or the reverse relationship between the two which may 
result in producing inconsistent and biased estimators for the impact of credit ratings on 
debt maturity structure.  
It is argued that the firms whose maturity structure is composed mostly of short-term 
debt are more susceptible to the deterioration of their credit ratings (Gopalan et al. 
2010). This is likely to be because of the rollover risk faced by the firms, where greater 
exposure  to  rollover  risk  leads  to  higher  potential  bankruptcy  costs  and  a  higher 
probability of bankruptcy  (He  and Xiong, 2012). Such differences  may exist at  all 
rating levels, whether at investment grade or speculative grade (Gopalan et al. 2010). 
For example, during the recent financial crisis 2007-2009, very high rated firms that 
were relying largely on short-term debt had to face serious refinancing risk, resulting in 
the deterioration of their credit ratings and as a consequence some were eventually 
declared bankrupt.   
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Table 8.10 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Debt Maturity Ratio  
on Explanatory and Control Variables  (With Heteroskedasticity Corrected Standard Errors) 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
AAdum 
Adum 
BBBdum 
BBdum 
Bdum 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
-0.059 (-0.84) 
 0.078 (6.09)*** 
-0.003 (-3.68)*** 
 0.127 (1.48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.029 (39.07)*** 
-0.001 (-0.98) 
 0.001 (9)*** 
-0.003 (-1.93)* 
 0.003 (0.32) 
-0.115 (-8.88)*** 
-0.108 (-9.37)*** 
-0.064 (-5.41)*** 
-0.173 (-14.19)*** 
-0.033 (-2.35)** 
 0.034 (2.4)** 
-0.071 (-5.44)*** 
-0.019 (-1.18) 
-0.084 (-1.01) 
 0.181 (3.91)*** 
-0.020 (-2.17)** 
 0.170 (1.52) 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.029 (39.03)*** 
-0.001 (-0.99) 
 0.001 (9.00)*** 
-0.003 (-1.95)* 
 0.003 (0.31) 
-0.115 (-8.89)*** 
-0.108 (-9.37)*** 
-0.064 (-5.4)*** 
-0.173 (-14.23)*** 
-0.033 (-2.41)** 
 0.034 (2.41)** 
-0.071 (-5.46)*** 
-0.020 (-1.24) 
 0.296 (18.8)*** 
 
 
 
-0.01 (-0.41) 
 0.044 (3.79)*** 
 0.188 (16.96)*** 
 0.179 (5.65)*** 
 0.176 (2.38)** 
 0.029 (38.97)*** 
-0.001 (-1.00) 
 0.001 (9.02)*** 
-0.003 (-1.97)** 
 0.003 (0.31) 
-0.116 (-8.95)*** 
-0.109 (-9.45)*** 
-0.066 (-5.51)*** 
-0.174 (-14.28)*** 
-0.035 (-2.52)** 
 0.035 (2.47)** 
-0.072 (-5.52)*** 
-0.022 (-1.35) 
 0.889 (6.11)*** 
 0.166 (3.93)*** 
-0.023 (-3.08)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.022 (-2.90)*** 
-0.008 (-1.87)* 
 0.002 (2.61)*** 
-0.004 (-0.53) 
-0.034 (-1.40) 
 0.023 (0.32) 
-0.012 (-0.33) 
-0.038 (-1.09) 
-0.125 (-3.34)*** 
 0.017 (0.31) 
-0.016 (-0.39) 
-0.129 (-3.11)*** 
 0.019 (0.40) 
 0.743 (5.04)*** 
 0.07 (5.87)*** 
-0.004 (-4.72)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.014 (-1.87)* 
-0.008 (-1.86)* 
 0.002 (2.82)*** 
-0.004 (-0.51) 
-0.028 (-1.20) 
 0.026 (0.37) 
-0.021 (-0.55) 
-0.042 (-1.20) 
-0.116 (-3.09)*** 
 0.055 (1.04) 
-0.007 (-0.18) 
-0.121 (-2.91)*** 
 0.041 (0.88) 
  1.123 (8.76)*** 
 
 
 
-0.026 (-0.91) 
  
 0.103 (5.40)*** 
 0.092 (3.05)*** 
-0.023 (-0.46) 
-0.022 (-2.91)*** 
-0.009 (-2.11)** 
 0.002 (2.52)** 
-0.006 (-0.77) 
-0.031 (-1.28) 
 0.067 (0.90) 
-0.034 (-0.91) 
-0.064 (-1.79)* 
-0.137 (-3.64)*** 
-0.027 (-0.50) 
-0.022 (-0.55) 
-0.141 (-3.42)*** 
-0.026 (-0.54) 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
.100 
166.704 
.000 
23974 
.101 
167.468 
.000 
23974 
.100 
148.492 
.000 
23974 
.187 
8.137 
.000 
571 
.196 
10.617 
.000 
571 
.183 
9.133 
.000 
571 
Notes: The table displays results for OLS regression results with heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors for Model (6) for whole sample (Columns 1-3) and rated firms only (Column 4-6). 
Columns 1 and 4 reports the results for broad rating coding, Columns 2 and 5 for individual credit rating coding and Column 3 and 6 for broad rating dummy technique. 
Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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The above argument is more explanatory of the relationship between debt maturity 
structure and rating changes. A direct theoretical and empirical support for the level of 
debt maturity structure and credit ratings is not generally found in the previous studies. 
For example, it is not clear whether firms with longer maturity structure will have 
higher  or  lower  credit  ratings.  Nevertheless,  previous  studies,  as  discussed  above, 
contend with  the direct relationship  of  capital  structure  and debt  maturity structure 
(Leland and Toft, 1996; Morris, 1992; Antoniou et al. 2006). It is also argued that the 
level of debt is indirectly associated with the credit ratings i.e., highly geared firms 
have  lower  ratings  and  vice  versa  (see  for  example,  Kaplan  and  Urwitz,  1979; 
Ederington, 1985; Molina, 2005; Gray et al. 2006, for the relevance of leverage for 
credit ratings). Following this, it can be argued that firms which have higher leverage, 
have longer debt maturity and lower ratings, and vice versa.   
If the above is true, the relationship between credit ratings and debt maturity structure 
cannot be established by estimating the model simply through OLS, as the coefficients 
of credit ratings will not be unbiased and consistent. One possible solution that most of 
the  econometric  textbooks  (see  for  example,  Gujarati,  2004;  Brooks,  2008; 
Wooldridge, 2008) and empirical studies examining the impact of credit ratings on the 
capital structure (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Judge and Mateus 2009; Mittoo and 
Zhang, 2010) suggest, is the use of two-stage least squares (2SLS). Despite that, the use 
of 2SLS is common for treating the endogeneity issues in capital structure models; 
previous studies, investigating the impact of credit rating on the maturity structure, do 
not tend to use this methodology. This is likely to be due to the lack of any direct 
theoretical and empirical association established between the two variables. Another 
method, although less formal, to address the potential endogeneity could be the use of a 
lagged structure for explanatory and control variables in the model. The results from 
estimating two-stage least squares and for lagged structure of explanatory and control 
variables are presented below. 
i.  Results for the Two-Stage Least Square Estimation 
As discussed in Chapter 6, 2SLS involves estimating the equation in two stages. In the 
first stage, the endogenous variables are regressed over the predetermined variables in 
the  model.  In  the  second  stage,  the  predicted  values  obtained  from  the  first  stage  
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replace the endogenous variables in  the original  model. The two-stage least  square 
model is only estimated for the rated firms since the non-rated sample will distort the 
estimation of the first stage as the estimates of predicted values for the credit ratings are 
likely to be seriously affected if the non-rated code is allowed to dominate the sample.  
The main model (6) is restated below: 
t i
n
i
t i i t i t i t i X CR CR DMR ,
1
,
2
, 2 , 1 0 ,           

...(6) 
 
In model (6), the control variables  t i iX ,  are all assumed to be exogenously determined 
in the system, while CR and CR
2 are endogenous variables, such that CR and CR
2 are 
also influenced by the dependent variable i.e., the debt maturity structure (DMR). In 
stage one, CR is regressed on the control variables (size of firm (LOS), quality of firm 
(QUAL), asset maturity ratio (AMAT), market to book ratio (MBR), effective tax rate 
(ETR) and industry dummies) and two other variables, namely the interest coverage 
ratio (ICR) and Taffler’s z-score (TZS) (see Subsection 6.1.2 for a detailed discussion 
on the relationship of ICR and TZS with the credit ratings). The model for the first 
stage estimation is therefore: 
) 6 (
1
, , , 2 , 1 0 , a X TZS ICR CR
n
i
t i t i i t i t i t i 

            
Following the procedures discussed in Chapter 6, model (6a) is estimated by the ordinal 
regression to obtain the predicted values for the CR. The predicted values are squared 
and  used  as  an  instrument  in  ordinal  regression  for  the  estimation  of the  predicted 
values for the CR
2. The equation for estimating the CR
2 is stated below as:  
) 6 ( ) ( ,
2
, 1 0
2 b PCR CR t i t i         
Model  6b  is  also  estimated  using  ordinal  logistic  regression.  The  actual  and  the 
functional form, CR and CR
2, are replaced by the predicted values of CR and CR
2, 
namely PCR and PCR
2 obtained from Model (4a) and (4b). Model (3) can now be 
rewritten as:  
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) 6 ( ,
1
,
2
, 2 , 1 0 , c X PCR PCR DMR t i
n
i
t i i t i t i t i            

 
Model (6c) is estimated by the OLS. As discussed in  Chapter 6, the use of ordinal 
logistic regressions in the first stage and the OLS in the second stage is consistent with 
procedures suggested by Winship and Mare (1984). Table 8.1 1 displays the results of 
the two stage least square regression. Results from the first stage and the second stage 
are displayed in Panel A and B respectively. 
Table 8.11 
Regression Results of the Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation (2SLS) 
of Debt Maturity Ratios 
Panel A: Stage I  Panel B: Stage II 
Variables  Estimate  Wald  Variables  Coefficients 
TZS 
ICR 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
-0.008* 
-0.032*** 
-0.746*** 
 0.013 
-0.053*** 
-0.174** 
 0.056* 
-2.583*** 
 1.443*** 
 0.602* 
 1.438*** 
 4.003*** 
 2.526*** 
 2.009*** 
 3.295*** 
3.807 
11.395 
108.868 
0.119 
28.208 
4.901 
3.038 
14.401 
16.432 
3.521 
17.177 
49.302 
41.998 
26.212 
45.369 
(Constant) 
PCR 
PCR
2 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
    0.580 (2.86)*** 
    0.175 (2.92)*** 
   -0.022 (-2.28)** 
   -0.008 (-1.01) 
   -0.001 (-0.38) 
    0.003 (2.88)*** 
   -0.010 (-1.35) 
    0.000 (-0.07) 
    0.053 (0.79) 
    0.059 (1.61) 
    0.011 (0.35) 
   -0.045 (-1.24) 
    0.066 (1.06) 
    0.056 (1.35) 
   -0.046 (-1.10) 
    0.099 (1.88)* 
Pseudo R-Square  
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke  
-2 Log Likelihood  
Intercept Only 
Final Model 
N 
 
.447 
.481 
 
2021.17 
1572.78 
571 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N 
.103 
6.770 
.000 
 571 
 
Notes: The table reports the regression results of the two-stage least estimation of DMR. Panel A reports 
the results of the first stage while panel B report the results for the second stage. Variables are defined as 
Taffler’s z-score (TZS), interest coverage ratio (ICR), predicted values of credit ratings (PCR), predicted 
values of credit rating squares (PCR
2), log of sales (LOS), Quality of the firm (QUAL), Assets maturity 
ratio (AMAT), market to book ratio (MBR),  Effective tax rate (ETR),  technology dummy (TECHdum), 
industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath 
care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy (BMdum) and  oil and gas dummy 
(OGdum), PCR and PCR
2 are predicted CR and CR
2 from the first stage. 
 ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A shows the  Cox and Snell, Nagelkerke statistics and -2 Log Likelihood. Cox 
and Snell and Nagelkerke R
2, indicating the fit of the model (O’Connell, 2006), suggest 
that the explanatory variables explain substantial variation in the dependent variable, 
credit  ratings.  The  estimated  coefficients  show  predictive  signs  and  are  mostly  
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significant  in  the  model.  The  Wald  statistics  show  that  size  is  the  most  influential 
variable in predicting credit ratings. The Taffler z-score (TZS) is negatively associated 
with the credit ratings and is significant at the 10% level indicating that an increase in 
the TZS is likely to be associated with higher credit ratings. The interest coverage ratio 
(ICR)  also  has  a  negative  and  significant  relationship  with  the  credit  ratings  as 
predicted.  
Panel B of Table 8.11 reports the results for the second stage estimation. The direction 
of  the  coefficients  of  PCR  and  PCR
2  are  in  line  with  previous  results  reported  in 
Column 2 of Table 8.6. The positive coefficient of PCR and the negative coefficient of 
PCR
2, significant at the 1% levels and 5% levels respectively, reinforce the previous 
findings  and  support  the  alternative  hypotheses  postulating  a  non-linear  association 
between credit ratings and debt maturity structure.  
The direction of the relationship of the control variables, reported in Panel B, is also 
comparable to those reported in Column 2 of Table 8.7. However, most of the variables 
become insignificant in the second stage of the 2SLS. For example, the size and quality 
of  firms,  although  negatively  associated  with  the  debt  maturity  structure,  are  not 
significant in the second stage. Such results have to be interpreted with caution, as the 
usual standard errors from the 2SLS tend to be larger than OLS depending on the 
quality of the instruments used (Wooldridge, 2008). The instruments used in this case 
have a sizable correlation with the credit ratings but cannot be assumed to be perfectly 
related with credit ratings. Therefore, one can expect lower significance or even no 
significance at all (Wooldridge, 2008).  
Another issue concerning the use of 2SLS is finding a valid instrument for endogenous 
variables. While Sargan statistics indicates the validity of the instruments, the interest 
coverage ratio (ICR) and Taffler’s z-score (TZS) are not perfectly exogenous in the 
model. Theoretically, they are likely to have also a relationship with the debt maturity 
structure  and  thus  may  be  inappropriate  instruments  for  credit  ratings.  Finding  a 
suitable instrument for credit ratings is difficult, as the factors which affect the leverage 
structure also affect the credit ratings. It is acknowledged therefore, that the instruments 
used in the estimation of 2SLS may pose concerns due to their potential relationship 
with the dependent variable.   
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ii. Results Based on Lagged Explanatory and Control Variables 
An  informal  test,  which  can  address  the  reverse  causality  in  the  model,  could  be 
estimating the same model with a lagged structure of explanatory and control variables. 
Although, the procedure may not completely address the consequence of endogeneity, 
i.e., non-independence of error term and explanatory variables, it may  theoretically 
facilitate  in  explaining  the  relationship  between  the  dependent  and  explanatory 
variables  without  possible  concerns  for  reverse  causality  in  the  relationship.  For 
example, theoretically, it is not possible that the proportion of long-term debt in the 
subsequent year influences the credit ratings of the previous period.  
Model 6 is therefore, also estimated by using a lagged structure for the credit ratings 
and control variables. Model 6 can be rewritten as: 
1 ,
1
1 ,
2
1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , 

         t i
n
i
t i i t i t i t i X CR CR DMR      ... (6d) 
Results of Model 6d are presented in Table 8.12 where Columns 1 and 2 present the 
results  for  the  whole  sample  of  rated  and  non-rated  firms  while  Columns  3  and  4 
display the results for rated firms. Column 1, displaying the results for the credit rating 
coding 1-6, shows that credit ratings (CR) are significant in the model although the 
credit rating square (CR
2) has become insignificant with this specification. This may 
suggest a positive relationship between credit rating and the debt maturity structure of 
the firms. Similar results can be noted for the rated firms in Column 3, where the 
coefficient of CR
2 is negative but insignificant. It should be noted that the number of 
observations  have  been  reduced  considerably  for  both  samples  due  to  the  lagged 
structure of explanatory and control variables. For the whole sample, 2,712 firm-years 
and for the rated firms’ sample 62 firm-years had to be discarded for the procedure. A 
reduced  number  of  firm-years  could  affect  the  significance  of  the  CR
2.  In  the 
unreported  regressions,  the  CR
2  becomes  significant  at  the  10%  level  when  utility 
sector is excluded for both the samples, which supports the earlier finding about the 
utility  firms  having  a  different  maturity  structure  than  the  non-regulated  firms. 
Nevertheless, the estimates for credit rating with coding 1-16 for the whole sample and 
1-15 for rated firms are qualitatively similar for CR and CR
2, as reported earlier in 
Table  8.7  with  both  coefficients  statistically  significant  at  least  at  the  5%  level.  
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However,  similar  to  Columns  1  and  3,  while  the  direction  of  the  control  variables 
remain the same, the significance of some of the control variables have fallen for both 
samples when a lagged model is estimated.  
Table 8.12 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Long-term Debt Ratio 
on Lagged Credit Ratings and Control Variables  
Variables  1  2  3  4 
(Constant) 
CR 
CR
2 
RATdum 
LOS 
QUAL 
AMAT 
MBR 
ETR 
TECHdum 
INDdum 
CSdum 
CGdum 
HCdum 
UTLdum 
BMdum 
OGdum 
 -0.201 (-1.91)* 
  0.155 (2.41)** 
 -0.012 (-1.06) 
  0.287 (2.23)** 
  0.029 (36.09)*** 
 -0.001 (-0.70) 
  0.001 (12.73)*** 
 -0.002 (-1.15) 
 -0.009 (-0.80) 
 -0.110 (-7.14)*** 
 -0.102 (-7.07)*** 
 -0.061 (-4.12)*** 
 -0.168 (-11.17)*** 
 -0.023 (-1.42) 
  0.037 (1.94)* 
 -0.067 (-4.15)*** 
 -0.005 (-0.27) 
 -0.151 (-1.67)* 
  0.072 (3.84)*** 
 -0.003 (-2.23)** 
  0.212 (2.12)** 
  0.029 (36.15)*** 
 -0.001 (-0.69) 
  0.001 (12.74)*** 
 -0.002 (-1.13) 
 -0.009 (-0.80) 
 -0.109 (-7.11)*** 
 -0.102 (-7.06)*** 
 -0.060 (-4.11)*** 
 -0.167 (-11.12)*** 
 -0.022 (-1.35) 
  0.037 (1.95)* 
 -0.067 (-4.12)*** 
 -0.004 (-0.21) 
  0.783 (5.09)*** 
  0.121 (2.69)*** 
 -0.012 (-1.41) 
 
 -0.016 (-1.93)* 
 -0.001 (-1.09) 
  0.000 (1.28) 
 -0.012 (-1.55) 
 -0.004 (-0.74) 
  0.092 (1.13) 
  0.088 (2.12)** 
  0.038 (1.00) 
 -0.052 (-1.29) 
  0.115 (2.06)** 
  0.093 (2.20)** 
 -0.047 (-1.04) 
  0.089 (1.75)* 
  0.572 (3.64)*** 
  0.061 (4.72)*** 
 -0.003 (-2.97)*** 
 
 -0.006 (-0.73) 
 -0.001 (-1.08) 
  0.000 (1.48) 
 -0.012 (-1.58) 
 -0.002 (-0.45) 
  0.123 (1.61) 
  0.088 (2.12)** 
  0.043 (1.14) 
 -0.032 (-0.80) 
  0.167 (2.98)*** 
  0.113 (2.69)*** 
 -0.027 (-0.60) 
  0.121 (2.40)** 
Adj R
2 
F 
Sig 
N
 
.101 
149.505 
.000 
21262 
.101 
150.193 
.000 
21262 
.183 
8.610 
.000 
509 
.214 
10.230 
.000 
509 
Notes: The table displays the OLS regression results of Model 3 using a lagged structure for credit ratings and the control 
variables. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the combined sample and Columns 3 and 4 for the rated firms. Broad 
rating coding for credit ratings are used in Column 1 and 3 while individual rating coding is used in Column 2 and 4. 
Coefficients are reported outside parenthesis while t-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes p-values significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
In brief, this section addressed the potential reverse relationship between credit ratings 
and the debt maturity structure of the firms by estimating two-stage least square and 
lagged regression models; results generally tend to support the previous findings. This 
entails that after addressing the potential endogeneity in the model, the results remain 
robust although minor  sensitivities  are  noted with the use of different coding and 
significance of some of the control variables is compromised when using alternative 
estimation techniques and models.  
Overall, the checks on robustness and sensitivities of the results for diffe rent coding 
schemes, alternative models and estimation techniques provide strong support to accept 
the alternative hypotheses that credit ratings are non-monotonously associated with the 
debt maturity structure of the UK firms.  
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8.4.  Conclusion 
This chapter presented the empirical results of the models testing Diamond’s (1991) 
liquidity  hypothesis  for  UK  firms.  The  main  finding  of  the  chapter  is  that  the 
refinancing risk is an important determinant of the debt maturity structure of the UK 
firms, which induces a non-monotonous inverted U-shaped relationship between credit 
ratings and debt maturity structures. These findings are in line with prior US study by 
Barclay  and  Smith  (1995)  and  Stohs  and  Mauer  (1996),  but  are  inconsistent  with 
Berger  et  al.  (2005),  thus  providing  additional  support  for  the  Diamond’s  liquidity 
hypothesis from a non-US setting. The results of the present study confirm that UK 
firms at different levels of ratings have varied concerns for managing the liquidity or 
refinancing risk. Firms with the highest ratings have significantly shorter maturity in 
their capital structure than mid rated firms, due to their lesser level of concerns over 
refinancing  their  existing  debt.  The  firms  with  the  lowest  ratings,  although  having 
higher refinancing risk, are also found to have shorter maturity. This is likely to be due 
to their constrained access to long-term debt market. Non-rated UK firms, similar to 
low rated firms, also have constrained access to the long-term debt and are therefore 
restricted to issuing more short-term debt, resulting in low levels of long-term debt in 
their capital structures.  
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSION 
9. Introduction 
This thesis has addressed its main research question in that it has empirically evaluated 
the impact of credit ratings on the capital structures of UK firms. In order to address the 
main research question, the thesis has three main empirical chapters, which address 
three different but interrelated dimensions of the relationship between credit ratings and 
capital structures. First, the question of whether the levels of credit ratings influence the 
capital structures of UK firms is empirically examined. Specifically, the implications of 
the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) are tested, which suggests a 
non-linear relationship between credit ratings and capital structure. High and low rated 
firms are expected to have low levels of leverage, while mid rated firms are expected to 
have  high  levels  of  leverage.  Second,  the  impact  of  credit  rating  changes  is  also 
examined with regard to the firms’ financial decisions. Following the implications of 
the credit rating – capital structure hypothesis, it is tested whether the concerns for 
upgrades and downgrades are material, and lead firms to follow a conservative debt 
policy  when  faced  with  potential  and  actual  rating  changes.  Third,  the  study  also 
investigates more detailed aspects of capital structure, by extending the analysis to the 
maturity structure of existing debt. Specifically, the study empirically tests Diamond’s 
1991  liquidity  hypothesis,  which  theorises  a  non-linear  relationship  between  credit 
ratings and the debt maturity structure of firms.  
This chapter provides the conclusions of the empirical work carried out in the thesis. It 
summarises  the  important  findings  of  the  thesis  and  presents  its  implications  and 
limitations, as well as suggestions for improvements and extensions of the study. The 
remainder of the chapter is therefore organised as follows. Section 9.1 presents the 
main findings of the thesis based on the three empirical chapters. Section 9.2 discusses 
the implications of the findings for future studies, firms and policy makers. Section 9.3 
offers a discussion of the limitations of the study and Section 9.4 offers suggestions for 
improvement, and highlights potential avenues for future research in the area.  
9.1.  Main Findings of the Thesis 
This section presents the main findings of the three empirical chapters of the thesis.   
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9.1.1. Credit Ratings and Capital Structure 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 6) examined the relationship between levels of 
credit  ratings  and  the  capital  structures  of  UK  firms.  By  specifically  testing  the 
implications of the CR-CS hypothesis developed by Kisgen (2006), it was postulated 
that credit ratings have a non-linear relationship with levels of debt, where high and 
low rated firms were expected to have low levels of gearing compared to mid rated 
firms. High rated firms arguably enjoy certain financial and non-financial benefits of 
high  credit  ratings,  providing them  with  a higher incentive to  maintain  their  credit 
ratings than other rated firms in the market might have. Therefore, high rated firms are 
expected to have a high concern for benefits enjoyed by their credit ratings and thus 
have  low  levels  of  gearing  (H1a).  Low  rated  firms  are  also  expected  to  have  high 
concern for the costs associated with low credit ratings as low ratings affect the cost of 
borrowing and may result in restrictive covenants in their debt securities, consequently 
leading  to  constrained  access  to  debt  markets.  Low  rated  firms  may  also  be  more 
susceptible to rating downgrades, which can have more serious implications for them 
than for other rated firms. It was argued that if costs of low credit ratings are material 
for low rated firms, then they are more likely to employ low levels of gearing (H1b). 
Mid rated firms may possibly have fewer concerns about their credit ratings than firms 
at each end of the ratings spectrum. Mid rated firms are perhaps too far away to enjoy 
the benefits of being top rated but are also less exposed to bankruptcy risk or a serious 
deterioration of their credit ratings. Mid rated firms are, therefore, expected to take 
advantage of being rated and are likely to have high levels of gearing (H1c).  
By specifically testing 874 rated firm-years and 38,800 rated and non-rated firm-years 
for UK firms  over the  1988-2009 period, the study finds that credit ratings  are  an 
important determinant of capital structure and that there are systematic differences in 
the levels of leverage across rating scales depending on the level of concerns which 
different firms have for their credit ratings. The findings of the present study, support 
the developed hypotheses of the study and show that credit ratings have a strong non-
linear relationship with the capital structures of UK firms. The results are generally 
robust  to  different  coding  schemes  for  credit  ratings,  alternate  specifications  and 
estimation techniques, and to potential endogeneity in the model. However, the results 
of the models estimated using market debt ratios as a dependent variable do not support  
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the main conclusions and generally show an indirect linear relationship between credit 
ratings and market debt ratios.  
Specifically, the research finds that high rated firms have low gearing ratios, which is 
consistent  with  the  CR-CS  hypothesis  that  managers  may  have  high  concerns  to 
maintain their credit ratings or to prevent themselves from downgrades. The findings 
imply  that  high  rated  firms  take  into  consideration  the  costs  and  benefits  of  credit 
ratings when making their capital structure decisions. Although high rated firms can 
access debt markets more easily, it appears that the perceived benefits of having high 
credit ratings (i.e., the financial and non-financial benefits of high ratings) exceed the 
benefits of high gearing ratios as suggested by the traditional trade-off theory. Low 
gearing ratios of high rated firms, highlights that the benefits of high credit ratings may 
be material for such firms to trade-off the benefits of high debt ratios.  
It  is  found that low rated firms  have also  low gearing ratios.  These findings  point 
towards the possibility that, similarly to high rated firms, low rated firms may be more 
concerned about their credit ratings. However, such concerns are likely to be driven by 
the costs associated with low ratings, i.e., high costs of borrowing, constrained access 
to debt markets, more susceptibility of downgrades, and the serious consequences of 
these factors. Although low rated firms can still be expected to have high leverage, 
given that they are rated and have better access to debt markets than non-rated firms, it 
can  be  inferred  from  the  results  that  for  low  rated  firms,  the  costs  of  low  ratings 
outweigh the benefits of having higher leverage. The results provide strong evidence 
that low rated firms keep their amounts of leverage low, possibly hoping to achieve 
higher ratings or to prevent themselves from downgrades. These results, however, are 
inconsistent with a prior Canadian study by Mittoo and Zhang (2010) who find that 
speculative grade firms have high levels of gearing.  
Contrary  to  high  rated  and  low  rated  firms,  and  consistent  with  the  theoretical 
predictions, mid rated firms are found to have higher leverage. The tendency towards 
high debt ratios suggests that these firms are possibly quite stable and creditworthy 
firms, with relatively good access to debt markets. Being far from the level where firms 
can enjoy the benefits of top ratings or from the level where there may have serious 
concerns for bankruptcy, these mid rated firms appear to take advantage of being rated 
and have high gearing ratios. It can be inferred from the financing patterns of mid rated  
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firms that they may have fewer concerns over rating changes compared to high and low 
rated firms.  
The  results  also  show  that  non-rated  firms,  which  are  assumed  to  be  firms  with 
relatively inferior credit quality and constrained access to debt markets compared with 
rated  firms,  have  low  debt  ratios  when  compared  to  rated  firms.  These  firms, 
specifically, have lower debt ratios compared to the lowest rated firms, which in the 
sample are B rated firms. This finding is consistent with the credit rating – market 
access hypothesis (CR-MA) proposed by Faulkender and Petersen (2006), and with the 
empirical results of Judge and Mateus (2009) and Mittoo and Zhang (2010). The results 
are in line with the argument put forward by Lemmon and Zender (2010) who argue 
that rated firms, whether at investment grade or speculative grade, have better access to 
debt markets than firms which do not have ratings at all. 
9.1.2. Credit Rating Changes and Capital Structure Decisions 
The  second  empirical  chapter  (Chapter  7)  extends  the  first  empirical  chapter  by 
examining  the  impact  of  potential  and  actual  credit  rating  changes  on  the  capital 
structure decisions made in the subsequent period. It can be argued that the behaviour 
of firms towards their leverage might be different (with respect to the level of their 
credit  ratings)  compared  with  instances  when  there  are  potential  and  actual  rating 
changes.  By  extending  the  implications  of the CR-CS  hypothesis  to  analyse  firms’ 
financial decisions, it is hypothesised that if firms are concerned about the benefits 
achieve  by  upgrades  and  costs  imposed  by  downgrades,  then  they  are  likely  to 
demonstrate  leverage  reduction  behaviour  when  they  are  near  an  upgrade  or  a 
downgrade.  Credit  rating  changes  can  impose  financial  and  non-financial  costs  on 
firms. For example, rating changes can significantly affect firms’ costs of capital and 
their access to short-term debt markets, increase their reputational concerns, and affect 
their supplier creditor relationships. The implications of the CR-CS hypothesis predict 
that the benefits and costs of credit ratings are material for firms and they will follow 
leverage  reduction  behaviour  when  they  are  near  rating  changes  (H2a),  whether 
upgrades (H2b) or downgrades (H2c). 
The implications of the CR-CS hypothesis also predict that firms will reduce leverage 
once they have been downgraded (H3a). Rating downgrades may increase the cost of  
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borrowing for firms, affect the pool of investors that might be otherwise interested, 
increase agency problems between different stakeholders, and limit the firms’ access to 
short and long-term debt markets. Conversely, upgraded firms are not likely to make 
any significant changes to their capital structures. While rating upgrades may lead to a 
firm having better access to debt markets with lower interest rates and an improved 
reputation in the market, firms are not expected to fully exploit this by taking on sizable 
amounts of new debt, because of the fear that this may put their high credit ratings in 
jeopardy (H3b).  
The descriptive statistics carried out in the Chapter 7 provide some insights into the 
general behaviour of UK rated firms towards their capital structures. It is noted that 
during the sample period, UK rated firms, on average, issue 2% more debt than equity 
as  a  proportion  of  their  previous  years’  total  assets.  However,  rated  firms  vary 
considerably in their net debt issuance behaviour. While rated firms can easily access 
debt markets, they also seem to be active in the equity market. Specifically, it is noted 
that high rated firms are more active in debt markets (i.e., they issue more debt than 
equity), while low rated firms seem to be more active in equity markets (i.e., they issue 
less debt than equity). Individual capital structure activities also show that high rated 
UK firms issue debt and reduce equity, while low rated firms reduce debt and issue 
more equity. These observations provide further support to the findings presented in the 
previous empirical chapter, where low rated firms were found to have lower debt ratios 
due to their constrained access to debt markets and high concern for maintaining and 
improving  their  current  credit  ratings  as  suggested  by  the  credit  rating  –  capital 
structure hypothesis (CR-CS). The size of the average debt issuance by high rated firms 
is, however, found to be smaller than average issuance by the low rated firms. These 
findings generally indicate sharp differences between the capital structure activities of 
high and low rated UK firms.  
The following subsections report the findings for analyses conducted to examine the 
effects of potential and actual rating changes on the financial decisions of firms in the 
years subsequent to the changes. 
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9.1.2.1. Potential Credit Rating Changes and Financial Decisions 
By testing 770 rated firm-year observations over the period 1988-2009, the findings of 
the present study do not give support to the argument that the proximity of upgrades 
and downgrades influences the capital structure decisions of UK rated firms in the 
subsequent years. This indicates that modifiers, i.e., + or -, with credit ratings, do not 
matter when firms make adjustments to their capital structure. These findings remain 
robust to alternative measures of the dependent variable and control variables and to 
model specifications similar with Kisgen (2006) for US firms. The results suggest that, 
unlike findings for US firms by Kisgen (2006), the upgrades and downgrades from one 
broad rating category to another are perceived not to impose any major costs on the 
firms.   
When  debt  issuances,  debt  reductions,  equity  issuances  and  equity  reductions  are 
analysed separately to assess whether potential rating changes have had any significant 
effect for them, none of these decisions seem to be influenced by the proximity of 
rating changes, with the exception of debt reductions when firms have a PLUS sign. It 
is noted that firms with a PLUS sign are more likely to reduce leverage than firms 
which do not have a PLUS sign.   
However, when the impact of potential rating changes is tested across rating levels, 
significant  differences  are  observed  between  high  and  low  rated  firms.  The  results 
indicate  that  high  rated  firms  with  a  PLUS  sign  issue  more  debt  than  equity 
(approximately 5.6% more debt than equity as a proportion of their previous years’ 
total assets). An individual analysis shows that high rated firms with a PLUS sign are 
more likely not to issue equity, while high rated firms with a MINUS sign are more 
likely not to reduce equity. Inconsistent with the CR-CS hypothesis, the results indicate 
that the PLUS sign for high rated firms possibly serves as additional evidence of their 
superior credit quality within the broad rating category. Moreover, it can also be argued 
that, in having low leverage (as found in Chapter 6), these firms may have reserved 
borrowing capacities to raise debt when required. This behaviour seems to indicate that 
high rated firms are confident that issuing debt will not result in a deterioration of their 
ratings  or  that  the  cost  associated  with  any  possible  deterioration  of  ratings  is  not 
material for high rated firms.   
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Conversely, firms towards low ratings display debt reduction behaviour (around 1% 
less debt than equity as a proportion of their previous years’ total assets with every 
notch decrease in credit ratings) when they have a PLUS sign where they specifically 
issue equity to bring reduction in their debt ratios. Leverage reduction by low rated 
firms  with  a PLUS  sign is  an indication of their making efforts  towards  achieving 
higher target credit ratings. By reducing their amount of leverage, low rated firms may 
have a better chance of getting an upgrade. However, MINUS signs do not indicate any 
specific patterns of leverage. It appears that low rated firms with a MINUS are reluctant 
to reduce any leverage, since doing so may not save them from downgrades or ensure 
upgrades. The findings for the high rated firms contradict the CR-CS hypothesis and 
support  the  trade-off  theory,  which  suggests  that  firms  with  a  lower  likelihood  of 
bankruptcy have higher levels of leverage. However, the implications of the CR-CS 
hypothesis are more apparent for low rated firms.    
9.1.2.2.  Actual Credit Rating Changes and Capital Structure Decisions  
When the effects of actual credit ratings are examined with regards to firms’ financial 
decisions,  the  results  do  not  support  the  underlying  CR-CS  hypothesis  and  are 
inconsistent with the findings of Kisgen (2009) for US rated firms. Nevertheless, the 
results  present  interesting  insights  into  the  behaviour  of  upgraded  and  downgraded 
firms in the UK market. The results indicate that, in general,  upgraded firms issue 
almost 4% less debt than equity. The downgraded firms, on the other hand, issue 3% 
more debt than equity, scaled by their total assets in the previous year.  
These results are surprising as well as conflicting with the expected relationship. It 
seems  possible  that  upgraded  firms  had  debt  reducing  behaviour  before  they  were 
upgraded and continued to issue less debt than equity after favourable outcomes from 
the rating agencies were achieved. This may also indicate the possibility that firms 
target  higher  credit  ratings  and  that  the  perceived  benefits  of  achieving  upgrades 
outweigh the benefits of high leverage (such as the advantages of tax shields). Prior 
studies also argue that firms target debt ratings and those which are below (above) their 
targets follow leverage reduction (issuance) behaviour (Hovakimian et al., 2009). For 
downgraded firms, the benefits of high leverage, as proposed by the trade-off theory, 
seem  to  outweigh  the  cost  and  benefits  of  credit  ratings  implied  by  the  CR-CS 
hypothesis.  A  separate  analysis  shows  that  upgraded  firms  issue  more  equity  as  a  
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percentage of their previous years’ total assets, to reduce the proportion of debt in their 
capital  structure.  Conversely,  downgraded  firms  continue  to  issue  debt  in  the 
subsequent period, suggesting that costs associated with downgrades are not material 
for such firms. However, downgraded firms are also found to issue equity. 
When the effects of actual rating changes are examined across rating levels, the results 
present interesting findings about the differences in the capital structure activities with 
respect to the different rating categories. It is noted that, similar to the usual behaviour 
following  potential  rating  changes,  high  rated  firms  and  low  rated  firms  behave 
differently when they are faced with actual rating changes. The results indicate that 
when high rated firms are upgraded, they display debt issuance behaviour, whereas 
when low rated firms are upgraded, they tend to display debt reducing behaviour with 
each notch decrease in credit rating. Specifically, the findings show that upgraded high 
rated firms issue around 8.5% more debt than equity, while firms towards low ratings, 
when upgraded,  issue 1.5% less debt  than equity  as  a percentage of their previous 
years’ total assets with every notch decrease in credit ratings.  
These results suggest that concerns over rating changes are not equally shared across all 
rating levels. High rated firms appear to take advantage of their superior position within 
the rating classes to issue more debt. It seems that concern about credit rating changes 
is either not material for this class of firms or that they are confident that leverage 
issuance will not jeopardise their higher ratings. These findings are consistent with the 
argument by Shivdasani and Zenner (2005) who state that debt issuance by high rated 
firms with already low levels of gearing might not significantly affect their cost of 
future borrowing and would not result in credit rating deterioration compared with low 
rated firms. These findings can also be interpreted in terms of the trade-off theory, 
which  predicts  a  negative  relationship  between  the  probability  of  firms’  level  of 
bankruptcy risk and their leverage levels. On the other hand, it appears that low rated 
firms foresee the possibility of future upgrades and continue to reduce their amounts of 
leverage after they have been upgraded.   
Overall, the findings of Chapter 7 suggest that credit ratings changes, whether potential 
or actual, do not have implications, as is suggested by the CR-CS hypothesis, for the 
financial decisions of the subsequent years. From the results, it appears that marginal 
changes in credit ratings do not impose any material financial or non-financial costs on  
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rated firms. It seems that only low rated firms are concerned about the costs associated 
with their credit ratings, and that they expect that reducing leverage can help them get 
upgraded and also that they continue to reduce debt once they are actually upgraded. 
High rated firms appear to take advantage of their superior credit quality within the 
range of all rated firms. For these firms, rating changes do not seem to be a specific 
major concern.   
9.1.3. Credit Ratings and Debt Maturity Structure 
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 8) investigates the relationship between credit 
ratings and debt maturity structures by testing Diamond’s liquidity hypothesis, which 
provides a theoretical framework for the relationship between the two variables. The 
central idea of the chapter is that the level of refinancing or liquidity risk induces a non-
linear relationship between a firm’s debt maturity structure and credit quality (H4a). 
Due to their limited refinancing risk, firms with high ratings are likely to prefer shorter 
maturity in their debt structure as they are confident that they can easily refinance the 
existing debt at low cost at the time of its maturity when favourable information will be 
revealed to the market. Conversely, low rated firms know that they may not be able to 
refinance  their  debt  and  they  therefore  prefer  long-term  debt  in  order  to  avoid 
refinancing risk. However, low rated firms may have to rely on short-term debt, as the 
supply of long-term debt may be limited for such firms due to the high probability of 
such firms having insufficient funds to service their long-term debt payments. It is 
expected that mid rated firms will mostly issue long-term debt, because while having 
good ratings helps them in accessing long-term debt markets, these firms are exposed 
to a level of refinancing risk (although to a lesser degree than low rated firms).  
By  analysing  a  combined  sample  of  23,974  rated  and  non-rated  firm-years  and  a 
sample of 571 rated firm-years, the overall results provide strong support for a non-
linear relationship between the credit ratings and debt maturity structures of UK firms. 
The  results  are  robust  to  alternative  coding  of  credit  ratings,  model  specifications, 
potential endogeneity in the model and the exclusion of utility firms from the models. It 
is also noted that the relative contribution of credit ratings compared to other firm level 
factors, which is argued to be an important determinant of debt maturity structure, is 
much higher.   
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It is found that high rated firms tend to shorten the maturity in their capital structures, 
indicating the possibly that they possess favourable private information which will be 
likely to facilitate them in refinancing the retiring debt at a later stage. These findings 
are consistent with Diamond (1991), giving support that high rated firms face lower 
liquidity risk compared to low rated and mid rated firms. The non-linear association 
found between credit ratings and capital structures confirms that low rated and non-
rated firms have shorter debt maturities, despite being at a higher refinancing risk than 
other, rated, firms. Consistent with Diamond’s theory, it appears that they encounter 
constrained  access  to  long-term  debt  markets  due  to  their  credit  quality.  Only 
intermediate or mid rated firms seem to prefer more long-term debt, since they have a 
choice of whether to issue debt with longer maturity but they also face a certain degree 
of refinancing risk, which prevents them from issuing more short-term debt. These 
findings are consistent with a prior US study by Stohs and Mauer (1996) who also find 
that credit ratings are non-linearly associated with debt maturity structures. 
The results show that the turning or peak point of the curvature pattern for the debt 
maturity ratio is the BB rated category for the whole sample as well as for the rated 
firms’ sample. The firms rated above and below this category have shorter maturities in 
their debt structures. For example, for the rated firms’ sample, AA rated firms have on 
average 13 percentage points and A rated firms have 10 percentage points less long-
term debt than BBB rated firms, while B rated firms have 12 percentage points less 
long-term debt in their capital structures, compared with BBB rated firms.  
From the findings of the three empirical chapters, it can be concluded that credit ratings 
are an important determinant for the level and maturity structures of the debt of UK 
firms. Rated firms have better access to public debt markets, particularly long-term 
debt markets. Firms with high and low ratings not only have lower levels of debt but 
also have shorter debt maturity than mid rated firms. However, in general, credit ratings 
changes, whether potential or actual, do not appear to be a major concern for rated 
firms in the UK. Only the low rated firms seem to be highly concerned about their 
rating changes leading them to follow leverage reduction behaviour. High rated firms 
seem to take advantage of their credit ratings and reserved borrowing capacity and 
issue debt when they require. Thus, it can be concluded that concerns over the costs and 
benefits  of  credit  ratings  only  matter  in  determining  the  levels  of  debt  but  are,  in  
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general, not of significant importance to influence decisions in subsequent years with 
the exception of low rated firms.  
9.2.  Implications and Recommendations  
The  empirical  findings  of  the  study  have  particular  relevance  for  the  theoretical 
framework of capital structure and future empirical studies. They may also provide 
assistance for the management of firms, who may have an interest in understanding the 
general behaviour of firms with respect to their credit ratings. Moreover, the study also 
provides guidance to policy makers who might benefit from an assessment of rating 
agencies and the role they play in financial markets in the UK.  
9.2.1. Implications for Theories of Capital Structure and Future Empirical 
Research  
The study provides implications for the two dominant theories of capital structure: the 
trade-off and the pecking order theory. It indicates that credit ratings are important 
considerations in managerial capital structure decisions, as firms appear to weigh the 
costs and benefits of credit ratings when they weigh other costs and benefits of debt, as 
suggested by the trade-off theory. The study finds that despite having better access to 
debt  markets,  not  all  rated  firms  behave  in  line  with  the  trade-off  theory.  The 
implications of the credit ratings – capital structure hypothesis (CR-CS) tested in the 
present study are distinct from the trade-off theory. The trade-off theory suggests that 
high risk firms (low rated) have low leverage while low risk firms (high rated) have 
high leverage. Contrary to this, however, the results of the present study indicate that 
high and low rated firms prefer lower leverage which may highlight the concerns for 
the  associated  costs  and  benefits  of  different  rating  levels.  Since  presumably  high 
creditworthy  firms  acquire  credit  ratings,  where  credit  ratings  are  relative  risk 
measures, it can be argued that low rated firms are also safe and creditworthy firms. 
This suggests that the implications of the CR-CS hypothesis may be unique and distinct 
from  the  trade-off  theory  and  the  generic  version  of  the  trade-off  theory  should 
therefore also incorporate the costs and benefits of credit ratings along with the other 
costs and benefits of debt.  
Similarly, the results of this study also have implications for the pecking-order theory 
by suggesting that if credit ratings provide certain benefits or impose costs, they may  
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have higher levels of equity compared to debt and may choose to issue equity instead of 
debt. After controlling for the profitability of firms, high and low rated firms seem to 
have low levels of gearing suggesting that possible rating concern alters their behaviour 
towards debt financing. This also indicates that firms may not follow the hierarchy of 
financing as suggested by the pecking-order theory and may instead choose to issue 
equity instead of debt, if costs and benefits associated with rating are material. It can be 
noted from the results of Chapter 7 that low rated firms generally tend to issue equity, 
where specifically low rated firms which have higher chances of being upgraded or 
which are actually upgraded issue more equity.  
This study further finds that credit ratings are an important factor in determining the 
capital  structures  of  rated  firms.  After  controlling  for  the  firm-level  characteristics 
argued  to  be  important  for  determining  capital  structures,  the  substantial  marginal 
contribution of credit ratings in the models highlights the significance of credit ratings 
in the determination of capital structures. The relationship of credit ratings with capital 
structures provides unique insights into the behaviour of firms, which are generally not 
explained  by  previous  theories  of  capital  structure.  Future  studies  would  benefit, 
therefore, if they include credit ratings as a determinant of capital structure. This will 
ensure that the correct inferences are drawn from the empirical analysis conducted and 
will provide a more accurate depiction of the actual behaviour of firms.  
The study also finds that the explanatory power and the relationship of the factors that 
determine the capital structures of rated firms are different from non-rated firms. For 
example, firm-level factors including the size of a firm, its profitability and growth 
opportunities  either  have  limited  power  in  comparison  to  credit  ratings  and/or  the 
relationship  with  capital  structure  contradicts  existing  theories  of  capital  structure. 
Studies conducted on capital structure determination should, therefore, recognise these 
differences and treat rated firms as a distinct group of firms, with varied firm-level 
characteristics and different explanatory factors affecting their capital structures.  
It  should  be  of  interest  for  future  studies  that  credit  ratings  do  not  have  material 
implications for financial decisions in subsequent periods for UK firms. Firms with 
potential  or  actual  rating  changes  do  not  show  any  particular  behaviour  towards 
leverage indicating that they may not have concerns for minor changes in their credit 
ratings. One reason, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, could be the institutional settings of  
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the markets. Firms operating in a market where credit ratings agencies have established 
themselves as an important part of financial system, specifically being an integral part 
of its regulations, are likely to be more careful about minor changes in their credit 
ratings.   
This study also finds that refinancing risk is an important determinant of debt maturity 
structure. High rated firms with low perceived refinancing risk opt for short maturity 
while mid rated firms with high refinancing risk choose long-term debt. Low rated and 
non-rated firms, although having a high level of refinancing risk, rely on more short-
term debt due to being restricted from long-term debt markets. It is also noted that 
credit  ratings,  a  measure  of  firms’  levels  of  refinancing  risk,  are  one  of  the  most 
important variables in determining the debt maturity structures of firms. Future studies 
would therefore benefit by including measures of refinancing risk in their models to 
capture  the  actual  behaviour  of  firms  towards  the  maturity  of  debt  in  their  capital 
structures.   
9.2.3.  Implications/Recommendations for Firms 
The present study also suggests that the possession of credit ratings helps with regards 
to unconstrained access to debt markets. If possession of credit ratings can help them to 
access  debt  markets,  then firms  may consider  obtaining credit ratings  to  shift  their 
reliance form traditional sources of financing such as bank and equity financing. It can 
be argued that firms relying on bank financing and specifically the firms that are least 
transparent may be directly affected by any shocks in the supply of funds. However, 
possession of credit ratings does not automatically lead to better access to debt markets 
or higher levels of leverage. Empirical evidence in this study shows that maintaining 
certain rating levels ensures the flexibility to issue debt, better access to short-term debt 
markets and assurance that rating shocks will not increase the fundamental risk for 
firms.  For  example,  high  and  mid  rated  firms  have  better  access  to  debt  markets 
compared to low rated firms. Nevertheless, high rated firms appear to purposely keep 
their amounts of leverage low in order to increase their financial flexibility to the extent 
that debt issuances would not seriously jeopardise their credit ratings and thereby affect 
the cost of their borrowings.  
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The analysis of debt maturity structures indicates that high rated firms prefer short-term 
maturity in their capital structures. Although high credit ratings may facilitate firms in 
accessing short-term debt, specifically directly placed debt, firms need to weigh the 
benefits and costs associated with short-term debt. On the one hand, a dependence on 
short-term debt may increase the chances of favourable re-pricing of the debt but it may 
also increase the liquidity risk of firms. A firm, therefore, needs to select an optimal 
debt maturity structure; one which balances out the costs of certain debt maturities 
against the benefits. 
9.2.3.  Implications/Recommendations for Policymakers 
Regulators and policymakers should ensure that credit rating agencies are objective and 
fair and that their ratings reflect the actual creditworthiness of firms. For example, high 
rated firms, due to their credit ratings, seem to be assured of low refinancing risk, and 
they therefore prefer short maturity. However, the recent financial crisis highlighted 
several instances where refinancing risk augmented the distress concerns of firms. As 
management of firms and investors believe in credit ratings’ ability to provide a reliable 
measure of firms’ creditworthiness, policy makers should stress upon rating agencies 
the  need  to  keep  improving  their  rating  methodology  so  that  it  appropriately 
incorporates  the  specific  risks  a  firm  is  exposed  to.  Increasing  competition  among 
rating agencies and transferring the responsibilities of misjudgement to rating agencies 
would further ensure that their ratings reflect the actual credit standing of firms.    
The findings also demonstrate that regulators and policy makers should also focus on 
developing the domestic bond market in the UK. Rated UK firms, which are argued to 
be large and highly creditworthy, mostly have access to international debt markets. A 
well functioning domestic debt market would provide alternative and cheap sources of 
financing for non-rated UK firms. Moreover, the proper functioning of credit rating 
agencies  would  improve  the  financing  environment  of  the  UK  bond  market  by 
encouraging small and less informed investors to actively invest in local markets.  
9.3.  Limitations of the Study 
Although  this  thesis  contains  several  important  findings,  it  also  possesses  a  few 
limitations,  which  should  be  acknowledged.  As  has  been  discussed  in  Chapter  5, 
financial statements data available from DataStream is provided on an annual basis,  
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while credit ratings data is more frequent, with more than one observation during a 
financial  year.  This  can  result  in  different  firms  having  different  length  of  periods 
between  their  credit  ratings  and  year-end  accounting  data.  Such  differences  may 
undermine  the  actual  effect  of  credit  ratings  on  capital  structure.  As  discussed  in 
Chapter 5, previous studies do not indicate any particular procedure for handling such 
an issue. Following Kisgen (2006, 2009) and Hovakimian et al. (2009), the difference 
between the date of the rating change and the  financial  year-end is  assumed to  be 
constant across the firms and the credit rating closest to the financial year-end is used 
as the credit rating for that particular year. This is based on the assumption that firms’ 
capital  structure  decisions  would  show  stronger  variations  when  the  credit  ratings 
closest to the financial year-end are analysed.  
It can also be noted that this study does not distinguish between different types of debt. 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, UK firms are more active in international debt 
markets than in domestic debt markets. This distinction between types of debt can have 
a meaningful impact on the relationship between credit ratings and capital structures. 
Specifically, when capital structure decisions are analysed with respect to credit rating 
changes, such details can potentially be important to the analysis. For example, a firm 
may substitute debt raised in the domestic market with debt from international markets 
and vice versa, if the costs or the benefits are greater for either source over the other. 
However, due to data unavailability and limitations of time period for the present study, 
such differentiations in the type of debt have not been taken into consideration.  
It should also be noted that while the endogeneity issue is extensively addressed in the 
thesis to ensure that the results are reliable and unbiased, the procedures followed for 
the two-stage least square estimation may not entirely resolve the issue. The additional 
variables, i.e.,  Taffler’s  z-score and the interest coverage ratio, used to  explain the 
credit  ratings  in  the  first  stage,  may  not  be  entirely  independent  of  the  dependent 
variable and therefore may have a correlation with the error terms. However, the study 
had to rely on these variables in line with data availability, as well as the nature of the 
credit  ratings  variable  itself,  creates  difficulty  in  finding  appropriate  explanatory 
variables. 
The  study  uses  Standard  and  Poor’s  credit  ratings,  due  to  the  availability  and 
comprehensiveness of the data for UK public firms. Standard and Poor’s had the largest  
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number of firm-years available at the time of data collection. Previous studies find a 
very high correlation between the ratings of the two major rating agencies, Standard 
and Poor’s and Moody’s, which would imply that the results would not be qualitatively 
different if data from other rating agency was used instead. However, it can still be 
argued  that  the  results  are  limited  to  Standard  and  Poor’s  ratings  only.  Moreover, 
following the criticism faced by rating agencies, there is a possibility that credit ratings 
do not in fact reflect the actual credit worthiness of the firms.  
The study has also not covered the period of the recent financial crisis, due to limited 
data being available for those years at the time of the data collection. It remains an 
empirical question, therefore, as to whether the relationship between credit ratings and 
capital structure/debt maturity structure holds for the period following the financial 
crisis.  
This study also does not take into account external factors such as level of stock and 
bond  market  development,  legal  enforcement  and  economic  conditions,  for  the 
determination of firms’ capital and debt maturity structures. The main reason for their 
exclusion was for consistency with the prior literature on the firm-level determinants of 
financial structure, and analysis of the incremental contribution and relevance of credit 
ratings to the capital structure and its components. However, the exclusion of external 
factors may possibly introduce omitted variable bias into the models. 
9.4.  Suggestions for Further Research 
This study is one of the few studies which examines the association between credit 
ratings and capital structure and its components for the UK market. Although the study 
provides a comprehensive examination of the relationship between credit ratings and 
financial structures, the present study, as with other studies, can be extended, and the 
questions raised in the present thesis can provide potential avenues for future research. 
The study, following Kisgen (2006), used PLUS or MINUS with rating changes to 
surrogate  potential  rating  changes  for  the  firms  where  the  results  are  generally 
inconsistent  with  the  credit  rating  –  capital  structure  hypothesis  (CR-CS).  Future 
research could investigate other measures of potential rating changes, such as rating 
outlooks and credit watch, to analyse and compare whether these measures are more 
appropriate for use as a proxy for potential rating changes.   
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Due to data unavailability, this study uses balance sheet and cash flow data to examine 
whether  potential  and  actual  credit  rating  changes  influence  the  subsequent  year’s 
capital structure decisions. However, the time lag between the credit rating changes and 
the year-end are different for each firm-year, something that could possibly undermine 
the  marginal  contribution  of  rating  changes  on  capital  structure  decisions.  Future 
research could examine the same question when using incremental debt issuance data, 
which could  be matched with  the credit ratings  in  the preceding period to  directly 
analyse the influence of these changes on the financial structure decision making more 
accurately.  
The  present  study  provides  strong  evidence  for  Diamond’s  1991  liquidity  risk 
hypothesis, which predicts a non-monotonous relationship between credit ratings and 
the debt maturity structures of firms. As has already been discussed in Section 4.3.1, 
incremental debt issuance should ideally be used to test Diamond’s theory. However, as 
stated above, due to the unavailability of incremental debt issuance data, this study has 
had to rely on balance sheet data. Future studies could examine whether the results hold 
if incremental debt maturity data is used instead of existing average maturity of balance 
sheet debt, as the maturity of incremental debt issuances is expected to be different 
from the average debt maturity of the existing debt.   
The main objective of the present study was to analyse the impact of an independent 
measure of credit quality, which is generated by independent external assessors who 
have superior access to public and private information, on the financial structures of 
UK  firms.  It  is  argued  in  the  literature  that  such  measures  can  be  obtained  via 
accounting information available from firms’ financial reports. If the above were true, 
it would be interesting to note whether or not the credit quality measures generated 
through using such procedures have similar effects on the financial structures of UK 
firms. The study can also be extended to other markets which are not active users of 
credit  ratings,  by  incorporating  credit  quality  measures  generated  by  using  models 
which can predict credit ratings.  
Further research could be carried out to investigate whether there are any systematic 
differences in the behaviour of firms with respect to credit rating changes triggered by 
external  conditions  beyond  firms’  control,  and  credit  rating  changes  due  to 
deterioration  or  improvement  of  firms’  internal  conditions.  It  can  be  expected  that  
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credit rating changes triggered by firms’ internal conditions will be more influential in 
explaining their capital structure decision-making than those changes that were due to 
factors beyond the firms’ control, such as general economic conditions and changes to 
interest rates. Moreover, a comparative study might also be conducted by examining 
the sensitivities of firms towards their financial structure in light of their credit rating 
pre and post the financial crisis of 2008. Since the recent financial crisis, the credit 
rating agencies have been in the spotlight and are blamed as being among the major 
culprits of the current crisis. It would be interesting to note differences in the firms’ 
behaviour, specifically the US firms, which are found to be more sensitive when they 
have potential and actual rating changes (Kisgen, 2006 and 2009). Investigations in this 
area  would  provide  further  insights  into  the  perception  of  management  about  the 
significance  of  credit  ratings  and  whether  these  changes  still  have  any  meaningful 
impact on their financial decisions. 
Future  research  could  also  compare  the  results  gained  through  using  ratings  from 
different credit rating agencies. For example, it can be argued that firms may well be 
more sensitive to an initial rating change than the other ratings which might follow the 
initial ratings change. A comparative study could therefore examine the differences in 
the responses of firms towards their capital structures with initial rating changes and 
with  any  following  changes.  Moreover,  the  research  could  be  extended  by  using 
qualitative measures such as interviews and surveys with the management of the firms 
in order to investigate the causes of differences between the responses of UK firms and 
US firms, when they are faced with potential and actual rating changes. This may help 
to build a better understanding of the factors, which trigger capital structure decision-
making  in  both  countries,  and  to  better  assess  the  marginal  contribution  of  rating 
changes towards such decisions.    
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 2A 
Definitions of Long-term Issuers’ Ratings 
AAA  An obligation rated 'AAA' has the highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor's. The 
obligor's  capacity  to  meet  its  financial  commitment  on  the  obligation  is  extremely 
strong. 
AA  An obligation rated  'AA' differs  from the  highest-rated obligations only to a  small 
degree. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is 
very strong. 
A  An obligation rated 'A' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes 
in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. 
However, the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is 
still strong. 
BBB  An obligation rated 'BBB' exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse 
economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened 
capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. 
BB,  B,  CCC, 
CC, and C 
Obligations  rated  'BB',  'B',  'CCC',  'CC',  and  'C'  are  regarded  as  having  significant 
speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree of speculation and 'C' the 
highest.  While  such  obligations  will  likely  have  some  quality  and  protective 
characteristics, these may be outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposures to 
adverse conditions. 
BB  An  obligation  rated  'BB'  is  less  vulnerable  to  non-payment  than  other  speculative 
issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, 
financial, or economic conditions which could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity 
to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. 
B  An obligation rated 'B' is more vulnerable to non-payment than obligations rated 'BB', 
but the obligor currently  has the capacity to  meet its financial commitment on the 
obligation. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the 
obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. 
CCC  An obligation rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable to non-payment, and is dependent 
upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its 
financial commitment on the obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or 
economic conditions, the obligor is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial 
commitment on the obligation. 
CC  An obligation rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable to non-payment. 
C  A  'C'  rating  is  assigned  to  obligations  that  are  currently  highly  vulnerable  to  non-
payment,  obligations  that  have  payment  arrearages  allowed  by  the  terms  of  the 
documents, or obligations of an issuer that is the subject of a bankruptcy petition or 
similar action which have not experienced a payment default. Among others, the 'C' 
rating may be assigned to subordinated debt, preferred stock or other obligations on 
which cash payments have been suspended in accordance with the instrument's terms 
or when preferred stock is the subject of a distressed exchange offer, whereby some or 
all  of  the  issue  is  either  repurchased  for  an  amount  of  cash  or  replaced  by  other 
instruments having a total value that is less than par. 
D  An obligation rated 'D' is in payment default. The 'D' rating category is used when 
payments on an obligation, including a regulatory capital instrument, are not made on 
the date due even if the applicable grace period has not expired, unless Standard & 
Poor's believes that such payments will be made during such grace period. The 'D' 
rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar 
action if payments on an obligation are jeopardised. An obligation's rating is lowered 
to 'D' upon completion of a distressed exchange offer, whereby some or all of the issue 
is either repurchased for an amount of cash or replaced by other instruments having a 
total value that is less than par. 
Plus  (+)  or 
minus (-) 
The ratings from 'AA' to 'CCC' may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus 
(-) sign to show relative standing within the major rating categories. 
Source: Standard and Poor's (2011)  
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Appendix 6A 
Descriptive Statistics: Sector-wise 
INDUSTRY  Variables  Minimum  Maximum  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Basic Materials 
LOS  0.69  22.30  13.23  3.63 
PROF  -0.99  0.55  0.09  0.16 
FAR  0.00  1.00  0.46  0.22 
MBR  0.16  17.51  1.48  1.12 
LIQD  0.00  36.54  2.01  2.48 
Consumer Goods 
LOS  0.69  23.21  12.75  3.44 
PROF  -0.99  0.55  0.11  0.13 
FAR  0.00  0.98  0.30  0.19 
MBR  0.12  20.10  1.52  1.19 
LIQD  0.00  34.05  1.90  1.77 
Consumer Services 
LOS  0.69  22.47  11.78  2.80 
PROF  -1.00  0.55  0.10  0.17 
FAR  0.00  0.98  0.38  0.28 
MBR  0.13  18.93  1.77  1.41 
LIQD  0.00  36.81  1.37  1.53 
Health Care 
LOS  0.69  21.15  11.14  3.66 
PROF  -1.00  0.50  0.00  0.26 
FAR  0.00  0.97  0.22  0.19 
MBR  0.13  19.75  2.74  2.31 
LIQD  0.00  35.13  3.47  3.99 
Industrials 
LOS  0.69  25.23  12.24  3.12 
PROF  -0.98  0.56  0.11  0.15 
FAR  0.00  0.99  0.28  0.20 
MBR  0.12  17.77  1.59  1.13 
LIQD  0.00  35.61  1.65  1.39 
Oil & Gas 
LOS  0.69  22.74  11.80  4.11 
PROF  -0.98  0.55  0.08  0.18 
FAR  0.00  0.99  0.47  0.27 
MBR  0.12  15.22  1.69  1.35 
LIQD  0.01  36.75  2.49  3.56 
Technology 
LOS  2.20  22.43  11.48  3.18 
PROF  -1.00  0.55  0.06  0.24 
FAR  0.00  0.96  0.15  0.14 
MBR  0.12  19.72  2.61  2.40 
LIQD  0.00  36.19  2.57  2.77 
Telecommunications 
LOS  1.95  21.74  14.08  3.32 
PROF  -0.98  0.53  0.11  0.20 
FAR  0.00  0.91  0.41  0.25 
MBR  0.14  20.15  1.99  1.94 
LIQD  0.09  20.04  1.32  1.50 
Utilities 
LOS  1.10  22.50  14.39  2.94 
PROF  -0.89  0.53  0.12  0.08 
FAR  0.00  0.97  0.66  0.19 
MBR  0.17  16.18  1.25  0.66 
LIQD  0.00  21.82  1.18  1.44 
Notes: This table displays the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in testing the relationship between levels 
of credit ratings and leverage structure.   
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Appendix 6A 
Credit Ratings and Capital Structure 
Tolerance and VIF 
 
Rated and  
Non-rated Firms  Rated Firms 
 
Tolerance  VIF  Tolerance  VIF 
CR  .004  264.506  .037  27.348 
CR
2  .002  518.234  .037  27.048 
RATdum  .016  64.297 
    LOS  .824  1.214  .635  1.575 
PROF  .868  1.152  .775  1.290 
MBR  .750  1.334  .569  1.758 
FAR  .893  1.120  .681  1.469 
LIQD  .829  1.206  .838  1.193 
TECHdum  .181  5.530  .751  1.331 
INDdum  .105  9.527  .358  2.791 
CSdum  .131  7.652  .230  4.347 
CGdum  .166  6.024  .302  3.308 
HCdum  .284  3.517  .471  2.122 
UTLdum  .470  2.126  .327  3.055 
BMdum  .252  3.970  .442  2.262 
OGdum  .397  2.520  .568  1.759 
Notes: This table displays the multicollinearity diagnostics (tolerance and 
VIF) for Model (3). The results indicate that CR, CR
2 and RARdum have low 
tolerance  and  high  VIF  indicating  that  these  variables  have  high 
multicollinearity.   
 
 
 
 
 
  Appendix 6B 
Credit Ratings and Capital Structure: Eigenvalues and Conditional Index 
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1  6.876  1.000  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00 
2  1.289  2.309  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .05  .01  .01  .04  .02  .00  .00  .00  .04  .04  .00  .00 
3  1.097  2.503  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .03  .00  .00  .01  .00  .01  .00  .00  .05  .08  .00  .01 
4  1.023  2.592  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .03  .00  .01  .00  .01  .01  .09  .09 
5  1.008  2.611  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .04  .07  .00  .03  .00  .00 
6  1.001  2.621  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .04  .01  .00  .00  .07  .00  .00  .14 
7  1.000  2.622  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .00  .01  .01  .01  .03  .09  .09 
8  1.000  2.622  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .01  .04  .00  .08  .02  .03 
9  .899  2.765  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .00  .00  .14  .00  .00 
10  .712  3.108  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .65  .00  .00  .03  .01  .00  .00  .00  .05  .00  .00  .00 
11  .472  3.816  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .17  .06  .02  .58  .02  .00  .00  .00  .03  .02  .00  .00 
12  .348  4.447  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .86  .16  .02  .00  .00  .00  .01  .01  .00  .00 
13  .209  5.736  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .00  .85  .08  .10  .00  .00  .01  .00  .00  .05  .02  .03 
14  .048  11.913  .00  .00  .00  .00  .84  .07  .01  .01  .06  .07  .08  .07  .09  .07  .09  .10  .06 
15  .017  20.279  .00  .00  .00  .00  .12  .01  .02  .01  .01  .76  .84  .82  .76  .64  .41  .65  .53 
16  .000  143.015  .98  .02  .01  .29  .01  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02 
17  .000  692.783  .02  .98  .99  .69  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00 
Notes: This table displays the multicollinearity diagnostics for Model (3). Eigen Values near 0 and Conditional Index above 15 suggests that CR, CR
2 
and RATdum have high multicollinearity issues.   
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Appendix 6C 
Credit Ratings and Capital Structure 
Distribution of Residuals (Rated and Non-Rated Firms) 
 
Residuals 
Notes: This figure displays the distribution of residuals from Model (3) for the combined 
sample of rated and non-rated firms, indicating the concerns for non-normality in error terms 
 
Appendix 6D 
Credit Ratings and Capital Structure 
Distribution of Residuals (Rated Firms) 
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Notes: This figure displays the distribution of residuals from Model (3) for rated firms’ 
sample, indicating the concerns for non-normality in error terms 
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Appendix 8A 
Credit Ratings and Debt Maturity Structure: Tolerance and VIF 
 
Tolerance  VIF  Tolerance  VIF 
 
Rated and  
Non-rated Firms  Rated Firms 
CR  .004  274.714  .033  30.293 
CR
2  .002  560.640  .034  29.697 
RATdum  .013  75.042     
LOS  .838  1.193  .672  1.488 
QUAL  .992  1.009  .865  1.156 
AMAT  .957  1.044  .720  1.390 
MBR  .920  1.087  .701  1.426 
ETR  .896  1.116  .768  1.301 
TECHdum  .209  4.792  .703  1.422 
INDdum  .108  9.284  .291  3.437 
CSdum  .132  7.559  .179  5.582 
CGdum  .177  5.645  .235  4.264 
HCdum  .292  3.425  .384  2.604 
UTLdum  .478  2.091  .259  3.856 
BMdum  .289  3.466  .355  2.818 
OGdum  .449  2.226  .480  2.083 
Notes:  This  table  displays  the  multicollinearity  diagnostics  (tolerance  and  VIF)  for 
Model (6). The results indicate that CR, CR
2 and RARdum have low tolerance and high 
VIF indicating that these variables have high multicollinearity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6E 
White Heteroskedasticity Test  
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of Book Debt Ratio 
on Credit Ratings and Control Variables 
Panel A: Rated and Non-Rated Firms 
F-statistic  46.09238     Prob. F(16,38863)  0.0000 
Obs*R-squared  724.0607     Prob. Chi-Square(16)  0.0000 
Scaled explained SS  1614.668     Prob. Chi-Square(16)  0.0000 
Panel B: Rated Firms 
F-statistic  11.83531  Prob. F(15,858)  0.0000 
Obs*R-squared  149.8373  Prob. Chi-Square(15)  0.0000 
Scaled explained SS  243.5117  Prob. Chi-Square(15)  0.0000 
Notes: The table displays the results of the White Heteroskedasticity Test for combined sample (Panel 
A) and rated firms’ sample (Panel B) for Model (3) indicating the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
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Appendix 8B 
Debt Maturity Structure: Eigenvalues and Conditional Index 
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1  6.317  1.000  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .01  .01  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00 
2  1.169  2.324  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .08  .01  .00  .03  .00  .01  .00  .01  .08  .00  .01 
3  1.050  2.453  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .03  .02  .00  .04  .01  .00  .00  .07  .06  .00  .01 
4  1.039  2.466  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .07  .00  .01  .00  .01  .03  .02  .02  .04  .00  .05 
5  1.004  2.509  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .21  .00  .00  .00  .02  .00  .02  .00  .08  .00  .04  .03 
6  1.000  2.513  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .03  .01  .00  .00  .04  .00  .17  .00 
7  1.000  2.513  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .00  .01  .01  .02  .02  .01  .26 
8  1.000  2.513  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .00  .09  .00  .05  .00  .03 
9  .987  2.530  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .74  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .02  .01 
10  .912  2.631  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .00  .10  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .16  .00  .01 
11  .747  2.909  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .67  .00  .01  .02  .00  .01  .00  .00  .04  .00  .02 
12  .415  3.903  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .51  .35  .01  .00  .00  .00  .02  .00  .00  .00 
13  .299  4.594  .00  .00  .00  .00  .01  .02  .04  .42  .56  .01  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .00  .00 
14  .043  12.079  .00  .00  .00  .00  .79  .00  .01  .02  .06  .09  .12  .11  .12  .08  .11  .12  .07 
15  .017  19.150  .00  .00  .00  .00  .19  .00  .00  .01  .01  .71  .81  .78  .72  .63  .41  .61  .48 
16  .000  137.579  .94  .02  .01  .27  .01  .00  .00  .00  .00  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02 
17  .000  648.045  .06  .98  .99  .71  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00 
Notes: This table displays the multicollinearity diagnostics for Model (6). Eigen Values near 0 and Conditional Index above 15 suggests that CR, CR
2 
and RATdum have high multicollinearity issues.  
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Appendix 8C 
Debt Maturity Structure: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Dependent, Explanatory and Control Variables (Rated and Non-rated Firms) 
 
D
M
R
 
C
R
 
C
R
2
 
R
A
T
d
u
m
 
L
O
S
 
Q
U
A
L
 
A
M
A
T
 
M
B
R
 
E
T
R
 
T
E
C
H
d
u
m
 
I
N
D
d
u
m
 
C
S
d
u
m
 
C
G
d
u
m
 
H
C
d
u
m
 
U
T
L
d
u
m
 
B
M
d
u
m
 
O
G
d
u
m
 
T
E
L
E
d
u
m
 
DMR  1                                   
CR  -.089
**  1                                 
CR
2  -.092
**  .996
**  1                               
RATdum  .097
**  -.967
**  -.984
**  1                             
LOS  .260
**  -.165
**  -.166
**  .164
**  1                           
QUAL  -.015
*  0.01  0.01  -.007  -.025
**  1                         
AMAT  .073
**  -.004  -.003  .004  -.079
**  -.017
**  1                       
MBR  -.046
**  -.006  -.005  .004  -.135
**  -.005  -.079
**  1                     
ETR  .070
**  -.049
**  -.048
**  .045
**  .296
**  -.086
**  -.050
**  -.073
**  1                   
TECHdum  -.056
**  .050
**  .051
**  -.047
**  -.076
**  0.01  -.088
**  .156
**  -.066
**  1                 
INDdum  -.042
**  .060
**  .060
**  -.061
**  -.009  .007  -.063
**  -.083
**  .059
**  -.237
**  1               
CSdum  .039
**  -.023
**  -.028
**  .033
**  -.058
**  -.001  .106
**  -.004  -.019
**  -.184
**  -.355
**  1             
CGdum  -.082
**  -.015
*  -.017
**  .016
*  .059
**  -.003  -.011  -.084
**  .039
**  -.141
**  -.273
**  -.211
**  1           
HCdum  .016
*  .001  .006  -.011  -.092
**  -.001  -.023
**  .161
**  -.071
**  -.093
**  -.180
**  -.139
**  -.107
**  1         
UTLdum  .103
**  -.107
**  -.104
**  .098
**  .123
**  -.013
*  .055
**  -.056
**  .009  -.060
**  -.116
**  -.090
**  -.069
**  -.046
**  1       
BMdum  .036
**  -.019
**  -.016
*  .011  .068
**  -.006  .027
**  -.043
**  .012  -.095
**  -.184
**  -.142
**  -.109
**  -.072
**  -.047
**  1     
OGdum  .043
**  -.020
**  -.016
*  .012  -.001  -.003  .065
**  -.015
*  0.01  -.064
**  -.124
**  -.096
**  -.074
**  -.049
**  -.031
**  -.050
**  1   
TELEdum  .070
**  -.018
**  -.021
**  .032
**  .104
**  -.005  -.032
**  .022
**  -.007  -.057
**  -.110
**  -.085
**  -.065
**  -.043
**  -.028
**  -.044
**  -.030
**  1 
Notes: Variables are defined as total long-term debt to total assets (DMR) as dependent variable, numerical code 1-5 for credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2), rating dummy (RATdum), log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm 
of sales, quality of the firm (QUAL) is the difference between earnings before interest and taxation (EBITt+1) and  EBITt scaled by share price SPt, assets maturity ratio (AMAT) is the ratio of total property, plant and equipment to total 
annual depreciation, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of assets while and effective tax rate (ETR) is the ratio of total amount of 
tax charged by total taxable income, technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), basic material dummy 
(BMdum), oil and gas dummy (OGdum), telecommunication dummy (TELEdum). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
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Appendix 8D 
Debt Maturity Structure: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Dependent, Explanatory and Control Variables (Rated Firms) 
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DMR  1                                 
CR  .282
**  1                               
CR
2  .265
**  .974
**  1                             
LOS  -.113
**  -.113
**  -.138
**  1                           
QUAL  -.054  .147
**  .158
**  0.05  1                         
AMAT  .103
**  -.132
**  -.102
**  -.154
**  .002  1                       
MBR  -.121
**  -.112
**  -.094
**  -.340
**  .004  -.206
**  1                     
ETR  -.097
**  -.160
**  -.177
**  .089
**  -.300
**  -.011  -.013  1                   
TECHdum  .030  .250
**  .299
**  -.043  .135
**  -.084
*  -.017  -.062  1                 
INDdum  .114
**  .051  .036  -.014  -.044  -.047  -.112
**  .056  -.053  1               
CSdum  0.054  .146
**  .097
**  -.184
**  .056  .038  .143
**  -.015  -.095
**  -.268
**  1             
CGdum  -.141
**  -.026  -.065  .084
*  -.022  -.098
**  .046  .107
**  -.059  -.167
**  -.301
**  1           
HCdum  -.128
**  -.271
**  -.207
**  .114
**  -.012  -.070
*  .339
**  .036  -.029  -.081
*  -.146
**  -.091
**  1         
UTLdum  .092
**  -.148
**  -.131
**  -.032  -.023  .361
**  -.173
**  -.072
*  -.053  -.149
**  -.269
**  -.168
**  -.081
*  1       
BMdum  -.130
**  -.123
**  -.112
**  .109
**  -.014  -.023  -.052  .058  -.041  -.116
**  -.210
**  -.131
**  -.063  -.117
**  1     
OGdum  .010  -.138
**  -.097
**  .068
*  .002  -.073
*  -.071
*  .119
**  -.029  -.082
*  -.148
**  -.092
**  -.045  -.083
*  -.064  1   
TELEdum  0.05  .226
**  .248
**  .039  -.023  -.166
**  -.100
**  -.258
**  -.037  -.105
**  -.189
**  -.118
**  -.057  -.105
**  -.082
*  -.058  1 
Notes: Variables are defined as total long-term debt to total assets (DMR) as dependent variable, numerical code 1-5 for credit rating (CR), credit rating square (CR
2), log of sales (LOS) refers to natural logarithm of sales, 
quality of the firm (QUAL) is the difference between earnings before interest and taxation (EBITt+1) and  EBITt scaled by share price SPt, assets maturity ratio (AMAT) is the ratio of total property, plant and equipment to total 
annual depreciation, market to book ratio (MBR) is the book value of the assets minus the book value of the equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of assets while and effective tax rate (ETR) is the ratio of total 
amount of tax charged by total taxable income, technology dummy (TECHdum), industrial dummy (INDdum), consumer services dummy (CSdum), consumer goods dummy (CGdum), heath care dummy (HCdum), utility dummy (UTLdum), 
basic material dummy (BMdum), oil and gas dummy (OGdum) telecommunication dummy (TELEdum). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
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 Appendix 8E 
Credit ratings and Debt Maturity Structure 
Distribution of Residuals (Rated and Non-Rated Firms) 
 
 
  
 
 
Appendix 8F 
Credit ratings and Debt Maturity Structure 
Distribution of Residuals (Rated Firms) 
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sample  of  rated  and  non-rated  firms,  indicating  the  concerns  for  non-normality  in  the 
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Appendix 8G 
White Heteroskedasticity Test  
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Regression of  Debt Maturity Ratio 
on Credit Ratings and Control Variables 
Panel A: Rated and Non-Rated Firms 
F-statistic  100.9757      Prob. F(16,38863)  0.0000 
Obs*R-squared  1514.616      Prob. Chi-Square(16)  0.0000 
Scaled explained SS  744.1988      Prob. Chi-Square(16)  0.0000 
Panel B: Rated Firms 
F-statistic  2.364984      Prob. F(15,555)  0.0026 
Obs*R-squared  34.30475      Prob. Chi-Square(15)  0.0031 
Scaled explained SS  104.308      Prob. Chi-Square(15)  0.0000 
Notes: The table displays the results of the White Heteroskedasticity Test for combined sample (Panel 
A) and rated firms’ sample (Panel B) for Model (6) and indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
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